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Abstract
In this comparative study a modified industrial relations 
system concept, combining both environmental, perceptional 
and operational influences on the system of industrial relations, 
is used to test the hypothesis that the technical and market 
contexts of industrial relations (’constants') produce simil­
arities, whilst the power context (’variables') produces 
differences in industrial relations rules across national 
systems. The focus of the study are the rules of conflict 
resolution at plant level.
A combination of methodologies was used in the empirical study 
including literature surveys, expert interviews and a question­
naire survey of plant-level actors. The findings show consid­
erable differences in both the type of conflicts arising and 
resolution processes in West German and British plants. In 
West German plants, conflicts took the form of collective pro­
cedural rights initiated by the works council in response to 
management decisions and were resolved by a process described 
as 'cooperative constitutionalism'. In Britain, conflicts take 
the form of collective procedural and substantive interests 
initiated by employees or their representatives in active pur­
suit of their own interests as well as in response to manage­
ment decisions and are generally resolved by a collective 
bargaining process.
The findings point to a complex interaction between constants 
and variables in their influence on industrial relations rules. 
Whilst constants have greater explanatory power in the British 
system of conflict resolution at plant level, variables in the 
form of the state and the collective bargaining parties have 
influenced the West German system to a significant extent.
The hypothesis of a 'logic of industrialism' across industrial 
societies does not have sufficient explanatory power in view 
of the considerable differences outlined in the study. The 
modified industrial relations system concept used in the study 
is seen as a useful theoretical tool for generating hypotheses 
on industrial relations phenomena, which can be tested empirically.
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1CHAPTER ONE: Theoretical Framework for the Study
of Conflict and Conflict Resolution 
at Plant Level
Introduction
There has been considerable debate about the definition of 
the field of industrial relations in recent years. This 
forms part of the process of theoretically establishing 
'industrial relations' as a field of study in its own right, 
analytically distinct from the study of economics, politics, pisociology, organisations and other areas of study. Behrend's
concern about the concentration on one aspect of industrial
relations so that:
'we get at least as many different approaches 
and emphases as there are disciplines in this 
field 1 ,
has led to a debate about how to integrate the many differing
contributions to knowledge of how and why management —
employee(s) relations develop as they do in Western industrial
societies. This chapter will seek to provide a summary of
research in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany,
which is thought to contribute to a greater understanding of
conflict arising in the workplace in the two countries and
the process by which conflict is resolved. The framework for
both the analysis of existing literature on this subject area,
and the empirical study of conflict and conflict resolution
in the Federal Republic, is a modified and expanded version3of J.T. Dunlop's 'Industrial Relations Systems', which is out­
lined below.
The relative German and British research contributions will 
not be considered separately but will be incorporated into 
the general framework. Mention must, however, be made of the
different emphases of the literature in each country as these 
reflect the key characteristics of the respective system of 
industrial relations and the major concerns of practitioners 
and researchers.
* Footnotes in Volume Two p. 1.
2In the Federal Republic, much work has focused on the
legislative framework of industrial relations which, in
comparison to Britain, is extensive. Early works in the
1950s and 1960s^ concentrated on the codetermination laws,
especially the contrast between the legal norms and actual
practice at company level in the iron, steel and coal
industries. The two waves of unofficial strikes in 1969
and 1973 prompted research into the problems of a trade union 5movement, which is highly centralized and pursues cooperative
policies vis— a*—vis the economic policies of the government.
There have also been studies bobh of the unofficial and
6official strike movements since 1969. Many works have been 
critical of the legalized system of industrial relations, 
both at the level of trade union - employer associations and 
in the workplace itself, and, in the early part of the 1970s 
at least, emphasis was placed on the development of a de­
centralized, conflictual approach to industrial relations 
based on the workplace shop-steward system and a new conscious­
ness of class conflict among the trade union members. Since 
the mid-seventies, attention has shifted to the effects of 
the economic recession on trade union bargaining power and 
relations in the workplace. The increasing rationalisation 
of work processes both in the factory and the office has led 
to redundancies, dequalification of skilled employees and a 
growing concern about its impact on working conditions generally. 
Projects undertaken as part of the 'Humanisation of the work­
place' programme show the low level of influence exercised 
by representatives of the workforce at workplace level to 
improve working conditions. These findings may reinforce the 
trend towards the greater regulation of workplace issues by 
the trade unions at regional and national levels as was the 
case with the second basic wage agreement (Lohnrahmentarif-gvertrag 2), which dealt with questions of work organisation, gIn the 1980s, the focus of research seems to be shifting1to 
national level as the trade unions show renewed interest in 
the extension of company-level codetermination, unemployment 
figures continue to rise and the social welfare system comes 
increasingly under attack. The present chapter will deal
3only with works which have some theoretical basis; other 
works will be covered in the chapters dealing with the 
national and workplace systems of industrial relations. As 
will be seen, the key areas of emphasis in the German studies 
include the role of the state and the legal system in industrial 
relations, national trade union organisation and policies, and 
some study of the workplace, particularly immediately after 
the two main unofficial strike waves and during works council 
elections, as a basis for a radical critique of existing co­
operative trade union policies. In general, the workplace 
level of industrial relations has not been considered of major 
research interest except as an example of the effect of 
centralized state and trade union policies in industrial 
relations and in legal studies of workplace legislation.
Workplace industrial relations has, on the other hand, been 
a major research interest in Britain since the late 1960s.
Prior to this, the emphasis had been placed on national level 
trade union organisation against the background of criticism 
about undemocratic trade union practices. Another key area 
was organisational sociology, with special attention given 
to the effect of technology on management organisation and 
general characteristics of organisation structure. During 
the 1960s, public attention shifted to the evidence of a lack 
of central trade union control over their membership reflected 
in increased unofficial strike figures and wage drift at work­
place level, which endangered the implementation of government 
pay policies. The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers Associations Report, published in 1968, prompted a 
major debate on the need for industrial relations reform in 
Britain. Works debated the respective merits of voluntary and 
statutory reforms, especially in the wake of the failure of 
the Industrial Relations Act in 1971 to initiate fundamental 
reform in the industrial relations system. Major works adopted 
an 'institutionalist' approach to industrial relations, 
focussing on the need for the reform of the institutions of 
collective bargaining at industry, company and workplace levels. 
More recently, the premises of pluralism, which was the
foundation of 'institutionalist' thinking, has been subject 
to a radical critique and a renewed concern about the in­
equality embodied in the social structure of society in 
Britain. The 'social action approach' to the study of 
industrial relations has stressed the need to look at the 
orientations of the actors in industrial relations and the 
meanings they give to their institutions and procedures.
Recent concerns have been the effects of technological changes 
on trade union organisation and structures, management roles 
in industrial relations and industrial democracy or 
participation at work. In contrast to the key subject areas 
of German research, attention in Britain has focused more 
consistently on the workplace as the major level of industrial 
relations activity. The impact of the recession on the work­
place, however, and on manufacturing industry in particular, 
is probably contributing to a shift of research emphasis to 
national level concerns including national economic policies, 
unemployment, national level trade union policies and action 
and the extension of the role of the state in industrial 
relations by way of increased labour legislation.
1) The Industrial Relations System - J.T. Dunlop's Version^
Dunlop's model for industrial relations systems was published 
in 1958 and offered a tentative theoretical framework for the 
large amount of data thus far collected on industrial relations 
themes. His framework was derived from earlier work on the 
definition of social systems by Pareto, and Talcott Parsons's^ 
work on the economic system.
Dunlop adapted Parsons's model to provide a general theory
of industrial relations, which was multidisciplinary but had
a focal point in the rules of employment relations, which were
seen as the goal of the industrial relations system. The key
12elements of Dunlop's model were:- the actors - management, 
workers and government agencies; the context in which the
5actors operate, comprising the technical, market (budgetary)
and power contexts; the ideology of the industrial relations
system, viewed as the commonly held ideas and beliefs of the
actors which bind the system together; and the idea of the
industrial relations system as an autonomous subsystem of
industrial society, which entailed a functional differentiation
of the industrial relations system according to the four sub-
13systems developed in Parsons's work.
The concept of 'industrial relations systems' was deliberately
variable in scope
'.. it may be used to characterize an immediate 
workplace, an enterprise, a sector, or a 
country as a whole. '
Dunlop argued its usefulness in analyses of the internal structures
and characteristics of an industrial relations system; of the
relations between the industrial relations system and other
subsystems such as the economy; and of the relations between
15the industrial relations system and the total society.
In his elaboration of the contexts of the industrial relations 
system, Dunlop stressed their distinction was for analytical 
purposes only as in practice all three were interdependent.
He also emphasized that he did not see them as having a 
deterministic effect on the actors.
The technical context was viewed as very significant by Dunlop,
who criticized the neglect of it by the Human Relations School
in the U.S.A.^ He emphasized seven key characteristics of
the technical context. Four were related to the workplace:-
fixed or variable workplace, the relation between the workplace
and residence of the workforce, a stable or variable workforce
18and work operations, the size of the work group. A further 
three were related to the work operations themselves:- job 
content, the locus of attention of the actors in the workplace 
(i.e. operations paced by the workers or machine-paced,
19customer-centred) and the hours of operation of the workplace.
The technical context was seen to be 'to a degree unique,
6defined by a wide variety of particular facets' and Dunlop
conceded that there were differences in organisations where
the actors faced similar technical contexts. His emphasis was,
however, on the determinist effects of technologys-
'many features of an organizational configuration 
are narrowly constrained by the particular 
technical context'll
20
'The technical context is decisive both to the 
substantive rules established for the workplace 
in the industrial relations system and to the 
organizational configuration and the interaction 
of the actors'22
The market context comprised both the product market and the
labour market. The important features of the product market
were the size of the total market, competitive constraints,
expansion or contraction of the market, market homogeneity
and seasonal fluctuations. Dunlop looked at the effect of those
features on the degree of uniformity and centralization of
industrial relations rules, the size of the enterprise and
the consequent effect of size on the rules and the interactions
of the actors, the effect on the substance of rules, on
compensation rules such as wages and on the timing of the
revision of rules. A further important effect was the influence
of the product market on the scope of the industrial relations
system itself. Dunlop argued that management usually choose
which industrial relations system they belong to on the basis
of 'enterprises or workplaces subject to the same or similar
23product-market competition'. In his assessment of the 
importance of the labour market, Dunlop included the particular 
characteristics of the labour force (racial, national, cultural, 
religious, geographical affiliation, social community), the 
effect of labour market stringencies on wage rates, and the 
ratio of labour costs to total costs.
With changes in the technical and market contexts, Dunlop 
foresaw changes to the industrial relations system since work­
places were not 'neatly'divided or assigned into a small group
24of permanent industrial relations systems'. Though manage­
ment may choose to define their industrial relations system as 
those firms facing similar product market competition, labour
7may have quite different preferences, which can change with 
changes to the context of the system.
Finally, the power context was described as being 'the locus
2 5and distribution of power in the larger society,1 and its 
main impact on the industrial relations system was on the 
status of the actors, i.e. 'the prescribed functions of that
26actor and the relations with other actors in the same system'.
In his later work on political systems and the industrial
27relations system, Dunlop argued that for the industrial
relations system, the power context is given and is not to be
explained. The political system sets up the main players in
the industrial relations game and defines the major rules of
play, whilst:
'Industrial relations provide the results 
of the play in a given technological and 
economic environment and at a given stage of 
economic d e v e l o p m e n t 28
Those rules considered to be more dependent on national policy 
such as the form of representation of the workforce and dispute 
settlement machinery were seen as less likely to be transferable 
from one national industrial relations system to another unless 
the actual national systems showed convergence and thus provided 
the necessary basis of consistency between the larger society 
and the industrial relations system, necessary for the con­
tinuity of both. Elements of the industrial relations system 
related to the technical and market contexts were most trans­
ferable. The status of the actors and their relations with each 
other could be imposed from outside the industrial relations 
system by a political process, or could develop from within 
the industrial relations system and be confirmed by community 
recognition.
Thus far, the industrial relations system is viewed as a
structural cross section at one point in time. Dunlop stressed
the importance of an 'historical perspective and an appreciation
29of change through time' in order to more fully understand the
operatiOnof industrial relations systems, and outlined five
maior factors which need to be considered in the study of growth
30and development of industrial relations systems. The first 
is the change in technical and market contexts with economic
development. This is expected to influence the shape of the
whole industrial relations system:
'a significant change in one facet of the 
context or the ideology may be expected to 
displace an old equilibrium (in the com­
parative statics sense) and to create new 31 
positions within the system and new rules.'
The second factor is the historical period of formation of
the industrial relations system:
'The major characteristics of a national 
industrial relations system appear to be 
established at a relatively early stage in the 
industrial development of a country, and in the 
absence of a violent revolution in the larger 
community, a national industrial relations 
system appears to retain those characteristics 
despite subsequent evolution'.32
The third factor is the sequence of national, political and
industrial revolutions. The fourth, the process of economic
development. The fifth, the characteristics and objectives
of the elite directing the industrialization process. Dunlop
differentiated dynastic-feudal, middle-class and revolutionary-
intellectual elites and studied the effects of their respective
ideologies on the relations between management and workers,
the functions of worker organisations,the structure of the
labour movement, attitudes to industrial conflict, mechanisms
for dispute resolution, the scope of decision-making in the
33industrial relations system and its ideology.
2 ) Critiques of Dunlop's Model of Industrial Relations Systems
The basis of the critiques of Dunlop's model as outlined above 
is his emphasis on the structures and environment of the 
industrial relations system at the expense of the processes 
whereby the rules of the system are generated. This omission 
has left him open to the charge of structural determinism, 
which ignores the role of the actors' own goals, values, 
ideologies in the establishment of rules to regulate the system. 
Further, the assumptions behind Parsons's use of the systems
9model - that conflict is inherent in society but the
systems model is an aid to explaining how order is
3 A*attained nonetheless - have been continued in Dunlop's
model. The emphasis on the explanation of order means a
neglect of the factors promoting disorder, conflict and
instability in society and in the industrial relations
system in particular. Thus Hyman's comment that:-
'If it is part of the definition of 
an industrial relations system that it 
contains built-in tendencies towards 
equilibrium, and that radical conflict 
is excluded from the actors' ideologies, 
then it cannot be assumed that industrial 
relations in the real world constitute a 
system at all.'35
If the model of industrial relations systems is to be used 
in the analysis of the conflicts between employers and 
employees as well as the regulation of these conflicts, 
there will need to be modifications to the basic concept as 
outlined by Dunlop. Recent analyses of the systems model 
provide a basis from which these modifications can be under­
taken: -
I) Processes in the Industrial Relations System
Several commentators have pointed out the problem of explain­
ing the output from the industrial relations system solely in
3 6terms of the environment of the system. Singh has outlined
a model to incorporate both the structures of industrial
37relations and the processes whereby rules are made:-
Environment— > Actors ——— ^Processes— — -> Output™^A /N
* From the industrial relations system to other systems and 
subsystems.
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Craig has suggested the following mechanisms in the industrial
3 8relations system for converting inputs into outputs:-
day to day interpersonal relations, the structure of
negotiation units, collective bargaining, grievance procedures,
continuous works committees, conciliation, inquiry commissions,
39arbitration, strikes. Blain and Gennard base their 
categorisation of processes on a mixture of the Webb's schema/Iand that developed by Flanders:- individual bargaining, 
collective bargaining, unilateral action, tripartite regulat­
ion, state regulation, social regulation via custom and 
practice, open warfare.
This solution to the problem of processes in the industrial 
relations system is seen as inadequate by other analysts, 
because it still neglects important behavioural variables and 
the importance of the actors1 own goals and perceptions of 
their environment in the rule-making processes.
II) Meaning, Goals and Values in the Industrial Relations System
Blain used Dunlop's model in his study of the reasons for
major strikes among airline pilots after thirty years of
42industrial peace. His work highlights the key role of the
change in pilots' attitudes to industrial conflict due to
changes in independent environmental variables:- status of
pilots, increasing technological nature of their work, the
capital-intensive character of the operations of the airlines.
Blain recommended the inclusion of a personality variable into
the industrial relations system to take into account the role
of individual personalities and how the goals of the actors
are influenced by environmental changes. His study together
with Gennard^ saw the role of personality as follows
'Personality influences rules through its 
effect on the processes by which they are 
derived.'^
The personality variable is viewed as having a similar status 
in the industrial relations system as the rules, actors,
11
technical, market and power contexts and ideology of the 
45actors.
There are various approaches to the relative importance of
structural and behavioural variables in the industrial
relations system. As we have seen, Dunlop omitted behavioural
variables from his model. The action frame of reference,
which will be considered in greater detail in a later section
of this chapter, tends to ignore the structures and begin the
analysis with the actors’ definitions of their situationand
goes on to explain social behaviour on the basis of their 
46definitions.
47Hyman has pointed to the danger of accepting the actors' 
definitions as the basis of social action since this may lead 
to the neglect of structural factors of which the actors them­
selves are unaware. He thus argues the need for a 'structured
48dialectic of social structure and social consciousness^
which assumes that although men's consciousness has certain
independence from structural factors and can influence the
development of these factors
'Yet consciousness is not wholly autonomous. 
Definitions of reality are themselves 
socially generated and sustained and the ability 
of men to achieve their goals is constrained by 
the objective characteristics of their situation.'
This approach is reflected in works on the industrial relations
5 0systems. Craig's work distinguishes 'within-puts' (goals, 
values and power of the actors) and the 'conditioning input' 
from the other social systems (ecological, economic, political, 
legal, social or cultural). He views the conditioning input 
as imposing
'... a range within which the within-puts and 
the outputs will fall. Specification of the 
outputs within that range, however, is 
determined by the goals, values and power of the 
actors in the system. This suggests that the outputs 
are not deterministic but rather that the actors 
do have some degree of control over the inputs ^  
and outputs of' the industrial relations system.1
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The goals, values and perceptions of the actors are usually- 
represented diagramatically as intervening variables between
the environment and the processes of converting inputs into
-  52 outputs.
IIP Conflict and Change in the Industrial Relations System
Dunlop's emphasis on the control of conflict and on ideology
as a unifying factor in the industrial relations system has
been criticized by Hyman. He argues that conflict and change
53need to be incorporated into the.outputs of the system.
The extent to which the beliefs and values of the actors
54converge or diverge is also problematic.
Wood differentiates between the differing philosophies and
values of the actors and the outcome of this which may provide
integrative norms or a conflict of ideologies in the industrial
55relations system. Other works emphasize the temporal 
limitations of stability in the industrial relations system
56in the face of changes in relative power and issues at stake.
Dunlop's view of the power context as external to the
industrial relations system has also been subject to modificat- 
57ions. Wood argues that power is also internal to the
5 8industrial relations system whilst Walker shows how power 
is not only derived from environmental factors but the values 
and capacities of the actors within the system itself.
59Blain and Gennard have sought to reflect the reality of 
change in industrial relations systems by comparing a system 
at different points in time. Both Walker*^ and Reynaud^ 
emphasize the importance of shifting power relations between 
the actors in generating change in the system.
Although Dunlop did foresee the possibility of change in the 
system as contextual changes affected the power position of
6 2the actors and thus the 'rules emerging from their interaction,
13
his concepts of power and ideology need to be modified to 
include the fact of conflict and instability as well as 
conflict regulation and stability at all levels of the system.
TV) The Output of the Industrial Relations System
The controversy about Dunlop’s concentration on rules as the
output of the system will be considered in depth in the next
chapter, which covers actual procedures for resolving conflict
in the workplace. Much of the debate has focused on the
definition of 'rules' and whether Dunlop's model only provided
for rules which arose from formal negotiation between worker
and employer organisations and ignored 'rules' generated by
the interaction of workgroups in the workplace and lower level
management representatives. The need to include the lack of
agreement and overt conflict as possible outputs of the
industrial relations system is related to the earlier discussion
on conflict and stability, which need to be seen 'as problematic'
and 'determined by reference to the empirical reality of the
6 3system under study.T
V) The Uses of the Industrial Relations System Model
64Gill and Golding view the deficiences of the model as serious
enough to reject its usefulness as a theoretical framework. It
is seen as a useful 'filing system' to identify and analyse
variables, but the value-laden and ideological assumptions
of the industrial relations system mean it has limited use as
a predictive model and needs to be supplemented with other
65models including the action approach. Hill and Thurley argue 
that the concept of an industrial relations system encourages 
description not explanation, and is useful only as a classify­
ing system not a theoretical model. Their own approach 
emphasizes industrial relations as an element in the wider 
social relations of production and the need to look at social 
structure and the way social forces have moulded industrial
14
relations systems as a basis for comparative industrial
6 6relations. Hyman agrees with this argument and defines
the study of industrial relations as:-
' The study of processes of control over 
work relations; and among these processes, 
those involving collective worker organisat­
ion and action are of particular concern.'67
Fatchett and Whittingham point to the neglect of socio­
economic data, action approaches, conflict and power variables
68in Dunlop's model and cite the Donovan Commission's Report 
as an example of the negative influence of systems models 
on industrial relations in the U.K. The Report's neglect of 
the impact of social and economic changes on the actor's 
goals is said to have led to the wrong diagnosis of Britain's 
industrial relations' ills and the wrong remedy for a cure: 
that is, the proposal for new procedures to deal with work­
place issues rather than an attack on the inequality embodied 
in the social structures of society. Bains and Clegg^ also 
view the industrial relations system model chiefly as 'a 
heuristic device for structuring data'. Although they 
recommend a broadening of the model to include behavioural 
variables. The study of industrial relations covers, in their 
view:-
all aspects of job regulation and the 
making and administering of the rules which 
regulate employment relationships... 
regardless of whether these are seen as being yQ 
formal or informal, structured or unstructured.'
This definition accords closely with Dunlop's concept of the 
industrial relations system as a rule-making body.
71Blain and Gennard list the uses of the systems approach as:- 
a checklist of factors to consider, capable of generating 
hypotheses of relations between variables, capable of the 
analysis of industrial relations at different levels and of 
specific issues, capable of explaining change and with some 
predictive value. Wood similarly views the industrial relations 
system as a theoretical not just a descriptive model, although 
modifications are necessary.^
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The assumptions behind the use of an industrial relations 
system model in this thesis and further modifications to the 
model to facilitate its practical application to the analysis 
of different processes of conflict resolution at workplace 
level in two national industrial relations systems will be 
outlined at the end of the present chapter.
Literature Survey of Structural and Social Action
Approaches to the Study of Conflict and Conflict
Resolution in the Industrial Relations System
The survey incorporates studies with a theoretical rather than 
just a descriptive approach to the subject of conflict and con­
flict resolution. The section headings reflect the differing 
preoccupations with either social and industry structures 
thought to promote conflict and influence its resolution or 
the actors themselves, emphasizing their values, goals, 
decisions which influence conflict levels and issues as well as 
conflict resolution. A further subdivision of structural 
approaches reflects the different levels of structural influences 
national, industry, workplace.
The logic behind these different approaches varies:- the 
structural approach tends towards a convergency view of industrial 
relations systems as the structures of industrial societies 
follow a natural law of development - the logic of industrialism - 
and thus influence conflict and conflict resolution in similar 
ways in different societies. The social action approach under­
lines the differences between industrial relations systems as 
the responses of the actors to their environment vary due to 
differing values, perceptions, goals.
The general models covered in section 3 include both structures 
and actors although the tendency is to view structures as 
independent influences which shape the perceptions and values
16
of the actors which are thus dependent factors, i.e. actors 
are in effect 'puppets' of their environment.
I) Structural Approaches to the Study of Conflict and Conflict 
Resolution in the Industrial Relations System
i) National System Level
A) The Material Infrastructure of Society
Extreme versions of a structural approach to industrial conflict
have a tendency to view actors as mere agents of structural
determinants, which condition their behaviour, values and 
73decisions. The majority of structural studies accord the 
actors varying degrees of 'choice' in their issponse to 
structural exigencies but since the studies emphasise external 
constraints to human action, the actors' own values and 
orientations are omitted in the analysis. Thus Marx and Engels 
trace social relations, including conflict, to the ownership 
of the means of production which leads to the dominance of 
capital owners and the exploitation of labour. From this 
derives the concept of the inevitable conflict of interests 
between the owners of the means of production and those 
dependent on them for their livelihood.
74Hyman argues that Marx provided for an area of choice in the
structures of social relationships. In practice this has been
neglected in Marxist studies in favour of an emphasis on the
75dominant influence of the material structure of society on 
all aspects of social relations. Marxist studies of industrial 
behaviour have provided a useful counterbalance to studies 
positing the end of industrial conflict during the immediate 
postwar years of relative economic stability for they emphasize 
a basic divergence of interests, which economic prosperity
only conceals by providing scope for both capital and labour
76 77to achieve their goals by bargaining. Fox and Goldthorpe
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have criticized liberal pluralist analyses of industrial 
relations in Britain for ignoring the basic disparity of 
power between capital and labour interests and positing a 
false consensus between the two. Both writers call for a 
radical restructuring of the economic and social basis of
7 8society for real consensus based on social justice to emerge.
The view that conflict and conflict resolution problems are
related to unequal economic class structures in society^ is
questioned by Dahrendorf in his study of different types of 
8 0class. Even where private ownership of the means of
production has been removed, authority structures continue
81to shape social relations in industry and provide the
8 2'ultimate source of class antagonism in industry’ in his view.
Various aspects of the economic system are included in studies
8 3of industrial relations issues. Ingham, in his study of 
Great Britain and Scandinavia, relates the institutions of 
industrial relations to the material infrastructure of society 
when they first originated. Thus low concentration, complex 
industrial structure and product differentiation and special­
isation in Britain promoted a decentralised, fragmented, custom 
based system of bargaining on industrial relations issues.
The opposite was the case in Sweden. In his view, the British 
system does not provide a secure basis for the regulation of 
conflict in a period of major economic and technological change 
such as the system has been facing since the early seventies.
He thus calls for institutional changes towards more 
comprehensive, uniform regulation of issues at national level.
Other studies relate trade union membership, patterns of
industrial conflict, state industrial relations policies to
84the economic cycle. German studies assess the importance 
of a sustained period of economic growth for centralised 
cooperative trade union policies.^ Lupton^ has considered
18
the impact of the trade cycle of particular industries on 
the extent of workgroup regulation of production output.
Studies of the significance of the material infrastructure 
of society show how the balance of power in the workplace, 
conflicts and conflict resolution need to be seen in relation 
to the wider social and economic structures of power. The 
material infrastructure of society at the onset of the 
industrial revolution had an important influence on the 
emerging system of industrial relations and continues to 
influence its operation today by providing an economic and 
power context within which the actors interact to achieve 
their goals.
B) The Role of the State in Industrial Relations
In his study of the strategy of dominant interest groups,
87Crouch has emphasized the role of state in industrial 
relations - the extent to which it is coercive, active or 
passive. In the British context the role of the state has 
developed from a passive policy in the 1950s and 1960s, where 
the interest groups had greatscope in regulating their relation­
ships by free collective bargaining - the so-called voluntarist 
system - towards increasing involvement in aspects of 
industrial relations either by way of agreements with the trade 
unions on industrial relations issues ('bargained corporatism') 
under a Labour government or anti-trade union legislation and 
monetarist policies under the present Conservative government.
Various explanations are offered for the extraordinary passive
8 8role of the state until the mid-sixties. Kahn-Freund related 
it to the development of the trade unions and employers' 
associations outside the law and their development of norms 
and sanctions by industrial pressure not legislation. More 
recent studies underline the economic and political conditions 
which rendered state involvement unnecessary until the 1960s 
when the low level of economic growth and high rate of
19
inflation forced greater government intervention. The 
increased intervention has taken various forms including 
corporatist solutions such as incomes policies and the Social 
Contract and direct legal intervention^ as in the case of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1971, Employment Protection 
and other Acts passed by the Labour government and the most 
recent Employment Acts designed to reduce trade union 
immunities from civil action in the courts and influence 
internal trade union government.
Most commentators foresee an increasing role for the state
in the economy and the possibility of greater state control
over industrial relations issues, particularly wages and
industrial conflicts, unless the trade unions recognise the
legitimacy of the state's role in the economy and control
91the sectionalism within their own ranks. This was indeed
the argument of pro-trade union researchers in industrial
relations during the 1960s. Both Flanders and Kahn-Freund
foresaw increasing state intervention in industrial relations
unless the two sides of industry responded positively to the
changed economic context and were able to bring the wage
drift and high conflict levels under control thus obviating
92the need for state intervention.
93England and Weekes argue that the combination of legal
regulation and the recession have changed the conditions which
originally facilitated collective laissez-faire or voluntarism
in industrial relations in Britain. The trade unions, however,
are not expected to radically alter their character, which
has developed over 200 years, in the near future. Studies of
the effect of government legislation on the conduct of
industrial relations, particularly at plant level, are limited.
Daniel and Stilgoe's study of the effects of the Employment
Protection Act commented on 'how modest had been the
influence of an apparently major package of employment legis-
94lation on firms surveyed. The widest effects were felt in
95small companies with a l'ow level of trade union organisation.
On strikes Edwards concludes that the practice of resolving
89
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disputes at the point of production is firmly embedded in
British industrial relations and would require a major up-
9 6heaval to alter this pattern. On workplace bargaining,
Sisson and Brown point to the continuation of the basic 
collective bargaining model based not on joint regulation 
but each side seeking to impose its views on the other.^ 
Collective labour law on bargaining rights has been piecemeal
and in keeping with the voluntary model of industrial
14-* 98relations.
The role of the state is increasing in Britain but, as Palmer 
99points out, there is no agreement on how its role should 
evolve. Corporatist solutions have been rejected by the 
present government in favour of economic liberalism and 
legislation to restrict trade union inf luence.
In West Germany, by contrast, the state has had a dominant
role in the shaping of the industrial relations system. The
extent of the legalisation of industrial relations has led
some commentators to argue that there is no concept of
industrial relations as an autonomous sphere of action in the 
101FRG. Dahrendorf has argued that this non-recognition of
the autonomy of the industrial relations parties has led to 
attempts by the state to eliminate industrial conflict per se 
by altering the structure of firms in the codetermination
i -14-- 102legislation.
Various reasons have been suggested for the preference for
legislation rather than collective action on industrial
103relations. Ramm emphasizes the importance of the continuat­
ion of the authoritarian state ('Obrigkeitsstaat') in Germany, 
intervening to protect the common interest and stave off 
social revolution. U n t e r s e h e r a l s o  stresses the tradition 
of social conservatism and state intervention in Germany in 
contrast to the tradition of non-intervention in Britain. The 
high level of industrial conflict in Germany in the late 
nineteenth century is also said to have promoted the establish­
ment of legal definitions of illegal and legal industrial action,
21
legally binding collective agreements and peace obligations
- a • 1Q5on trade unions.
The reasons behind the trade unions' acceptance of the
state's dominant role in industrial relations prior to the
second world war have been related to their development from
the political parties in Germany, their weak position
especially at workplace level, and the dominance of the
employers, especially in heavy industry. This is said to have
caused the trade unions to rely on state help at national 
106level. Bahl traces the debate in the trade union movement
in the early twentieth century on trade union autonomy, show­
ing how some trade unionists welcomed reliance on the state 
(Sinzheimer) and others rejected it (Heimann). The former 
won the day and the trade unions concentrated their strategies 
on the representation of their interests via parliament to 
attain their goal of economic democracy at all levels of 
society (Naphtali). The organisational strength of the trade 
unions was not built upon and this reinforced the trend to­
wards reliance on the state. What Bahl describes as the 
'conservative understanding of the state's role in society' 
('das konservative Staatsverstdndnis der Gewerkschaften'), 
whereby the trade unions rely on social change via state action 
instead of by their own actions, has continued into the present 
day programmes of the trade unions. Many works have criticized 
trade union reliance on legislations since 1945, as this is said 
to have led to the incorporation of the trade unions into the 
present economic and social system, and the neglect of the 
organisational strength necessary to enforce reforms at
107pa rliamentary level and at regional and workplace levels.
There have been many studies of corporatism in West Germany in 
light of the concerted action of the state, trade unions and 
employers, which ceased to operate in the late seventies 
formally, although trade unions and employers continue to base 
their negotiations on economic trends forecast by the govern­
ment as shown in studies of the annual wage bargaining rounds.
108Lehmbruch has considered the development of liberal
22
corporatism in West Germany as the response to negative
economic developments and the inability of the state to control
them. His 'liberal corporatism1 is akin to Crouch's 'bargained
corporatism', being based on voluntary cooperation of the
109parties concerned. Alemann has pointed out what he sees 
as the convergence of the British and German systems towards 
a system of pluralist corporatism, although they have trodden 
different paths to reach it due to different historical, 
economic and political environments.
Traditional trade union attitudes towards the state facilitated 
their cooperation in the concerted action, especially when the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) came to take over government in 
1969. An additional factor in the explanation o£ trade union 
reliance on and cooperation with the state since 1945 has been 
their reorganisation on the lines of industrial trade unions. 
Whereas the previously fragmented structure of the movement 
was said to lead to reliance on the state in the face of great 
opposition from the employers to any trade union role, the 
present industrial trade union structure with its centralized 
decision-making is said to lead to cooperation with the state
110due to the macro-economic impact of any trade union policies. 
Streeck argues that there is an inevitable link between 
industrial trade unions and cooperation with the state in its 
policies for economic stability. The centralization of the 
trade union structure to ensure solidarity can also be used 
for external compromises. He further argues that state legis­
lation has supported the trade unions in their resolution of 
organisational problems, by creating works councils at work­
place level, which carry out important functions for industrial 
trade unions yet do not compete with the trade unions because 
they have no role in wage bargaining and are depoliticized so 
they cannot endanger the solidarity of the unions. Streeck 
emphasizes the importance of state support for trade unions 
in resolving organisational problems by comparing the German
railway union with the fragmented union structure in Britain. 111
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Trade union cooperation with the state in West Germany has 
not been problem-free as rank and file members have challenged 
its effects on basic wage rates both during periods of economic 
expansion in the late 1960s and the onset of recession with 
rising inflation in the early 1970s.
The role of the state in industrial relations thus has an
important influence on the type of system which emerges and
its ongoing operation. Later sections will consider the impact
112of the industrialising elite groups on the emergent industrial 
relations system in Britain and West Germany and the factors 
which constrain and facilitate an increasing state involvement 
in industrial relations today. The tradition of legalisation 
of industrial relations and trade union cooperation with state 
policies in the FRG will be compared with the voluntarist 
tradition in Britain, which has limited the success of corpor-
atist policies as well as legal regulation of industrial
14-* * 113relations issues.
C) National Value Systems
The significance of national value or cultural systems forms
part of the debate on the convergency or divergency of
industrial societies. Organisational theorists have focused
on what Lammers and Hickson describe as diachronic, mono-
societal and monoinstitutional studies which emphasize
structural aspects and tend to conclude that organisations are
1X4all 'brothers under the skin.' On a wider level, Kerr and
Dunlop have underlined the dominant influence of technological
and market factors in industrial societies, which promote
similar structures and processes in industrial relations in
115what is termed the 'logic of industrialism.'
Recently studies have emerged which question the logic of 
industrialism with reference to organisation of industry and 
industrial relations. Child and Kieser have developed a culture- 
specific' theory arguing that:-
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’even if organisations located within different 
societies do face similar contingencies and 
adopt similar models of formal structure, deep- 
rooted cultural forces will still reassert 
themselves in the way people actually behave and 
relate to each other. Structure will remain 
purely formal if it is not consonant with 
culturally derived e x p e c t a t i o n s 116
Whilst Child and Kieser emphasize expectations, Maurice's
’societal effect’ looks at the social conditions surrounding
the formation and development of organisations.117 This
entails the study of how actors construct organisations and
how their decisions are influenced by the societal context.
In the study on manufacturing units in France, Germany and
Britain emphasis is laid on the educational systems in the
different countries and how they transmitted social values to
118firms and with what effects. Values include the criteria
of social selection and rewards, whereby Britain and France 
accord higher rewards to academic non-manual professions 
whilst Germany emphasises professionalism and technical
competence. These differences are underlined in studies by
119 120 121Marsden, Lawrence and Granick.
Further studies by Maurice and Sorge consider the ’socio-
122historical sources of unity and diversity’, relating
differences in worker and management organisations and in forms
of industrial democracy to ’the constraints to rationality
prevailing at the time when decisions to create the institutions
are typically made.’ Constraints include management and worker
ideologies, power structures in society including the role of
the state and dominant elites. Similar constraints or influences
on the development of industrial relations institutions are
recorded in many studies which compare two or more different
123national systems. Clarke contrasts the bureaucratic
pathology expressed in centralised rule-making of French 
industry with the ’adaptive bureaucracy’ of British firms and 
relates them to the pattern of social change and power 
structures in society. Eyraud and Gallie draw similar con­
clusions from their study of industrial relations in France 
and Britain.
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Once structures become 'institutionalised' they in turn act
as constraints on social behaviour and reduce the scope for
124choice in actor decision-making. These institutions
become a socialisation process through which the actors pass
and they perpetuate particular forms of behaviour in industr-
125ial relations as well as inother sectors of society.
X 2 6Faucheux argues that the differences between national
societies which emerge in terms of conflict management are
127quantitative not qualitative. Others like Shalev argue 
the differences undermine the logic of industrialism post­
ulated in industrial societies.
The present study will include a historical survey of the 
development of the industrial relations systems in Britain 
and Germany, which highlights the differing power structures 
and ideologies which shaped the current institutions of 
industrial relations. Differences in the role of the state 
and judiciary in industrial relations and the organisation and 
policies of the interest groups are shown to have influenced 
both conflicts arising and the processes of conflict resolut­
ion at workplace level.
ii) Industry Level
The main elements covered in this section are the relations 
between the trade unions and employers and the institutions 
of collective bargaining.
17 8Wood has described the Oxford school of industrial relations
as 'the dominant school' in British industrial relations
129research. According to Poole, its key characteristics are:- 
pragmatism, pluralism and rejection of an increased role of 
the state in industrial relations and the focus on the 
institutions of collective bargaining and of job regulation in 
particular.
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Allan Flanders was a leading exponent of the Oxford school.
He applied Dunlop’s concept of an industrial relations system
to an explanation of British industrial relations in the 
1301960s. Industrial relations was defined as a system of
rules dealing with the employment relationship at workplace
level and the level of collective bargaining between trade
unions and employers' associations. The study of industrial
relations was the ’study of the institutions of job regulation.'
The major influences on rule making at workplace level were
the factors ’associated with the changing character of those 
132enterprises’, such as size. The key influences on the 
external rule-making process were Dunlop’s technicalmarket 
power and cultural contexts of the bargaining unit, which 
varied from industry to industry but were united into one 
system by the system's ’ideology’
'The unity in this diversity is to be found 
in certain underlying principles, expressing 
value judgements, which are broadly accepted 
throughout the nation...without some elements 
of a common ideology or a number of 'shared 
understandings' the system would lose its 
coherence and s t a b i l i t y I 22
The main characteristics of the common ideology in the British 
system of industrial relations were:- the preference for 
collective bargaining rather than other methods of job 
regulation and autonomy of the parties to regulate their own 
relations, the preference for voluntary rather than com­
pulsory procedural rules for collective bargaining and the 
absence of legal restrictions, the preference for procedural 
rather than substantive rules. These preferences will be 
..considered in greater detail in later chapters. Flanders 
argued that this normative order was being challenged from 
above (the state) and below (workplace bargaining) and he 
formulated a series of reforms to the system of industrial 
relations to adapt the system to the change in power relations
Ain society which had taken place since the second world war.
The way to reestablish normative agreement was by reforms of 
the institutions of collective bargaining at national, company 
and workplace levels.
131
27
Although Flanders incorporated environmental influences on 
the industrial relations system, his emphasis was on the 
institutions of collective bargaining. This has been 
criticized by exponents of the social action and behavioural 
schools, as he is said to have ignored unstructured, informal 
relations, the role of personalities, status. He is also 
said to have run the risk of 'reification' of the institutions, 
by focussing on the goals of the institutions rather than the 
people who formulated the goals. The radical school, includ­
ing Fox^"^ and Goldthorpe,^ ^  argue that merely a change in 
the institutions of collective bargaining will not bring 
normative order. They propose instead changes to the environ­
ment, ho the structures of society as a whole.
One of the main difficulties arising from the studies of the
Oxford school are their limitation to the British
system of industrial relations. Clegg's work on collective
bargaining is said by him to cover only those countries where
138collective bargaining predominates. It does not, therefore,
constitute a general theory as it cannot be applied to France
where political action is preferred to collective bargaining,
and also may be said to have limited applicability to Germany,
where legislative action predominates. Clegg bases his work
on the Webb's theory that the methods by which trade unions
regulate the terms of employment of their members influence
all other aspects of their behaviour. In applying this to
countries where collective bargaining predominates, Clegg
argues that:- 'Differences in trade union behaviour can be
139explained by differences in collective bargaining.' In his
six country study he assesses the structures of collective 
bargaining, including the extent of bargaining, the level, 
the degree of control and the scope. These structures are 
seen to derive from the structure and attitudes of employers 
associations and managements as collective bargaining takes 
place where decisions are made if it is to be effective, and 
the role of the state in the formative period of the industrial 
relations system. Clegg's study of strikes and industrial 
action^^ is also based on the structure of collective
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bargaining, especially for the regulation of wages issues.,
Clegg's work draws attention to the importance of employer
and management organisation and preferences in an explanation
of collective bargaining systems. He does not, however,
explain how these preferences arise except in terms of the
level of pay bargaining seen by them to be most appropriate,
and admits that there is a wide variation in employer
preferences between industries in one country and in a
comparison of similar industries in different countries.
He points out the need to refer to political and cultural
preferences and values oE employers' associations, management,
trade unions and at the level of the state to explain these
differences between industrial relations systems and different 
X 1industries. The major critiques of Clegg's work have been
from the radical school and focus on the assumptions of 
pluralism in his studies, which are said to obscure the in­
equalities in the power structure of society and, like 
Flanders, focus on the need for changes in institutions to 
achieve normative agreement based on concession and com­
promise. Fox^^ argues the need for changes in the economic 
and social structures of society in order to obtain the 
objectives of pluralism, for example, social justice, a wide­
spread diffusion of power so no one group can dominate.
Clegg and Flanders's analyses are seen as being limited to 
highly developed industrialized countries, where there is no 
one dominant interest and good economic conditions prevail,
i.e. Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. Clegg, in his reply to 
143Fox, accepts that pluralism, defined as autonomous interest 
groups engaging in continuous compromises, works best in highly 
developed countries, where the governments can allow a wide 
scope for group activities. He sees signs of failure of the 
pluralist stabilisation mechanism to contain inflation, com­
petition, greed and social disorder in Britain, and can fore­
see the possibility of egalitarian policies, outlined by Fox, 
overriding pluralist values. The conflict between egalitarian­
ism and political liberties is a continuing one in all 
societies.
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Analyses made by members of the 'Oxford school' are therefore
limited in their applicability to certain countries in
specific historical periods. They represent an attempt to
use Dunlop's model to explain conditions prevailing in a
particular industrial relations system at a specific point 
144in time. The importance of the school in the study of
industrial relations in Britain is reflected in its influence
on the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers'
145Associations Report. The diagnosis of Britain's ills
was the conflict of the formal system of industrial relations 
with the informal, which has arisen due to the former's fail­
ure to reflect new demands and new power relations. The 
proposals for reform adhered closely to Flanders's reforms 
of the collective bargaining institutions.
The difficulties of applying the analyses of the Oxford school
on collective bargaining institutions to other national
systems are reflected in the different concerns of the major
studies on trade unions and employers' associations in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The focus of analyses has been on
the problems which the trade unions' external cooperation
with the state and the employers' associations creates for
internal cooperation, particularly the relationship between
146the trade union leadership and the members. Bergmann 
points out that the cooperative policies of the German unions 
require that they work as effective representatives of their 
members within a given institutional framework, and that they 
consider the prerequisites of the capitalist economy in 
the formulation of their wages policies. He links the 
development of cooperative trade union strategies to economic 
and political factors:- economic prosperity and the state 
pursuing policies favourable to the trade unions. The dis­
appearance of these preconditions for cooperative policies 
creates a crisis in the relationship between the trade unions
and the state and their members. Many works deal with this
147crisis in the trade unions' cooperative policies. HoB 
deals with the crisis in 1963, when trade unions were unable 
to meet their members' expectations by their policies and the
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employers pressed for centralised wage negotiation at the end 
of the 'economic wonder' period. Many studies made of the un­
official strike waves in 1969 and 1973 are based on a critique 
of trade union cooperative p o l i c i e s . T h e  trade unions are 
criticised for operating as an organisation promoting orde^^
in a capitalist economy instead of leading opposition to it.Mliller- 
150Jentsch's critique is that the unions do not represent the 
true workers' interests against capitalism, they are dominated 
by the national leadership and subjugated to the Social 
Democratic government. The trade unions are 'junior partners' 
in the crisis management programme of the government. The 
reasons for the development of this type of policy are seen as:- 
the destruction of the radical workers' movement by Hitler and 
the privatisation of individual workers after 1945, economic 
prosperity, centralised collective bargaining and legislation 
which cuts the trade unions off from the workplace and imposes 
legal restrictions on their action. In another article,^ h e  
contrasts cooperative trade union policies with their basis in 
centralised trade union decision-making apparatus and con­
cessions made by the capitalist system, which leads to system 
stability but apathy among the membership, with conflictual 
policies, which require decentralized decision-making to 
mobilize the members and contribute to crises in the system, 
promoting collective experiences of the workforce. The German 
unions, in his view, have to perform a balancing act to main­
tain cooperative policies yet uphold their strike capability 
to ensure representation of their interests.
These works which are critical of the trade unions often view
the shopstewards as bearers of an alternative democratic trade
union policy,especially on wages, and call on the trade unions
to rely more on their own organisational power and less on the
state, especially in view of the loss of the government's
152reform momentum in the economic crisis, and its pursuance 
of anti-Keynesian economic policies.
31
Streeck’s studies have considered the organisational 
problems of large industrial trade unions especially the 
dilemma of their role as a stabilising factor and the con­
tinued legitimacy from their members. Cooperative centralised 
policies lead to apathy, the view of the trade unions as
a service organisation, problems of solidarity, loss of
155members' union dues. His book on the subject looks at the
difficulties of mobilisation of trade union members in a
liberal corporatist state and trade union dtempts to improve
organisational security. In his view, the dual system of
workforce representation, expressed in trade union organisation
outside the workplace and works councils within, enables the
trade unions to overcome some of their organisational problems.
To maintain solidarity of the membership, industrial trade
unions need to prevent workers in prospering firms following
their own independent policies. This requires a representative
body in the workplace which cannotmake key decisions on wages
but can fulfill important functions for the union such as the
transmission of members' interests to the union and union
policy to the members. Streeck argues that the works council
fulfills this requirement. Far from having a negative effect
on the unions, the works councils fulfill an important role,
which involves the generalisation of issues at workplace level,
the prevention of the emergence of splinter groups, the
necessary flexibility for centralised union policies without
endangering general norms (i.e. the second round of wage
156bargaining at workplace level). In Britain, where the
unions have not received the same organisational support
from legislation, there is severe fragmentation and decentral- 
157 158isation. Miller also points out the interdependence of
trade unions and works councils, so that far from pursuing 
independent policies contrary to trade union interests, the 
two work closely together. Since 1974, the growing bargaining 
weakness of the works councils is leading to their increasing 
dependence on trade union action. Miller's conclusion is that 
the stability of workplace relations in the Federal Republic
154
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is due to the inter-relations operating between the works
council, the trade union apparatus and management, and 'their
159ability to control or stifle alternative interests.’ Threats
to this stability came with the increased power of the works
councils during economic prosperity and the unofficial
160strikes in 1969 and 1973. Streeck shows how these threats 
were largely overcome by the incorporation of their new powers 
in the Works Constitution Act of 1972. However, new threats 
are posed by the emergence of qualitative demands which cannot 
be fully represented by centralised trade union policies and 
could, therefore, lead to new channels of workplace represent­
ation, and by what Streeck calls the 'cooperative syndicalism' 
threat - the increased power of works councils especially at 
company-level. Milller-Jentsch^^ sees further threats to 
stability in the inability of works councils in the recession 
to protect the interests of key groups of workers, and the 
employers' attempts to block the transference of problems in 
the workplace, created by rationalisation, to higher levels.
He points to an increase in oppositional candidates for works 
council elections and the emergence of new groups at workplace 
level, which will pose a serious threat if group militancy 
increases.
Although the studies of trade unions and employers' associations 
focus on the problems involved in the co-ordination of national 
union and workplace interests, the context of the problems and 
the problems themselves are very different in Britain and West 
Germany. The West German unions are centralized, cooperative 
and are a factor promoting stability' of the system. The British 
trade union movement operates a decentralised, conflictual 
policy and has been viewed as a factor promoting instability 
in the British system. Proposals for reform differ:- in 
Germany, emphasis is placed on the need for greater devolution 
of decision-making to enhance member participation; in Britain 
attention has been focused on the centralisation and formalis­
ation of decision-making to reduce shopfloor power.
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iii) Plant Level
A) Organisational Structure
Organisation theory has emphasised the study of contextual
influences such as size, relations of dependence and technology
of specific plants and components of organisational structure
including workflow integration, structuring of activities,
functional specialisation, formalisation of documentation,
diffusion of authority. Management variables include role
definition, role routine, formalisation and expectations of 
162innovation.
The postulation of a 'culture-free context of organisational 
163structure' emphasises the constraints which a firm's
environment places on management decisions about organisational
structure and strategies. Divergences due to differing
socio-cultural contexts are seen to be in degree only, such as
a greater or lesser level of formalisation relating to size of
firm. Horvarth's study of firms in Britain, Japan and Sweden
found very different responses of organisations to similar
environmental pressures in terms of the centralisation or de-
165centralisation of control. Hofstede discovered very different
power distances between employees and their superiors in the
166same multinational company in forty countries.
Child has developed the concept of 'strategic choice', i.e.
'the agency of choice by whomever has the power to direct the 
167organisation' to explain these differences in organisational 
structures and processes. His study of British and German 
companies upheld the link between size and structure but not 
that between contextual factors and management characteristics 
such as authority relations, structures of decision-making, 
management roles and attitudes. This divergence is explained 
by the fact that:-
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'culturally specific factors such as people's 
expectations about authority will mediate 
between contextual variables such as size of 
organisation and the nature of structures, 
roles and behaviour within organisations.
Sorge found differences in the actual configuration of
manufacturing units in Britain, France and Germany including
staff-worker ratios, structure of work, qualifications and 
169career systems. This extends Child's scope for strategic
choice beyond the roles and relationships between the actors
to actual organisational and work structures. Mansfield
argues that decisions about structural arrangements must be
within the range of what management sees as acceptable.
Management perception is influenced by economic interests,
cultural values, ideological views, current management theories,
170the interests of other interested parties including employees.
Other recent works on managerial strategy in Britain emphasise
cognitive and behavioural influences. Loveridge, for example,
rejects the idea of an impelling structural imperative towards
centralisation of organisations in industry, for, as is the
case in Britain, companies can cope with uncertainty in their
171environment by diffusion of risk in a decentralised policy.
Purcell outlines differing approaches to industrial relations
by management and emphasizes the important role of key
172personalities in shaping strategies. Thurley similarly
illustrates the widely diversing business and industrial
relations strategies in British industry which he relates to
173the decentralised organisation of industry.
Studies of aspects of organisations do not therefore support 
either a universalistic or culturalist view of their structure 
and o p e r a t i o n . ^ T h e  perception and decisions of dominant 
coalitions do not merely mediate between context and behaviour 
but are instrumental in the development of organisations in 
the first place. Although, as Gospel points out in his study * 
once a specific organisational structure is established it can 
constrain future decisions of the actors. In his view structure
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both follows and embodies management strategies. The
empirical study of individual firms will thus incorporate 
an assessment of managerial strategies, particularly as 
they affect the institutions of conflict resolution at plant 
level, as well as the general organisational context.
B) Size of Organisation
'Size' has been a key element in the study of organisations. 
176McMillan argues that it has an overwhelming influence on
the structuring of activities, although the size of the parent
organisation rather than the unit itself was a more important
177indicator. Brown's survey of the factors shaping shop- 
steward organisation in Britain emphasized the important 
influence of size via its effect on the size and homogeneity 
of interest groups, the continuity of shop-stewards, hierarchy 
and specialisation, regular meetings, written minutes, stop­
pages and sanctions. The critical size was 500 employees and 
he argued that once establishment size was taken into account, 
there was little difference in the complexity of shop-steward 
organisation across manufacturing industry in Britain. The 
differences between the manufacturing and public sectors, 
however, could not be accounted for by size.
'Size' is often included as a factor influencing the power
resources of a trade union and its representatives at work- 
178place level, and the degree of dependence or independence
179of workplace organisation on the external trade union.
180Ingham considered the impact of size on structural changes 
in the organisation and workgroup dynamics. He concluded that 
major structural changes affecting workgroup behaviour via the 
size of work crews occurred at the critical size of 30 to 60, 
after which the changes were less dramatic until the organis­
ation reached a size of 50,000 plus.
Studies of industrial conflict often include size as a factor
181influencing conflict. Brown's study rejected the view that
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large plants were more strike-prone, arguing that if size of
the labour force was taken into account,smaller plants have
more strikes and forms of industrial action per employee than
182large plants. Edwards also found size explained only
15 - 207o of the variance in the number of strikes, technology
had very litle impact. He stresses the importance of daily
management and shop-steward relations and decisions in an
183explanation of strike levels. Prais, in his study of 
Sweden and Britain, however, related large scale production 
such as car assembly, steel production, ship-building to 
higher frequency of strikes due to the difficulties in 
communication, reaching agreements and observing them. Edwards 
found some evidence of a relation between complex management 
organisation and the degree of trade union organisation and 
strike-proneness. /V Turner'*'^ also found a link between the 
bureaucratisation of management, which may be related to size, 
and an increased strike incidence.
The relationship between size and conflict levels is, however,
a complex one involving many different elements including
specific responses of management to specific industrial
185relations situations.
The common view that smaller firms enjoy more harmonious
186relations is not always supported by research. Nash has
considered differences in management motivation in smaller
firms (2 - 200 employees), including the prevalence of a unitary
ideology, the view of 'industrial relations' as a threat, the
rejection of collectivism and externally imposed regulation
and the low level of experience of employment law. Studies
carried out as part of the humanisation of the workplace
research project in West Germany have focused on the specific
187problems of smaller firms:- the difficulty of applying legal
provisions due to the lack of knowledge of both management and
1 88workforce representatives, 00 the evidence of exploitation as 
trade union organisation is often low, no works council exists 
and there is a lack of alternative job opportunities in the
37
189 190community. The studies have shown the great organisation­
al obstacles of works councils in small firms due to the
existential threat posed by management and the powerful role
191of the foreman. Curran and Stanworth's study of social 
relations in printing and electronic firms of varying size 
showed, however, that differences in the social relations in 
the workplace were related less to size than to the 'industrial 
subculture' of each industry branch. Relations in the small 
printing plant were very different to those in the electronics 
plant.
Studies of the structure of industry in Britain point to the
increasing concentration of industry, especially in chemicals,
192 193metalworking and engineering. Hannah links the growth
in concentration to the increase in mergers and points out
how Britain is developing larger scale firms more rapidly
than any other European country. The social and political
effects of this are seen as a drop in worker satisfaction, an
increase in labour costs and strike-proneness, the growth of
bureaucracy and inefficiency and the risk of more government
intervention as the decisions taken by such large firms have a
194macro-economic impact. Prais shows how the growth in con­
centration is not linked to a growth in plant size but in the 
size of the controlling group. For example, in 1972, the 100 
largest firms in Britain owned 72 plants each, each plant 
averaged 430 workers. Concentration was found to be much 
lower in West Germany, with small firms three to four times 
more frequent.
The important effect of size on the structure of organisations
and especially on management structure and functions in terms
of its bureaucratization, formalisation, specialisation needs
to be included in the assessment of workplace relations.
195Ford has, however, pointed out the ways in which management 
choice influences size in the case of managers of small firms. 
Their motivation in setting up a business is often to 'be their 
own boss' and this influences their decisions about expansion;
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they prefer to keep their businesses small so they can stay 
in control. The significance of size of firm for conflict 
and conflict resolution processes will be assessed in the 
empirical study by the inclusion of firms of different sizes.
C) Technology
Studies under the 'technical implications' approach look at
the effect of technology on organisation, social relations
196and behaviour in the workplace. Blauner's definition of 
'technology' is as follows
'technology refers to the complex of 
physical objects and technical operations 
(both manual and machines) regularly 
employed in turning out the goods and 
services produced by an industry.1^97
This definition covers the machine system, technical know­
how and mechanical skills. Woodward's categorisation of 
different types of technology based on their production system
includes unit and small batch.large batch and mass production
198and continuous flow or process production. These are the
categories used in most studies of technology. Woodward con­
sidered the impact of technology on the organisation of 
manufacturing industry, and found that the process and small 
batch systems had similar organisational structures, 
characterized by delegation and decentralisation, whereas
large batch systems had more centralised, bureaucratic
199organisational structures. Technology was found to
influence factors such as the length of the line, the span 
of control, percentage turnover allocated to wages and salar­
ies, the ratio of managerial to total personnel, the ratio of 
administrative and clerical staff to manual workers. However, 
the relations between technology and organisational character­
istics was not direct. The relation was more obvious in 
small batch and process production as the actual physical work 
flow limited the organisational choice. In mass production, 
there was more choice. Technology was not seen to determine
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organisation but defined the limits within which it could be 
determined. The management control system depended partly 
on the physical workflow, partly on the policies of top 
management. Later studies^^ looked at the role of the 
management control system, seen as having a mediating effect 
on the relation between technology and behaviour and explain­
ing the different effects of similar technological systems.
201Technology was seen as a 'partial predictor'. This
reflects the findings of other projects using technology as 
a variable. McMillan found technology had little impact on
202structure except in areas directly linked to the workflow.
203Burns and Stalker's study of the impact of technology on 
organisation structure, especially of management, distinguishes 
between a mechanistic system of management, associated with 
a routine technology, a low level of technological sophisticat­
ion, large size and large capital investment, and an organic 
system, associated with a non-routine technology, high level 
of sophistication, small size and small capital investment.
The mechanistic systems stressed quantity and cost and were 
found in mass production industries; the organic emphasized 
quality and innovation and were associated with small batch 
production. They looked at difficulties arising where there 
was no fit between the technology and the management organisat­
ion.
Most of the studies stressing technology as a key variable have
looked at its effect on workgroup behaviour in terms of
204alienation and conflict. Woodward's view of the impact
of technology on behaviour was not deterministic. She argued
that there was a two-way interaction: the behaviour of an
operator was constrained by the portion of the technology he
is directly concerned with and the requirements of the
administration and workgroup, but much depends on how the
operator interprets his environment and he is able to bring 
about changes in his technological situation.
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A number of studies have looked at the alienating effect 
of assembly line technology via its effect on job tasks and 
social contacts in the workplace. Process and craft product­
ion led to lower levels of alienation. Blauner emphasized, 
however, that technology did not have a deterministic effect 
and other factors such as the 'conscious organisational 
policies' of management and the social character and personal­
ity of the workforce can be 'critical in their effect on
206 207employee alienation.' Goldthorpe's studies of assembly
lines in the car industry showed that the motivation of the
workers affected their perception of and reaction to the
alienating effects of the technology. The fact that they
sought their fulfilment in life not at work but in the home
and the assembly line job gave them high incomes and job
security in order to do that meant that their attitudes to
208the work were positive. Form's study also showed that the 
majority of assembly line workers were satisfied with their 
jobs.
This contrasts with those studies which view workers' attitudes 
as being shaped by their work experience not by factors out­
side the workplace or intrinsic to the workers themselves. 
Sayles' study related grievance activity to the technology and 
organisation of the plant, which are said to affect the groups' 
inherent ability to function in a certain way and relationships 
within the groups. He recommended structural reforms to
promote the ideal type of workgroup from management's point 
210of view. Euler argued that conflict behaviour was related
to the level of enforced compliance rather than choice which
211the technology imposed on the workforce. Popitz, too, 
looked at the types of worker cooperation required by the 
technology to explain behaviour, although he introduced what 
he called 'individual prerequisites' to explain why two workers 
doing the same job can have totally different subjective 
assessments of the work. The prerequisites were, however, 
limited to 'in-plant' factors such as job experience and
205
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knowledge and also individual temperament, but not family
212status, age, origin etc. Peach and Livernash emphasized 
task organisation and work environment as key influences on 
grievance initiation but introduced other variables to 
explain resolution processes including trade union leader­
ship type and trade union organisation.
Whereas earlier studies often emphasized the influence of
technology on all aspects of industrial behaviour and argued
the case for a convergence of industrial societies due to the
213convergence of technological processes, recent studies 
consider how the application of technology is influenced by 
actor decision-making within the wider socio-economic and 
cultural system. Manwaring considers how social organisation 
in Japan, specifically paternalism and strategies of incorp­
oration, facilitates the use of specific organisational and2 -jA
technical techniques in industry. Sorge and Warner show
how new computer technology is adapted to fit in with the
215existing structure of work in German and British companies.
Wilkinson looks at the application of computer technology from
a trade union standpoint and considers various attempts by
workforces to influence its application in line with their
216interests in the control of the work process. Technology
is no longer viewed as a functional imperative but as a 'man-
made and man-controllable factor. Thus the application of
technological processes needs to be analysed within the wider
context of management and workforce interests and environ-
217mental constraints.'
The empirical survey will include a number of different 
technological processes and an assessment of their effect on 
the type of conflicts emerging and the industrial relations 
institutions and processes developed to deal with them . An 
attempt will be made to compare the effects of similar 
technologies on conflicts and conflict resolution in Britain 
and West Germany.
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II) Social Action Approaches to the Study of Industrial Conflict
Whereas systems approaches view human actors as being 'acted
upon' by social forces, the action approaches stress the
importance of human actors as they create the society in
which they live. In contrast to the emphasis on formal
aspects of organisations in the 'systems' approach, the action
approach is particularist, pluralist and focuses on the in-
218formal aspects of behaviour and processes not structures.
219Kirkbride is critical of the application of the method­
ology and epistemology of the natural sciences to the study 
of social phenomena, because the latter, unlike natural 
phenomena, have their own intrinsic meaning. The action 
approach looks at these meanings which lie behind actions 
to explain behaviour. Meaning is thought to derive from the 
context of the action (past, present and future) and the actor's 
rationale for action.
220Silvermann argues that the action approach is useful in
the explanation of the origins of organisations by considering
their conscious creation with respect to the goals of the
founders, the nature of behaviour by looking at members'
expectations, and organisational change with reference to the
participants' definitions of their external environment. The
physical environment sets some constraints within which the
participants can interpret their environment in different
ways and respond differently. Silvermann's theory bears close
221ressemblance to Child's concept of strategic choice, al­
though Child only looked at the choices of 'dominant coalitions'. 
The major difference perhaps is that those studies stressing 
environmental factors view choice as a residual category and 
do not seek to explain its operations, whereas the action 
approach focuses on the area of choice, which requires the 
study of questions such as the nature of the actors' involve­
ment in an organisation, the actors' own definitions of
222situations. Silvermann gives Gouldner's study of a wild­
cat strike as an example of the approach, whereby the change
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in management leads to the end of the old 'indulgency pattern', 
based on informal interactions, and a new stress on efficiency. 
The effect of this change on the workforce leads to a wildcat 
strike, which is only settled by an agreement on formal rules 
which prevents conflict between the different expectations of 
management and the workforce. Most of the works using an 
action approach focus on the workforce and trade union actors.
223Lane and Roberts's study of the Pilkington strike looks at 
the change in attitudes of the workforce towards authority, 
especially the autocractic paternalism of the management. The 
change in attitude is related to changes in the community and 
the society at large:- changing attitudes to work, the erosion 
of the insularity of the community, the decline of the firm's
2 fy
dominance over local labour markets. Chinoy's study of
automobile workers looks at how their aspirations have been
influenced by changes in society, for example, the American
dreams of equal opportunity and independence. Confronted
with the lack of opportunity in their jobs, the workers trans-
225fer their objectives to their children. Goldthorpe's study
of car workers uses a social action approach to refute the
thesis of the embourgeoisement of the working classes due to
9 9 f)the affluence of the 1950s and 1960s. The workers were
found to have adopted an instrumental attitude to work due to
socially generated factors outside the workplace including:-
their position in the life cycle, their geographical mobility
and downward social mobility. The priority given to their
standard of living and the material rewards from their jobs
led to a positive orientation to the firm and the segregation
227of work and non-work areas of their lives. Partridge has
applied an action approach to the study of shop-steward activity, 
focusing on their problem of defining issues in a way consonant 
with the frames of reference held by their members.
There are numerous studies of worker consciousness. Two key
228works from the British research are Mann's concept of dual
229consciousness of the working classes and Runcimann's con-
44
elusions about 'relative deprivation'. Mann shows how co­
operation in the workplace coexists with an inherent 
opposition of the workforce to management interests. He 
outlines four elements in class consciousness:- identity, 
opposition, view that one's whole situation is determined 
by the opposition of the classes and ideas about an alternat­
ive society. Usually one or more of the elements is missing 
thus preventing class consciousness from emerging. His con­
clusion is that the working class does not have the power 
to be a class in itself in capitalist societies. In Britain, 
trade union consciousness prevails and the trade unions' con­
centration on economic demands not control of work has 
reduced the class conflict and makes it possible for 80% of 
workers questioned in his study to feel that management and 
workers are on the same side. Runciman also emphasizes the 
dominance of pluralist trade union ideology in Britain.
This has led to the fragmentation of the working class, thus 
preventing class consciousness. The response of workers to 
difficult economic circumstances is to contract their 
reference groups to remove the sense of relative deprivation. 
Goldthorpe does, however, point to the effects of incomes
policies in broadening reference groups and thus increasing
. 1 r; . 230the sense of grievance.
A major focus of German research has been worker conscious­
ness and the prospects for collective action. Adorno and 
Habermas's work on the repression in modern industrial society 
has led to the prevalence of the concept of 'the dual con­
struction of society', i.e. 'reality is rooted both in the 
objective relationships of production and the interpretation
* 231which individuals give to the circumstances of their own life.
This, together with the problems of access to firms, has led
232to the prevalence of action research. Kern and Schumann's 
work on different types of work and worker consciousness 
involved the intervention of the researchers in the group 
processes to initiate changes in attitudes by working out the
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contradictions in the consciousness of partial collectives'
233in the workplace. Socio-biographies were used by Osterland
to look at the effect of crises on the attitudes of workers.
Present attitudes are seen as 'the complex, historical and
social products of change in the lives of individuals' X n “the 
234Dortmund study of workplace conflicts, worker correspondents
were used to record continuously the development of conflicts
out of everyday working conditions. Other works have emphasized
the political culture of the workplace as an independent factor
235 236in the development of workforce consciousness. Gross
used the conflict traditions of the workplace community as 
well as occupational consciousness and attitudes pertaining 
to the age of the workers to explain how conflicts are pro­
cessed in the workplace.
Finally, many studies have looked at the effect of economic
237developments on worker attitudes. . Schumann's study showed 
passivity of the workers in the economic crisis, viewing the 
crisis as unavoidable. He argued this was due to the absence
of a frame of reference by which to interpret the crisis.
238Arzberger's attitude survey in four metalworking firms
revealed similar findings as well as considerable optimism 
about the government's ability to overcome it by economic 
planning. He pointed to the important influence of the media
and continued trust in the state and social welfare system.
239Herkommer's most recent study pointed to a change in
240attitudes towards the trade unions. His early study showed 
that workers felt the trade unions were important but not for 
their own personal situation, as they trusted in their ability 
to achieve their own improvements. The economic recession has 
meant that the trade unions are seen as vital to the achieve­
ment of any improvements as the state's reform policies have 
declined and workers not only cannot secure any improvements 
themselves, but are threatenedwith job losses. The evidence 
given for this is the growth in trade union membership from 
30% (1969) to 35.9% (1978).
46
Hartmann's conclusion on the state of German research based 
on the action approach is a wealth of qualitative data but 
the absence of generalisations from it. He is concerned 
about the abdication of the research scholar as an independ­
ent source of observation (ethnomethodology) and the con­
sequent problems of validity, representativity and subjective
, . 241bias.
Similar criticism has been voiced of social action studies in 
Britain, although social action studies do not claim any 
theoretical status but stress the use of the approach to 
highlight particular themes and gain additional insights.
The approach has not been widely used in the study of manage­
ment decisions and actions due to the focus on organisational 
constraints to decision-making. Some recent studies emphasize 
the need to look at cognitive and behavioural structures in 
the assessment of managerial strategies particularly in
relation to their perception and response to uncertainty in
242their environment.
243In response to the social action approach both Walker and 
Rose argue that equal weight must be given to the study of the 
person and the situation as determinants of industrial relations 
behaviour. Thus:-
'worker response to the objective features 
of a work situation... are mediated by 
socially structured subjective aims and 
perceptions. '
The trend away from a concentration on institutions and
structures to the study of attitudes and informal behaviour
permits the introduction of a psychological/behavioural
245perspective into the study of industrial relations. The
key subjects of behavioural studies of industrial relations
are negotiating behaviour and industrial conflict. In their
9study of negotiating behaviour Walton and McKersie outlined 
four types of labour negotiating activity. Variables thought 
to influence the different patterns of relationships included 
technology, market and power contexts, the basic personality
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dispositions of key actors and their shared bargaining
experiences. Emphasis was placed,however, on the different
bargaining processes, the strategies, tactics and issues
associated with these. The four processes were:-
distributive bargaining ('the process by which each party
attempts to maximize his own share in the context of fixed
sum pay-offs ' integrative bargaining which 'finds common
or complementary interests and solves problems confronting 
248both parties', attitudinal structuring where the actors
'seek to influence the attitudes of the participants towards 
one another and affect the basic bonds of the two parties '^49 
and intraorganisational bargaining to reach consensus within
O C A  Q  C  “I
each of the interacting groups. Peterson and Tracy's
application of Walton and McKersie's theory to identify 'the
conditions, behaviours and procedures that enhance problem-
1 252solving in labour negotiations, i.e. integrative bargaining, 
supported the importance of independent variables such as a 
cooperative working relationship, the anticipated recognition 
and approval from constituent and opponents, the frequency of 
contacts and openness of communications, team policy and 
administration. Their findings did not support the need for 
a professional orientation of the negotiators, recognition 
and approval from one's own team members or the length of the 
bargaining relationship. The personality of the negotiators 
was thought to be more important than length of bargaining 
relationship. Other important factors were perceived bargain­
ing power and the likelihood of strike action - the latter 
variable was negatively correlated with bargaining success.
The concern to discover the variables leading to an integrative
bargaining relationship is reflected in behavioural studies of
253conflict. Deutsch distinguished between constructive and 
destructive processes of conflict resolution:-
'A conflict clearly has destructive consequences 
if its participants are dissatisfied with the 
outcomes and feel they have lost as a result of 
the conflict. Similarly, a conflict has 
productive consequences if the participants all 
are satisfied with their outcomes and feel they 
have gained as a result of the conf1ict.'254
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His study considered many types of conflict of which inter­
group conflict is only one. The conditions thought to be
conducive to the emergence of inter-group conflict include:-
255contact, visibility, competition and social change. He
looks at the conditions necessary for the institutionalisation 
of conflict and as these have a direct bearing on grievance 
procedures, they will be considered in more detail in the 
next chapter His list of variables affecting the course of 
conflict, i.e. destructive or constructive include:- the 
social environment, in so far as it offers facilities or 
constraints to certain types of conflict resolution, interested 
third parties and the consequences of the conflict to them, 
the nature of the issue in conflict, the characteristics of 
the parties to the conflict (values, goals, intellectual and 
social resources), their prior relationship, strategies and
n r r
tactics and the consequences of the conflict to them.
257 258Coser and Galtung also assess the destructive and con­
structive potential of social conflicts.
Both social action and behavioural approaches provide a useful 
counterbalance to a structural determinist approach by focusing 
attention on the industrial relations actors and the actual 
processes of industrial relations. The theoretical model and 
empirical surveys of individual firms will include both environ­
mental influences and the actual policies and behaviour of the 
actors in the consideration of conflicts arising and processes 
of resolution at plant level.
Ill) General Models of Plant Level Industrial Relations
These models seek to combine structural and perceptional
259variables in one model. Hill's model to study workgroup 
formation and activity included structural conditions, which 
impede or facilitate formation, group consciousness and the
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power position of the group. Poole covered three 
dimensions of power:- its latent sources (structural), its 
exercise and the values of the parties regarding the 
legitimacy of the structures of decision-making in the 
workplace. The values of the shop-stewards were the most 
important factor explaining the pattern of dispute settle­
ment at workplace level, although in one firm, management
policy played a crucial role in limiting the power of the
261shop-stewards. Parker included structural variables,
perception and historical influences in his model of work-
262place industrial relations. Thomson and Murray different­
iated independent variables (process, contextual and 
procedural) and dependent variables (perceptions, conflict 
manifestation and outcome) to explain grievance resolution at 
workplace level, although their own empirical studies 
emphasized contextual variables, especially technology, as 
the primary factor influencing the grievance resolution 
process. Technology influenced resolution by way of its 
effect on the work situation, the main source of grievances.
The type of grievances arising influenced the resolution
^  263processes in the firms they considered.
German models of workplace industrial relations focus on
2 6 A*models of representation by the works councils. Fhrstenberg 
cited Neumann's categories of ideaL - typical models of works 
councils, which have dominated the German research. These 
include:- the democratisation-integration model of early 
studies such as those by Potthoff and Blume, where emphasis 
is placed on the works councils' role in the process of joint 
conflict resolution; the compensation-surrogate model, where 
the works council is seen as compensation for the lack of 
rights of the workforce due to the private ownership of 
production - the interest here is on decision-making processes; 
conflict and oppositional model, where the works council 
operates to increase the self-determination of the workforce 
and curtail the influence of the employer; the partnership and
260
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fairness model; and the corruption model, which views the 
works council, as instituted by law, as obscuring the objective 
conflict of interests in the workplace and emphasis is 
placed on the use of works council rights to promote a con- 
flictual policy and mobilize the workforce. FUrstenberg 
points out how ideological assumptions about the works council 
have influenced the methodology and results of German studies 
on the workplace.
265Kotthoff's interest was empirical:- what type of particip­
ation processes do works councils in different industrial and 
organisational settings engage in? His key variables were 
size of firm, industry branch, ownership relations, qualific­
ation level of the workforce, level of trade union organisation 
and number of shop-stewards. Kotthoff looked at the effect of 
those variables on the attitudes of the parties, their 
relations and the effectiveness of the works council as a 
representative of workforce interests. A further study266 on 
the development of collective interest representation in the 
workplace distinguishes general variables (industry branch, 
location, legal type, size, economic development of firm), 
workplace variables (composition and qualification of work­
force, work situation, technical conditions, wage levels and 
differentials) and two other elements, which help to explain 
differences in representation in firms with similar situations 
from the point of view of the first two sets of variables:- 
social anchorage of the workforce (e.g. working class sub­
culture, rural area, commuters) and their historical experiences 
of continuity and discontinuity in their firm's development.
The interest of the study is in a conflict model of works
267council representation. Dzielak's study of workplace con­
flict looks at the effect of structural variables on the 
perception and representation of conflict in the workplace 
with particular emphasis being placed on the internal communic­
ation system of the workplace representatives as a mediating
factor between structural conditions and actual perception and
268representation of conflict. Finally, Wilpert's model for
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the study of the effects of industrial democracy distinguishes 
between different levels of influence:- extra-organisational 
and intraorganisational. Within the organisation he con­
siders structural variables and cognitive/attitudinal variables 
and then looks at the intended and unintended functions of the 
relationship between structural and attitudinal variables and 
the consequences of these functions both for the organisation 
and the extra-organisational environment. His model bears 
great ressemblance to a systems model as developed by Dunlop 
with the addition of social action perspectives such as mean­
ing and attitudes of the actors themselves.
A general model for the study of industrial relations issues
will need to cover both the environmental and social action
) Qperspectives at different levels of the system. Henemann 
suggested five levels which are important:- national, the 
level of the associations, organisational level, informal 
group level and the individual.
A variety of theories and theoretical models on industrial 
relations institutions and processes have now been outlined. 
Many aspects of these studies are incorporated into the general 
model of an industrial relations system to be used in the 
present analysis of conflict and conflict resolution. The 
Power School which emphasizes social power relations based on 
ownership of the means of production or authority relations 
needs to be incorporated in a wider model which will explain 
differences in social power relations across different 
societies and also relate the wider social power relations 
to the plant level and the pattern of conflicts and resolution 
processes prevalent there. Theories which emphasize structures 
of organisations need to be combined with theories on how 
structures emerge and how they influence and are influenced 
by the perceptions and actions of the industrial relations 
actors. Although the social action and behavioural approaches
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provide an additional dimension to the study of industrial 
relations phenomena by focusing on the actors themselves they 
must be analysed in conjunction with environmental factors 
at all levels of the system and in a historical perspective, 
particularly in a cross-national study of industrial relations 
issues. The liberal-pluralist analysis of industrial relations 
based on structures of collective bargaining needs to be 
included in a study of the British system but is limited in 
its applicability to a specific period of time in the British 
system and in a cross-national comparison of Britain and 
Germany since in the latter the state has played a vital role 
in the development of the industrial relations system, 
supported by both the trade unions and employers' associations.
Dunlop's model of an industrial relations system is thought to 
provide the best possibility of combining numerous partial 
theories in order to study a plant level phenomena within two 
national systems. A number of modifications have been 
incorporated into the original model to reflect recent research 
findings on the industrial relations system. These are out­
lined below.
4) The Modified Industrial Relations System Concept
I) Theoretical Modifications to the Industrial Relations System
i) The Place of the Industrial Relations System in the Wider 
System
Dunlop's view of the industrial relations system was:-
'to treat the industrial relations system 
(analgous to the economy) as an analytical sub­
system of society.'2^
He therefore analysed the industrial relations system in terms 
of the four functional imperatives of a social system as outlined
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by Parsons:- adaptive, goal gratification, integrative and
271 272latent pattern maintenance. Wood has pointed out that
Parsons only described four functional subsystems of industrial 
society:- the economy, the polity, the integrative subsystem 
and pattern maintenance, and therefore suggests that the 
industrial relations system should be seen as a subsystem of 
the economy, with the function of integrating the labour resource 
in the economic system. Parsons described the role of the 
integrative subsystem as follows:-
'(it) relates the cultural value patterns to the 
motivational structures of individual actors in 
order that the larger social system can function 
without undue internal conflict.'222
Flood interprets this in terms of the industrial relations 
system as the goal of satisfying the functional need for order 
within the production system. The industrial relations system2y a
produces rules to govern the production system. This could
be used to describe the goals of those who govern the wider 
social system and the production system. It could not be used 
to describe the goals of different interest groups within the. 
industrial relations system itself unless the groups' ideology 
emphasized order and stability as a prerequisite for the 
achievement of their goals as could be argued in the case of 
the German trade union movement.
ii) The Levels of the Industrial Relations System
Dunlop had a flexible definition of an industrial relations 
system. It could be used 'to characterize an immediate work­
place, an enterprise, a sector, or a country as a whole', 
depending on what problem was being studied. The actors them­
selves could have different definitions of the industrial 
relations system to which they belong:- management tend to 
choose as their industrial relations system those enterprises 
subject to similar product market competition, the workforce 
may choose similar or differentiated labour markets with more
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favourable rules. Dunlop argued that in many cases there
was no conflict about which was the appropriate system. His 
example of the railroad network as constituting one indu^rial 
relations system points to the view of industrial relations 
systems as industry branches.
The levels which will be used in the comparative study of 
grievance resolution are national, industry and plant levels 
although the impact of the company on the plant and different 
departments within one plant will be considered in the case 
studies of individual German plants and their systems of 
grievance resolution. The assumption made by Dunlop that the 
context of individual plants will have a significant impact 
on their internal functioning will be assessed.
iii) Conflict and Change in the Industrial Relations System
A study of conflict resolution includes the study of conflicts 
and how and why they arise in the workplace. Differences of 
interest precede the development of procedures to regulate 
the differences, and procedures can be seen as representing a 
balance of power between management and employees at a specific 
point in time - a negotiated conditional state of stability 
if, indeed, the procedures are adhered to.
The fact that objective differences of interest between the 
owners and managers of capital and labour exist and differences 
of interest also arise within these interest groups is not the 
only source of instability in the industrial relations system. 
The context of the industrial relations system is not fixed 
but changes and affects factors such as the power balance 
between the different interest groups, the issues in conflict 
and the procedures for resolution themselves. Thus any study 
of conflict procedures involves a consideration of how the 
procedures came to be established and their operation, and the 
factors which are contributing to changes in the operation and 
form of procedures.
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Reynaud has spoken of the basic fragility of industrial
279relations systems and Parson’s aim was to explain the 
apparent stability of social systems in the face of the 
ubiquitous conflict in society. Conflict and change are 
therefore seen as basic to societies and to industrial life 
in particular. The association of systems approaches with 
an emphasis on consensus and stability stems in part from 
what is described in the political sciences as ’equilibriumoonanalysis', which stresses the propensity of a system to 
revert back to equilibrium if it is temporarily affected by 
changes in the environment. This is related to the applicat­
ion of concepts from medical science and the operation of
281the human body to social organisations. Easton stressed 
the need for a dynamic analysis of political systems and the 
recognition that disequilibrium may be deliberately promoted 
by parties seeking the establishment of a new equilibrium in 
their favour. His adaptations to the political systems model
282were carried over into industrial relations systems by Craig, 
who described the idea of a feedback from the industrial 
relations system into the wider system, which could promote 
changes in the industrial relations system itself.
If it is accepted that the object of the industrial relations 
system is the regulation of the labour resource within the 
economic system in the face of basic differences of interest 
between capital and labour and changes in the context of the 
industrial relations system, then conflict and change are basic 
elements of . the study of industrial relations issues. This 
is particularly evident in the study of conflict at plant level.
iv) Power and Ideology in the Industrial Relations System
Dunlop’s concept of power as being chiefly located in the 
external environment of the industrial relations system must 
be modified if basic differences of interest between the 
parties in the industrial relations system itself are 
accepted as objective fact.
27 8
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Power relations in the wider society do affect the industrial 
relations system, particularly where the state plays a 
dominant role in its regulation. Different social groupings 
in society cannot all be seen solely in relation to whether 
they support the owners of capital or labour. Groups such as 
the executive body of the state, the military, the administrat­
ive body of the state, taxpayers and so on do not simply reflect 
the interests of capital or labour but have their own interests, 
which they seek to represent in society. Cultural and 
educational values are also not simply a reflection of relations 
in industry but shape those relations in many ways, including 
the expression of their power relations, the resolution of dis­
putes, the predominance of technical vis-a-vis administrative 
strata in industry, the goals pursued by the different parties 
in the industrial relations system. The effects of the wider 
society on power relations in the workplace need to be assessed. 
It is, however, also important to look at the actual power 
relations in the industrial relations system itself and how 
they affect, in this particular study, the plant level 
resolution process.
Power is usually described as the ability to carry out one's
own definition of a situation in the form of a policy or
283programme and to impose changes on one's environment.
Several works have emphasized the need to analyse power in
terms of its structural bases and the values of the actors 
284themselves. Thus the position of a trade union in the
technological process, labour market, organisation and its
resources in terms of membership, skills, finances are part
of its structural power resources. This power resource,
however, needs to be harnessed to particular values concerning
the legitimacy of the structure of decision-making in industry,
the conflict of interests between employers and employees, in
order to be effective. The power positions of the respective
actors will need to be considered in the explanation of 
processes of regulation not only of issues relating to the
status of the actors but also technical and market issues
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arising in the industrial relations system.
Dunlop's concept of ideology was of 'a set of ideas and beliefs
commonly held by the actors (in the industrial relations system)
that helps to bind or integrate the system together as an
entity. '385 -^e acknowie(iged that each of the actors would have
286their own ideology but argued that 'an industrial-relations
system requires that these ideologies be sufficiently compatible
and consistent so as to permit a common set of ideas which
recognise an acceptable role for each actor.’387 Voluntarism
in the British system was an example of an industrial relations
system ideology, which all parties accepted until recently.
Examples of incongruent ideologies include firms where management
has a paternalistic philosophy and the workforce an instrumental
attitude to their relations. Incongruities concerning the basic
organisation of an industrial relations system were more serious
than disputes within an agreed framework. Thus Dunlop
distinguishes between an industrial relations system ideology
and the ideologies of different actors in the system. His
emphasis on elements of ideologies which bind the actors rather
than divide them needs to be modified to include both elements
288of the actors' ideologies. Giner's distinction between 
values and ideology is helpful in considering these aspects of 
the industrial relations system:-
values - 'cultural and social predispositions
which...fashion links between patterns 
of social action on the basis of 
ethical and moral criteria.'
ideology - 'a conception of the social world
explicitly or coercively maintained 
by a collectivity, which explains its 
existence through it, which derives 
from it a general plan of action and .an
identification of the sources of legit­
imate authority, and attempts to control
its social environment in consis­tent with this c o n c e p t i o n . '
Values thus can be related to the influence of the wider socio­
cultural context, ideology to deliberate strategies by
collectivities to justify a power relation. Values transcend
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the specific interests of different groups in the industrial 
relations system, ideologies enhance the difference of interests. 
Both influence the actors' perceptions of conflict procedures 
and thus the actual operation of procedures. Personality 
influences are recognised as important in the analysis of 
individual firms, where individuals on the management and worker 
representative sides have had a significant influence on the 
present shape of the plant level industrial relations system.
v) The Processes and Output of the Industrial Relations System
The study of conflict procedures involves a study of the form 
and operation of the procedures in the workplace. The actual 
rules for resolution of conflicts will be described but it is 
assumed that actual practice often differs from that laid down 
in legislation, agreements or understandings between the 
representatives of the parties. The empirical work of the 
thesis emphasizes the processes of conflict resolution. The 
different categories involved in the assessment of the processes 
are outlined in the section on methodology and the theoretical 
framework of procedures in chapter two.
The actual output of the system is also considered in greater 
detail in chapter two, where the different types of rules to 
emerge from the regulatory process are assessed. The acknowledge­
ment of a conflict of Interests between the different actors in 
the industrial relations system, however, requires the assess­
ment not only of the resolution of conflict by the actors or 
relevant third parties, but also the possibility of non­
resolution of conflict and intensification of the conflict re­
lationship between the parties.
II) The Application of the Modified Industrial Relations System 
to the Study of Conflicts and Conflict Resolution at Plant 
Level in Two National Systems
The modified Industrial Relations System is seen as a comp­
rehensive theoretical tool for the study of industrial conflicts
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and conflict resolution at plant level in two national systems.
Recent studies argue the case for broad explanatory frameworks
290for the investigation of industrial relations phenomena,
which incorporate the macro-environment of an organisation as
well as intra-organisational factors^^^ and view organisations
292in their historical as well as their temporal perspective.
The recent history of attempts to induce procedural reforms in
the British system has underlined the importance of analysing
293industrial relations themes in their wider context. Dunlop's
model of the industrial relations system has formed the basis 
of a broad theoretical framework which can be used to invest­
igate one aspect of the system, i.e, conflict resolution at 
plant level. The modified system incorporates several of 
Dunlop's original model components including actors (the state 
and its agencies, trade unions and employers' associations), 
the concept of a context within which the actors operate with 
the basic categories of technical, market and power contexts, 
different levels within the system (national, industry, plant) 
and the need to view the current system in its historical 
context by considering the timing and context of the origins 
of the system and the type of industrialising elites who shaped 
the system on the basis of their particular values and interests.
However, a number of modifications to Dunlop's original model 
were necessary to develop a more viable theoretical model to 
study plant level industrial relations phenomena in their wider 
context. The present study does not view the Industrial 
Relations System as a subsystem of society but as a part of the 
economic subsystem which focuses on the relationship between 
capital and labour and the development of rules to govern the 
production system by these actors and the state. The theme of 
the study necessitates the isolation of one element of the 
industrial relations system:- the procedures and processes 
whereby conflicts between the interests of the two actors are 
resolved at plant level.
Dunlop's concept of ideology was that of 'shared understandings' 
where the values of the actors represent responses to their
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environment which is perceived by them in broadly similar 
terms and they have similar views on appropriate industrial 
relations behaviour. However, values can be incongruent 
as well as congruent as interests differ. The present study 
considers those factors which produce congruency in the values 
of the actors as well as those producing incongruencies by 
investigating social values, the values and goals of trade 
unions and employer associations and particularly those of the 
plant level actors, which are expected to influence their
295perception of conflicts and the means used to resolve them.
An explanation of how these values emerge is derived from the 
study of the context in which the current industrial relation 
systems emerged particularly the power relationship between 
the state, capital and labour interests.
The power context, originally described by Dunlop as focusing
on the relationship between the above actors at national level,
has been extended to include the interrelationships between
296the actors at all levels of the system. The power position
of the actors is derived from objective material resources as 
well as their respective values and goals, which are invest­
igated in the case studies of individual firms. It affects 
both the perception and resolution of conflict issues arising.
It is also an important factor in the decisions made by 
dominant actors about work organisation, economic strategies, 
technological processes and other areas which constitute the 
context of plant level industrial relations.
The context of industrial relations is not viewed in a 
deterministic light as regards behaviour of the actors but is 
shaped by the actors in accordance with their particular aims 
and values. Changes arise in the system of industrial relations 
as changes in its context are perceived and acted upon by the 
actors and as values and aims change within the system itself.
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Further modifications to Dunlop's original model include the 
importance accorded to perception, goals and values of the 
actors and thus a rejection of the determinist model of 
influence as illustrated below in favour of a complex inter­
action between the actors and their environment in a historical 
perspective.
environment —?> actors —> behaviour —> output
Since the study focuses on conflict resolution, processes of 
interaction in the system form an important part of the system. 
The modified system includes a consideration of the actors 
involved, the levels at which they are involved and the type 
of interactions which take place. Processes are seen as distinct 
from actual procedures which may or may not be reflected in the 
actual practice of conflict resolution.
The basic categories of the industrial relations system context 
as devised by Dunlop have been incorporated into the theoretical 
model and empirical survey used in this study. The implications 
of the market and technological context of individual firms 
for conflict issues and resolution processes were investigated 
in both the interviews with key workplace actors and in the 
questionnaire survey.
Dunlop assumed that the technical and market contexts would tend
to produce similar rules in all industrial relations systems by
29 7posing similar problems. The power context would produce
different rules affecting procedures in particular. Thus
by comparing national industrial relations systems where
technical and market contexts were kept constant it would be
possible to investigate the effects of the power context and
the extent to which its influence overrides any similarities
299in technical and market contexts. In the present study a
distinction has been made between 'constants' (those influences 
derived from the technical and market contexts thought to lead 
to similarities in conflict issues and their resolution) and 
'variables' (those influences derived from the power context 
thought to promote differences in conflict issues and their 
resolution). These two factors are illustrated in the diagram
62
below, where several assumptions about their complex inter­
action are outlined.
Constants Variables
include:-
- conflict between 
capital and labour 
and its regulation
- size of firm
- technology of firm
- general economic 
climate
include:-
- organisation of 
trade unions and 
employers assoc­
iations , their 
policies and 
relations
- role of the state 
in regulation of 
industrial 
relations
- social structures
- cultural values
- role of work­
place level
Differences 
in conflicts 
arising and 
their rate. 
Differences 
in the 
resolution 
of conflicts
1 - the constants generate similar issues which lead to
conf1icts
2 - the issues are mediated through the variables and this
promotes differences in the type of conflicts, the rate
of conflicts and the resolution process.
3 - the conflicts arising and the processes of resolution
have an.impact on variables, e.g. the nrocess of resolution 
which emerges from the effect of the Works Constitution 
Act in West Germany influences the views of trade unions, 
employers, the state and wider society on the relative 
roles of the works council and shop-stewards in the 
workplace. A further example of this type of feedback 
is the influence of the operation of the Works Councils
Act of 1920 on the development of industrial trade
. . . n 300unionism m  Germany.
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4 - The differences in conflicts and resolution processes
influence the effect of the constants on conflicts 
arising. For example, the removal of wage bargaining 
from the workplace to regional and national levels and 
the central role of the works council in the regulation 
of workplace issues reduces the impact of particular 
technologies on the relative power position of work­
groups and wages conflicts.
5 - The constants can effect changes in the variables. The
economic pressures to concentrate business operations and 
rationalise technological processes are influencing the 
traditional informal system of conflict resolution in 
Britain.
6 - The variables can promote changes in the constants.
Cultural values which emphasise a partnership between 
the two sides of industry and a responsibility of the 
state to promote industrial peace and consensus can 
influence the objective impact of the conflict between 
capital and labour.
The respective influence of constants and variables on conflicts 
and conflict resolution at plant level in Britain and West 
Germany is investigated in the empirical research undertaken 
in German firms. Dunlop's categorisation of the three aspects 
of the industrial relations system's context (technical, 
market, power) formed the basis for the choice of constants 
and variables used in the model. Extensive literature surveys 
of the German and British systems provided further indication 
of the key elements which have influenced the pattern of con­
flicts and conflict resolution at plant level in the two systems. 
Interview schedules and the questionnaire layout reflected 
these key elements in the theoretical model, which is shown 
in diagrammatic form on p.65. The model does incorporate a feed­
back effect although this is not illustrated. The output of 
the resolution process can influence future relations between
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management and the workforce as well as relations at higher
levels in the industrial relations system if the output is
301generalised across many plants. Thus change in the
industrial relations system can arise both from the impact 
of its wider environment and from the feedback effect from 
lower levels in the system.
The distinction between constants and variables does not
reflect the complexity of the interaction between the actors
302and different aspects of their environment but provides 
a theoretical construetwhereby this interaction can be 
investigated in practice. The application of this construct 
and the empirical findings are outlined in later chapters.
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III) Methodology
i) Choice of Methodologies
Some of the key works on the operation of disputes procedures
in Britain have focused their attention on national and
industry levels and their methodology has been based on a
documentary analysis of formal procedures laid down at 
3 0 3national level, of cases referred to national and regional304levels of dispute resolution and cases of disputes coming
3 0 3 3 0 6before Industrial Courts. American studies have
emphasized the actual workplace level to a greater extent but
have stressed the influence of technology on grievance rates,
selecting pairs of high and low grievance rate departments
and explaining the differences with reference to the effect of
technological processes. Their methodology has consisted of a
documentary study of written grievances, interviews with
management, trade union officials and workers, and the
observation of grievance meetings, which are characteristic of
3 0 7the American system of grievance resolution. The work which
has influenced the methodology adopted in this study is by
308Thomson and Murray. They interviewed four management levels
in thirty-five plants, which represented three industrial 
groups (food, chemicals, textiles). They drew up three 
different questionnaires to obtain information about the 
environmental influences on grievance procedures from senior 
management and personnel management, and about the actual 
procedures from departmental and supervisory managers. The 
weaknesses of their study which they drew attention to were 
the exclusion of shop-steward respondents, the limited 
attention to institutional influences, the lack of control 
over the selection of plants and respondents and the absence 
of statistical validity of their findings.
Comparative studies concentrate on the selection of a small 
number of plants, in which case studies are undertaken to find 
out the role of trade union representatives in the workplace,
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the way specific issues are dealt with, especially wages 
311issues, and general information on the workplace system
312of industrial relations.
Studies of workplace industrial relations are based on a wide
313variety of methodologies, including mass surveys,
314 315questionnaire surveys in one particular firm, observation.
Generally, the aim is a combination of different methodologies
to highlight different aspects of the workplace situation
( ' triangulation' ) .
An assessment of the different methodologies in the light of 
limited resources and access led to the decision that a com­
bination of literature and documentation analyses, case studies 
based on 'expert' interviews in selected firms and a question­
naire survey to discover the actual operation of resolution 
at lower levels in the workplace would provide the best means 
of assessing the impact of environmental and workplace factors 
on grievances arising and their resolution. The empirical work 
was particularly necessary in the German system due to the 
limited number of works dealing with the actual operation of 
the workplace system of conflict resolution in comparison with 
the British system, where attention has been focused on the 
workplace since the late 1960s.
ii) The Choice of Firms and Technological Processes
The choice of the metalworking branch as the basis of the 
empirical study was made for a number of reasons. This branch 
has been the focus of studies on the workplace in Britain and 
West Germany and the information which can be gleaned from the 
literature helped to overcome some of the problems of the 
limited resources available for the project, especially the 
impossibility of an empirical study in Britain and Germany, and 
the impracticability of a mass survey in Germany to supplement
310
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the general dearth of information on actual workplace conflict 
resolution. The fact that metalworking is an old established 
industry branch with a tradition of workplace representation 
dating back to the nineteenth century, i.e. pre-works council 
legislation, gave a closer basis for comparison than the 
chemical industry, for example, whose system of workplace 
relations has been shaped by works council legislation in West 
Germany. Finally, the opportunities for access to firms in 
this branch were good due to prior contacts with the Metal­
workers' Union in West Germany, who offered their assistance.
The implications of this choice of industry branch for the 
study include a possibly exaggerated picture of the importance 
of shop-steward organisation at workplace level, higher levels 
of trade union organisation and contacts between the workplace 
and union outside than in other industries, a more favourable 
picture of works council activity in terms of a strong 
representative of the workforce and a more conflictual approach 
to industrial relations than other industry branches, where 
the partnership aspect of the Works Constitution Act is 
emphasized by both the unions and parties in the workplace.
The fact that representatives at the national level of the 
Metalworkers' Union selected the plants and access was dependent 
on the cooperation of management and works council in the firm 
probably implies a more effective operation of works council 
and shop-stew7ard representation than may be the case in other 
firms in the industry, and the existence of what the parties 
see as non-problematic industrial relations in the workplace.
The choice of technological processes was made after discussion 
with trade union representatives and researchers in West 
Germany. The steel sector was not seen as a good basis for 
comparison due to the prevalence of national peculiarities 
relating to the Iron, Coal and Steel Act of 1953 in Germany 
and its nationalized status in Britain, as well as indicators 
of the centralization of resolution processes at works council 
and works management level or above. Two steel firms are, 
however, covered in the'case studies to give some impression
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of the characteristics of vzorkplace relations in this sector.
The electro-technical, car manufacture and engineering sectors
were chosen for comparison. Initial discussions with workplace
representatives covered maintenance, assembly, metal processing
and other departments represented in the respective firms. It
was recognised that each department had its own grievance
patterns and resolution processes, which would require different
sets of questions to obtain the necessary information. The
processes of assembling parts was therefore chosen as it
provided a basis of comparison between electro-technical and
engineering plants and between differently sized firms, as well
as being associated in British and American studies with higher
grievance rates than other departments or technological 
317processes.
The particular sizes of firms chosen were related to the interest 
in the different effects of small batch or unit production with 
an emphasis on craftsmanship, and mass or large batch
318production, which focused on mass assembly processes. These
different processes of production were expected to influence 
grievance rates and'resolution processes. Size levels rep­
resented in the study were small (under 200 employees, though 
over 100 to facilitate access and the study of worker rep­
resentatives' activities), medium-sized (up to 3,000 employees) 
and large (over 5,000).
iii) Sample Size
The case studies covered ten firms visited during the course 
of four visits to West Germany. In most of the firms it was 
possible to hold separate discussions with the works council 
chairman and manager responsible for industrial relations at 
works level, although in the small firms it was difficult to 
obtain interviews with both parties.
The questionnaire survey was piloted in three firms, where 
qualitative interviews on the basis of the questionnaires were
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held with representatives from the four groups of respondents:- 
shop-stewards, works councillors, employees and foremen. Forty 
questionnaires were completed and discussed.
The actual survey took place in six firms who were prepared to 
assist the project. Five hundred questionnaires were sent out 
and three hundred were completed and collected in person by the 
researcher. The missing questionnaires are accounted for by 
the steel production plant’s inability to complete its 
questionnaires due to a sudden deterioration in the economic
situation necessitating extensive short-time working and a
consequent deterioration in relations with management, which 
affected the cooperation with the survey. The steel manufactur­
ing plant was only able to complete forty of its one hundred
questionnaires due to a variety of circumstances and was not
included in the data analysis based on the SPSS system. The 
completed questionnaires by firm and by respondent group are 
as follows:-
irm: - By respondent group:-
car manufacturing 108 shop-stewards 71
electro-technical 
(medium) 78 foremen 43
electro-technical 
(small) 36 employees 136
engineering 
(small) 37 works council 50
steel manufacturing 41
300 • 300
The respondents could not be selected by a statistically valid 
procedure. The choice of respondent and the sample size were 
dependent on the cooperation of the works council and manage­
ment. The implications of this for the survey are, firstly, 
that the respondents probably reflect a greater level of 
activity in the workplace and satisfaction with the workplace
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system than is generally the case. Where management represent­
atives were responsible for the distribution, there is probably 
a higher level of satisfaction with the management organisation 
among respondents, and the contrary, where works councillors or 
shop-stewards were responsible. The fact that there was no 
choice of sample size meant that the size needed for a 
statistical analysis (50 - 100 in each subgroup) could not be 
attained especially in the small firms. The sample size thus 
affected the statistical validity and generalisation of the 
findings. The frequencies and cross-tabulations by size and 
technology cannot therefore claim to provide a statistically 
representative sample of blue collar workers involved in 
assembly processes in the metalworking sector. The application 
of the findings is discussed in the final section of this 
chapter.
iv) Application of the Empirical Findings
Details of the interview schedules and questionnaires are given 
in the appendices. Despite the problems associated with the 
lack of statistical validity and thus generalisation of the 
empirical findings together with the problem of definitional 
terms in a cross-cultural study, the findings present an. 
illustration of conflict resolution processes under specific 
conditions including a legislative framework for conflict 
resolution, a particular size of plant and technological process, 
a specific level of trade union organisation and workforce 
structure.
The findings can be compared with German and British studies 
of similar plants to reveal differences and similarities and 
to provide a safeguard against the findings being purely 
coincidental. They illustrate conflict resolution processes 
not only from the point of view of ’experts’ but also the 
actual actors involved including employees who raise the actual 
problems studied. A variety of influences shape the process
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of conflict perception, initiation and resolution. The 
relative impact of the different influences, both constants 
and variables, will be investigated in the final chapters of 
the thesis.
IV) Summary of the Thesis
Chapter one has dealt with the major theoretical approaches 
to the study of industrial relations topics and has outlined 
the theoretical and methodological bases of the investigation 
of conflict and conflict resolution in this study.
Chapter two looks in detail at conflict resolution procedures 
as one aspect of the industrial relations system and discusses 
the difficulties associated in a cross-national comparison of 
procedural systems.
Chapter three provides a historical perspective of the develop­
ment of the British and German systems of industrial relations, 
underlining those factors which contributed towards a 
voluntaristic system in Britain and a legalised, centralised 
system in the FRG.
Chapter four focuses on the plant level systems of industrial 
relations in the two countries. The British system emerges 
from the literature survey as a voluntary, decentralised, 
conflictual system whilst the German system's main character­
istics are its legal framework, its centralised and co­
operative structure. The implications of these two different 
frameworks for conflicts and conflict resolution are assessed 
in detail.
Chapter five presents the empirical findings of the case studies 
of nine German plants in the metalworking and electro-technical 
branches of the economy. Each case study describes the specific 
plant level industrial relations context as well as outlining 
actual conflict issues and procedures
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Chapter six represents an analysis of the main influences on 
conflicts and conflict resolution in the German plants and 
compares the findings with the situation in the U.K., outlining 
similarities and differences in the patterns emerging.
Chapter seven suggests further modifications to the theoretical 
concept of an industrial relations system in the light of the 
empirical findings and suggests a typology of conflict and 
conflict resolution which is incorporated into the system 
model.
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CHAPTER TWO: Conflict Resolution Procedures in the
Industrial Relations System: Some 
Theoretical and Definitional Distinctions
1) The Function of Conflict Resolution Procedures in the 
Industrial Relations System
I) The Institutionalisation of Conflict
The key function of conflict resolution procedures in the 
industrial relations system is the institutionalisation 
of conflicts arising, so that differences can be resolved 
peaceably by means of joint decisions on appropriate 
substantive rulings.
•A*
Geiger has been accredited with the initial development
of the concept of the 'institutionalisation* of conflict
in industrial society. His work traces the development of
the workers' organisations and the replacement of open
warfare between labour and capital by negotiation. The
recognition of the conflict between the two interest groups
2 3led to its control and legitimation. Dahrendorf summarises 
the nature of the institutionalisation of conflict as follows
'..in post capitalist societies industrial conflict 
has become less violent because its existence has 
been accepted and its manifestations have been 
socially regulated ... Today industrial conflict 
is recognised as a necessary feature of industrial 
life. this recognition, as well as the establish­
ment of regulatory institutions, constitutes in 
itself a structural change which is due to no small 
extent to the effects of industrial conflict.'4
The process of institutionalisation protects the mutual sur­
vival of the two parties, reduces injury, introduces predict-5ability and protects third parties. Conflict resolution
* Footnotes in Volume Two p. 18.
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procedures provide a mechanism to ensure this institutional­
isation. Hawkins describes them as 'an agreed code of£
voluntary restraints on the use of power'; Singleton as 
'providing an accepted method of dealing with such business' 
i.e. the resolution of differences; and Thomson and Murray 
as a 'help to bring about accommodation between the two 
sides in the context of divergent interests'.^
There are preconditions which need to be met for the 
institutionalisation of industrial conflict. Dahrendorf's 
work outlines four preconditions:- the recognition by 
both parties of the necessity and reality of the conflict 
situation and of the justice of their opponent's cause, 
the organisation of the two interest groups as regulation 
is impossible where there are 'diffuse incoherent aggregates^ 
agreement on the formal rules of the game including pro­
cedural norms, and the development of rules which put the 
parties on an equal footing and do not disable one or the 
other group. These conditions are reiterated in most works 
on conflict and conflict resolution. Conflict theorists
in the behaviouiaLschool expand on these elements. Morton 
11Deutsch , for example, adds the need for willingness to 
accept the outcome of the regulation even where it is un­
favourable to one's own interest, and the advantages
12accruing from the parties being part of a common community.
In his view, adherence to the rules is made easier where 
the rules are known and are clear and consistent, where they 
are not perceived to be biased against one's own interests, 
where the other party adheres to the rules and violations 
are quickly known by significant third parties, where past 
adherence has been rewarding and thus encourages the parties 
to seek the preservation of the system of regulation. These 
represent some of the factors contributing towards the 
legitimacy of the procedures for conflict resolution in 
the eyes of those who use them and hence their commitment 
to use them.
j oint
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II) Legitimacy and Commitment in the Institutionalisation 
of Industrial Conflict
For the institutionalisation of conflict to result from the 
use of resolution procedures the parties need to recognise 
the legitimacy of the procedures and be committed to their 
use to resolve conflicts peaceably rather than resorting 
to open warfare. In industrial relations practice pro­
cedures are used in a variety of ways depending on the actors’ 
interests and perceptions of the conflict relationship. In
his study of the 1922 Engineering Procedure Hyman revealed
13its use as a bargaining instrument, as shown in the large 
number of pay claims referred through the procedure, and as 
a form of intra-organisational bargaining to show trade union 
members that their demands were unrealistic.^^ Thomson and 
Murray outline various models of grievance procedures in­
cluding the administrative model (where the procedure is a 
means of finding the best answer to a problem in the shortest 
time), the judicial model (where the procedure operates as 
a process of law to interprete substantive rules), the 
power model (where the procedure is used to press claims) 
and procedures as an information processing system (where
a problem is taken as quickly as possible to the person
15who has the authority to make a decision on it). These
models form the basis of the analysis in chapter six of the 
different modes of operating plant-level conflict resolution 
procedures in Britain and West Germany.
A number of theories exist on which factors are crucial
16in the promotion of legitimacy and commitment. Goldthorpe 
17and Fox emphasise the social balance of power and the need 
to relate procedures to the actors' social power positions 
before a sense of legitimacy can be established. The 
history of the 1922 Engineering Procedure provides an 
example of how procedures need to change to reflect the
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social balance of power. The procedure was imposed on 
the trade unions by management when the former were in a 
weak position after a failed strike in 1898 and a success­
ful lockout in 1922. The procedure contained many features 
favouring the employers' prerogative to manage their firms 
in their own way including a system of employer conciliation 
whereby conflicts were reviewed by panels of employers not joint 
committees and a 'management functions clause' which per­
mitted management to introduce changes and compelled the 
unions to work on managements' terms until their objection 
to the change had been through the procedural stages.
As trade union strength increased in the postwar era 
they voiced serious objections to the procedure and began 
to use it as an instrument to press their own interests, 
particularly wage claims. Thus the operation of the pro­
cedure itself became a matter of dispute and lead to the 
reliance on informal procedures which could be 'put in
obeyance unilaterally to suit the changing convenience
19or strategy of either party.' The procedure was event­
ually discarded in 1971 but not before a legacy of distrust 
and power bargaining to obtain one's own interests had been 
established in the engineering industry, thus presenting 
considerable obstacles to the operation of any future 
procedures as a means to institutionalise conflict. How­
ever, adjustments to procedures to reflect changing social 
balances of power are very difficult to effect by the 
actors involved in the power struggle. This led Marsh
and others to call for a greater involvement of the state
20and other third parties in procedural reforms.
In the area of legitimacy the perception of the actors
is a crucial factor and the effects of the social balance
of power on the use of procedures is dependent on how the
actors perceive the power structure and respond to their 
21perception. in his study of the engineering industry
78
Brown emphasises the requirement that the workforce has
a political awareness of its interests and the power and
opportunity to put their awareness into action for custom
22and practice rules to emerge in the plant. A further
requirement is a poor management control system which
allows practices to emerge which the workforce come to
see as legitimate to defend. In practice, the normal
mode of rule-making at plant level is unilateral decision-
23making by management. ~ Few workers develop a radical
perception of social power relations based on political 
24programmes. Although changing attitudes towards pro­
cedures are related to wider social factors, more direct 
influences or attitudes are those specific to a particular 
plant or company. This is reflected in the fact that a 
serious breakdown in the use of procedures is limited to 
a few companies in the British context.
Behaviouralist studies, as indicated in section 1 I), focus
on the relationship between the actors themselves. Key
influences on attitudes to and thus use of procedures
include both the content of the procedures themselves
(clear and consistent rules not favouring one side or the
other) and the history of their use in the plant concerned
(whether they have been adhered to by the other side,
25whether adherence to the rules has been rewarding).
Purcell has investigated some of the factors leading to
26low trust relationships in firms in Britain whilst Kott-
noff found no evidence of a 'spiral of distrust' in the
relationships between the parties in the German plants he
surveyed, although he did discover 'spirals of impotence'
27with respect to some works councils. Behaviouralist 
studies affirm the self-reinforeing process of an established 
pattern of relationships, whether low trust or high trust:
'Insofar as interaction tends to develop habits, 
customs, institutions, attitudes and ideologies 
within the parties congruent with their positions 
in the interaction, there will be a tendency for
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interaction to persist in its initial form 
despite effective changes to the situations 
of the tv/o parties.’28
'External pressure, internal change .. historical accident
(and) the effect of a management's reaction to a particular
event' are seen by Turner as the way into a spiral of 
29distrust. ‘ Purcell sees the way out as a trauma which
compels both sides to realise their mutual dependence.
Where this realisation is rewarded it can lead to a 'virt-
30uous circle' of relationships.
In the present study, legitimacy and commitment to plant- 
level conflict resolution procedures are analysed both in 
terms of a historical appraisal of the origins and develop­
ment of the procedural systems in chapters 3 and 4 and 
their actual use in the case study firms in chapter 5.
Ill) Assessment of the Effectiveness of Conflict Resolution 
Procedures
The institutionalisation of conflict implies a channelling
of conflicts through procedures for their peaceful resolution. 
31Dahrendorf emphasises that the aim of such procedures is 
not the elimination of conflict but the regulation of its 
expression. The effectiveness of procedures cannot, how­
ever, be measured by the existence of absolute industrial
32 33peace. Both Marsh and Singleton point out that pro­
cedures cannot resolve all stoppages for not all stoppages 
are unjustified:
'Some of the most spectacular disputes follow 
meticulous observation of preliminary procedures. 
Decisions on substantive issues like pay levels 
are matters of policy and procedures do not determ­
ine policy decisions. They are the means through 
which they are carried out.'34
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Procedures cannot resolve economic interest conflicts or 
eliminate the conflict between capital and labour but, 
according to Marsh, they should be 'sufficiently effect­
ive to ensure that all reasonable attempts are being made
35 36to achieve a peaceful settlement.' Mack and Snyder
point out that they should contribute to stable, specific
power relations which help the parties to develop expect-
37ations about the system of resolution. The aim of
institutionalisation is the continuity of interaction
between the parties and regularised procedures to handle
3 8changes in conditions, goals and power. A low degree of 
institutionalisation is easily discernible in the chronic 
recurrence of unsettled issues, the absence of agreed pro­
cedures to review their relations, the discontinuity of
39interaction and drastic shifts in the mode of resolution. 
Mack and Snyder stress the importance of the perception of 
the parties for institutionalisation to be effective - the 
parties must recognise that the utility of violent modes 
of resolution has become limited for them to seriously 
attempt to control warfare.^ Singleton^ emphasises the 
necessity of goodwill otherwise the procedures are reluct­
antly subscribed to by suspicious enemies. Attitudinal 
factors are crucial. He does point out, however, that 
wel1-designed procedures can help to sustain goodwill in 
difficult circumstances by providing for joint discussion 
and some codification of previous agreements.
The effectiveness of procedures cannot therefore be 
assessed by an isolated review of the levels of overt 
conflict. The economic, political, social and techno­
logical context of a particular industry or company may 
generate major conflicts of interest which procedures can­
not be expected to resolve peacefully. The existence of 
long-term endemic strike situations and conflictual re­
lations between the two parties as well as the above
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indications of a low level of institutionalisation do, 
however, point to the need for a major review of the 
parties' relations. By its inclusion of the context of 
industrial relations and actual conflicts arising as well 
as the procedures themselves, the present study seeks to 
provide a comprehensive basis for the assessment of pro­
cedural effectiveness in terms of the institutionalisation 
of conflict.
2) Some Definitions in the Study of Conflict Resolution 
Procedures
I) Conflicts of Rights and Conflicts of Interests in 
Industrial Relations
In chapter one, rules regulating employment relationships 
were seen as the concern of industrial relations. This 
included informal and formal, structured and unstructured 
rules as seen in Dunlop's inclusion of 'the customs and 
traditions of the workplace and work community'^ in his 
definition of the rules which represent the output of the 
industrial relations system.
Works on industrial relations distinguish between sub­
stantive and procedural rules. The substantive rules, 
according to Dunlop, define jobs and govern'compensation, 
expected performance and duties of the workforce, their4 o
rights and obligations and general working conditions.
Flanders sees such rules as the output from the system.^
Procedural rules 'regulate the making, interpretation
and enforcement of its substantive rules, they provide...
the institution of job regulation with its form and con- 
45stitution , they govern the rule-making process of the 
system.
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Within procedural rules a further distinction is made
between rule-making and rule administration in the use 
46of procedures. This lies at the heart of the distinction 
between negotiating procedures and grievance procedures. 
Negotiating procedures produce substantive agreements 
whereas grievance procedures administer these agreements 
in daily working life, applying their clauses to individual 
cases which cannot be dealt with in detail in the agree­
ments, which are usually drawn up at industry or regional 
levels. Rule administration, however, can be adjudicative - 
a judicial process to interprete the rules or legislative -
actually creating new rules in its creative interpretation
47of the agreements. Whilst these distinctions are easy 
to uphold in theory, they are obscured in practice.
The American system, for example, is based on the distinction
between disputes of interest - disputes over the terms of
new collective (substantive or procedural) agreements -
and disputes of rights, which 'involve efforts to vindicate
rights already established by law or by individual or
I Zj. 0collective agreements. Within the latter category there 
is a further distinction for procedural purposes between 
disputes of rights relating to statutory law, which are 
dealt with by public administration tribunals or the courts, 
and those disputes relating to collective agreements, 
which are dealt with by grievance procedures. The griev­
ance procedure has arbitration as its last stage and the 
trade unions have renounced their right to strike over such 
issues, while a collective agreement is in operation. Con­
flicts over interests are excluded from the grievance pro­
cedure and, according to Aaron, are not usually carried
further than informal discussions unless a new collective
49agreement is being negotiated. The American definition 
of a grievance is thus:-
'A claim that a right established by collective 
agreement has been violated by one of the parties
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to the agreement, usually the employer, either 
directly, by engaging in conduct absolutely pro­
hibited by the agreement, or indirectly, by mis- 
construing or incorrectly applying the agreement.1
51Chamberlain, in his historical account of the development 
of this distinction in the USA, describes the nature of the 
grievance procedure as follows
'It disavowed any purpose of using bargaining 
power or strategic position to force a favourable 
decision. It proposed to seek a solution to 
particular problems on the basis of principles 
which had already been jointly agreed by both 
parties.'52
The difficulty of upholding the distinction between negot­
iation and grievance procedures in practice is described 
53by Kuhn, who notes a shift in the use of procedures from
the adjudication of grievances to on-the-]ob joint determ-
54 55ination of working conditions. Kennedy has described 
the use of grievance procedures as 'grievance negotiation', 
which has several purposes not just the interpretation of 
agreements but actual extension of the terms of the agree­
ment and, in some cases, the preparation for open conflict 
when the collective agreement ends so that the procedure 
is used for guerilla warfare not resolution of conflict.
In the FE.G, a distinction is also made between disputes
56of interest and rights. The main difference between
the German and American systems is the preference for the
public ordering of dispute settlement procedures by the
labour courts instead of voluntary or private institutional 
57arrangements. This derives from the fact that employment
5 8rights are created more by law than private agreements.
Many works refer to the wide discretion of the labour
courts in the development of employment rights as the result
of the general clauses of legislation passed on employment 
59matters. * Collective agreements are also viewed as
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legally binding contracts with an implicit peace obligation 
during their duration. The predominant role of the legal 
system in the operation of industrial relations in the FRG 
means grievance procedures are not a major factor in the 
system of workplace relations, unlike the USA, The right 
of grievance of individual workers, set down in the Works 
Constitution Act 1972 (S 84 and 85), reads like an in­
dividual legal entitlement under the law not a procedure 
for the administration of collective agreements. The in­
dividual has a right of appeal to management or the works 
council 1 if he feels that he has been discriminated against 
or treated unfairly or otherwise put at a disadvantage by 
the employer or other employees.' (WCA 1972 § 84,1). 
Empirical study has confirmed the insignificance of this 
clause on grievance procedures in the actual operation of 
workplace relations. Any administration of agreements pro­
ceeds via the works council, which is bound by a peace 
obligation in carrying out its duties (WCA 1972 74,2).
It tends to view collective agreements in terms of legal 
entitlements with conflicts of interests being transferred 
to regional and industry levels, where detailed agreements 
are negotiated by trade union and employers' association.
In Britain, no distinction is made between conflicts of
right and those of interest. The reasons for this are
usually traced to the predominance of voluntary methods
of dispute resolution, whereby collective agreements are
viewed as gentlemens' agreements to be upheld by social
not legal sanctions.^ Collective bargaining is not seen
in terms of legally binding, fixed term contracts with a
peace obligation, but as 'a continuous process in which
differences concerning the interpretation of an agreement
merge imperceptibly into differences concerning claims to
* 61change its effects. Collective agreements do not est­
ablish detailed rules so that 'procedures are very little
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used in the application or interpretation of substantive 
62agreements.’ Instead, relations are said to be con-
6 3ducted on the basis of 'procedural handling of grievances.' 
Various recommendations on the structure of workplace re­
lations have pointed to the need for a distinction between
different procedures to replace the general, multipurpose
6 4  *procedures used in the workplace. The parties have, how­
ever, rejected the need for a distinction between a grievance
and a claim in their procedures, preferring flexible pro-
65cedures to deal with any issue and arguing that in a sit­
uation of continuous changes in production it is not possible
to separate the interpretation of a contract from amendments
6 6to the contract. Lord Denning has also argued the diff­
iculty of distinguishing rights and interests in practice
and sees it as largely dependent on how the parties choose
67 68to view the issue. Flanders views the absence of legal
restrictions in the UK system as due either to the effective­
ness of voluntary restrictions or to the fact that labour 
has been so weak that management has been able to impose its 
own terms in the workplace. Recent studies of management 
attitudes to industrial relations show a new interest in
some legal restrictions, chiefly on labour's freedom of 
69action. The trade unions remain opposed to any changes 
in the voluntary system.^
The brief outline of three different systems for the instit­
utionalisation of industrial conflict show the wide variety 
of forms this can take, from the autonomous system based 
on informal social controls in the UK to the German system, 
where conflict is largely regulated by legal norms enforced 
from outside the industrial relations system.^ The problems 
involved in comparing such different systems, especially in 
terms of the general definitions used, are discussed below.
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II) Definitions used in the Comparative Study of Conflict 
Resolution Procedures
In a comparative study of two different industrial relations 
systems problems arise in the development of definitional 
terms which are applicable to both situations. Early work 
associated with this study recognised a distinction between 
a grievance and a claim based on the ILO's definitions:-
'.. a grievance may be submitted by the worker 
or workers concerned in respect of any measure 
or situation which directly affects or may 
affect the conditions of employment of one or 
several workers in the undertaking, when that 
measure appears contrary to the provisions of 
an applicable collective agreement or of an in­
dividual contract of employment, to works rules, 
to laws or regulations or to the custom and usage 
of the occupation or country. Where a grievance 
is transformed into a general claim at some stage 
in its examination, the claim falls outside the 
grievance procedure and normally comes within 
the area of collective bargaining.f72
This definition is based on a broad appreciation of what 
'rights' can involve in different industrial relations 
systems. It has been seen, however, that in practice it is 
difficult to uphold a distinction between issues relating 
to rights and those relating to claims or interests. This 
is true even in a system such as the FRG, where the parties 
recognise a difference between the two. Here the role of 
the labour courts in making law as they interprete existing 
legislation is now seen to be a major problem. In the USA , 
grievance procedures do not only administer the terms of 
agreements but also enlarge upon them - in grievance neg­
otiation. In a system such as that in the UK, where industry 
agreements provide minimum conditions only and the law has 
a minor role in the regulation of workplace relationships, 
regulation occurs at workplace level on an informal basis 
with few written agreements and procedures. It is very 
difficult in such a situation to separate rights and interests 
for procedural purposes.
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Some works distinguish grievances and claims not on the
basis of rights and interests but as to whether an issue
affects only an individual or a small group or workers or
a larger collective. The former are usually resolved at
low level, the latter at higher levels in the management
73and trade union hierarchies.
This distinction is difficult to uphold in the UK because 
individuals and small groups tend to refer issues to their 
shopstewards who, if they perceive some bargaining value 
in the issue, will take it into the general ongoing bar­
gaining relationship with management. Since neither side 
recognises a distinction between rights and interests, 
issues arising from individuals or small groups can become 
major claims leading to industrial action. The government's
Code of Industrial Relations practice does recommend sep-
74arate individual and collective procedures and Thomson
and Murray give an example of such a distinction in the
ASTMS - Pilkington agreement of 1971, which distinguishes
between individual issues, those affecting a number of
75employees and those of common collective interest.
A further distinction is based not on how many workers are 
affected by an issue but the nature of a specific issue.
This is usually related to the highly contentious nature of 
certain issues such as discipline, dismissals and redundan­
cies. Even in Britain, the law has recognised how such 
issues can quickly lead to serious conflict and has made 
legal provision for their settlement. Marsh has shown how 
the intervention of the law has had a big impact on pro­
cedures in Britain.^
Differentiation of procedures according to the nature of 
issues can also be based on the high level of disputes 
in a specific industry or firm, such as demarcation dis­
putes, recruitment, promotion, manning levels. Singleton
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points out that where it is not possible to eliminate
these problems, specific procedures can ease their hand-
, . 771 m g .
Schregle,7  ^ in his assessment of European and American 
labour court systems, argues that the theoretical distinct­
ion between rights and interests, individual and collective 
issues appears to be a logical one but it does not reflect 
the reality of the different systems of industrial relations 
in practice and is therefore not a useful basis for com­
parison. His advice is to direct a comparative study to 
general social issues and look at how the systems deal with 
them. This is the path chosen in the present study of 
procedures for resolving workplace conflicts. The original 
theme of the study was grievance procedures. Further study 
of the actual operation of ’grievance procedures' in Britain 
and West Germany showed that, despite their formal existence, 
they were not a major part of the resolution processes 
taking place. Neither system understands grievance pro­
cedures as the means of administering collective agreements 
at workplace level as in the American system. In the FRG, 
a grievance procedure is outlined in the Works Constitution 
Act 1972 ('Beschwerderecht') but represents only a general 
right to take grievances to management or the works council. 
The term 'Beschwerde' or grievance tends to evoke the pic­
ture of a 'moaner', who is always finding grounds for com­
plaint, in the eyes of German managers. Workers are not 
viewed as presenting grievances but rather requests for 
information or, at most, problems which need to be solved 
by management and the works council. There is a marked 
preference among the actors in the German system for in­
formal resolution processes with reference only being made 
to the law where these processes do not achieve a solution.
In the British system there is some evidence that more firms 
are now drawing up formal grievance procedures but there is 
little information about the significance of such procedures
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in the actual practice of workplace relations. Singleton 
has pointed out the general lack of a distinction between 
a grievance and a negotiating procedure in practice in 
Britain. Views on what a grievance actually is vary greatly 
- some avoid the use of the tern, as in the German system, 
and talk about questions and matters, others see a grievance 
as pertaining to an individual employee, others view a 
grievance as becoming a dispute where a shopsteward or trade 
union officer is called in, or where an issue is referred 
to an external procedure (outside the workplace) or there 
is a failure to agree. Generally, one procedure tends to 
be used for both grievances and disputes as an unsettled 
grievance can become a dispute, especially where all inter­
action with trade union representatives is seen as negotiat-
80ion. As Denning argued that one issue can be seen either 
as one involving rights or interests depending on the views 
of the parties to the issue, so it can be argued that the 
distinction between a grievance and a claim depends on how 
the parties view issues arising in the plant. Since the 
parties in Britain tend not to make the distinction between 
rights and interests in practice the study adopted the more 
general theme of plant-level conflict resolution procedures.
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3) Major Elements of Conflict Resolution Procedures
I) A Hierarchy of Appeals
Procedures usually contain a hierarchy of appeals, that is
81 82 a series of steps' or, in Marsh's ** words, sieves, which
ensure that those with effective authority deal with the
issues. Each new level of authority reviews the decisions
of earlier levels as to the suitability of settlement at
different procedural levels. The number of stages vary
90
with the management hierarchy in a specific firm and with
83the issue in question. Thomson and Murray argue that 
there is a minimum of three levels in each procedure:- 
the supervisor or foreman, the departmental or middle 
management, senior management. This becomes much more 
complex in large plants with many specialised departments 
and committees, which deal with specific issues such as 
job evaluation. Two preconditions for the effective op­
eration of such a hierarchy are, that at each level there 
is effective authority to settle issues appropriate to that 
level and a serious attempt is made to settle at each level, 
also that the number of steps does not delay the speedy 
settlement of issues. Where these preconditions do not 
exist as foremen fear any decisions they make will be over­
ruled or senior management discourage settlement at lower 
levels because they fear the creation of undesirable settle­
ments, or workers have found they obtain better results If 
they bypass a number of stages in the procedure, there is 
usually a breakdown in the procedure's operation.
The terminating point of a hierarchy of appeals usually 
involves reference to a third party. In the American 
system there is a voluntary commitment to use arbitration 
as the final stage in the grievance procedure* Kennedy 
views this a vital precondition for an effective procedure
'.. the mere existence of final and binding 
third party decisions as the certain and pre­
dictable destination of all unsettled griev­
ances is the fact which makes a viable pro­
cedure of grievance negotiation.'84
It can, however, lead the parties to renounce their res­
ponsibilities to reach a mutual agreement, as seen in the
case of the 'arbitration mill' at International Harvester.
In the more legalised German system, the labour courts 
have an important role as the final stage for disputes of
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rights. The collective bargaining parties outside the 
workplace employ arbitration as a final stage in their 
negotiation of collective agreements before the resort to 
industrial action. Conciliation boards have been established 
by law to deal with workplace issues specifically relating 
to interests, and although they are little used in practice, 
the mere fact of their legal provision can be viewed as en­
couraging peaceful voluntary settlement of issues in the 
workplace. In Britainjgeneral voluntary commitment to the 
use of arbitration is not widespread. The employers view 
third party intervention as a diminishing of their prerog­
atives and the trade unions refuse to give up their freedom
8 6to resort to strike action if they so wish. The case 
studies and literature survey will outline the hierarchy of 
appeals specific to different plants.
II) Securing Commitment to Procedures
Various methods are employed to maintain the integrity of 
procedures, that is, to encourage observance of agreements 
and discourage unconstitutional industrial action. Time 
limits represent one method of securing commitment to 
follow each step of the procedure by agreement on a com­
promise between the interests of the workforce in a speedy 
settlement of issues and the desire of management to have
time to gather all the facts and coordinate the decision- 
8 7making. Time limits, which usually are lengthened as 
issues proceed up the procedure as an indication of their 
gravity, provide a reassurance to the workforce that settle­
ment will not be infinitely delayed and thus discourage the
8 8resort to strike action to press for a settlement.
Another method used to secure commitment is the use of 
status quo agreements to ensure the procedure is not biased 
in management's favour. -A status quo clause ensures that
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a change by management which has been challenged by the 
trade union will not be put into effect until the procedure 
has been exhausted. Employers object to such clauses as 
they are felt to challenge management's right to manage 
their establishments. The Engineering Employers Feder­
ation only accepts a status quo clause on changes which. . 8 9depart from agreements or established practice. The
problems of agreement on what issues the status quo clauses
should apply to are immense in the British system, where
agreements are general and vague, and informal settlements
predominate. In the FRG, the problem has been legislated
for by a general peace obligation on workplace relations,
and a legal distinction between issues decided by joint
agreement and those subject to unilateral management
decision-making.
Ill) Written Procedural Agreements
The formalisation of procedural agreements in written
documents has been a major discussion point in Britain
since the publication of the Roval Commission's report^
q iand research papers in 196S." The research paper onQ 2workplace relations by McCarthy and Parker" revealed the
informality of the relations between the two parties,
which the researchers viewed not as the expression of a
mutual desire for flexibility but a continuation of con-
93flictual relations. Management opposed the formalisation 
of works agreements and procedures as they feared this 
would establish de jure rights for shopstewards, which 
could not be challenged or bargained over when circumstances 
were in management's favour. It was thought that shop- 
stewards would see the formalised rights as just the first 
step in the extension of their rights. Shopstewards fav­
oured formalisation of procedures but not works agreements.
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The Donovan Report and the later Code of Industrial
9 5Relations Practice recommended that procedures should
be written down and cover the constitution of joint
negotiating bodies, issues which can be bargained about
and at which levels, facilities and rights for trade union
96activities, procedures to settle disputes. Singleton', 
too, sees advantages in having written procedures based 
on joint discussion and agreement. The process of form­
alising joint procedures forces the parties to discuss 
controversial issues and reduces misunderstandings, espec­
ially when the personnel operating the procedures change, 
such procedures provide a common basis from which the parties 
can consider necessary changes and amendments, and the fact 
that they are written down makes it easier to ensure clar­
ity and consistency of use of procedure in day-to-day con­
flict resolution. Caution does need to be exercised
in the introduction and scope of formalisation because the 
procedures need to be flexible enough to register gradual 
changes in the relationship - Singleton sees the aim as 
commitment to a method of resolving conflicts not to a 
static procedural system. Other problems such as the fact 
that formalisation can lead to changes in the actual rules 
operating and can create conflict will be discussed in 
later chapters.
The documentation of actual grievances has not been a
subject of serious debate in Britain. It is seen as
97advantageous at the higher stages of a procedure, where 
the parties are not familiar with the circumstances of 
the issue as it helps clarify the issue and prevent mis­
understandings. Similarly, a written statement of the 
final decision on an issue is useful for the same reasons 
and also to build up a case law on how to deal with issues, 
although the parties in Britain have not favoured this 
development. Recording of grievances at lower levels 
should only be used where there are severe problems with 
procedures and management needs to see the course of 
grievances.
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IV) Formal and Informal Procedures
The distinction between formal and informal procedures
, 90was at the heart of the Donovan Reports assessment of 
British workplace relations. The report diagnosed Britain's 
problems as due to a conflict between the formal system of 
industry-wide agreements and procedures and the informal 
system of workplace industrial relations. Shopsteward 
bargaining had become the key means of regulating workplace 
relations but it was not formally recognised in procedures 
as management either refused to recognise the change in 
the balance of power or desired to be free to withdraw in­
formal concessions when circumstances were in their favour.
The Commission noted a wide discrepancy between the view 
of workplace relations reflected in the formal industry­
wide procedures and the actual practice, which was unreg­
ulated by procedures or works agreements.
however, even where formal workplace procedures exist, informal
processes still continue to play an important role. It is
important to distinguish between the informality which was
operating in the British system in the 1960's, which was
due to an absence of any clear agreements to follow, and
the informality, which supplements the operation of formally
agreed procedures bv means of informal discussion between 
99stages ‘ - informality on the basis of jointly agreed and
accepted procedures.
Thomson and Murray make a distinction between formal pro­
cedures (i.e. those written down),^^ standard practices (i.e.
'more or less habitual, officially accepted (though not off-
101icially promulgated) patterns for handling grievances')
102and the actual practice of grievance handling. The pur­
pose of the first two types i s  , as in the case of the W o r k s 
Constitution A c t , to provide the lowest common denominator
of grievance handling patterns, a means of checking deviat­es
ions andAfal1-back position if the informal system is
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constantly abused. It is, however, important to see
formal and informal procedures in the workplace not as 
polar opposites but complementary - the latter enabling
the former to operate in everydav relations in the work-
n 104 place.
The present study seeks to reflect the complexity of the 
operation of conflict resolution procedures by assessing 
official procedures such as the Works Constitution Act and 
written workplace procedures (documentation), standard pract­
ices as described by worker and management representatives 
at higher levels of the procedure and actual practice by 
means of a questionnaire survey of the actors involved in 
the day-to-day resolution of conflicts at lower levels.
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4) The Context of Conflict Resolution
The brief outline of some of the key characteristics of 
the procedural systems for conflict resolution in the American, 
British and German industrial relations systems has shown 
some of the ways in which the context of resolution pro­
cedures influencestheir structure and operation.
Studies of procedures in different national systems usually 
consider the influence of the role of the state by means of 
legislation on the form and operation of procedures partic­
ularly those regulating national and regional trade union 
and employer collective bargaining. In the USA the state 
has played a significant role in the development of present 
patterns of conflict resolution^^ as it has in Germany.
The traditional role of the state in Britain has been ab- 
107stentionist. Where the state has had a major influence
on the conduct of industrial relations labour courts also 
play an important role in the regulation of industrial
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conflict. ' The present study will compare the effects 
of a statutory lav; system in Germany with a common law 
system in Britain on the modes of operation in industrial 
relations with respect to conflict regulation. Both the 
role of the state and judiciary need to be considered in 
a historical perspective to elucidate the reasons behind 
their differing roles in national industrial relations 
systems. Chapter Three provides this historical back­
ground and also assesses the significance of the timing 
and characteristics of the process of industrialisation 
for the developing industrial relations systems in Britain 
and Germany. The present day economic context of both 
systems influences the balance of power between the actors 
both in the wider society and at plant level and as such is 
considered in the chapters on the national and plant-level 
systems of industrial relations. Singleton has underlined 
the importance of a strong labour organisation for the 
institutionalisation of conflict by means of procedures to 
take place. Only a strong organisation can make accommodation 
a desirable proposition for the employers and the state
'It is the potential for conflict which generates 
the need for agreement. It is the organisation 
of employees which makes it possible'.189
The present study looks at the differing impact of cent­
ralised and decentralised structures of trade union coll­
ective bargaining on conflicts and. conflict resolution at 
plant level. Where detailed collective agreements are 
agreed at levels above the plant, plant-level procedures 
tend to deal with the interpretation of these agreements.
Where this is not the case, as in Britain, there is more 
scope for actual plant-level bargaining and thus conflicts.
Plant-level influences on conflict resolution procedures 
include the assessment of the impact of technological pro­
cesses on work organisation and thus on workgroup formation 
and their conflict behaviour. American studies have traced
10 8
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different types of conflict behaviour to technological
factors which either promote or hinder homogenous work- 
111groups. Thomson and Murray consider the influence of
specific technologies on grievances arising and thus on
112informal processes of resolution. However, different
conflict levels and processes of resolution in firms with 
similar technological contexts point to the importance of 
additional plant-level influences.
Size of firm is often seen as an important influence on both 
the level of conflict and complexity of procedures. Increas­
ing size is thought to lead to higher levels of conflict
and thus the need to develop greater procedural specialis- 
113ation. Singleton points to its influence on attitudes
and practices in the evolution of understandings about the
_c i 114-use of procedures.
The organisation and policies of management, particularly
towards wages systems, employment matters, use of procedures
and role of workforce representatives, have an important
impact on conflict levels and the effectiveness of resolution
procedures. The development of custom and practice and high
conflict levels in British plants in the 1960's were related
to poor management information systems, high discretion of
lower management in the administration of rules and a gap
between higher and lower management, and the absence of
bureaucratic rules to support lower management against shop- 
115floor pressure. British industrial relations commentators
attributed these conditions to the priority accorded to 
profitability and the smooth running of production in man­
agement goals and the relegation of the industrial relations
116function to a minor place in management functions generally. 
Further, management's refusal to share decision-making auth­
ority with workforce representatives was thought to lead to 
trials of strength at plant level.
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Karsh views the trade unions as having to operate within
118a regulative framework laid down by management. Thus
policy decisions about the type of technological process 
and size of production unit influence trade union organ­
isation, policies and action at plant level as does the 
nature of the workforce with respect to its age structure, 
sex, race, skill levels and general level of education, 
its social background and geographical location. These
factors influence the workforce attitudes to both management
1 1 9and trade union. Partridge, for example, argues that
workforce values are influenced both by the wider society
120and the technological context of work. Dominant values,
which accept the institutional context of relations with 
management, are derived from the context of work relations, 
subordinate values, which include workforce aims, derive 
from the wider working class community whilst radical 
values are derived from political parties. Only workforces 
with the latter two types of values are prepared to 
challenge managerial authority. Kott^pff similarly empha­
sises the important role of the trade union in influencing
121workforce relations with management. Whilst in-plant
factors influence the workforce towards agreement with 
management goals, factors outside the plant such as political 
parties and trade unions enable the workforce to develop 
its own conception of its goals and interests. The forms 
of plant—level trade union organisation are also an import­
ant influence on conflict perception and collective action
by the workforce. Multi-unionism in British plants is seen
122both as weakening workforce solidarity and leading to
extensive shopsteward organisation in order to coordinate
1 2 3workforce action.
Behavioural studies, as indicated earlier, focus on the 
factors promoting cooperative and conflictual processes of 
resolution. These include aspects of the technical, market 
and power contexts of the plants as well as the influence
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of key individuals and the prior relationship of the two 
124parties. " The fact that endemic strike situations tend
125to be concentrated in a small number of companies where 
there has been a breakdown in procedures leads Purcell to 
speculate that the causes are 'more readily traced to fact­
ors within the company than general societal movements, 
although both are important'. * Structural changes to 
induce reform will not on their own lead to changed atti­
tudes and behaviour since the latter are related to values
127and perceptions which are more resistant to change.
Thus the context of the operation of conflict resolution
procedures incorporates influences from the wider society,
trade union and employer association relations,as well as
plant—level factors and the actors' attitudes and policies.
Just as the context of procedures does not remain static,
procedural arrangements also need to be altered to reflect
the changes in their context, particularly changes in the
balance of power between the actors and conflict levels.
However, the problems associated with any alterations to
procedures often lead in practice to procedural inertia
with the possible breakdown of procedural arrangements
which no longer reflect the realities of the conflict sit-
128uation they are called upon to regulate. Marsh and
others underline the need for external pressure on the
parties to ensure the continuing effectiveness of procedural
„ 129arrangements.
The close relation between procedural arrangements and the 
general context of the industrial relations system also 
militates against the transfer of procedures from one in­
dustry or one firm to another as well as from one national
130context to another. The fact that procedural arrangements
where they are effective, are 'rooted in the social structure 
is reflected in the present study, which considers the gen­
eral context of plant— level procedures in Germany and Britain
! 131
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in a historical perspective. The case studies look at 
specific plant-level contexts within which the operation 
of procedural arrangements is assessed. Thus conflict 
resolution procedures are viewed as one aspect of the 
industrial relations system within its wider societal 
context and an attempt is made to isolate the major in­
fluences on both their form and operation in practice.
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CHAPTER THREE: The National System of Industrial
Relations in Britain and West Germany 
- a Historical Survey
1) Great Britain - a Voluntaris tic Industrial Relations System
Voluntarism is the term used to describe the commitment 
of the parties involved in the system of industrial relat­
ions to the principle of free collective bargaining as the 
means of regulating their relations as opposed to legis­
lative and judicial involvement in the regulation of terms 
and conditions of employment and the resolution of disputes.
The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Assoc­
iations provided evidence of the operation of a voluntary 
system of industrial relations in Britain:—
based on voluntarily agreed rules, which, 
as a natter of principle, are not enforced by law... 
no trade union, no employer in private industry, 
no employers' association is under any legal ob­
ligation to bargain collectively; and, exceptions 
apart, the law does not intervene to enforce such 
a bargain or any of its terms ... In short, it 
has been the traditional policy of the law, as 
far as possible, not to intervene in the system 
of industrial relations .' l,c
The heyday of the voluntarist principle dates from the post- 
second world war period to the mid 1960s when the Royal 
Commission survey was carried out. The impact of volun­
tarism on the operation of procedures at workplace level is 
considered in detail in chapter 4.
In the present study,the British voluntary system of indust­
rial relations will be compared with the 'legalised' system 
in West Germany in an analysis of the operation of both 
national and plant-level systems of regulating relations
* Footnotes in Volume Two p. 26.
102
between employers and employees. Chanter three Highlights 
what are considered to be the main, developments which in­
fluenced the present day systems of industrial relations 
in both countries.
I) The Historical Role of the State in Industrial Relations 
in Oreat Britain
?Marsh' views the role of the state in industrial rel-ations
as a continuum from a voluntary system, where the state
only intervenes to uphold the system, to a system where
the state, either by legislation or decree, shapes the whole
framework of procedural arrangements. The reasons for the
differences in the degree of state involvement in industrial
relations, in his view, are related to the assumptions of
the respective political system, the role of law in society,
and in relations between employers and employees in partic-
ular, and the maturity of employer-trade union relations.
The state in Britain until recently supported the voluntarv
3principle of industrial relations.
In the nineteenth century, after initial outlawing of trade 
unions under the Combination Act, the state tolerated the 
restricted development of trade unions after 1324. The 
success of trade union development, particularly towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, led to attempts bv the 
courts to restrict their activity first by the imposition of 
criminal liabilities and then civil liabilities in court 
cases. Kahn-Freund has described the conflicts of the late 
nineteenth century as a clash between the courtd interpret­
ation of the common law (based on the equality of individuals 
and Parliament’s idea of good social policy as labour in­
creased not only in collective but political strength too.^ 
The results of the clash were a series of legal immunities
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from criminal and civil liability for the trade unions 
incorporated into government statutes. Henceforth, trade 
union activities were to be excluded from common law con­
siderations. Wedderburn describes the emergent collective
labour law as a liberty rather than a right to participate
5in certain collective activities.
There was an attempt to develop a comprehensive labour lav;
code with positive legal rights and duties by the Royal
Commission in 1903, but this was rejected by the trade
unions although supported by lawyers on the Commission and
6in Parliament and by the employers.
Generally, the policy of the legislators has been not to 
regulate employment relations by statute where they can be 
effectively regulated by collective bargaining.7 Statutes 
were limited to subjects which did not lend themselves well 
to collective bargaining. For example, safety, health and 
welfare, and to the support of voluntary collective bar­
gaining where it is poorly developed (cf Wages Councils Act, 
Whitley Recommendation 1916). Legislation on arbitration 
and conciliation has also adhered to the voluntary principle 
apart from war-time emergency situations when arbitration 
was compulsory. Third party involvement in dispute resolution 
has been voluntary and has been viewed as the 'continuation
of the process of collective bargaining with outside ass-
8istance' when the parties' own procedures have been ex- qhausted."
The P.oyal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer Associations 
(RCTIJEA) , set up to examine the state of British industrial 
relations in the mid-1960s, continued to support the op­
eration of a voluntary system. Although some reforms were 
needed they were to be put into effect by the parties them­
selves on a voluntary basis. Some support from government 
agencies would be required to assist the parties in their
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reform of the institutions of collective bargaining so 
that they better reflected the changed power situation, 
especially at plant level,and the Commission supported 
the codification of law on labour relations, their emph­
asis, however, was on voluntary reform of the system.
Both the Labour government in their White Paper ('In Place 
of Strife' 1969) and the Conservative government in their 
Industrial Relations Act of 1971 rejected a purely volun­
tary reform of industrial relations as impracticable in view 
of the urgent necessity of controlling inflation and the 
level of industrial c o n f l i c t . T h e  Conservative govt, attempted 
to create a legal framework for the conduct of industrial 
relations by the 1971 Act. The rejection of its provisions 
by the trade unions when they still had a balance of power 
advantage in the early seventies meant employers rarely 
used the provisions to take unions to court and when they 
did the courts could not enforce the lav? in practice. Sub­
sequent Codes of Industrial Relations Practice and piecemeal 
attempts to influence the industrial relations system by 
the present Conservative government's Employment Acts of 
1980 and 1932 represent a continuation of their attempt to
reform the system albeit by less directly interventionist 
11means. The Labour government's legislation on industrial 
relations continued the earlier tradition of enacting leg­
islation to cover areas not adequately regulated by collect­
ive bargaining and the involvement of industrial tribunals
12in hearing appeals under the new legislation.
Apart from legislation on ■industrial relations,the state
is also impinging more and more on the voluntary system
of industrial relations by its taxation policies, control
of public spending and monetarist measures in order to
control economic processes. This shift from a previously
passive role of the state in Britain to greater state
intervention is a reflection both of the growing power of
13the labour movement to endanger state economic policies
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as well as the increasing interdependencies and complex­
ities of the national economic process and the greater 
requirement for government involvement to control its 
development. The changing role of the state and its eff­
ects on the operation of the voluntary system of industrial 
relations are assessed in greater detail in chapter four.
II) The Historical Role of the Judiciary in Industrial 
Relations
Works which look at the impact of the legal system on 
industrial relations usually distinguish between a statute 
law model, where statutes are used to deal with social re­
lations and the courts interpret them in practice, and a 
common law model, where social relations are dealt with
*1 /
on a case by case basis, a system of 'custom and practice'. 
Under a statute law model such as West Germany, emphasis 
is placed on the 'contract' in industrial relations. The 
contract or collective agreement is viewed as legally bind­
ing and this transfers decisions about what subjects can be 
bargained on, when and how to the courts. Schregle sees the 
advantages of the statute law model as the clarity, logic 
and system it promotes in social relations. The common law 
model, which is found in Britain, is said to emphasise the 
process of negotiation to regulate social relations. The
aim is not legal entitlements but compromises generated by
15the adhoc solution of problems. Clegg sees its advantage 
as its flexibility although the complexity of the substantive 
rules developed by such a system means it is difficult for 
the state or, in the case of the industrial relations sys­
tem, the central negotiators to exert any control on their
development, which can become irrational and generate inter-
16group conflict. Kahn-Freund’s originally positive
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evaluation of the informal nature of intergroup relations
in Britain ('a dynamic system of collective bargaining1)
changed to a more critical analysis of the negative effects
17of legal absentionism by the 1970s. Although he rejected 
direct legal sanctions, such as those incorporated into 
the Industrial Relations Act 1971, as alien to British 
traditions, he advocated comprehensive and systematic legis­
lation on mutual rights and duties not covered by collective
bargaining and a body of legislation on the law of labour
18disputes to clarify when the courts could intervene. c
In Britain, the courts' involvement in industrial relations
has focussed on their attempts to apply common law principles
to collective social organisations first by criminal then
19civil liabilities in the nineteenth century. Wedderburn 
argues that from 1920 - 1952 the courts acquiesced in the 
voluntary principle of industrial relations by applying the 
common law in a spirit of non-intervention. However, since 
the shift in the balance of power in the trade unions' favour, 
the courts have once again attempted to restrict trade union 
activity. His examples include the new tort of intimidation 
by threats to break contracts of employment (countered by 
the Trade Disputes Act 1965 passed by a Labour government), 
the enlargement of tort liabilities associated with know­
ingly inducing a breach of existing commercial contracts,
20and the use of labour injunctions to break strikes. This
culminated in the passing of the Industrial Relations Act
1971, which had as its aim the greater involvement of courts
and judges in industrial relations and the nronagation of
21the ideology of individual ism.
The Industrial Relations Act reflected the change in the
states and the employers' attitudes to voluntarism. Wedder- 
22burn argues that the voluntary system depended on the acq­
uiescence of the middle classes. The new interest in greater 
legal intervention in industrial relations marks the turn 
away from a purely voluntarist system and, possibly, a
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decline in the confidence of employers that they can 
adequately represent their interests in the voluntary 
play of social forces under a changed balance of power.
Several recent studies show a change in the employers1 
attitudes to legal intervention. In his study of man­
agement in Britain, Poole showed that:-
1 despite a generally hostile stance on state 
intervention respondents made a clear exception 
in the case of labour discipline, for legislation 
to curb strikes, tribunals to investigate strikes 
and compulsory arbitration were all enthusiast­
ically endorsed. Similarly, the Conservative 
government's intentions to limit secondary pick­
eting, to provide facilities for secret ballots 
and to make changes in the effects of closed shop 
agreements were all strongly supported.'23
Trade union opposition to greater le5^al intervention in 
industrial relations has remained constant, although a dist­
inction must be made between individual employment law9 
based on tine contract of employment and involving greater 
legal entitlements for employees, and attempts to intervene 
in collective employee relations with employers. Flanders 
argued that the trade unions do not distrust legislation 
so much as the courts of law but this lias meant that the 
trade unions have rejected legal support where it has meant
greater legal intervention as this is seen as a threat to 
24their autonomy. The courts have been seen as anti-union be­
cause of their espousal of the common law principle of
equality between individuals when trade unions are based on
25collective organisation. The principle of individualism
threatens the role and existence of trade unions and Marsh
uses this to explain the reliance on voluntarism, which
'derives partly from the absence of an alternative legal
26basis which is generally acceptable'. Any plans to create 
an acceptable legal basis by a system of positive collective 
rights could founder on the courts' inability to alter
traditional perceptions about the priority of the individual. 27
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III) The History of Trade Union-Employer Relations in Britain
The nineteenth century saw the emergence of an effective
2 8trade union movement in Britain. Lewis ° sets the start of 
industrialisation in Britain as the mid-eighteenth century. 
With industrialisation came the end of the legal fixing of 
wages by magistrates and state agencies in operation since 
1349 and the start of a laissez-faire economic policy based 
on individualism and the play of market forces. The previoiis 
albeit limited responsibility of the state to provide some 
protection for employees in the question of wages and con­
ditions was now seen as interference in the running of in­
dustry. Employees gradually shifted their reliance from
29government agencies to collective organisation. Kahn-Freund' 
sees as crucial the fact that the industrial revolution in 
Britain preceeded the extension of the parliamentary franch­
ise to the working classes. This meant their only resource 
was collective power, unlike the German trade unions which 
developed from political parties and had an early reliance
30on political power pressure. Both Kahn-Freund and Flanders 
view this as developing a pattern of thought and action 
based on the principle that ’workers could best achieve
31their goals by relying on their own voluntary associations'. 
This derived from their corporate, social experience during 
the formative period of their development.
A further important factor was the early lifting of the ban 
on trade union development with the repeal of the Combination 
Acts in 1824 (in contrast with Germany where the ban was 
only lifted in 1869 and state intimidation continued none­
theless). The Webbs describe the immediate years after the 
lifting of the ban as a revolutionary period when the trade 
union movement was uncertain about its legal possibilities 
and attempts were made to move from small local unions to 
large trade unions (for example, the Grand National Con­
solidated Trade Union), which failed as they were based
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on unskilled labour which had little bargaining power vis-s- 
vis the employers.
32The crucial influence of craft trade union ideology on
British industrial relations began to take effect from the
1840s when skilled craft unions began to amalgamate and form
33national federations. The political impact of the Junta, 
as the General Secretaries of the Amalgamated Societies of 
Engineers and Carpenters were known, was immense. From the 
1860s there were a series of battles with the courts and the 
regularisation of the position of the trade unions by the 
legislature. From 1867, when the working classes were en­
franchised, the Junta operated as the parliamentary committee 
of the TUC and exerted pressure on the Royal Commissions set 
up to investigate Industrial relations. The}'' fought the 
courts through their influence in Parliament. The craft 
trade union leaders supported the ideology of economic in­
dividualism and rejected the legalisation of the trade unions, 
viewing it as providing the employers with the opportunity 
to prosecute and sue them as corporations. From the late 
nineteenth century, after the battle over trade union imm­
unities had been fought and won, the trade unions began to
rely more on direct action via collective bargaining than 
34law reform, (although the two were not mutually exclusive),
as employers were now prepared to grant some concessions.
3 3Lovell ~ does,however^point out the different reactions 
of trade unions to legal assistance - the craft unions, 
having achieved recognition by virtue of their collective 
and political power, rejected any involvement of the law. 
Weaker unions,which developed under the New Unionism of the 
1880s and 1890s such as the dockers and the railwaymen,fav- 
oured legal assistance as compulsory arbitration could be 
used to force employers to recognise them and engage in 
collective bargaining. The craft unions won the day in 1901 
over the Taff Vale case and the voluntary system of free 
collective bargaining was established. This difference
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in reactions reappears many times in the twentieth century 
even with reference to the Industrial Relations Act 1971. 
Flanders, however, points out the myth that British trade 
unions developed from their own efforts. lie emphasizes 
the importance of employer recognition (either due to the 
power of the trade unions or because they also served 
employer interests) and government promotion - two periods 
of great trade union expansion occurred during government 
support 1910-1920 and 1933-1948.^
The development of employers' associations came late in the
nineteenth century as a defensive measure against the grow-
37ing power of the trade union movement' and their tactics
of picking off one firm after another especially in coal,
cotton and iron industries. Other factors apart from the
trade union threat are needed for the effective organisation
of employers such as homogeneity of interests and purpose.
Many works point to the problems of homogeneity due to the
diversity of Britain's industrial structure in the nineteenth 
38century. Generally, the picture of employers' associations
° 9in Britain is one of diversity and lack of central control,J 
Some associations,such as that in the chemical industry* 
have two classes of membership, one of which excludes in­
dustrial relations from the scope of the association. Recent 
trends reveal a decline in homogeneity of interest as large 
multiproduct companies seek to negotiate their own settle­
ments with the unions, the gap between the large and small 
firms is widening and the functions of the associations appear 
to be shifting from the economic and general regulatory to 
the advisory and representational functions (before the 
government).
The associations were originally locally and regionally
based (the first National Employers? Federation was set up
only in 1919) and district rates predominated in collective
41bargaining prior to the First World War, ' although some 
associations, such as the engineering employers, had
Ill
negotiated national industry-wide dispute resolution pro­
cedures (1898 in engineering). After 1914, national neg­
otiations made awards to the existing district rates. The 
coverage of collective bargaining was still defective - in 
1910 only 17% of the working population were trade union 
members and trie absence of formal institutions to resolve
disputes at workplace level led to recommendations on joint
42works councils by the Whitley Committee in 1918/ After 
the Second World War, national rates predominated and dist­
rict differentials either narrowed or disappeared altogether. 
The types of national agreements vary according to industry:- 
in electrical contracting the agreements are comprehensive 
due to the highly labour intensive nature of the industry, 
a large number of small firms and the employers' interest in 
controlling future costs. Agreements in the engineering 
industry are minimur.is, establishing basic rates only as 
members desire to negotiate supplementary workplace rates 
and factors such as the labour market, heterogenity of prod­
uct and types of firms support this. Working conditions, 
however, as opposed to wages rates are fixed by national 
agreement arid not subject to improvement at workplace level.
In the footwear and cotton textiles industries, national 
agreements are partial.
Recent studies show a shift from national rates as the main
level of collective bargaining to plant or cotnnanv rates in
44the manufacturing industries. Industry-wide agreements are
still influential though not regulative.^  Brown and Deaton4^
point to a wide variety of bargaining arrangements including
industry-wide, company-wide, establishment level, divisional
level. The typical pattern of collective bargaining is seen
as industry-wide minimum agreements and further bargaining
* 7at firm and plant levels. Brown shows how the reliance 
on industry-wide minimums meant many substantive issues were 
left unregulated. Dispute resolution procedures have also 
followed the national collective bargaining structure and this
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created many problems at plant level where many procedural
4 8issues remained unregulated. °
Recent figures on trade union membership show a decline
after an increase of 20.2% during the 1970s. Membership
now stands at 11.4 millions or 43% of the working population.
The number of unions has fallen by 16% to 401 (the fall has
occurred in the declining traditional industries), although
22 trade unions have 79.8% of the total trade union member- 
49ship. Accurate figures about employer association member­
ship is scant. Recent studies show a decline in the number
SOof associations from 1350-1400 in the late 1960s to 300 
in 1980 via a reduction in locally based employer groups. 
Density of membership is estimated at 70.75% of all employers. 
One of the largest associations is the Engineering Employer's 
Federation covering 5000 establishments and negotiating 
agreements with 35 trade unions, most of whom are affiliated
S 2to the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions."
The prevalence of minimum agreements at national level and
informal regulation at plant level, which provoked many
problems with the rise in shopsteward power in the 1960s,
is seen by Sisson to be related not so much to the structure
of the industry, which lias not hindered greater centralisation
of collective bargaining by their West German counterparts,
but historical aims and policies including the desire to
53retain management control at plant level. In the 1970s
and 1980s the trend for negotiation in engineering is towards
54company and plant bargains with the trade unions,~ although
national level agreements continue to play an imnortant role
"55in regulating conditions in snail establishments.
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IV) The Influence of the Process of Industrialisation 
on the British Industrial Relations System
The early industrialisation of Britain, at a time when 
other nations were still dominated by a feudal agricultur­
ally based system, and the slow development of the process 
of industrialisation are thought to have had a significant 
impact on the structure of industry, management and trade 
union ideologies and policies and their relations with the 
state. Fevera1 w o r k s h a v e  emphasized this in contrastive 
studies of early industrial developers such as Britain and
late develooers such as Sweden, Janan and West
57Germany. Ingham points to the low level of industrial 
concentration in Britain, the great complexity of its tech­
nical and organisational structure in industry and the high
product differentiation and specialisation as indicative of
58its early industrialisation. Likewise Dore, in his study 
of Britain and Japan, emphasises the effect of the slow 
gradual evolution of-industry in Britain on the predominance 
of small scale, owner-managed, labour-intensive organisations 
in contrast to Japan, whose late development is reflected 
in the dominance of highly capital-intensive, corporate
organisations. Late devoloners such as West Germany and' * */
Japan underwent a rapid, massive expansion of industry.
The structure of industry as it emerged in the nineteenth
century in Britain promoted a fragmented, decentralised
system of collective bargaining based on informal workplace
regulation. For where industries comprise a large number ol
differently-sized establishments with a large number of
products and product markets, technologies and management
styles the emphasis will be on small decentralised decision-
59making units to facilitate adaptation. National or industry 
level collective agreements will deal only with a limited 
number of general matters and decisions will be taken mainly 
a t works 1eve1. ^
Later economic developments need to be seen in conjunction
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with this decentralised structure of industrial relations 
in Britain. Developments since the Second World War have 
promoted plant—level collective bargaining due to the 
strengthened position of the shopstewards in a situation 
of full employment. Despite the present economic recession, 
company-level and plant-level bargaining continue to flourish 
in private manufacturing industry. Although the economic 
process in West Germany provided some leeway for plant-level 
bargaining in the 196Cs, the fact that the industrial re­
lations system is centralised and legally based limited the 
extent of bargaining,and collective bargaining has reverted 
back to regional and national levels in the present recession 
as is shown in the second half of the present chapter.
V ) National Values as Reflected in the Industrial Relations
Svstem in Britain      .
In chapter two the importance of ’shared understandings1 
in the institutionalisation of conflict resolution was under- 
lined. The shared understandings reflect agreement not 
only on the rules of resolution themselves but on the values 
which underlie their operation. These common values reflect 
the social ethos of the society in which industry is em­
bedded and in their turn influence society as industry and
63work form a major part of the citizen's life.”
The influence of individualism and self-government in 
British society has been emphasised in many studies partic­
ularly those on industrial relations topics. Crouch traces 
these values back to the onset of industrialisation with 
the development of a laissez-faire market economy and the 
fragmented, decentralised structure of industry.^  Dore, 
however, points out that market individualism was an ess­
ential feature of the capitalist organisation of agriculture
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in Britain in contrast to fanily-based systems in Japan 
and West Germany. Market individualism in agriculture 
thus produced market individualism in industry whereas 
the Japanese and German systems led to an authoritarian
paternalist and centralised operation of industry in the
65nineteenth century.'"'
Individualism was reflected in the organisation of industrial 
units on a fragmented and decentralised basis in Britain. 
Despite recent concentration of industry via mergers, in­
dividual companies and establishments have retained much of 
their independence in decision-making by their organisation 
in loose federal structures. Gospel underlines the import­
ance of managerial choice in this process of concentration.^ 
Despite the loss of economies of scale and irrespective of
cornapny size 'companies seek to behave as far as nossible
67as if they were small and informal' and operate as though
they 'consisted of a host of small firms with coordination
68lacking and suboptimisation rampant'. ' In Britain there 
tends to be a high level of decentralisation which goes ag­
ainst the pressure of size of company whereas the opposite
69is true of German companies. Flanders relates this to
the entreorenurial tradition of self determination and
A 70economic freedom in industry. ' ~
The craft tradition in the trade union movement similarly
emphasised independence and self reliance of the working 
71people. The trade unions give priority to their freedom
to order their own affairs according to their own preferences
72with as little outside interference as possible. Hobshawn
emphasises working class traditions of syndicalism in
Britain to explain present day strike action based on the
rank and file members at plant level. Although the original
syndicalist aims of self-governing producer groups in
industry have been discarded, syndicalist techniques of
spontaneous militancv have been retained bv the labour nove-
73ment m  Britain.
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The operation of market individualism and the voluntarist 
tradition of regulating industrial relations issues have 
been increasingly called into question due to the incom­
patibilities between economic freedom and industrial peace
7 4and prosperity since the 1960s. Crouch underlines the 
influence of a period of full employment on the power re­
lations between employers and employees in the demise of 
market individualism and liberal collectivism, which was 
based on the freedom of autonomous interest groups to 
represent their interests (pluralism). Pluralism is only
effective in institutionalising conflict where power relations
... 75 , „ ,, 76are specific and stable.
A further characteristic of British industrial relations, 
which may be related to the competing value systems in­
dicative of pluralism as well as the general social ethos, 
is the low status of industry. This is seen to be reflected 
in the low salaries, poor performance and low level of
77prestige accorded to industrial or production management.
The highly talented in British society do not tend to enter
industry or if they do they avoid production management
* 7 8favouring marketing cr finance. ° On the shopfloor, technical 
services have a higher status than production and mainten­
ance with a sharn differentiation between technical and line 
79staff. The dualism between practical or technical and
academic qualifications is reflected in the education system.
Technical education has been particularly weak in Britain.
The opposite is true of the German system where industry
8 0and work associated with it enjoy a high social status.1
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2) West Germany - a Legalised, Centralised, Cooperative 
System of Industrial Relations
In contrast to the voluntarism which has characterised the 
British system of industrial relations, the German system 
has developed largely on the basis of legislation and 
judicial interpretation of this legislation.^ The legal­
isation of industrial relations in West Germany is referred 
to in many German works and is often viewed in a negative ^ 
light. Schonholz describes the effect on the process of 
industrial relations as a 'differentiation between altern­
ative courses of action in typical situations on the basis
8 2of their legality'. This dependence on legal criteria
to define courses of action is often viewed as inferior to
the dependence on trade union organisational strength such
8 3as is seen to be the case in Britain. Although the gen­
eral legal framework of industrial relations as created by 
the legislation not judicial interpretation is seen as 
valuable, the trade unions are called upon to adopt an 
instrumental instead of a legalistic approach to law in
order to better represent the interests of the working
i 84classes.
A second characteristic of the German system, which is in 
direct contrast to the British system, is its centralised 
nature both in the organisation of the trade unions in 17 
major industrial unions and the highly centralised national 
federation of employers' associations as well as the in­
dustrial federations. Collective bargaining has become 
increasingly more centralised since the 1960s with the shift 
from regional to national— level bargaining. Although the 
rank and file protests in 1969 did lead to moves to improve 
communication channels within the trade unions and extend 
the autonomy of regional-level collective bargaining parties, 
the negotiations are tightly coordinated by the national 
trade union and employer .association executive bodies.
The effects of the economic recession are promoting further
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centralisation of the industrial relations system.
The cooperative aspect of the German system is reflected
in the priority given to the promotion of national economic
prosperity and the prosperity of individual firms in trade
union policies and action as well as their recognition of
the authority of the legal framework of industrial relations
8 5which entails considerable restrictions of their activity. 
Cooperative conflict resolution as opposed to open confront­
ation is the preferred mode of resolving differences between 
employers and trade unions.
I) The Historical Role of the State in Industrial Relations 
in West Germany
The state has played a very significant role in influencing 
the present structure and operation of the industrial relat­
ions system in West Germany. At the onset of the industrial 
revolution in Germany, the policies of the state towards
the developing labour movement were those of an authoritarian 
86welfare state.0 They included the banning of the Social 
Democratic Party and the trade union movement, which was 
still dominated by party control, on the one hand and a ser­
ies of social welfare legislative measures on the other to 
combat the worst effects of the industrialisation process 
on the industrial workers. The state ignored the trade un­
ions and promoted reconciliation between employer and employ­
ees direct by means of industrial codes on rules to be 
drawn up in the workplace to regulate such issues as the 
beginning and end of the working day, breaks, form and method 
of wage payments, dismissals notices and discipline and by 
the introduction of works committees. Teuteberg argues that 
in the view of the state:-
1.. the industrial employment relationship no 
longer constituted a private relationship between
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two contracting, parties. The parties had to fit 
in with prevailing legal opinion... from this new 
standpoint the state saw itself entitled to inter­
vene at any tiine in natters of human workplace 
organisation.'37
The continuities in legislation on the workplace from the 
Prussian codes of 1849 to the present Works Constitution 
Act are outlined in detail in chapter four.
.State intervention was not restricted to the workplace 
but was extended into the collective relations between 
employers' associations and the trade unions after the 
First World War. The role of the- state was transformed 
from a protective and preventative one in the nineteenth 
century into an active and controlling role to regulate the
development of the labour movement and its relations with
8 8the employers.' In the interwar years there was an increas­
ing amount of legislation on the collective contract. The 
determined opposition of employers to collective bargaining., 
especially in heavy industry, meant wages and conditions 
came to be increasingly determined by binding decision of
the Federal Minister of Labour until this svstem was ended goin 1928W' After 1945 the Collective Agreements Act (1949) 
continued the tradition established in 1918 of regarding a 
peace obligation as an implicit element of collective con­
tracts. The labour court system has been responsible for 
the development of the law on collective bargaining as 
shown in the following section.
Apart from legislation on industrial relations issues, the
state has influenced collective relations by the policy of
a 'Concerted Action' by the state, employers, trade unions
and banks to promote economic growth and stability. The
policy has operated as a method of restricting wage increases
in order to promote investment and economic growth by means
of quarterly discussions between the parties and agreement
on the guidelines submitted by the Council of Economic
90Advisors for the development of the economy." Although
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'Concerted Action' was formally ended in 1975, the trade
unions and employers continue to respect government guide-
91lines in their collective wage negotiations.
Studies of trade union cooperation with government economic
policies underline the importance of the climate of economic
92growth which promoted compromise solutions, centralised
trade union organisation capable of enforcing adherence to
93government guidelines and the Social Democratic government 
which provided an opportunity for the attainment of trade 
union goals via political rather than collective action.
The introduction of corporatist state policies is viewed 
as a response to economic crises created by ful1-employmentQ /j,and its effect on inflation levels. The impact of these 
policies is considered in terms of the restrictions on in­
terest representation by the trade unions since their aims
95must fit into an economic policy defined by the state. 
Unterseher, however, points to a tradition of social con­
servatism which accepts the need for state intervention in
the economic and social life of the nation, which dates back
96at least to the nineteenth century. The acceptance of and 
recourse to state intervention in industrial relations by the 
trade unions and employers is a characteristic of the German 
system which stands in marked contrast to the British system. 
Various explanations are suggested for this difference in­
cluding the opposition of German employers to any system of 
collective bargaining which led to trade union reliance on
state action due to their weak economic and organisational 
97position, or the political power of the unions after 1918
when they could rely on a Social Democratic government to
98represent their interests. Other studies point to the very
high level of industrial conflict in the nineteenth century
as the reason for state intervention to promote conflict
99rationalisation. The importance of an authoritarian state 
tradition which predates the nineteenth century and views 
the state as responsible for the regulation of economic and 
social life is underlined by Mommsen and o t h e r s . T h i s
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has led to the precarious position of the industrial re­
lations system as distinct from state regulation in Germany. 
Threats to social and economic stability from the operation
of the system have led to the reassertion of total state
101control as was the case in 1933. L Section V continues 
the discussion on traditional views of the role of the state 
in German society.
II ) The Historical dole of the Judiciary in Industrial 
Relations
The characteristics of the German legal system, which is
based on the Roman law tradition of qualified or codified
laws, are in contrast to the common law system operating in
Britain. The impact of traditional legal thought can be seen
102in the 'statute law model' " of collective bargaining or
103what Kahn-Freund described as 'collective contracting'.
Firstly, collective agreements are viewed as legally binding
contracts which are fixed for a specific period of time in
writing. A peace obligation is incumbent on the parties
during the 1ife of the agreement and is enforced bv the civil 
] 04courts. " Secondly, the labour law system is rooted in
legislation, in contrast to America or Scandinavia where it
105is rooted in collective agreements. ° Both these factors
lead to the regulation of collective relations on the basis
of legal entitlements which are enforced primarily through 
106the courts. The advantages of such a system of legal en­
titlements include the certainty created by rules which are 
fixed for a certain period and the freedom from industrial 
action during this time. The disadvantages include the 
rigidity of the system and its inability to respect special
circumstances as the focus is on uniform rules for a large 
107sector,
10 8Although Guillebaud " traces the development of labour courts
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in Germany from the C-onseils de Prudhommes established by 
Napoleon I on the left bank of the Rhine and the Industrial 
Courts Act 1890/Commercial Courts Act 1904, which established 
a system of referring industrial disputes to communal author­
ities, the labour court system's emergence and impact on 
collective relations only dates back to 1923. In 1923, the 
responsibility of Conciliation Boards to decide collective 
disputes arising under contracts of employment and individual 
disputes under the Works Committees Act was transferred to 
newly established labour courts. It was thought that these 
new legal bodies at national, provincial and local levels 
would be better able to secure a unity of judicial decision­
making in the interpretation of the new statutory provisions. 
The fears of the trade unions that this would lead to a rigid 
application of legal principles to labour questions, in which 
aspects of public policy and social issues need to be con­
sidered, were countered by the involvement of members rep-
110resenting both the employers and trade unions in the courts.
The impact of the courts on collective relations during the 
Weimar period is usually discussed in terms of the court's 
wide discretion to shape industrial relations due to the 
vagueness of the l e g i s l a t i o n , a n d  their continuation of 
the traditions of the authoritarian, welfare state as it had 
developed under Bismarck in the nineteenth century - the com­
bination of restricting the activities of trade unions while
seeking to remove the obvious injustices in the area of in-
112dividual labour law. Legal interpretation of the 1918
Order on Collective Agreements saw their aim as the preser­
vation of industrial peace and a peace obligation on the
parties to the contract was assumed to be part of the agree- 
113raent. Trade union support for this concept of collective
agreements was based on the principle of an exchange of 
industrial peace for better working conditions.^ ^
Since the Second World War, labour courts have greatly ex­
tended their influence as a result of the increase in
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legislation but have continued trends in labour law interp­
retation set up in the interwar years. Although the 1949 Law 
on Collective Agreements does not mention a peace obligation 
on the parties the courts have interpreted the contractual 
obligations in terms of an absolute obligation to refrain
from industrial action in between the annual collective bar- 
115gaining rounds. The view of industrial action as undes­
irable due to the economic and social disruption it causes
and as an ultima ratio is supported bv the collective bar-
. . 116 gaming parties.
The extent of labour court involvement in the determination 
of collective relations is considerable and includes dec­
isions concerning the status of the associations, their use
-  • 117ot industrial action, their position at plant level.
The only area not open to court resolutions are the actual 
terms and conditions in the collective agreement. Roth the 
extensive role of the labour court system and state legis­
lation has led to a debate on the scope of free collective
11bargaining - the so-called 'nucleus of freedom of coalition'.
Its definition is viewed as important in order to resist
further encroachment by the state and legal system. This
reflects the view that there is no autonomous sphere of
industrial relations in Germany, unlike its Anglo-Saxon
counterparts, due to the role of the. state in ensuring social 
119integration. The debate on collective bargaining has
focussed on the issue of whether it is derived from a pri­
vate relationship of the two parties independent of the
state or has been delegated to the parties bv the state,
120who is in overall control of social relationships.
Labour court decisions, especially the Federal Labour Court, 
grant priority to employer interests of profitability but 
not at the expense of social stability, thus the courts per­
mit a measure of trade union collective representation to
bolster their position as institutions contributing to
12 1social stability. With respect to plant-level relations
124
the courts have allowed the trade unions only sufficient
influence to support the works councils’ role as effective
representatives of workplace interests on the basis of
122social partnership with the employers.
The extension of the role of the labour courts and their
transformation from conciliatory to increasingly legalistic
institutions for conflict resolution is criticised by some
studies which view these factors as militating against their
effectiveness in finding a workable solution to plant-level 
123conflicts. The advantages of labour court rulings on
industrial conflicts include the effect of definitive rul­
ings in the reduction of the number of conflicts on specific 
issues, the promotion of clear comprehensive agreements by 
the parties in order to obviate the need for court involve­
ment and the stabilisation of conflict relations as:-
’The parties have become used to living under 
rules which may be legally enforced...and which 
are administered by a third party whose author­
ity is generally accepted.*124
Chapter four will consider the impact of the labour court sys 
tern on plant-level conflict resolution in detail
III) The History of Trade Union-Employer Relations in 
West Germany
A major influence on the development of the German trade
union movement was its origins in the political parties of
125the nineteenth century. It was only in 1905-1906 that
the trade unions decided to pursue a policy of specialisation 
whereby they would represent the economic interests, the 
parties, the political interests of the labour movement.
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Until the dissolution of the trade unions in 1933 the move­
ment was divided along political lines. The Free Trade 
Unions were allied to the Social Democratic Party, the 
Christian trade unions to the Centre Party. Whilst the 
hirsch-Duncker unions and the pacifist employer initiated 
unions had no di.rect political affiliations. The close
association between the Free Trade Unions and the Social 
Democratic Party prior to the First World War meant that 
the former also suffered under the povernmentsAnti-Socialist 
Laws until 1090. After 12 years of repression the Trade 
Union Congress moved away from their earlier rejection of 
collective bargaining, which had been based on the irrecon- 
ciliable conflict between capital and labour, and argued
that collective agreements could be seen as proof of the
127employers’ recognition of worker equality. The legal
basis for recognition was established by the Order of 1918 
which recognised the trade unions and saw collective agree­
ments as legally binding. The new constitution also incor­
porated the freedom of coalition.
Despite this new legal basis for collective bargaining 
employer resistance to collective agreements was great, par- 
ticularly in heavy industry, and the trade union movement 
was increasingly dependent on state support for the extension 
of collective agreements to industries as yet not covered 
by any collective bargaining arrangements. Initially the 
employers tolerated trade unions and collective agreements 
but their toleration was conditional, based on the threat 
of socialisation of heavy industry after the First World War, 
the revolutionary Workers' Councils movement and the temp­
orary strong economic and political position of the trade 
128union movement. The collapse of the economy and increas­
ing weakness of the democratic government after 1923 led to 
a withdrawal of this toleration, and in 1928 the combined 
opposition of the employers and labour courts led to the
end of the practice of extending collective agreements by
120tne Ministry of Labour.
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The collective organisation on a large scale of the employers1 o n
dates back to 1903. ^" Within three years a national assoc­
iation (Reichsverband) had been established and employer 
resistance to trade unions and collective bargaining by 
means of lock-outs intensified. The focus of opposition 
was heavy industry. In 1923 it was the iron and steel indust­
ry which brought an end to the system of state arbitration on 
collective agreements. Damnan explains their fierce oppo­
sition by reference to the claim to sole prerogative to
131fix wages and working conditions in their industry, which
other studies describe as the authoritarian paternalist trad-
132 nition of management in German industry. Citing Rockier in
1949, Potthoff refers to the fact that the fiercest opponents
of the unions have always been situated in the Ruhr Valley
and other employers have tended to follow the policies of
133this group of big industrialists.  ^ The collective organ­
isation of the employers can be viewed as a response to the 
centralisation of trade union organisation after the repeal 
of the Anti-Socialist Lav/s and the intensification of indust- 
rial conflict in the late nineteenth centurv.
The trade unions came to rely increasingly on state action
in the 1920s in. the belief that their political position
was stronger than their economic one. Trade union theorists
like Sinzheiner gave priority to state interests and fixed
collective contracts rather than to trade union autonomy as
it was feared that a return to free employment contracts
would leave the workforce at the mercy of employers in view
135of their superior power position. ~ haphtali's programme
for economic democracy similarly emphasised macro-economic
136and social reform via political action." The demise of 
the Social Democratic influence in government in the late 
1920s blocked this last avenue of trade union action.
The post Second World War period lias been marked by an in­
creasing centralisation of the collective organisations ami 
their bargaining on the terms anti conditions of employment.
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The trade unions have reorganised into seventeen industrial
unions under the umbrella of the German Trade Union Feder- 
137ation. The largest of the industrial unions is the
Metal Workers' Union with approximately 2.5 million members
133and the highest trade union membership density (51%). °
The employers are organised into 44 industry associations 
which are coordinated by the Confederation of German Employers. 
Membership density is estimated to be 80% of all firms,em­
ploying 927c of the working population. Recent studies argue 
that 50 employers from the largest firms in the metalworking 
sector are the key decision makers in collective bargaining 
with the unions since other employers1 associations follow 
the lead given by the Metalworking Association (Gesamtmetal1).^ '
The centralisation of the collective representation of em­
ployers and employees has been accompanied by the centralis­
ation of collective bargaining. In the 1950s there was a 
relatively loose framework of regional agreements. In the 
early 1960s the Metalworking Employers' Association terminated 
all collective agreements and introduced a central coordination
of wage agreements by means of binding instructions to its140regional associations and lock-outs.' ° The reasons behind 
this drive towards centralisation include the desire to pro­
tect employers from strong trade union pressure in regions
n ? rsucn as Baden-Wurrtemberg, where high settlements could be. 
readied and used as a basis for negotiations in other regions 
where the unions were weaker. The central coordination of 
collective bargaining is secured bv national executive con­
trol over decisions about the termination of agreements, the 
establishment of claims, the recording of a breakdown in
negotiations, the acceptance or rejection of the results of
negotiation, balloting on the calling or ending of industrial 141action. ‘ Blanket agreements (Manteltarifvertrag) are 
negotiated at national level for a 3 year period and deal
with working hours, overtime and holiday issues, the wage
framework agreements(Lohnrahmentarifvertrag) and the annual
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wage agreements (Lohntarifvertrag) are negotiated at re­
gional level under executive supervision.
Both the centralisation of collective bargaining and the
operation of the 'Concerted Action', under which the trade242unions adhered to government guidelines on wage levels, 
have created problems for the trade union executives with 
respect to their representation of member interests. Rank 
and file opposition to wage settlements in the spontaneous 
strikes of 1969 and 1973 are dealt with in chapter four.
The effect of these strikes on the trade unions was to en­
courage the executive body to be more responsive to the views 
of the membership. A decentralisation of the wage bargaining 
process to plant level was rejected in favour of an improved 
system of consultation with the membership prior to the 
establishment of wage claims. The qualitative issues which
formed part of the demands of the 1973 strikers found some11expression in regional agreements such as the Baden-Wurttemberg
143Wage Framework Agreement II in 1973 and the Humanisation 
of Work programme launched by the government with trade union 
support in the mid-1970s. Actual wage agreements were
modified to reduce their duration from 18 to 12 months'^'* 
and several trade unions adopted a more aggressive wages 
policy to appease their members - in 1971 the Chemical Tirade245Union called its first strike for 50 years and the strike
by the Metalworkers' Union was the largest since the early 
1471930s, in 1972 the Print Union called their first
strike for 20 years.
Studies of industrial action by employers and trade unions,
however, point to the strength of the employers' position
149as reflected in the extent of lockouts. Although lockouts
represent only 3% of all industrial action, they account for 
25% of working days lost and are increasing in duration 
and scope. 52% of all lockouts occur in the metalworking
sector which is a trend- setter in annual wage negotiations. 150
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Muller-Jentsch1s survey of Industrial action since the 
Second World War reveals a relatively high level of conflict 
over government measures and wage levels in the 1950s (1 mill­
ion working days lost per annum), a drop in conflict in the 
1960s due to cooperative policies of the trade unions in an 
economic climate which facilitated compromises (333,000 work­
ing days lost per annum), a rise in conflict in the early 1970s 
as a reaction to the fall in living standards (over 1 million
working days per annum) and a decline in the late seventies
151due to the effects ol unemployment. ' West Germany, however,
is ranked as low as 15th in the international comparison of
strike fugures and lias a much lower level of industrial152conflict than Britain.
153The low level of strike action in West Germany lias created 
problems for the unions in terms of mobilising their mem­
bership when action is necessary to support annual wage 
claims in a period of economic recession. The problems of 
maintaining solidarity in industrial trade unions by indust­
rial action and continuing the cooperative policies in line
with government economic, guidelines are covered in many
154recent studies of trade unions in West Germany. ' There 
does not appear to be a trend away from earlier cooperative 
policies despite the recession. Trade unions do not press 
for increases and demands which could threaten the competit­
iveness of German industry and general economic recovery.
There is instead a trust in the ability of government ec­
onomic policies to lift the country out of the recession and 
the recognition of the need to adhere to government guide­
lines. The unions are supported by the vast majority of
155their members in their approach to the economic crisis.
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IV) The Influence of The Process of Industrialisation on 
the German Industrial Relations Svstem     .—           w        rf—    
The main characteristics of the German industrial revolution
156were its lateness, rapidity and thoroughness. The key
years of industrial expansion were in the 1370s and 1890s
and expansion was generally concentrated into a 40 year per- 
157iod. The implications of this process of industrialisation
included great social problems and high levels of social con-
158flict towards the end of the nineteenth century. There
was a sudden enormous growth of the industrial labour force
which, according to Maurice, promoted homogeneity, class con-
159sciousness and centralisation of the labour movement. On
the employers' side, the promotion of industrialisation by
the state and large banks encouraged the formation of large
companies, especially in the heavy industrial sector, and the
concentration of power in the hands of a small number of big 
160industrialists. Dahrendorf points out that the mass of
middle-class entrepreneurs played an insignificant role in
the process. The concentration of industry continued during
the early twentieth century. By 1937 6 firms produced all
161Germany's crude steel and 507„ of her coal output. The
contribution of the big industrialists of the heavy industry 
sector to Hitler's rise to power led to the dismantling of these 
industries by the Allies after 1945 and the involvement of 
the trade unions on the company boards under the Montan 
Codetermination Law of 1951.
The characteristics of the industrialisation process in Ger­
many meant laissez-faire economic policies and decentralised 
trade union action in response to the great social problems 
which emerged were inappropriate. There was extensive state 
involvement in the promotion of industrialisation by way of 
loans and protectionist trade policies. Further,state owner­
ship of the railways, mining, iron industry and canal system
led to its direct involvement in the process of industrial- 
162isation. There was considerable government legislation
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on welfare issues as well as restrictions on the develop­
ment of the labour movement. The increasing centralisation 
of the trade unions and employers' associations has been 
outlined in section III as has the tradition of trade union 
reliance on state action and cooperation with its economic 
policies particularly since the Second World War in the 
Concerted Action.
Dore has compared the effect of the late industrial develop­
ment on industrial relations in countries such as Germany 
and Japan with that of early and gradual development as in 
the case of Britain and France. 'Late developers' reflect 
an odd combination of modernity in technological and work
163organisation and pre-industrial societal characteristics.
In Germany of the nineteenth century there was an advanced 
system of ordinary and technical education, large scale 
organisation of industry and the latest technologies. These 
coexisted with an authoritarian state system, the absolute 
rule of employers and the continuation of the traditions of 
the system of guilds to promote social harmony and cooperation. 
Dahrendorf argues that Germany did not develop into a modern 
capitalist industrial society in the nineteenth century but 
became an 'industrial feudal society’ controlled by an 
authoritarian welfare state.
Further consideration of the impact of pre-industrial social 
traditions of organisation and action on the process of 
industrialisation in Germany and its system of industrial 
relations is included in section V. The implications of 
this for the logic of industrialism thesis and the converg­
ence of industrial relations systems of advanced indust­
rialised countries are discussed in the conclusion.
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V) National Values as Reflected in the Industrial Relations 
System in West Germany
The influence of the traditional authoritarian welfare role 
of the state in the pre-industrial era has promoted a legal­
ised, centralised and cooperative system of industrial re­
lations. Dahrendorf's term ’authoritarian welfare state' 
describes the role of the state as the regulator of all polit­
ical, social and economic life and its policy of social 
integration on the basis of the 'common good' (Gemeinwohl)*
which was reflected in patriarchal policies towards the work- 
165ing classes. Bismarck's policies of state repression of
socialism and welfare legislation are a good example of this 
role of the state. Its continuity today is manifest both in 
legislative measures and judicial interpretation which serve 
to limit conflict measures by promotion of social partnership
1 r  r
and bolster the position of the employer at plant level.
In his study of codetermination in Germany, Schregle under­
lines the continuing importance of 'accomodation and integ­
ration, as well as order and authority1 in the national 
system of values. ^ ^
The reasons for this central role of the state in German 
society and the priority given to social harmony can be traced 
back to the effects of centuries of national, social, polit­
ical and economic disunity,which were eventually overcome 
by the establishment of the German empire under absolute
Prussian control in 1871,and to the pre-industrial guild 
168system. ‘ The Prussian government encapsulated feudal pol-16Qitical and social values, " promoting absolute rule of the
state and employers and the view of society as a harmonious
170whole with the factory as a family or works community.
The severe strain placed on society by the industrialisation 
process were countered by social welfare measures and pol­
icies of corporative interest representation - industrial
councils - which the Prussian state had developed as early 
171as 1849. Chapter four traces the continuity in corporative
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interest representation from the early guilds to the present 
day works councils.
Muszynski underlines the tension between the old feudal
values and the newly industrialised society in the nineteenth 
172century. Total market freedom was seen by the state as
a threat to social stability., thus the industrial economy 
was made subject to state economic and social policies.
The system of works committees was imposed by legislation 
on employers who opposed what they saw as a diminution 
of their management and ownership prerogatives. The promotion 
of social integration by such committees was seen by the 
state as in the employers' long term enlightened self int­
erest. This role of the state as the guarantor of social 
integration,even at the expense of employers' short term
interests., is continued in current plant-level legislation
173and judicial interpretation as shown in chapter four.
The employers have generally recognised the role of the 
state as the embodiment of the common good and national 
interest. Although tension does arise where legislation 
impinges on the absolute rule of employers within their 
sphere of influence - the firm. The 'Lord of the Manor'
(Herr im Hause) policies of employers in the iron and steel 
industries of the nineteenth century are well documented.
This policy was both authoritarian and patriarchal. Men 
like Krupp, Siemens and Stumm-Iialberg rejected trade union 
representatives and works committees, promoting in their 
stead the concept of a works family and creating extensive 
welfare systems to bind the workforce to the company and the 
employer. The centralised system of managerial decision­
making in German industry today is covered in chapter four.
The trade union response to the authoritarian welfare pol­
icies of both the state and large employers has been a 
policy of cooperation and recognition of the need to respect
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the 'common interest', particularly as regards economic 
growth and prosperity and the competitiveness of individual 
firms, in their representation of labour interests".—
'We have learnt over the course of the centuries, 
in respect of the heavy sense of responsibility 
which we have always felt, to calculate our 
demands and formulate our proposals such that 
to meet them would not have ill effects on the 
rest of society.'175
Trade union proposals for economic democracy based on cor­
porative bodies at plant, company, regional and national 
levels also reflect the Feudal system of guilds, although
they permit wider workforce participation than government
176models which tend to be consultative. The centralised
structure of the trade union movement and their cooperative 
policies even in the present economic recession reflect the 
traditions of centralised decision-making and social harmony. 
This can be seen partly as a natural response to the realities 
of the state and industrial system which encapsulate these 
values as well as trade union preference in view of their 
common national heritage with the other actors in the in­
dustrial relations system.
A further difference between the British and German systems
111of values is the high status of industry in German society. 
Various explanations are offered for this phenomena including 
its high technical performance and dynamism, which are re-
178lated to characteristics of the industrialisation process,
and a social organisation which promotes submission to the
authority of the state and employers and cooperation in the
179common goal of economic growth and prosperity. Thus a
system of 'industrial feudalism', though it blocks the dev­
elopment of liberal democratic principles, encourages high 
economic performance. The importance of the principle of 
'technical competence' (Technilc) is considered in the follow­
ing chapter.
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Finally, the traditional role of the state as overseer of 
social harmony provides some explanation for the limited
autonomy of the industrial relations system in Germany3°^
181 182 Both Hartmann J and Mommsen ° view the Third Reich as
the logical outcome of an authoritarian state tradition.
Taken to extremes this tradition can make it 'impossible for
the economy (and thus the actors in the industrial relations
system) to lead an independent life outside the principles
183of the state and corresponding obligations'. This is
seen as a constant threat to the autonomy of the collective 
bargaining parties,for if their conflict of interests is 
interpreted as endangering social stability the state will
intervene to seize control of the system of industrial re-
, 184lations.
3) Conclusion
The present chapter has outlined the main characteristics 
of both the British and German systems of industrial relations 
at national level. It has contrasted the traditional vol­
untary, decentralised and conflictual system in Britain 
with the legalised, centralised and cooperative German system. 
Explanations for these differences have emphasised historical 
aspects including the general historical development of the 
two nations and the process of industrialisation which diff­
ered greatly in the two countries.
The 'late developer effect' espoused by Dore and others
emphasises the industrialisation process and its effects on
185the industrial relations system. Although the process is
diverse,depending on the pre-industrial base of a country 
and whether it industrialises after other countries have 
been through the process and provided an example of how and 
how not to respond to the pressures, subsequent economic
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development is expected to have a ’levelling effect' on
186all industrial societies. Examples of this
argument include Kerr's 'logic of industrialism', organ­
isational studies which emphasise the culture-free effect 
of structures such as size and technology on the industrial 
process ° and convergency theories such as Alemann's on
the general trend towards neo-corporatism in industrial 
139societies. These theories emphasise the determining
effect of the economy and technological progress on soc­
ieties and thus ressemhle Marxist arguments although they 
tend to emerge from more conservative, often American, sources.
The present study recognises that industrial economies, just 
as agricultural or service economies, tend to exert similar 
pressures on societies including the need to resolve the 
conflicts which inevitably arise between different groups 
of actors in the system. However, economic and technolog­
ical developments cannot be isolated from the socio-political 
context of a particular country, which must be seen in a 
historical perspective to explain not only the formal struc­
tures of the system but its actual operation and the meanings 
accorded to it by the actors themselves. Studies which 
have looked beyond organisational structures at plant level
have shown great differences in the meanings attached to
190the structures and thus in their operation in practice.
Clark's recent study of the cooperation between trade unions,
the state and employers in Britain and West Germany has
shown that,despite superficial similarities in strategies,
the actual substance of the cooperation and its support from
191the wider society were very different. Clark concluded
that the contributionof cooperative policies to Germany's 
economic success had been overestimated because these diff­
erences had been ignored.
The responses of a society or individual actors or actor 
groups to economic and technological pressures vary in
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accordance with their interpretation of their specific 
socio-political context and the aims they have established. 
Thus the late development of German industry was a result 
of the particular political, social and economic context, 
reflected in national economic and political disunity 
until the latter half of the nineteenth century and auth­
oritarian feudal traditions in the operation of society.
These factors influenced the way Germany industrialised 
and also the characteristics of the industrial relations 
system which emerged. Continuities in the aims and policies 
of the actors to the present day reveal the strength of the 
historical diversities in the structure and operation of 
industrial relations systems. Chapter four will consider 
how these diversities continue to influence the introduction 
and application of new technologies and organisational 
methods in industry.
Derber's study of the metalworking industry in five countries 
revealed similarities and differences in structures, pro­
cesses and results of the industrial relations systems at 
192national level. The following chapters will discuss the
relative impact of economic and technological pressures 
within two different contexts of plant-level industrial 
relations.
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CHAPTER 4: The Plant-Level Systems of Industrial Relations
in Britain and West Germany
1) Great Britain - a Voluntary, Decentralised, Conflictual 
System
I) Great Britain - a Voluntary System of Plant-Level Industrial 
Relations
(i) The Role of the State in Plant-Level Industrial Relations
As outlined in the previous chapter, voluntarism refers to the 
development of industrial relations by means of voluntary 
agreements of trade unions and employers rather than by govern­
ment legislation. The role of the state in such a system is
described as 'facilitative', i.e. enacting legislation only to
1*promote the voluntary system of regulation.
The Royal Commission's report on the state of British industrial
relations in the 1960s described the operation of the voluntary
system in British industry and made recommendations to support
its continuing effectiveness thus subscribing to the view that
voluntarism was the most appropriate means of regulating
2industrial relations issues. However, the minority view of the 
Commission called for a greater measure of legislation to direct 
the development of the system along less conflictual lines.
In chapter 3 the increasing intervention of the government in 
the system by an extension of collective and individual labour 
law legislation was outlined. Both Conservative and Labour 
governments rejected the previously passive role of the state4and intervened either to reduce trade union power or to bolster 
trade union and individual employee rights. The employers have 
supported a limited role for the state in the enactment of 
legislation on labour discipline as in recent Employment Acts
*  Footnotes in Volume Two n. 41.
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covering secondary picketing, trade union ballots on strike
5action and election of officials. Generally, however, they 
have maintained their commitment to the autonomy of trade 
unions and employers in the regulation of their own affairs 
at all levels of the industrial relations system. The trade 
unions supported the extension of trade union rights under 
the Labour government but have rejected state intervention in 
the actual bargaining process whereby industrial relations
7issues are regulated, particularly in the area of wage claims. 
They also oppose the present government’s attempts to intervene 
in the internal organisation and operation of the trade union 
movement.
A number of recent studies assess the impact of government 
legislation during the 1970s and 1980s on the operation of 
industrial relations in Britain, particularly at plant level. 
Its main effect appears to have been the encouragement ofg
greater professionalism on the part of management, with the 
subsequent development of more formal procedures to regulate 
plant-level issues,^ and the promotion of a higher level of 
bureaucratisation in shopsteward organisation to meet the new 
demands placed upon it by management.^ This effect of legis­
lation is particularly significant in those industries with a 
low level of trade union organisation and few shopstewards. 
Industries with a high level of organisation and an extensive 
shopsteward system developed their own procedural systems based 
on recommendations made by the Royal Commission in the early 
1970s.12
The following sections will look in detail at these effects of 
government legislation on plant-level industrial relations.
The general conclusion of studies which consider the effects 
of legislation on the actual practice of industrial relations 
is that it represents on the whole a ’toothless challenge' to 
the traditional practice of free collective bargaining to
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resolve industrial relations issues. The legislation has 
followed the tradition of facilitating the operation of the 
voluntary system of regulation apart from intermittent waves 
of direct state intervention to encourage the incorporation 
of the collective bargaining parties, repression of trade 
unions and, at present, the restoration of a climate of 
'economic liberalism'.^  Thus the present study views the 
British system as still basically voluntaristic although the 
possibility of increasing state involvement in industrial 
relations is foreseen. The conclusion of chapter 4 continues 
the discussion of voluntarism in the British system.
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(ii) The Pvole of the Trade Unions in Plant-Level Industrial 
Relations
Voluntarism has not only been a characteristic of the relation­
ship between the state and the collective bargaining parties
but also has been reflected in relations between the trade
15unions or employer associations and their members. Plant-
level systems of industrial relations have been largely 'self-
contained and self-regulatory', shaped by the pressures internal
16to the plant itself. Various reasons have been suggested
for this characteristic of plant-level relations in Britain
including the preference of trade union and employer association
executives for the establishment of broad principles for their
respective industries, whilst leaving plants free to develop
their own procedural and substantive arrangements appropriate
17to their particular context. Employers in Britain have been
reluctant to allow their organisations to regulate any plant-
level issues and have restricted their responsibilities to the
18establishment of minimum conditions. On the trade union side,
Hobsbawn and others point to the syndicalist tradition and the
original British working class social ism,described as 'artisan
socialism', based on the development of self-governing producer
L9groups at plant level. From this developed a tradition of
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rank and file democracy restricted to plant level action.
The results of these preferences led to the unilateral regulation 
of working conditions by craft-workers whilst other groups of 
workers were subject to the absolute rule of employers at 
plant level, where they were free to hire, operate piecework, 
introduce overtime and develop the plant as they desired.
Workshop organisation of employees developed on an ad hoc basis 
as economic and technological circumstances permitted. There 
were two waves of shopsteward development during the First and 
Second World Wars, when changes in technology, work organisation 
and payment systems were introduced via negotiation with work-
20shop representatives, particularly in the engineering industry.
In the 1960s there was a significant rise in the number of shop-
stewards due to a combination of full employment, the introduction
of new technology via productivity bargaining and a buoyant 
21economy. Between these eras of expansion regulation was
22based on national collective agreements.
Despite the fact that shopstewards constitute the trade union
for the members at plant level there has been littLe regulation
of the duties and rights of shopstewards either by collective
23agreements or in trade union rule books. In 1971, a CIR 
report concluded
'A number of major unions make no provision in 
their rule books for any form of workplace 
organisation, preferring to rely on branch 
organisation... Even where provision is made 
the relationship between the steward and his 
union is less rigidly controlled than the rule 
book suggests and the creation and development 
of workplace organisations adds to his relative 
autonomy in the bargaining s i t u a t i o n . ’ 2 4
At branch level, 'the responsibility for workplace relations
2 5rests with the shopstewards of the establishment concerned.' 
Full-time trade union officials rely on shopstewards for their
contact with the members as the number of officials is actually
26 27declining and branch attendance is low. The influence of
the officials tends to be greater in the general unions,
however, where, due to the high turnover in membership and
unstable job conditions, workplace dependence on the national
2 8union is stronger than in craft unions. In the public sector
and national government offices, conditions are regulated by-
centralised national agreements and the growth of a shop-
29steward system is a recent phenomenon.
McCarthy's studies of the relations between shopstewards and
their full-time officials showed a high level of congruency in
their views about their respective roles, policy objectives
30and the use of sanctions. Thus the Royal Commission's con­
clusion about the conflict between the formal or official
system of industrial relations and the informal, plant-level 
31system is seen as questionable by Marsh and others since it 
has never been the aim of the trade unions to regulate aspects
32of the plant-level system by means of industry-level agreements.
Recent studies of the relationship between the national trade
union and plant-level trade union representatives reveal an
increasing decentralisation of collective bargaining responsib-
33ilities to the plant. Decentralisation has been most extensive
in one of the general unions - the Transport and General Workers' 
34Union. The AEU was already highly decentralised in the 1960s3
as indicated in the Royal Commission reports which focussed
on the engineering industry. During the 1970s, the AEU has
encouraged the development of shopfloor bargaining by abandoning
their national level disputes procedure and temporarily sus-
35pending national level pay negotiations. These steps have
been taken by the union to formally decentralise what was
3 6already de facto decentralised. The role of shopstewards
is expected to increase and it will be difficult for the trade
unions to control or even to influence this process in Taylor's 
37view. The development of workplace organisation in Britain 
continues to be influenced by factors such as the economy, 
full employment, technological processes, wage systems and
143
management rather than by trade union policies and agreements
3 8with employers’ associations.
(iii) The Role of Other Third Parties in Plant-Level Industrial 
Relations
The official third party involved in the resolution of conflict
at plant level is the Arbitration, Conciliation and Advisory
39Service (ACAS) set up in 1974. Concannon describes it as 
a reorganisation of government institutions deriving from the 
Conciliation Act 1896 and the Industrial Courts Act 1919. Its 
special characteristics are its independence and the involve­
ment of trade union and employer association nominees on its 
governing council. The statutory requirements placed upon it 
are the promotion of peace and the extension of collective 
bargaining, although its duty to rule on trade union recognit­
ion cases was revoked by the 1980 Employment Act.
All references to industrial tribunals go via ACAS, which 
attempts reconciliation and advises on the merits of a 
particular case before it is subjected to the legal process.
The main area of industrial tribunal work is unfair dismissals 
cases - of the 46,996 cases of individual conciliation referred 
to ACAS in 1982, 90% related to unfair dismissals, particularly 
unfair selection for redundancies. 68% of these cases are 
cleared without reference to an industrial tribunal (38% by 
conciliation, 27%, are withdrawn and 3% are settled p r i v a t e l y ) 
The majority of such cases arise from small, poorly organised 
workplaces. Studies of how industrial tribunals deal with the 
32% of unfair dismissals cases referred to them point to the 
small number of reemployments among successful applications 
(5% in the years 1972 - 1978).^ Dickens^ explains this by 
the low percentage of applicants who specify reemployment as 
their desire (24%) and the fact that ACAS tends to favour
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monetary compensation in the face of the impracticability of 
reinstatement where relations between employer and employee 
have broken down.
The other major area of ACAS work is collective conciliation.
43There were 1865 requests for collective conciliation in 1982. 
This represents a decrease of 5% compared to the 1981 figures 
and reflects the continuing decline in collective conciliation 
from the peak-level of 3338 cases in 1978 when trade union 
recognition cases were an important area of ACAS's conciliation 
work. Issues are referred jointly in 41% of the cases in 1982. 
The most common issues are:- pay and other terms and conditions 
of employment (60%), trade union recognition (14%), dismissals/ 
discipline (12%), redundancy (7%), demarcation and trade 
union affairs (5%).^
Apart from formal attempts at conciliation by ACAS, informal
contacts with the parties are a crucial aspect of ACAS's work
and this alone is often sufficient for agreement to be 
45reached. In 1982, ACAS estimated that it 'ran alongside'
46173 disputes without becoming formally involved.
Where the process of collective bargaining has broken down 
completely ACAS becomes involved in its role as arbitrator, 
mediator and investigator. These cases are much less common 
than conciliation, there were 251 such cases in 1982 of which 
the majority (194) were dealt with by single arbitrators.
The decline in this side of ACAS's work is related to the 
decline in the level of industrial disputes generally over the
4- * 47past few years.
Despite the low key voluntary role of ACAS in 'the continuation
of the process of collective bargaining with outside assist- 
48ance' there is a general reluctance to refer plant-level 
issues to ACAS, particularly on the trade union side.4  ^
Preference is expressed by both sides for private, voluntary 
reconciliation, although Wedderburn argues that conciliation
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’oils the wheels of voluntary procedures far more than 
statistics tell',~^ as has been shown in the above figures.
Millward's study showed the most usual form of outside inter-
51vention was by higher management. Brown pointed to the
important role of trade union and employer association 
52officials. Although establishments specified ACAS in certain
5 3procedures, particularly on pay and working conditions,
limited use is made of its services and collective bargaining
thus remains the main method of regulating industrial relations
54issues at all levels of the system.
II) Great Britain - a Decentralised System of Plant-Level 
Industrial Relations
(i) Decentralised Management Control at Plant Level
In chapter 3 reference was made to the decentralised structure
and operation of employers' associations in Britain. Early
studies showed local managers were making concessions to the
trade unions which their association disapproved of and the
officials from the associations had no desire to exercise a
55greater influence on plant-level industrial relations. The
declining regulatory role of industry agreements and increase
in single employer agreements reflects the changing role of
the employers' associations towards an advisory function as
firms develop their own bargaining structures and procedural
56arrangements with the trade unions.
Within the companies themselves decision-making has been de- 
57centralised, preference being given to the operation of small 
independent management units irrespective of size of company 
and despite an ensuing loss in the economies of scale.
Gospel points out that company mergers occur by the creation 
of a federal organisation of constituent firms, loosely con­
trolled by the parent company. Holding company control tends
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to be limited to legal and financial issues, the rest is left 
to the operating subsidiaries. This decentralised structure 
of operation reflects the preference of management and has 
the advantage of spreading the risks and delegating local 
labour responsibilities.^
The recent shift towards single-employer bargaining^ away
from the earlier reliance on multi-employer agreements in order
to establish greater management control over wage bargaining,
has promoted greater centralisation of financial control at 
61company level. Generally, however, company boards tend to 
restrict themselves to the consideration of financial and 
tactical company interests, devolving all operational responsib­
ilities, particularly those associated with industrial relations
6 2issues, to plant level.
Studies of plant-level management in the 1960s and early
1970s criticised their poor systems of control over work
6 3organisation and pay systems in particular. This was seen
as a result both of the strength of workplace trade union
64organisation in a period of full employment and the reliance
6son multi-employer industry agreements. J Whereas federated 
firms relied on custom and practice to regulate plant-level 
relations, non-federated firms had developed their own 
sophisticated system of procedures and agreements and exer­
cised more control at plant level.^ The Royal Commission's 
survey on plant-level industrial relations in the 1960s made 
a series of recommendations based on the principle of re­
establishment of management control via joint regulation.
The six main objectives were:- comprehensive and authoritative 
collective bargaining machinery, joint disputes procedures, 
agreements on the role of shopstewards, procedures on 
redundancies and discipline and joint discussion of safety at 
work. These objectives were to be achieved by means of an
industrial relations strategy drawn up at company level and the
6 7strengthening of personnel departments within the company.
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Many studies undertaken in the late 1970s indicate a growth
in the professionalism of management on industrial relations
issues at plant level. The majority of large establishments
have both a main board director responsible for employee
relations and personnel or industrial relations managers at 
6 8plant level. The reasons given for this growth include the 
increase in labour legislation and the shift to corporate
6 Qbargaining structures. These two factors are also associated 
with size of company, trade union density and foreign ownership
70in promoting professionalism of industrial relations management. 
Despite the appointment of company and plant-level industrial 
relations special ists,investigation of the actual practice of 
industrial relations in industry shows that company boards
71continue to give industrial relations issues a low priority
and industrial relations staff are 'engaged mainly, or even
exclusively, in trying to secure quick settlement of minor 
72disputes'. Marsh found that production and maintenance
managers dealt with issues raised by shopstewards, not personnel
or industrial relations management, but that even they spent
73little time on industrial relations activity. The conclusion
reached was that 'industrial relations did not receive the attent-
74ion they need along with commercial and operational matters .
The extent of the formalisation of procedures to resolve conflicts 
at plant level during the 1970s will be considered in a later 
section. Generally, studies show a formalisation of the 
structures and procedures for industrial relations activity at 
plant level whilst informal collective bargaining and conflict 
resolution activity continues to predominate, particularly
75amongst manual workers, in private manufacturing industry.
There is evidence of an increase in the use of systems of job
evaluation in large and medium-size companies to reestablish
management control over the wages system and labour costs 
76generally. Payment-by-results schemes continue to operate 
but in conjunction with work study methods to prevent their
demoralisation through uncontrolled workplace bargaining.
There are signs of a shift back to incentive schemes in the
7 8late 1970s and 1980s. Brown and Terry see the rise of 
company and plant-level wage bargains as essential in order 
to maintain the integrity of the new wages systems, which 
would be threatened by a continued reliance on regulation by 
multi-employer agreements.^
Whereas there are indications of some changes in the management
of industrial relations in large and medium-size companies,
small firms continue to operate on an informal basis. Most
have very limited or no experience of dealing with statutory
80employment provisions and all continue to resist what is
seen as bureaucratic interference in the running of the firm
81and its relations with the employees.
In the 1980s, the sharp decline in trade union membership 
and the reversal of the trend towards larger plants removes 
some of the pressures which promoted the changes in plant-level 
industrial relations management during the 1970s. Later sections 
will assess the impact of the present economic situation on the 
structures and practice of industrial relations at plant level 
in the 1980s.
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(ii) Decentralised Trade Union Organisation at Plant Level
Studies of trade union organisation at plant level in Britain
underline its fragmented and decentralised structure and 
82practice. Eyraud points to the significance of occupational 
structure as the basis of trade union organisation in the plant. 
This promotes sectionalism as different occupation groups seek 
to maintain control over their status and job content as well 
as pay differentials within the plant structure.^
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The Royal Commission survey in the 1960s showed extensive
multi-union representation in private manufacturing industry
and recommended trade union cooperation to ensure only one
union represented each work grade in a factory and to promote
84trade union mergers where appropriate. Recent surveys show
that multi-union representation is still ’the experience of
the majority of employees in manufacturing', since it is wide-
85spread in the larger plants/ Where multi-unionism exists,
particularly in those plants with 1000 or more employees,
there are conflicts about demarcation, pay differentials,
86recruitment and trade union membership. Its effect on wages
8 7systems and levels has been shown to be especially serious.
Streeck shows how in a fragmented system of representation
trade unions have no control over the negotiations of other
groups and cannot therefore exercise restraint for fear of
8 8losing members to a more aggressive union.
Apart from the fragmentation arising from multi-union represent­
ation, the fact that shopstewards act as departmental represent­
atives creates further division of loyalties across departmental 
89lines. Studies in the 1960s showed that shopstewards were 
often unable or unwilling to control bargaining at departmental 
level. In some firms the system of piecework was 'taken over 
by extremely fragmented bargaining between individual workers 
(or possibly gangs of them) and rate fixers, whilst shopstewards 
only dealt with the most intractable b a r g a i n s T u r n e r  gave 
examples from the motor industry where the lack of management 
and trade union control over wage systems led to unstable 
earnings, inequitable relativities and erosion of skill differ­
entials, which promoted a high level of plant and departmental
91industrial conflict.
The fragmentation of representation promoted shopsteward 
organisation and hierarchy in some firms as a means of controlling 
some of the worst effects of the system. Brown showed how 
joint shopsteward committees favoured more centralised negot­
iation on wages issues rahher than individualised transactional
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bargaining. However, the integration of the shopsteward body
was dependent on management support and control of its own
92lower level representatives. Studies undertaken in the
1960s showed 71% of establishments, chiefly in the engineering
industry, had a joint shopsteward committee, of which 60%
93involved other trade unions. More recent surveys point to
a continued growth in joint committees, particularly in areas
outside engineering.^ Terry makes a distinction, however,
between those industries with traditions of trade union
organisation and shopstewards, such as engineering, and those
where shopsteward organisation has been introduced as a package
deal to bolster management strategies such as mergers, single
employer bargaining, the introduction of work study and job
95evaluation in order to meet the present crisis in profits. 
Although the organisational forms of shopsteward activity are 
similar, actual practice differs greatly. This is considered 
in detail below.
Apart from the generalisation of joint shopsteward committees 
throughout industry, the number of shopstewards and full-time 
shopstewards or convenors has increased during the 1970s. The 
majority of plants which recognise a manual trade union and 
employ 50 or more manual workers have shopstewards and a con­
venor or senior steward. 75% of those with 1000 manual workers
96or more have a full-time convenor. The average shopsteward
97constituency has declined from 60 in 1966 to approximately
9830 in the 1970s.' Convenors are thought to be responsible
99for 10 shopsteward constituencies, i.e. 350 employees. Trade 
union organisation is closely associated with size of firm - 
97%, of firms employing 1000 workers or more had recognised trade 
unions, shopstewards and were 90% unionised. Corresponding 
figures for the 50 - 99 size group were 59% recognised a trade 
union, 56% had shopstewards and trade union density was 657,. 
Outside manufacturing industry, trade union organisation has 
also reached relatively high levels during the 1970s, as Terry's
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study in local government offices and workshops shows; shop- 
steward organisation, however, is less well developed.
Most studies underline the crucial role of management in the
102development of shopsteward organisation. This is especially
true of industries where shopsteward organisation emerged during 
the 1970s as a result of management strategies to regain con­
trol at plant level. Early studies of the engineering industry, 
however, show that the important role of shopstewards was based 
on management's preference for the resolution of issues with
103plant-level rather than full-time trade union representatives.
Reasons for this preference include the shopstewards' intimate
knowledge of the plant and the workforce, their ability to
make decisions and ensure they are adhered to by the members,
the desire to keep issues within the plant and promotion of
good workplace relations. The Royal Commission survey also
revealed management's preference for informal recognition of
their shopstewards in order to reserve the right to withdraw
104recognition in certain circumstances. The CIR report con­
cluded that 'few establishments ... had defined and known
policies on steward functions and on the necessary level of
105 106facilities ... The facilities were mostly informal ...'
107and custom and practice was the decisive factor. Time off
for shopsteward meetings and elections was not generally a
point of contention, although time off for training and meeting
108with the members was less widespread. Physical facilities
were very limited for ordinary shopstewards, and shopsteward
109committees and convenors did not fare much better. In
Clack's study of a motor vehicle production plant, the joint
shopsteward committee held their meetings in the canteen and
had one locker. The convenor committee did not have an office 3
despite the fact that it was the key negotiating body in the
plant and was consulted by management on a wide range of issues.
Expectations, however, were also low - no minutes were kept of
shopsteward meetings and the majority of shopstewards spent
111most of their working hours on their regular jobs. The
evidence of a formalisation of relations between shopstewards
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and management during the 1970s points to some improvements
in facilities for full-time shopstewards,particularly towards
112the end of the 1970s. Daniel and Millward show how most
of these stewards had access to office services although few had 
their own office and telephone. 50% of the plants employing 
1000 employees or more had written agreements on facilities 
for senior shopstewards. Generally, overseas employers showed
a greater readiness to provide good facilities than their
„ . . i 113British counterparts.
Studies of the activities of shopstewards reveal the development
of their role from that of a recruiting agent for the trade 
114union to actually bargaining on workshop issues, particularly 
115piecerates. The Royal Commission survey found shopstewards116negotiating on issues such as pay, working hours, safety,
although it was stressed that their activity should not be
exaggerated as the average steward spent the majority of his
117time on his usual job. Foremen were often circumvented
with shopstewards holding regular (once a month) meetings with
management above foreman level to discuss important issues.
Shopstewards generally felt higher management was more reason-
119able to deal with than the lower levels. Negotiation by
shopstewards is most extensive in the engineering industry -
in Storey's recent survey, 49% of stewards claimed to negotiate
120eleven types of issues or more with management. Despite the
general formalisation of relations at plant level during the 
1970s there are considerable differences in the operation of 
plant-level bargaining between traditional shopsteward strong-
121holds, such as engineering, and shopstewards in other industries. 
Where shopsteward organisation has only developed during the 
1970s and has been introduced as a 'package deal' with manage­
ment, senior shopstewards are dominant and conduct most of the
122negotiations with management. Traditional shopsteward
strongholds, on the other hand, continue to operate on the 
basis of sectional bargaining,which constrains any dominance 
by senior shopstewards. In Terry's view, formalisation in these 
areas is only a mask due to the long tradition of occupational
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group interest representation at low levels. Brown outlined
two trends of development of shopsteward organisation in engin­
eering:- a centralisation and integration of shopstewards 
supported by management in terms of facilities and control over 
its own activities so central agreements are not undermined; or 
a continuation of custom and practice characterised by high 
shopsteward turnover, a high level of opportunistic stewards, 
poor bargaining relationships with management, extensive usej 2 /.of sanctions and broad criteria on strikeable grievances.
He emphasised the important influence of management on this
trend. Other studies look at the problem of shopsteward control
based on their ability to create common interests between
125sectional groups of workers.
Studies of shopstewards' relationships with their members con­
sider the extent to which shopstewards lead or reflect their
126members' interests. The Royal Commission survey showed
the majority of shopstewards act as a moderating influence on
the workforce - 43% said they could get their members to see
127things their way in a dispute. Brown's study revealed a
desire among shopstewards for a greater level of integration 
in their organisation which would enable them to pursue object­
ives such as unity, equity, good relations with management and
128the economical use of sanctions. ° Important influences on
the shopstewards' role include their power resources and bargain- 
129ing awareness. Both these factors have promoted the
extensive role of shopstewards in engineering. Elsewhere 
circumstances have militated against a strong representative 
role for shopstewards."''^^
Studies emphasise the low level of control over the labour
process by shopstewards and the low level of expectation as
131regards worker control. Even strategically powerful groups
132such as craftsmen are said to only control work at the margins.
The aims of plant-level trade union representation are seen as 
parochial, at most factory-based, and involving ad hoc encroach­
ments on managerial prerogatives or reaction against inadequate
123
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133management control systems. The organisation of the work­
place on the basis of occupational group interest represent­
ation is viewed as inadequate in the face of new corporate 
strategies which seriously affect previous work and wage
- i n /
systems at plant level. Attempts by shopstewards to organise
representative bodies at company level have been largely 
13 5ineffective. Generally, trade union influence at company1 Q/
level is very limited in Britain. Representation is
restricted to traditional areas of interest thus neglecting
long-term workforce interests. Influence is exercised mainly
at the implementation stage of company policies and Wilson
concludes that British trade unions have a ’limited capacity
137to obstruct or impede an otherwise smooth-running economy'.
The reliance on shopfloor bargaining tactics means important
issues are being decided unilaterally by management at higher 
138levels. Traditional methods of trade union action are seen
as totally inadequate in their response to new technology being
139introduced into plants. Furthermore,these methods are being
undermined in the present economic recession. There has been
a sharp fall in the level of trade union membership, particularly
in the traditional areas of membership,140 and there are
indications of attempts by management to roll back workplace
organisation and reduce the role of shopstewards whilst retain-
141ing the formal structures of shopsteward organisation. A
later section looks at the promotion of joint consultation as 
one means of undermining the shopstewards' bargaining role.
During the 1970s, shopsteward organisation became more general­
ised and formalised with bargaining occurring at higher levels 
in the plant between senior shopstewards and management. Sisson
and Brown, however, found that informal bargaining still
142predominated in the early 1980s. Present economic circum­
stances indicate a reversal of the pressures which promoted 
formalisation in the 1970s. Further study is required of how 
the recession is affecting both the structure and operation of 
plant-level relations in British industry. At present,the 
focus of attention has -shifted to company-level policies and 
national trade union organisation and activity in the face of 
the government's punitive policies on the economy and labour 
law legislation.
Ill) Great Britain - a Conflictual System of Plant-Level
Industrial Relations
(i) Relations between Shopstewards and Management
Earlier sections have shown how the system of conflict regulation
at plant level in Britain has been based on the collective
representation of group interests by shopstewards in a
bargaining relationship with management. This has promoted a
conflictual view of industrial relations, described by Dowling
and others as the 'them' and 'us' view, where interests are
seen as mutually exclusive and there is little common ground
143for perceptions of joint interests to arise.
There have been a number of attempts to encourage a greater 
level of consultation to counterbalance conflictual interest 
representation. These attempts have, however, only been 
successful in areas of low trade union organisation and during 
crisis periods such as wartime and economic recession when the 
power of plant-level trade union organisation is restricted.
One of the first major attempts to promote consultative arrange­
ments in British industry came with the Whitley Committee
144recommendations on the setting up of works committees in 1918.
The Committee's aim was to improve the climate of industrial 
relations in well-organised industries, where there had been 
considerable unrest during the war years. Its recommendations, 
however, were based on the voluntary principle of permitting 
the industries concerned to establish their own machinery for 
consultation in accordance with their specific requirements. 
Well-organised industries, however, chose to retain their shop- 
steward-based system of regulation whilst the recommendations 
on works committees were taken up by those industries with a 
low level of organisation and by the Civil Service.
During the Second World War, Joint Production Committees were 
established to support the war effort and promote plant-level 
consultation to resolve conflicts arising. Trade union support
156
ensured their widespread adoption in the engineering and
145allied industries. The growth in shopsteward organisation
after the war, however, lead to a decline in Joint Consultation 
Committees in favour of collective bargaining as the Committees 
were increasingly manned by shopstewards and the distinctions
1 li.fibetween consultation and negotiation broke down in practice.
Studies undertaken in the late 1970s and 1980s again point to 
the revival of consultative arrangements as economic circum­
stances no longer favour a strong bargaining position for shop- 
stewards and management views such arrangements as a useful
means of securing the cooperation of the workforce and as a
147response to the debate on industrial democracy. Both Brown
and Beaumont show how over 50% of Joint Consultation Committees
in manufacturing industry have been introduced since the mid-
1970s and that 507, of them are not part of the collective
bargaining process; 707, of them were composed of representatives
which had not been appointed through trade union channels in the 
148plant. Brown associates the more recent committees with
large plants (1000 +) and a high level of trade union organisat­
ion among manual workers.
Studies of management and shopfloor attitudes to consultation
show, however, very different views of the aim of consultative
arrangements. This is reflected in the fact that management
satisfaction with consultative arrangements is associated with
a low level of trade union organisation, the establishment of
committees before 1972, a low incidence of conflict and their
149focus on personnel issues. Trade union satisfaction, on the
other hand, is related to strong local trade union organisation,
a leadership orientation of shopstewards and a pluralistic
150management approach to plant-level industrial relations. 
Management aims focus on the extension of workforce support 
for management objectives via the improvement of internal
151communication channels and more 'open’ styles of management.
Opposition is expressed to any extension of collective bargain- 
152ing and the success of consultation is measured by improved
153efficiency and a decline in conflict levels. Trade union
157
representatives, on the other hand, favour the extension of
collective bargaining as the best form of workforce participat-
154ion, emphasising control via negotiation not consultation.
Both sides tend to oppose the introduction of worker directors
and participation at company-board level as envisaged by the
155Bullock R.eport on industrial democracy.
These findings show the difficulties of introducing a system 
of consultation,based on the retention of managerial decision­
making prerogatives and 'a consensus philosophy of labour-
156management unity and c o o p e r a t i o n i n  the context of British
plant-level relations, particularly when plant-level trade union
organisation is in a strong position. Although several studies
argue the case for consultation as offering an opportunity to
discuss common interests and build up a climate of mutual trust
157outside the conflictual context of collective bargaining,
past history has shown the problems of separating the two modes
of interaction in practice and how the collective bargaining
ethos tends to reduce the effectiveness of consultative arrange-
158ments in promoting joint interests.
(ii) The Extent of Conflict at Plant Level
The characteristics of British strike action based on the
number of strikes occurring each year are:- smallness, shortness,
locally-based action and unofficial action, often restricted to
159one plant or a group of workers within a plant. Thus
Edwards’ study among others shows that 66% of strikes in manu­
facturing industry in the years 1977 and 1978 lasted less than
one day and the vast majority were 'small brief protests over
160immediate grievances'. Durcan's study showed that in the
years 1960 - 1973 almost 95% of strikes were unofficial
The characteristics of the majority of strikes in Britain are
associated with the decentralised system of plant-level
bargaining and these strikes form 'part of the continuous process
162of negotiation within the factory'.
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Brown’s study revealed that 46% of establishments surveyed
had experience of strike action by manual workers and 667o of
those affected by strikes also experience other types of action
163including overtime-bans and working-to-rule. Frequent
strike action, however, occurs only in a small number of 
164plants and is seen as the result of the day-to-day handling
165of industrial relations at plant level rather than any 
structural or technological factors.
Large official strikes account for the majority of working
166days lost due to strike action. Whilst coal and engineering
industries account for the largest number of strikes and workers
167involved in strike action, sectors such as local authorities,
168the Civil Service and post office in the 1970s, and gas,
water and electricity in the late 1970s and 1980s account for
169the greater number of working days lost.
In international strike statistics Britain is in the middle
range at aproximately rank s e v e n ^  although during the years
1977 - 1981 it had a higher than average incidence of strikes
with a peak of 29.5 million working days lost due to strikes 
171in 1979. Since then,strike figures have been declining as
a result of the impact of economic recession with 5.3 million
172days lost in 1932. Strike figures in Britain, however,
have been consistently higher than in the FRG, where in 19815
173for example, 58,398 working days were lost due to strikes.
Various reasons have been suggested for the high level of 
strikes and working days lost in Britain. Strikes have been 
focussed in the metalworking sector and, since 1977, public17/administration. This pattern accords with the strike-prone
175industries in France and Germany. Silver points out that
in Britain the prominence of the metalworking sector in the 
strike figures is the result of a decline in disputes in the 
mining industry during the late 1960s and 1970s not of a rise
1 7  Ain the industry's strike-proneness. Apart from this general
pattern in strike figures, technology and industry branch have
177been discounted as the main factors behind strike incidence.
159
Strike incidence in the public sector has been related to the 
effect of government policies and general economic climate of 
inflation and unemployment on the earnings and working con-178ditions in that sector. In manufacturing industry, studies
have focussed on the effects of plant-size and levels of trade
union organisation in their explanation of strike concentration
in particular firms. Although the overall incidence of strikes
is higher in large plants, they have fewer strikes per head
179than smaller plants. Edwards relates their higher incidence
of strikes to the fact that there are a larger number of groups
with strike potential not to any special alienating characteristics
180of large plants. Generally it is argued that official figures
have underestimated the large number of small strikes in small
i 181plants.
Collective opposition to management is thought to be closelyTOOassociated with high levels of trade union organisation.
Although Brown argues strikes are more likely where there is 
low trade union density, whilst sanctions such as go-slows and
1 8 3working-to-rule are only possible where there is a high density.
Other influences on strike levels include foreign ownership,
centralised company agreements, geographical factors'*"^ anc[
details of the day-to-day handling of industrial relations issues 
187at plant level. Finally, Walsh argues the importance of
national characteristics of the industrial relations system in
any explanation of strike levels, highlighting, in particular., the
fragmented structure of trade union and employer organisation
and collective bargaining, the low formalisation of procedures
and the high level of flexibility in the labour law. These
factors tend to be associated with those countries showing a high
188incidence of strike activity, Goodman's study of conflict
resolution in the footwear industry shows how specific collective
bargaining institutions contribute to a low strike incidence
despite economic, technological and work organisation factors
1 8 9which promote high conflict potential.
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IV) Great Britain - the Effects of a Voluntary, Decentralised, 
Conflictual System of Plant-Level Industrial Relations on 
Conflict Issues and Procedures
(i) Conflict Issues at Plant Level
Wage-related issues have constituted the greater proportion of
conflicts at plant level since the 1960s when studies were first
190made of key conflict areas. In the 1960s, attention was
focussed on demoralised payment-by-results systems in the engin­
eering industry and the ways in which they led to disputes due 
to fluctuations in earnings, anomalies and inequities in pay 
relativities and very complex systems of bonus calculation.
As shown in earlier sections*there are indications of a shift 
towards job evaluation schemes and formal plant-level agreements
on wages systems in the 1970s/1980s, which have reduced the
192level of disputes due to pay anomalies. Wages issues, however,
continue to predominate despite a decline in disputes relating
193to incentive schemes. Wages issues in the 1970s and 1980s
194focus on actual wage rates and earnings levels. Edwards
views this shift as a result of inflation and incomes policies
1 9 5pursued during the 1970s.
Apart from wage rates, other key areas of conflict include
redundancies, manning and work allocation, discipline and dis- 
196missals. A recent survey of shopsteward perceptions of the
present industrial relations climate showed that 51% of trade 
union representatives and 35% of managers foresaw an increase 
in conflicts in the areas of manning levels, wages and salaries, 
the closed shop, picketing, working methods, productivity, 
shorter working hours and civil actions against trade unions 
(in order of priority) as a result of recent government legis-
197lation and pressures to rationalise production at plant level. 
Storey argues that, although the most negotiated issues in 
industry revolve around traditional work-related trade union 
interests such as manning, overtime, shifts, transfers, speed
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of work and job content, there are indications of a workforce
challenge in areas relating to long-term company-level
strategies on promotions, product price and type and purchase
198of plant and equipment. This challenge is, however, muted
at present and restricted by trade union traditions of rep-
199resentation at low levels according to occupation group.
(ii) Procedures for the Pvesolution of Conflict at Plant Level
Early studies of the operation of conflict resolution procedures 
at plant level in the 1960s pointed to widespread informality 
in both their form and operation. A conflictual view of
industrial relations led to management's opposition towards 
any formalisation of procedures, as this would extend shopsteward 
recognition and encourage them to press for more concessions; 
it would further entail an open admission of the decline of 
managerial prerogatives at plant level. Whilst shopstewards 
favoured a formalisation of procedures, they too opposed any 
formalisation of substantive agreements as they, like manage­
ment, desired to be free to argue about the terms of agreements
201when they were in an advantageous power position. Marsh
concluded that the four key characteristics of British plant-
level procedures were:- voluntarism, generality, flexibility
and the preference for procedural as opposed to substantive
202rules to regulate plant-level issues.
The 1922 Engineering Procedure's operation was a good example
203of the British procedural system at plant level. The
procedure made no attempt to regulate plant-level resolution 
procedures; consequently, al1 issues arising at plant level were 
viewed as interest issues and open to bargaining. Issues were 
not settled by reference to written agreements but by bargain­
ing on the matter at issue. This placed great strain on the
personal relations between shopstewards and management, 
particularly in a situation of technical and market change. 
Clack's study of its operation in a vehicle production plant 
showed how the 1922 procedure could only operate with 'a heavy 
overlay of informal consultation and discussion' and thus was2Q/tvery dependent on personalities and goodwill. Each side
felt the other was 'trying something on' and the obscurity and
inconsistency of procedures provoked disputes about the operat-
205ion of the procedures as well as basic conflict issues.
Recommendations on the reform of plant-level procedures in the 
1960s focussed on their formalisation via joint agreement on
Q  A  /■
mutual relations between shopstewards and management. The
Code of Industrial Relations Practice further recommended that
a distinction be made between grievance and negotiating
207procedures at plant level. Procedures were to have stages,
time limits and a clause preventing industrial action until 
the procedure had been exhausted, although the specific details
would vary depending on the size and structure of the plant and
, . . 208 key issues arising.
Studies of the application of the Code's recommendations in 
small firms reveal that most had not heard of it and procedural 
systems continued to be informal apart from disciplinary pro­
cedures, which had been drawn up in response to publicity about 
unfair dismissals compensation. The disadvantages of informal
systems included their reliance on key personalities, their lack
209of consistency and their piecemeal communications systems.
Changes have been focussed mainly in the larger plants, where
recent studies reveal a high proportion of establishments with
formal procedures for individual grievances, discipline and
210dismissal, pay and conditions. Brown found that 757. of the
procedures were written; 707, of firms had the same procedure 
to cover grievances, dismissals and discipline however.
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Hawes and Smith point to similar developments in non-
212manufacturing sectors too. Factors which appear to have
influenced this process of formalisation include government 
213legislation, economic circumstances promoting the con-
214 215centration of industry, size of firm and level of trade
. 216 union organisation.
Some doubt, however, has been expressed about the actual 
influence of this process of formalisation on the day-to-day 
operation of conflict resolution at plant level. Marsh's 
early study of the engineering industry showed most written 
grievance procedures had been taken from the national pro­
cedure and merely indicated those responsible on the manage-
217ment side at each stage. Only 27% of procedures had beenO-IQjointly agreed - usually those relating to monetary issues.
The scope of written agreements was limited and shopsteward
219'agreement' to them was suspect. Management continued to
stress their preference for the old system of agreement based
220on minutes and unwritten 'understandings'. Despite the out­
ward appearance of formality he concluded that informal practice
continued to prevail in plant-level relations in the engineering 
221industry. His 1981 study reflected a continuing formalisat­
ion of procedures in the larger companies, although 50% of the 
multi-plant companies had no guidelines on industrial relations
and continued to rely on 'traditional procedures, ad hoc
222responses to problems and common sense'. Hence his con­
clusion that despite some change in the form of the rules of
223the game, 'practice obstinately remains the same'.
Sisson and Brown support these findings - there are many plant-
224level procedures but few are jointly agreed. Collective
bargaining, defined as joint regulation, is largely absent from 
the manufacturing manual sector, which continues to be character­
ised by informal bargaining based on pressure group activity
225with no rules or agreements emerging. Thus informality
still dominates plant-level r e l a t i o n s . 326
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Batstone points to the concentration of changes in the
procedural sector with substantive reform having been largely
ignored. There has been no change in the substance of actual
decision-making and he views this as likely to exacerbate
227labour conflict in the future. Turner similarly found a
relation between formalisation of procedures and high strike
incidence in his study of 30 strike-prone plants across 6 
228industries. * Turner explains this relation by the increased
229rigidity and bureaucratisation in the regulation of conflict. 
Whilst Terry suggests that the preferences of foremen and work­
groups for informal bargains at shop-floor level may thwart
230attempts at centralisation and formalisation.
Shopsteward and workforce cooperation in the implementation 
of measures to formalise relations at plant level are thus vital 
for the effective operation of the measures in practice.
Purcell describes this as 'cooperative constitutionalism1 in 
contrast to 'antagonistic constitutionalism', where new pro­
cedures and institutions are used to express the distrust and
231conflict between the two parties. The possibility of a real
change towards cooperative relations, in his view, arises out of
crises or traumas which confront both parties with the need 
2 39for change.
Gouldner's study of change in plant-level relations in a gypsum
mine in America provides a reflection of the trend of change
233in the British system since the mid-sixties. The change
is from an 'indulgency pattern' of relations, established during 
years of relative economic calm and prosperity, towards greater 
management control via bureaucratic administration. The 
pressures of intense economic competition and the need to 
rationalise production encourage changes in actual managerial 
personnel as well as policies. Gouldner describes a transition­
al period of instability during the shift from a custom- 
based system to one where 'explicit consent' becomes the basic
9  Q /
criterion of the legitimacy of a claim by the workforce.
The new bureaucratic system is based on the delimitation of
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spheres of authority and competence, the reinforcement of
central organisation, and the clarification of hierarchy and
informal rules in order to inhibit unanticipated conflict
235'born of low-ranking initiatives and commitments'.
Bureaucratisation of relations, however, is not an inevitable
outcome but the result of a contest between those who desire
236it and those who do not. Resistance to bureaucratisation
is equally not inevitable but dependent on a number of factors 
such as the extent to which it violates belief systems, the 
conditions of legitimisation of active resistance to manage­
ment rules, the extent to which the status quo is impaired
237and levels of informal solidarity.
The 'indulgency pattern' of British industrial relations, in 
the metalworking industry in particular, has a long tradition 
and has been supported by management and workforce preferences 
for decentralisation and informality. External pressures during 
the 1970s and 1980s, however, have motivated changes in plant- 
level relations to control labour costs and promote rational­
isation of production as well as adherence to government legis­
lation prompted by economic pressures. The changes have 
contributed towards a formalisation of procedures, an increase 
in management control over work and wages systems, the regular- 
isation of shopsteward organisation and facilities and the 
professionalisation of personnel management systems. Despite 
these changes in the form of plant-level relations, however,
their operation continues to be decentralised and informal in
4- * 233 fline with past preferences.
Present economic circumstances seem likely to promote the 
continuation and extension of management control at plant 
level, reducing the possibility of resistance by the workforce. 
It remains to be seen whether management will continue to 
promote bureaucratisation of workplace relations for its own 
sake rather than as a means of restricting the ability of the 
workforce and their representatives to interfere with the 
day-to-day operation of plant-level relations. A measure of
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informality will be vital even within a formalised system for
239the day-to-day regulation of minor issues. This type of
informality, which is characteristic of the German system-,
stands, however, in sharp contrast to the traditional informal- *ity of British plant-level relations, which arose out of the 
lack of mutual agreement on the definition of workplace 
relationships and an absence of third party intervention to 
establish clear guidelines on industrial relations.
The contrast between the British and German systems of plant- 
level relations will be discussed at the end of the present 
chapter.
2) West Germany - a Legalised, Centralised, Cooperative System
I) West Germany - a Legalised System of Plant-Level Industrial 
Relations
(i) The Role of Government Legislation in Plant-Level Industrial 
Relations
Whereas in Britain there has been a low level of external 
regulation of plant-level industrial relations by either the 
state or the trade unions, the German system has been described 
as 'legalised' ('verrechtlicht') since it has been shaped by 
an extensive network of legislation, labour court decisions
and legally based collective agreements at national and regional
i i 240 levels.
Legislation on plant-level relations shows great continuity
despite two world wars and the transformation of the German
nation first into a unified state under an absolute monarch,
then into a federal democracy which has continued since 1918,
apart from the years of dictatorship under Hitler. The state
policy of creating cornorative representative bodies to secure
241industrial peace can be traced back to the pre-industrial
guild system and the establishment of industrial councils
('GewerberHte') by the Prussian state in 1849. According to
the Prussian Industrial Code rules were to be laid down in
every workplace on matters including the start and finish of
the working day,breaks, forms of wage payment, dismissal notices
and disciplinary penalties. The workforce was to be consulted
242on the establishment of the Code. When voluntary works
councils were set up in the mining industry in 1905 these
243issues formed the core of their rights and have continued
244to provide the basis of works council legislation since then.
The Works Council Act of 1920 led to the introduction of works 
councils into all firms with 20 employees or more. Their role 
was a cooperative one - 'the support of the employer in the
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efficient conduct of his business - as well as the 
representation of workforce views in the area of works rules, 
working conditions (where there was no regulation by trade 
union collective agreements) and in the administration of 
pension funds and welfare schemes. A right of veto was 
accorded in some personnel issues,including hiring and dis­
missals; and works councils in firms with over 300 employees 
had limited information rights on specific economic issues.
Where no agreement was forthcoming at plant level, questions
were referred to a conciliation board, which was later replaced
245by labour courts. Both the 1952 and 1972 Works Constitution
Acts are based on this model.
The 1972 Act provides a comprehensive constitution for the
operation of plant-level industrial relations, covering the
246status and facilities of workplace representatives, joint 
procedures for the settlement of disputes arising and reference 
to third parties where agreement cannot be reached by the 
parties themselves. Works councils are formally independent 
of trade unions and represent the whole workforce. The access 
of trade union officials to the workplace is laid down in2 4 y
detail. The de-jure independence of the works council from
the trade union contrasts with its extensive involvement with
management, which leads some commentators to argue that the
works council often only operates by grace of the management
243in the workplace. The involvement of the works council in
the regulation of plant-level issues can be roughly subdivided
249into codetermination or joint participation in the regulation
250of social matters and some personnel issues (although this
right only operates where the issues are not regulated by 
collective agreements of trade unions and employers' associations); 
consultation and veto in personnel issues, where the veto is
251subject to the employer offending against certain conditions.
Information is given on economic matters, which directly affect250the workforce including extensions, closures, on areas
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necessary for the works council to fulfill its statutory
253  25 /duties, and on the appointment of managerial employees. v
The basis of the operation of workplace relations is co­
operation and the peaceful resolution of differences. The Act
prohibits strike action and any other activities which threaten
255the peace of the firm. Such activities are considered to
include go-slows, boycotts, working to rule and lockouts.
The two parties are called upon to work together for the good
256of the firm ('Betriebswohl1). Penalties for offences against
these rulings include dismissal of and damages against the works
257council and fines for the employer. The two parties must
make a serious attempt to settle their differences. Where
258agreement cannot be reached, issues are referred either to
a labour court^^ or a conciliation b o a r d . T w o  sections of
the Act secure the right of individual employees to lodge a
grievance with their employers directly or via the works
council and to refer the issue to a labour court if it involves
261an issue of rights on which no agreement can be reached.
Government legislation thus establishes a comprehensive frame­
work for plant-level relations. Later sections review how 
the parties operate within this legal framework.
(ii) The Role of the Labour Courts in Plant-Level Industrial 
Relations
The labour court is available for references of legal issues 
by all actors in the industrial relations system including the 
trade unions and employers' associations. Issues are referred 
initially to a local labour court and may be referred on to 
higher levels (regional and federal) where interpretation on 
significant points of law is required.
With reference to plant-level conflict issues, the labour courts 
deal with issues involving legal entitlements of individual
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employees and the works council. Individual cases are dealt
with by what is known as an 1 Urteilsverfahren1 or procedure
which leads to a judgement which may or may not involve an
award. Issues involving the rights of the works council come
under a 1BeschluBverfahren ' or procedure leading to a resolution
on a point of law. Cases under the former are more numerous^^
and deal with areas such as dismissals (roughly 33% of all
references), wages and wage group issues (33%) and other
matters relating to the contract of employment - working hours,
holidays and holiday money, the handing over of documents the
employee requires when leaving his job etc. 95% of such cases
263are referred by the employee. Recent estimates of the
total number of dismissals in private firms show that only a
2 {j/jsmall percentage are dealt with by the labour courts.
Studies show that employees from small firms are overrepresented
265in the references to labour courts by a ratio of 5:1.
Various reasons have been suggested for this. Feser relates
it to the weakness of the power of the workforce which under-
A / /*
mines the effectiveness of legal provisions in the workplace.
Employees from small firms only refer cases after their contract
is ended, whereas those from large firms and the public sector
refer cases before the contract is ended due to their greater
job protection and the lower level of direct discrimination
267they experience at work. Blankenburg points out the low
rate of references from these two areas due to the fact that:-
'conflicts are resolved within the firm and 
if cases are finally referred to labour courts
they appear less risky because there is no
personal relationship between superior and
subordinate which could threaten the con­
tinuation of the employment contract.
Large firms have a variety of means at their disposal to
reduce numbers, including early retirement, voluntary redundancy
and natural wastage combined with a halt on hiring. They
also have sophisticted institutional machinery to regulate
269conflicts internally. Schdnholz argues that size and 
organisational structure affects the formalisation and differ­
entiation of procedures-for conflict resolution and this means
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that law tends to be anticipated in working relations in large
firms with the consequence that there will be fewer references
to labour courts. Where trade unions and works councils are
active in advising and selecting issues to be taken up with
270the employer, this pre-legislation process is intensified.
The Max-Planck study, however, revealed a low level of works
council opposition to dismissals, and explained this by the
very high demands which opposition places on the works councils
due to the need to prepare a legal defence of their opposition -
271this often led to legal mistakes which could invalidate a case.
Ddubler also points to the obstacles to an employee referring
a case, including the problem of recognising it as a legal issue,
the inability to concretize the grievance, the expense of
bringing the case, the risk to their job and promotion, problems
raised by the legal proceedings in court and also the view that
272all the effort would be to no avail. Only an estimated 1.7%
of successful references lead to the employee getting his job 
273back. This fact has led some commentators to argue that
the law is not about job protection but financial compensation
and even this is not forthcoming where dismissal occurs due
to pressing workplace problems - the onus is then placed on
the employee to argue that others are less entitled to keep
274their jobs than he is on social grounds. The labour court
can also reject a continuation of employment if this is thought
to threaten workplace cooperation in promoting the interests 
275of the firm. These obstacles, together with the length of
the proceedings (up to 3 years), means that the resort to law
is often ineffective in p r a c t i c e . R e f e r e n c e s  vary not only
according to the size of firm but also its industry (although
the two are probably related in practice). References are
very low in metalworking, mining and the public sector and high
277in construction, retailing and hotel and catering. Certain
groups of workers are also more likely to be affected by dis­
missals - blue-collar rather than white-collar, instant dis­
missals affect women and foreign workers to a great extent-, 
whereas older workers are removed by voluntary redundancy.
Those more likely to refer cases to the courts are white-collar
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rather than blue, male rather than female, and foreign workers. 
Finally, SchBnholz points to the importance of economic and 
regional factors such as levels of unemployment, alternative 
job opportunities, concentration of large or small employers
27in a region in his explanation of references to labour courts.
Many cases referred to the courts are dealt with in the pre- 
court hearings. Legal commentaries differentiate between the 
precourt procedure (1Gdteverhandlung') and the court proceedings_ g _ _
('streitige Verhandlung1). Even when issues are referred
to labour courts, the aim is still a compromise settlement
without a court verdict as this is seen as promoting good
relations in the workplace and also does not incur any costs.
The informal oral proceedings allow the judge to determine
whether an issue will stand up to court investigation. Ramm
estimated in the 1960s that 28% of cases were settled by a
compromise after mediation, 45% by an out of court settlement,
2819 - 10% only after court litigation. Although this appeared
to uphold the principle that the realisation of the provisions
of the Works Constitution Act 1972 should be via the parties
282in the workplace not external bodies, Ramm pointed to
evidence of a weakening in the conciliatory role of the labour 
283courts. Ddubler's later estimate on precourt settlements
was that only 35% of references were being settled by a corn-
284promise at the first level of the court system.
Although collective references under the WCA 1972 are smaller
in number, those which are referred act as legal precedents
in labour law and reduce the number of cases referred under
that particular point of law. There are a large number of
references after a new act has been passed in order to clear
up uncertainties about the provisions as they apply in the
2 8 5practice of workplace relations. Issues referred include
the interpretation of works council rights vis-a—vis material 
working conditions and work organisation, works council
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training and their resort to experts to advise them on plant- 
level issues, shopsteward rights and rights of access of full­
time trade union officials, and the extent of the peace
286obligation during industrial action. 1 Most cases are settled 
by a compromise solution out of court via the mediation of the 
labour court judge. Court decisions during the 1970s have 
been seen as bolstering the position of the works council at 
the expense of the trade unions at plant level.
As was the case with individual references, size of firm is 
thought to have a major influence on whether a collective 
issue is referred or not. In his study of references during 
the 1950s, Wagner concluded that most conflicts did not go to 
the labour court but were settled between the two parties in 
the workplace. In firms with 200 to 3000 employees and above, 
the WCA 1952 had become the basis of relations in the work­
place. In firms with under 200 employees, apart from works
287council elections, the law was not being applied in practice.
In general, it can be argued that in large firms (1000 +) the 
law tends to be adhered to, although this depends on the strength 
of workplace organisation to a large extent. In the very 
small firms (100 and below), there is no majority for recourse 
to the labour courts due to the fear of employer discrimination 
or adoption of the employers' argumentation. Medium-size firms 
may be expected to refer more issues to the labour courts due 
to the lack of stability in their industrial relations either 
in terms of the subjugation of the works council as in smaller 
firms or its acceptance, found in larger firms. Other factors 
do have relevance in any consideration of collective referencesj 
including trade union strategy, as in the example of the senior 
managerial employees issue,and the aims of political groups 
represented in specific firms in West Germany. Influences on 
references to the labour court will be considered in chapters 
5 and 6 in the light of the study's own empirical evidence.
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(iii) The Role of Trade Unions in Plant-Level Industrial 
Relations
In chapter three the centralised system of collective bargaining 
on wages and working conditions in the FRG was outlined. The 
concentration of bargaining on key issues, particularly wages, 
at national and regional levels has reduced the scope of plant- 
level actors to regulate issues. Marsh argues that the system 
leaves only the administration of agreements to workplace actors 
hence his description of the German system of workplace relations 
as centralised and administrative.^00
Paragraph 2(1) of the Works Constitution Act (WCA) supports the 
central role of the trade unions and employers' associations 
in the regulation of wages and working conditions by calling 
upon the employer and works council to have regard to applic­
able collective agreements in their cooperation at workplace 
level. The codetermination rights of works councils are only
applicable where 'they are not prescribed by legislation or
289collective agreement'. Further, works agreements may not
deal with 'remuneration and other conditions of employment that
have been fixed or are normally fixed by collective agreement',
unless collective agreements expressly permit additional plant-
200level agreements. " In this way the centralised system of 
collective bargaining is upheld in the practice of workplace 
relations.
The establishment of works councils throughout German industry 
in 1920 was accompanied by trade union efforts to ensure the 
incorporation of the councils into the trade union organisation 
and their subordination to the trade unions. Guillebaud des­
cribed the various means used, which included the setting up 
of 15 industrial groups to which the works councils belonged
to prevent the development of a separate national works council 
291organisation, control over works council elections,
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attendance at works assemblies, advisory work and training of
works councillors and the influence of trade union newspapers
emphasising trade union loyalty. The recession of the 1920s
showed works councils how vital trade union support was for
292their effective operation as workforce representatives.
Guillebaud argued that in the absence of 'a strong and compact 
trade union organisation, the works councils would either be 
reduced to complete impotence or would fall victim to syndical-?93ism in one or other of its forms’.“ Works councils,
however, also performed important functions for the trade
unions at plant-level, acting as trade union agents in recruit-
294ing members, supporting policies and safeguarding agreements, 
providing flexibility within the centralised system of collective 
bargaining and constituting a source of trade union leaders who 
would have a 'constructive attitude on the role of labour in
295the economy' and an insight into the problems of management.
This interdependency between the trade unions and works councils
continues to be a feature of the German industrial relations
system todav. Streeck describes this as 'the dual system of
296interest representation', and his studies show the vital 
role of the works councils in resolving the organisational 
problems of industrial trade unions by operating as trade 
union representatives at plant level, providing the basis for 
unified interest representation as they represent the whole 
workforce and ensuring the necessary flexibility in a central­
ised system of wage bargaining without being in a position to 
threaten the operation of the system. The system of works 
councils thus prevents the fragmentation of interest represent­
ation at plant level whilst promoting a workplace organisation
which is capable of being mobilised in support of trade union 
297policies.
Problems have arisen in the dual system of interest represent­
ation. Plant-level strikes against low wage,settlements in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s led to a debate on increased 
involvement of works councils and shopstewards in wage
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o q gregulation.'” The transfer of wage bargaining prerogatives 
to company and plant levels was, however, rejected by the 
national trade union executives as threatening the solidarity 
of trade union interest representation. Instead minor adjust­
ments were made,such as the introduction of more warning strikes 
during wage negotiations, transfer of some authority on wage
bargaining to regional levels and the adoption of new forms
299of wage claims and payment methods. In the recession new
problems have emerged, particularly those associated with mobil­
ising members in support of trade union policies. These are 
dealt with in detail in section III (ii).
The trend is towards greater regulation of substantive and
procedural issues by collective agreements in the recession.
The application of the agreements at plant level, however, is
problematic as studies of the implementation of the 1973 wage
agreement in Baden-VJiirrtemberg and of provisions associated
301with the humanisation of work reveal.0 Implementation 
requires an effective workplace organisation,which is largely 
absent during an economic recession apart from the very largest 
firms in the metalworking sector.
A further continuity in the relationship between works councils 
and trade union movement is highlighted by Kotthoff's study, 
which shows.the direct influence of works councils on trade 
union policy at all levels. Although 85% of works councillors 
surveyed said they relied on trade union support and advice 
at times, their view of relations with management was dominated 
by a social partnership as opposed to trade union orientation. 
Kotthoff argued that this contributes to the cooperative
policy of the trade unions via works council influence on
’ n  k . . . . 302collective bargaining commisssions.
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(iv) The Role of Other Third Parties in the Resolution of
Conflict at Plant Level
Conciliation boards are the second key resource of external 
help in resolving workplace conflicts according to the WCA 1972. 
Unlike the labour courts, the boards deal with interest disputes. 
Any disputes about the legitimacy of referring an issue to such 
a board, the number of wingraen and the person of the neutral 
chairman of the board are referred to the labour courts. The 
role of the conciliation board is to facilitate voluntary agree­
ment between the two parties within the principles of the WCA
3031972. Marsh has pointed out that in the area of co­
determination rights of the works council the board operates as 
an arbitration board with a compulsory procedure for reaching
agreement, in all other areas the procedure is a voluntary 
304one.
305There is a very low level of cases referred to such boards. 
Despite a rise in cases since 1972, there were only 700 refer­
ences throughout the years 1972 - 1975 according to government 
statistics. Marsh estimated that there had been 202 cases in 
the metalworking branch in the years 1972 - 1976. The small 
number of cases is borne out in the empirical studies considered 
in chapter 5. It appears that the economic recession has not 
led to an increase in references.
The subjects of the references are overwhelmingly redundancy
n  a /*
compensation plans (507o) and wages issues (10%). Various
reasons are suggested for the references that are made.
307Ebsworth suggests issues involving a great deal of money
and important principles are more likely to be referred. He
also refers to the tactical use of threatened references,
although Knuth and Schank point out that instances of its use
308as threat are rare. Generally, references are made as a
last resort measure in areas of vital workforce interests, 
particularly redundancies.
178
Many studies underline the disadvantages of referring issues
to conciliation. For employers these include the deterioration
of relations with the workforce, the prejudicial effect of any
decision on other firms within the company and outside, the high
costs involved and the intrusion of outsiders into the process
of plant-level decision-making, particularly trade union
309officials acting as wing men. Works council reluctance to
refer issues to conciliation appears to be based on the
possible negative influence of the involvement of a labour
court judge on negotiations and the complexities of the pro-
310cedure of reference. Despite trade union encouragement of
311increased references to conciliation in the recession,
few cases are being referred. In large firms, works councils
have been largely accepted as negotiating partners and recourse
to conciliation is unnecessary. In small firms, works councils
are in a very disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the employer
and will rarely contemplate referring an issue to conciliation.
In Knuth's view, references are more likely from the medium-
size range of firms where the works council's acceptance is
ambiguous and the works council actively pursues its role as
312workforce representative.
The actual process of conciliation is described as a con­
tinuation of plant-level negotiations with the help of a third 
party in order to achieve a mutually acceptable solution. The 
procedure is informal and the majority of decisions are reached 
within 3 months and without the chairman using his casting vote.
Favourable experience of references to conciliation is thought
313to promote further references by works councils in future.
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II) West Germany - a Centralised System of Plant-Level 
Industrial Relations
(i) Centralised Management Control at Plant Level
Many studies record the centralised structure of decision-
314making in German industry and the fact that this is viewed
as legitimate by lower management who show greater job satis-
315faction than their Anglo-Saxon and F'fench counterparts.
The centralisation of decision-making is not, however,
associated with a bureaucratic management structure in German
firms. German management is described as person-oriented
rather than system-oriented, that is, oriented towards the
practices and preferences of top management as individuals
316rather than towards an impersonal management system. Child
and Kieser's study, for example, showed that the role of
departmental managers was less likely to be set down in official
documents in Germany than in Britain and they concluded that the
definition of management roles in Germany was largely a function
317of personal relationships. Maurice's study similarly under­
lined the fact that German units, as opposed to French and 
British units, rely more on individual expertise and professional
authority than bureaucracy and Taylorian methods of work 
318organisation. The value-orientation of German managers was
the theme of Hartmann's survey in the 1950s. The ultimate
values of managerial authority were described as private
property, the 'calling' and elite ideology. Hartmann saw
these as general social values since they were shared by those
319subject to management authority. There was evidence of an
increase of 'functionalist' orientations in the technical and 
commercial management sectors and problems were arising in 
medium-size firms (2000 +) , where there was often an uneasy 
coexistence of 'family management' and professional management 
with a shift in emphasis from management welfare policies to 
the product i t s e l f . ^20 Generally, however, value orientation
1 GO
still dominated general management and industrial relations, and
German managers tended to oppose unrestricted pragmatism where
it would undermine their value-based authority, viewed by
Hartmann as a more stable model of authority than bureaucracy
since it appealed to the common ground of social values which
321all interest groups share.
The organisation of work in German firms reflects the low level
of bureaucratisation and the community of interest based on
social values and, increasingly, the product itself. Studies
of work organisation in West Germany consistently reflect the
lower number of hierarchical levels and the wider spans of
control of German management than their British, French or
322American counterparts. This results in a lower proportion
of non-manual supervisory and management personnel to the tnanua
workforce and larger spans of control for the existing super- 
323visory staff. The role of the foreman in German industry
is considered in detail below. Studies also reflect the lower
level of functional specialisation and compartmentalisation
between the skilled — unskilled— technical staff, non-manual"-
324staff and management, production and non-production work.
325As outlined in chapter 3, ~ the common focus of interest and
activity in German firms is 'Technik' - the 'knowledge and 
skill relevant to making things and making them work' - and 
the product itself. This community of interest is reflected 
first of all in the close relation between technical and 
management qualifications. In West Germany, management is 
thought to be more technically oriented than British or French 
management, where qualifications tend more towards the natural 
sciences and management diplomas in the one and civil service 
qualifications and experience in the other and different 
qualifications are required for management and technical posts. 
Maurice points out that in West Germany an engineer is con­
sidered a likely manager, for a manager is required to be com-
327oetent in the firm's technical affairs. The status of
326
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production is high in West Germany and management emphasises
3 28product quality and type not purely economic goals. Lawrence
contrasts the high standing of industry and management in West
Germany with its low standing in Britain. This is reflected
in the prestige, salaries, qualifications and performance of3?9industrial management in the two countries.
Foremen benefit from the high status given to production.
Studies reflect their high status and the absence of a 'man-in-
the-middle' problem such as is found in British and American 
330"industry. The foremen have higher qualifications and greater
technical knowledge and skill in West Germany, and their role
331is much broader than in British firms. Fores likens German
foremen to British factory superintendents, being both factory
organisers and administrative chiefs as well as technically
competent supervisors of production. They deal directly with
production management, engineers, design technicians, production
332control, testing and inspection. Maurice shows how special­
ist work tends to be given to line personnel in Germany rather
than to separate specialist departments and this increases the
333foreman's role and status. Foremen are aided by charge-
hands (Vorarbeiter) who deal with details of day-to-day 
operation including tools, transportation, manning,but not
334discipline. This sets foremen free to run their departments.
The predominance of technical qualifications is also reflected
at workforce level. Maurice points to the high degree of
professionalism of skilled workers as well as foremen and the
concept of continuous training to foster greater mobility and
flexibility. Semi-skilled workers are also trained to do a
335large number of jobs. In contrast to Britain-,where manning
arrangements tend to be laid down centrally and workers 
exercise more autonomy, foremen deal with manning in West 
Germany and any disputes about time allowed. Maurice found 
disputes rarely passed above the level of foreman and were 
resolved between him, workers, shopstewards and the works
council. In Britain and France, line management spent 30% of 
their time dealing with grievances and disputes relating to
manning and job grading, which were seen as matters of principle.
Several reasons are suggested for the lower level of labour 
disputes in West German firms. Fores emphasises the high status 
of foremen as 'skilled workers with enough experience, technical 
knowledge and formal qualifications to do the job', in contrast 
to the obsession with social standing and orientation towards 
'social problens*of British and American management. In his 
view, foremen have retained their authority over the work­
force in West Germany and their decisions as technical experts 
337are. respected. Lawrence relates the low level of problems
to the social differences between Britain and We.st Germany vis-
a-vis attitudes to work, organisation of industrial production and
towards keeping the line strong and rewarding technical 
338proficiency. The important influence of the Works Constitution
Act 1972 in removing many areas of decision-making from the
shopfloor to works council - works management level will be
reflected in the case study material in chapter 5. Several
studies refer to the role of the works council as the third
339pillar in the formal management organisation, ' operating as 
a direct channel of communication to works management and thus 
preventing conflicts arising and, indirectly, encouraging fore­
men to act as effective resolvers of conflict where possible 
to ensure works management do not receive workforce grievances 
via the works council.
Recent studies underline the important influence of 'culturally
341specific' factors, such as expectations of authority and its 
exercise, on the introduction of, among other things, new 
technological processes. Sorge and Warner show how numerical 
control machines have been introduced in such a way as to 
maintain existing organisational structures and operations in 
British and German engineering firms. Whereas in Britain they 
were used to maintain departmental and personnel group autonomy
336
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and the division of the workforce in terns of qualifications 
3^2and status, ' in Germany they were used to reduce training 
differentials, to increase the status of production and unite 
foremen, chargehands, employees and planners around a common 
concern. Thus the development and application of technology
343is 'constrained by an unchanging socio-technical tradition'. 
There were considerable differences in the organisation of 
labour and technical practices in small and large companies in 
Britain. In Germany, practices were very similar across the 
spread of companies, reflecting possibly a common management 
ethos and concentration on 'Technik' as well as the common 
form of workforce representation - the statutory works council.
(ii) Centralised Workplace Representation
Studies of the operation of works councils in chemical and 
metalworking firms reveal the trend towards increasing central­
isation of representation within an executive committee or the
344person of the works council chairman. Hartmann has described
this trend as the operation of the 'iron law of oligarchy',
whereby interest groups elect leaders who become an oligarchy
and immune to replacement by election due to their high level
of expertise and efficiency developed during their term of
office as leaders. He describes the professionalisation of
works council representation,reflected in their long tenures
in office, re-elections and high levels of skill, particularly
in large firms, although the position of works council chairman
in small firms often leads to a 'one-man-show' in so far as
345workplace representation is concerned. These works councils
become superior power centres incorporating the most effective 
and influential shopstewards and conducting all negotiations 
with management at all levels. Strategies are developed to 
neutralise all potential rivals.
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Fiirstenberg points out that bureaucratisation and centralis­
ation of representation is inevitable if a works council is 
to be effective and this trend is intensified by management's
o  / r
policy of treating works councils as a branch of personnel. 40 
This has led Pouyadou to write of a 'condominium of works 
council and management' which manages on behalf of the work-
^  2  A  yT
force and over which the workforce has little control.
This process of bureaucratisation is seen as a result of the 
legislation on works councils. The WCA 1972 sets down the 
establishment, composition, organisation, constitution and 
operation of the works council, which are related to the size 
of firm. Where there are 9 works councillors, an executive 
committee is set up to deal with day-to-day business and sub­
committees may be set up as required. The committee system 
is extensive in chemical and metalworking firms. Ebsworth 
described conflict resolution in chemical plants as the
'automatic solution of problems by what amounts to a bureau-
348cracy created for this purpose' - a system of committees Q / Owhere 'experts meet experts and carry out important tasks'.
Studies of the iron and steel industries reveal vast networks 
of committees dealing with issues such as wages and piece-
350rates, social benefits, technical matters and accident prevention.
In addition, there are works councillors represented on
company-level and concern-1evel councils depending on the size
of the firm and type of industry (i.e. for Montan-codetermin-
ation). The operation of such committee systems means works
councillors are involved in many discussions with management
representatives and have little time to spend with the people 
351they represent. Miller points out that the legal status
of works councils means they are not obliged to seek the
collective support of the workforce since they are elected
by lists not departments and are not accountable to a con- 
352stituency. This has caused problems of alienation between
the works council and workforce and between the works council 
and trade union representatives at plant level.
A) The Effect on the Works Council's Relationshio with the
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Workforce
Actual workforce contact with the works council is generally 
low as shown in Ebsworth's study of the chemical industry,
353where employees refer grievances to their supervisors instead,
Q C /
and in studies of the metalworking industry. Factors
influencing contact with the works council and levels of personal
satisfaction with the operation of the works council include age
(older workers have more contact), sex (women expressed greater
personal benefit from works council representation) and level
of education (the higher qualified tend to be more satisfied
355with its operation). Despite, however, the low level of
contact the majority of employees feel codetermination has 
benefited the workforce as a whole,though not them personally.
Size of plant and management attitudes to the works council
356both influence workforce attitudes. In small firms manage­
ment is often hostile to the works council and the works 
council is impotent so employees do not refer issues to them. 
Firms with patriarchal management in the medium-size range 
also reveal problematic works council - workforce relations 
as the works council tends to promote management policies, 
using the MCA 1972 to deflect workforce interests. Kotthoff 
found only one example of intensive communication between 
works council and workforce, which promoted a sense of collect­
ive interests and an offensive strategy of workforce interest 3^7representation. KiBler underlines the problems of
communication in larger firms where some works councillors
358are responsible for 400 employees or more.0 c
In view of the low level of personal contact between the works
council and workforce, knowledge about codetermination and the
359legal role of the works council is restricted. Employees
often develop their own views about the works council’s role,
viewing it as a trade union body to represent workforce
360interests, particularly -material interests. These views
reveal a conflict between the tenets of the law and workforce
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expectations. In Schardt's study of employees in a chemical
plant, 80% said the works council should promote workforce
interests not act as a social partner for management, 60%
of manual and 45% of non-manual workers rejected the secrecy
obligation on works councils, 60% of manual workers said the
works council should do nothing against the will of the work- 
362force and 90% expected the works council to discuss issues
363with the workforce before negotiations with management.
Schardt’s concern was that ignorance of legal restrictions on 
the works council led to an overestimation of its ability to 
safeguard jobs and increase wages. This led to passivity and 
complacency of the workforce and was destined to create wide­
spread disillusionment with the works council when its impotence 
was revealed.
Other studies describe the relationship between the workforce 
and works council as instrumental^^ or based on a ’service' 
mentality:
'they expect the works council to make gains 
for them without being interested in how they 
do it. A conflictual involvement of the work­
force is seen bv some rather as a burden to be
avoided.'3^5
Interest in codetermination is related to the works council's 
success in the areas of subjective needs - job security, wages 
and health. This places tremendous pressures on the works 
council to be seen to be successful without being able to rely 
on active workforce support. Unless there is an effective 
shopsteward organisation in the workplace, the works council
is forced to rely on management concessions to bolster its
position.
Alienation of the workforce from their works council is
reflected in views which include the works council in the
management category ('die da oben1) and where the workforce
has as little idea of their activities as they do of those of
366senior management. Tiorks councils tend to be comprised
mainly of skilled workers, which leads to the neglect of the
361
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interests of groups such as unskilled workers, female and
367foreign employees. This neglect led to independent action
bv representatives of these groups in the 1973 wave of strikes
J ^ 368to protest against the effects of rationalisation.' ' The
fact that works councils tend to be mainly blue-collar rep­
resentative bodies has been a reflection of the white-collar 
employees' preference for individual resolution of problems 
with management representatives direct. The effects of the 
rationalisation process in the 1980s are, however, expected 
to hit hardest in the white-collar sector and lead to greater
recourse to the works councils and to union membership among
, . -i -i , 369white-collar workers.
Studies of workforce attitudes during the recession reveal
that blue-collar workers do hold a dichotomous view of employee
and employer interests, but view the prosperity of the firm as
370the precondition for their own prosperity. The present
troubles are not related to the failure of capitalism, and
employees see themselves as sitting in the same boat as the
employers, relying on state economic policies to lift the
371country out of the recession. The general passivity of
the workforce is related to the failure of the t.rade unions
372to develop a 'critical consciousness' among the members
and to past traditions of conflict within specific plants,
since resistance to management measures cannot be expected
where there is no tradition of a conscious recognition of
collective interests and collective action to promote work-
373force solidarity.
The recommendations for resolving the problems of passivity 
of the workforce during the recession focus attention on the 
need for works councils to be more responsive to the expressed 
interests of the workforce and to involve the workforce in the 
formulation and application of plant-level strategies of interest 
representation. This 'collectivisation' of communications
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between the works council and workforce is very dependent on 
effective shopsteward organisation at plant level to mobilise 
the members and create a greater awareness and interest in 
works council activities .
B) The Effect on the Works Council's Relationship with the 
Trade Union Shopstewards
Trade union shopstewards, unlike the works councils, have no 
legal basis for their presence and activities in the workplace. 
Their status is covered in trade union rulebooks. Wallraven's 
study of the rulebooks has shown that the metalworking and
376chemical unions accord the most extensive role to shopstewards.
The Metalworkers' Union describes the shopsteward as the trade
union representative at plant level, responsible for building
up and maintaining communications between the members and the
union. With regard to the works council, shopstewards are to
work with them to resolve plant-level issues, with individual
stewards acting as information and grievance channels between
377the members and the works council. The Chemical Workers'
Union extended the role of the shopstewards in the collective
bargaining process after the failure of the 1971 strike in a bid
378to more accurately gauge shopfloor feeling.
In actual practice, shopsteward organisation is weak, even in 
the metalworking and chemical industry, as a result of the 
central role of the works council at plant level.
Ebsworth's study of the chemical industry showed the lack of
379contact between management and shopstewards and the fact
that employees took their problems to f o r e m e n , e v e n  electing
their foremen as shopsteward in some instances. The foremen
found no conflict between the two roles, which tends to support
the view that shopstewards act mainly as a recruiting and dues
381collecting body in the chemical industry. 1 The reasons for 
their weak position include the dominance of the works council,
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the technical constraints of the industry and the existence
of management-sponsored stewards to aid the works councils'
33?communiontions with the workforce.
Studies of shopstewards in the metalworking industry have 
focused on the iron and steel industry where there is a 
tradition of strong trade union and shopsteward organisation 
and more favourable conditions for the trade unions to exercise 
their influence on the plant via the 1951 Company Codeterminat­
ion Act. Early studies pointed to the close contact between
the workforce and shopstewards and the involvement of the
383stewards in resolving small individual problems. ° More-
recent studies give example of plants in the steel sector
where shopstewards and senior stewards deal with the lower
stages of grievance resolution whilst the works council deals
with the representation of collective issues in negotiations
384with works management. The ICM survey also shows the strong
position of shopstewards in large firms, where most are given
time off for trade union duties and 84% of stewards claimed
to be involved in the regulation of shopfloor issues - the
majority mediating between workers (65%) and between a worker
and the foreman (51%). Only 20%, however, said they dealt with
individual wages issues. There were regular meetings between
the works council and the shopsteward committee in 70% of firms
with stewards but little contact between individual stewards
^85and the works council.'"0 The problems of shopsteward rep­
resentation are considerable even in the iron and steel sector,
where shopstewards operate mainly as a channel of communicat-
386ion between the workforce and the works council. c Both Era 
and Schmidt point out that, despite their numbers*shopstewards 
in the steel sector play an insignificant role in the regul-
3 P  7
ation of plant-level issues. ;
During the 1960s the Metalworkers' Union introduced an intensive 
recruitment campaign for shopstewards. The number of shop- 
stewards rose dramatically from 53,273 (1960) to 124,490.(1976). 
This increase, however, was concentrated in firms where con­
ditions 'were favourable, particularly where works councils
338
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were willing and able to support the union's campaign. Streeck
points out that in 40% of plants with trade union membership
389in the metalworking sector there are no shopstewards. The
fact that the unions are dependent on the works councils for
an effective shopsteward system, and for maintenance of trade
union membership at plant level per se,has been clearly
390reflected in their policies on shopstewards. In the 1970s,
shopsteward status was accorded to all works councillors who 
were members of the Metalworkers' Union and the union has 
increased its reliance on the work of the full-time councillors 
in particular by channelling all information to and from the3Q1plant through them. "
Thus the role of shopstewards at plant level is very limited
with most employees referring grievances either to the works
392council or management representatives.“ Shopstewards function
39amainly as the arm of the works council'.
k number of attempts have been made during the 1970s to secure
legal status for shopsteward activity by means of collective 
394agreements, ' Despite a small number of agreements at company
395and. regional levels, the employers' associations have
3q6resisted trade union pressures on legal grounds ' and there
is evidence of strategies to undermine shopsteward organisation
by the promotion of workgroup codetermination, management-
sponsored ’shopstewards' and to bolster the position of the
397works council as sole workforce representative. Recent
moves to introduce 'quality circles' into some plants are
viewed as management attempts to exclude both shopstewards and198the works council from workforce representation.^
In many snail firms there is no works council representation,
elsewhere the majority of shopstewards are works council 
399members. In nedium-size firms all the active trade union
members tend to be works councillors too, which leaves little 
scope for the development of an effective shopsteward system.
It is only in the larger firms in the metalworking industry,
and then only in those branches with high levels of trade
union density, that a strong shopsteward system can emerge.
There the dominant role of the works council and the policies
it adopts have led in some cases to shopsteward opposition in
the form of oppositional lists of candidates at works council 
40 ?elections. ' ' The criticism of shopstewards focuses on the 
careerism of works councillors, their neglect of workforce 
interests and refusal to involve the shopstewards in the 
representation of workforce interests since they base their 
strategies on legal argumentation and management concessions. 
Such oppositional groups of shopstewards are, however, rare 
and the involvement of these shopstewards in newly elected 
works councils means they come .under the same pressures to 
cooperate with the employer as the previous works council.
This can also lead to the demise of an effective shopsteward 
organisation since there is no-one to replace those who are 
elected as works councillors.^"4
The role of shopstewards in German industry is thus based on
their function as information channels to and from the works
council in large firms where it is impossible for the works
40 5council to maintain close contact with their constituents.
They cannot be described as the main workplace negotiators
as in the case of British shopstewards. The works councils
are the main representative bodies at plant level in West
Germany and conduct all negotiations with employers on issues
which affect the workforce as a whole. Kotthoff sees the key
for positive participation of the works council, based on the
representation of workforce interests, as where the trade
unions provide the source of works council orientation and 
407activity, and where there is an effective internal communicat­
ion system between workforce, shopstewards and works council. 
The works council, however, will remain the dominant plant- 
level actor. Carew argues that the crucial consideration with 
workplace representatives is 'what they can do in a concrete 
sense that will benefit the m e m b e r s ' . S i n c e  all the rep­
resentative functions accrue to the works council by law, there
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is little scope for shopstewards to develop into a powerful 
counter-organisation - those stewards who do seek power are 
obliged to run for election to the works council. Marsden^^ 
foresees little opportunity for shopsteward development in the 
face of the concentration of functions in the works council, 
the well-established relationship managements have built up 
with the works council and the continuing ambivalent attitude 
of the trade unions towards the role of shopstewards. The 
works councils are firmly established not only as the legal 
representatives of the workforce but the trade union represent­
atives too. This dual role leads to some problems of rep­
resentation, which are outlined below.
Ill) West Germany - a Cooperative System of Plant-Leve.1 
Industrial Relations
The principles of works council - management relations prohibit 
strike action and any other action which threatens the peace 
of the firm.^^ The resolution of workplace issues must be 
via peaceful negotiations based on the recognition of the 
interests of both the workforce and the firm as a whole.
There has been much criticism of the peace obligation and the
41°idea of common workplace interests of workforce and employer.
Johanson views them as a means of concealing the differences
in interests and integrating the works council into management 
414organisation. Filrstenberg argues that they place the works
council in a difficult position as it has to represent both
415workforce and management interests. The ambiguity of the
works council’s position is most evident in the case of work­
place strikes, where works councillors are trade union members 
and shopstewards. Employers seek to develop an extensive 
interpretation of the peace obligation and 'trustworthy co­
operation' and court cases show how works councillors have 
been dismissed for provocative statements to the workforce 
which, it was argued, le'd to strike action. ^ 0 Employers argue
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that in the case of strikes the works council should persuade
the workforce to return to work. Trade union commentators
interpret the peace obligation less extensively for the
works council - the works council as a body should not be
involved in strike action but its individual councillors can
be involved as trade union members, although not in leading 
417roles. In strike situations, the works council is not
obliged to persuade the ’workforce to return to work but should
mediate between the workforce and management, investigate the
413causes and seek a resolution. ' However, considerable risks
are involved in workplace strike action unless there is a high
level of solidarity to prevent employers dismissing ringleaders,
419especially shopstewards, when the workforce returns to work.
The actual extent of conflict measures in the workplace can 
therefore be expected to be very limited.
(i) Relations between Works Councils and Management
The specific details of the daily contacts between works 
councils and management are covered in section IV,ii, which 
deals with actual procedures for the resolution of conflict. 
This section deals with the broad categories of relationships 
between these two parties in the workplace and considers some 
of the key influences on these relationships.
The two main factors shaping relations between the works 
councils and management appear to be size of firm and manage­
ment policies, particularly their view of the role of the works 
council.
Studies of relations in small firms show a reliance on informal 
social relations and works councils are not seen as necessary 
by either management or the workforce. Kotthoff has given 
examples of firms where the works council, if one exists, is 
either ignored or isolated by the independent and paternalistic
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style of management. ' The works council chairman is often
friendly with management and operates to deflect conflicts421away from management. ' Apart from the obstacles to
effective works council work created by the management style
of the owner-entrepreneur in small firms, which often poses
a constant threat to the very existence of the council, there
are problems created by the fragmentation of the workforce
into small interest groups, the low trade union density and
the absence of alternative job opportunities in the areas in
422which small firms are established. " The conclusion on 
relations in small firms is that there the employer rules. 
Works councils are either non-existent or ineffective as 
representatives of workforce interests.
In large firms, works councils have become vital for the 
smooth-running of the firm by promoting peaceful resolution 
of the inevitable conflicts which arise, providing for the 
integration of a large and varied workforce and operating as 
a communication channel to and from the workforce. The 
problems for works councils in large firms are not those of 
recognition and involvement in decision-making in the work­
place but the attempts by management to integrate the works
council into management as a branch of nersonne1 work to the
423detriment of the council's role as workforce representative.
As indicated earlier, examples of a joint management—works
council condominium can be found in the system of expert
424committees in the chemical industry and large metalworking
firms. In chemicals, particularly, the organisation of the
production process and the profitable position of the industry
have promoted this type of relationship. Management has had
the scope to permit the works council representative successes
in the area of workplace wage rates and social benefits. This
has bolstered the position of the works council in the eyes of
the workforce but made it dependent on management for its
future effectiveness. The only way out of what Filrstenberg
425describes as the 'pull to integration' under the WCA 1972 
is dependence of the works council on the trade union and the
420
workforce for its successes. This is seldom the course
chosen by the works council because it necessitates a great
deal of work and conflict with management to build up a strong
workplace organisation, including a shopsteward system, and
an orientation of works councillors whereby they do not view
their activities as dictated by the MCA 1972 but by the
interests of the workforce. The lack of direct contact between
the trade union and works council in the daily running of the
plant means their orientation is more likely to be dictated
4 27either by trie lav? or by management policies.
Kotthoff argues that the majority of works councils operate
on the basis of 'trustworthy cooperation' as laid down in the 
428MCA 1972. This type of relationship developed during the
1950s and 1960s when the German economy and society was being 
rebuilt and there was general prosperity. Studies of the 
operation of works councils immediately after their intro­
duction in the 1920s and 1930s concluded that works councils
429had rejected the idea of a social partnership. Factory
inspectors' reports complained that works councils regarded 
their functions solely in terms of the representation of work­
force interests and ignored the legal provisions on supporting
430the employers in the attainment of company goals. Reasons
given for this orientation included the influence, of the
revolutionary workers' council movement, the unsettled economic
and political conditions and the relative newness of works
councils in many German firms. However, even in these early
years, there were indications that the works councils were
having a rationalising effect on social conflict in the work- 
431place, acting as a safety valve in the turbulent years, and
that the works councils were learning to appreciate the limit-
432ations on management.
The conditions which restricted the development of social 
partnership in the workplace during the 1920s and 1930s were 
largely absent after the Second World War, and there were 
factors, mentioned above, which promoted the development of
A- 2 6
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cooperative relations. There are indications that these
favourable conditions, particularly economic conditions, have
receded and that works council work is becoming more difficult
in the recession. There was considerable opposition of
employers to the 1972 Works Constitution Act and attempts
to restrict its interpretation to prevent what was seen as
an attack on the free democratic order, particularly the right
433to private property. A recent article in the Chemical
Workers' Union journal refers to continuing attempts to ignore
or restrict the interpretation of the WCA 1972. Employers are
more ready to take questions to the labour courts instead
of resolving them via cooperation with the works council, and
there is evidence of rights being undermined by using the
proviso of 'urgent decisions', which cannot wait to be settled
434by negotiation with the works council. In the face of this
opposition, the unions are calling upon the works councils to
make full use of their legal rights to keep jobs and to
4 3 5  winvolve the workforce in their work. The evidence is,
however, that works councils are not securing their rights by
436references to the labour courts. They are exhibiting great
reluctance to engage in any conflicts with the employers and
this is thought to be increasing the alienation and passivity
of the workforce in the recession. Although the resources for
cooperation are declining, few works councils have developed
437a conflictual policy of representing workforce interests.
Kotthoff and Jacobs explain this continuation of cooperation
by the force of habit. The two sides have invested much in
the system of mutual dependencies or codetermination and
derived many benefits from the relationship so there is little
chance of alternative forms of relationships being acceptable
438in the near future despite the recession. Bergmann points
to the absence of any acceptable socio-political alternative
to capitalism as a reason for continuing cooperation despite
439the disadvantages. Dybowski s study of works councillors'
views similarly shows them as being unable to visualise any 
alternative form of representation to codetermination and 
this is explained as being due to the institutional and 
structural constraints shaping their orientation - the legal 
definition of their duties and the individualisation of conflict 
in the WCA 1972.tf*+^
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Since the WCA 1972 only provides the opportunities for co­
operation, the existence of cooperation is dependent to a
j  !  n
great extent on management's desire to foster such relations.
This desire, in turn, is very much related to the economic
climate as studies of the operation of works council legis-
442lation since the 1920s have shown. The only areas of
effective works council action based on representation of
workforce interests appear to be in large firms, especially
metalworking, where works councils depend on trade union
support rather than on the employers' goodwill for their 
443operation. This assumption is investigated in the following
chapters, where the operation of works councils in a variety 
of firms of differing sizes and production methods is assessed.
(ii) The Extent of Conflict at Plant Level
In view of the legal framework for cooperation at plant level 
and the prohibitions on industrial action to resolve plant- 
level issues a low level of overt conflict measures can be 
expected in German plants. Cases of endemic conflict situations4 4 4
are 'a very rare exception' - Kotthoff found only one
example of a car firm which was not Dart of his survev but
445had been described elsewhere.
The two waves of unofficial plant-level strikes in 1969 and 
1973 in opposition to low national and regional wages settle­
ments were exceptional in the German system and led to studies 
positing a change in the attitudes of German workers towards 
overt conflict measures. The more recent debate on the 
severe problems of mobilising trade union members to support 
trade union policies during the recession indicate that this 
has not been the case in most plants.^4’7
The. 1969 wave of strikes were a protest against the wage lag 
which arose due to low wages settlements in a long-term
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collective agreement and a sudden unexpected rise in profits.
This prompted trade union and employer association officials 
to bring forward the collective bargaining round and negotiate 
a higher settlement. The workforce demands were thus very 
limited and the strikes affected a small proportion of the 
total workforce - 140,000 workers in 69 firms in the steel,
metal processing, mining industries and the docks over an 13
i i 4 4 8day period.
The 1973 wave of strikes focused on the drop in living 
standards brought about by a low wages settlement and a sudden 
rise in inf1 ation,and led to additional wages payments to make 
up for the lag. Apart from skilled worker protests about 
wages, unskilled groups joined the strike to call for improve­
ments in working conditions which had deteriorated as a result 
of the process of rationalisation in industry. Although 
the trade union executive opposed the strikes these new qual­
itative demands have become a focal point of the 1Humanisation 
of W o r k ’ programme in the late 1970s and 1 9 8 0 s . T h e  1973
strikes involved 275,000 workers in 335 firms, particularly
451in the steel sector and car plants/ There was, however, 
a lack of solidarity between the striking German skilled 
workers and the foreign unskilled workers.
Opponents of the cooperative policies of works councils seldom
advocate overt conflict measures as an alternative but call
452.for the instrumental use of the MCA 1972. ' Such strategies
involve the works councils developing their own definition of 
’social partnership' to secure management cooperation with 
workforce interests, and basing their activity on a long-term 
plan of objectives rather than on individual conflict regulation. 
These strategies are based on a close working relationship 
between works councils, shopstewards and workforce, and the 
pursuit of an aggressive policy of collective interest rep­
resentation within a stable relationship of trust with manage­
ment. Streeck describes the use of such strategies in his
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study of the car industry, where works councils engage in 'so-
called ’package dealing’, 'making their attitude on matters
of codetermination conditional upon concessions of the
453employer on other matters'. The fact that such strategies
require considerable legal expertise and political skill means, 
however, that they are only found in large plants with high 
levels of trade union and shopsteward organisation.
IV) West Germany - the Effects of a Legalised, Centralised 
System of Plant-Level Industrial Relations on Conflict 
Issues and Procedures
i) Conflict Issues at Plant Level
A) Wages and Wage Payment Systems
Under the WCA 1972, the works council is excluded from the 
area of wage determination since wage rates are negotiated
454by trade unions and employers associations at regional level.
In contrast to Britain, collective agreements on wage levels 
are significant regulators of actual workplace earnings. During 
the 196Cs, some wage drift did occur as employers were able 
and willing to make concessions to their workforces to retain 
their skills during a period of full employment. The actual
extent of the drift varies in the estimates of different
455commentators from a maximum of 30% to 3.3% in the years of
456the highest drift - 1961 and 1969. " ' However, workplace
wage rates were undermined in the late 1960s and early 1970s
and this led to a wide discussion on different methods of
securing the rates, from open clauses in collective agreements,
to permit a measure of workplace wage bargaining, to company-
457level agreements in the metalworking and chemical sectors. 
Employers rejected any extension of wage bargaining competence 
to the workplace and in the 1970s and 1980s the trade unions 
have once again become the main negotiators of actual wage 
rates.
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Teschner describes the shift fron wage drift in the 1960s to
453method drift in the 1970s. ' He argues that the main area
of works council activity in respect of wages was methods of
wage payment in the early 1970s. Although the works councils
studied supported the incorporation of workplace wage rates,
social benefits and annual premia into regional collective
agreements, they regarded actual payme.nt systems as the4^9exclusive domain of the works councils.
Studies of wage payment systems in the 1970s, however, show
the increase in management control over such s y s t e m s . I n
his comparison of British and German engineering firms, Marsh
points to the contrast between the lack of resistance to work
study and active participation in setting up such schemes in
Germany, and the resistance to such schemes by the trade unions
in Britain, where shopstewards in the firms surveyed did not
agree to the use of a stopwatch in the application of work 
461study methods. Maitland has described the difference in
operation of the sane payraent-by-results system in a British
and German firm belonging to the same chemical company. He
sums up the difference in the fact that in the British firm
the system is under workforce control and bargaining on the
piecerate for a specific job takes place on an informal, frag-
462mented and decentralised basis, " whereas in the German firm, 
the system is under management control. In the German firm the 
Industrial Engineering Department estimates piecerates which 
are checked by the works council for their technical accuracy 
in setting the correct standard time for jobs. All new job 
values are derived fron existing values for comparable jobs. 
Maitland describes this as a centralised expert determination 
of corect times, which maintains the rationality and internal 
consistency of the pay structure.
The methods used for evaluating wage rates are becoming 
increasingly finer as employers seek to secure control over 
wages costs, and this trend is reducing all bargaining scope 
for individual employees' and for the works council. Schmiede
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points to the increase in performance-related wage payment
systems reflected in the number of job evaluation and work
463study experts in industry. ° lie relates this to the increas­
ing intensity of work since the early 1970s. The summary 
system of evaluation is being replaced by the more precise 
analytical evaluation method. The former method evaluates 
the totality of a job or area of work and its advantages are 
that it is easy to oversee. The analytical method is preferred 
for its precision,for it snlits up the various demands of the 
job (ability, responsibility, physical exertion, environmental 
influences etc.) on the basis of a points system and creates a 
number of wage groups ‘(12 in metalworking and chemical industries 
in Germany). The weighting of the demands of the job can be 
varied - qualification and training is weighted high in
skilled craft jobs, responsibility and concentration in staff 
464jobs. The performance of the employees is checked every
6 months on the basis of the average performance for their 
particular wage group. The effects of these systems of wage 
evaluation are to remove workforce control over areas such as 
time taken for a job, correct wage rate, and to substitute 
scientific evaluation by experts for negotiation between 
individual employees and the work study engineer, the works 
council and management.
Although studies of workforce attitudes show that the central
focus of interest is wages and that they would like to see
46 5greater works council involvement in wages issues, the 
actual influence of the works council is diminishing not only 
in the area of direct wage increases but also in the evaluation 
of jobs and principles of wage payment systems despite the 
extension of the codetermination rights into job and bonus 
rates in the MCA 1972.^°
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2'' Personnel Issues 
467Marsh ' has pointed to the differences between works council
attitudes to discipline and those of shopstewards in Britain.
In Britain, discipline is traditionally regulated by the
employer and the trade unions take up grievances in the
grievance procedure, refusing to become involved in the establish
ment and administration of disciplinary measures. In Germany,
the ■works council has a right of codetermination in the area
468of works rules, the administration of sanctions. ' In her
study of the operation of discipline in German firms, Karstedt
found only 33% of them had a written works agreement on a
469disciplinary code. She explained this with reference to the
management's desire for flexibility in the administration of
sanctions and also works councils' desire for informality as
this permits an informal system of resolution based on the
470assessment of each individual case on its own merits. Trie
study showed a low level of registration of offences against
works rules. Most cases were dealt with informally by the
employees' immediate suoeriors and both sides sought to avoid
471conflict and disciplinary measures. The ultimate sanction -
dismissal - was more commonly used against women, foreigners, 
apprentices and the unskilled. In such cases, the works council
was less likely to object to the dismissal unless an employee- 472was determined to take his case before a labour court.
Marsh similarly argued that the rights of individual workers
were more vigorously nursued bv the shopstewards in Britain 
by 4 7 3than the works councils.A
The works councils' rights in situations of mass redundancies
474are similarly very weak. Marsh argues that redundancy is
one area where Britain has more detailed provisions,especially
475on the right to financial compensation. The works council
has the right to be informed if the preconditions for 
redundancies are met, and agreement should be reached on
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whether the change should be introduced and how. The
employer in effect is not hindered from carrying out his 
economic plans and the works council is only able to negotiate 
compensation for the effects of this change on the workforce, 
although there is no obligation upon the employer to pay com­
pensation where the redundancies are due to 'oressin? economic 
477reasons'. Studies of redundancies in German firms show the
variety of methods used to obviate the need for a social com­
pensation plan. Marsh found redundancies handled as disciplin­
ary and dismissal cases as well as the employer offering
A 7 ofinancial inducements to employees to end their contracts. °
Where redundancy compensation plans have been agreed there has
often been considerable criticism of the works council for
479agreeing to such a measure, which provides one explanation
for the high proportion of compensation elans referred to
480conciliation boards for a decision. The studies also reveal
the paucity and tardiness of any information given to the works 
council by the employer on major changes which will affect a 
large part of the workforce.4
Gerl's study reveals the low level of works council influence
and involvement where investments and major changes to the
plant are concerned. In the area of personnel decisions,
however, the works council is more active. He shows how the
works council was accepted as a negotiating partner by the
personnel, department in the 'early stage of drafting new selection
482procedures for recruiting new employees. He ex-plains this
by the more extensive rights accorded the works council in
A S 3personnel issues and their greater knowledge in such areas.
Marsh found issues such as manning and hiring were a source of 
major disputes in the British firms, where management claimed 
to be able to man machines as they wished, although the workforce 
had considerable influence in practice. In the German firms,
they were not a central source of dispute, although there were 
some examples of disagreement over the need for special shifts
A 7 G
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and undermanning. The works council had some influence over 
the composition of the workforce via their involvement in 
establishing selection criteria. The WCA 1972 permits the 
works council a veto on hirings under specific conditions
and involvement in the establishment of the conditions of
485employment. Marsh sees the key difference in the British
shopstewards' interest in collective issues such as manning, 
whilst the works council participates in individual issues.
Kohl's questionnaire survey of works councils' involvement in 
the broader issue of personnel planning, however, showed a 
weak influence on company policy due to poor information and 
a lack of knowledge and skill in dealing with these wider issues.^
Transfers of employees are not seen as a major issue in Germany.
Management is required by law to notify the works council of
long-term transfers and the works council can veto the decision
43 7under specific conditions. The financial aspects of trans­
fers tend to be regulated in collective agreements, whilst 
contracts of employment usually involve a mobility clause.
C} Working Conti it ions
The works councils have wide de jure rights in the area of
alterations which have a significant impact on a large section482of the workforce. The employer must inform the works council
in due time of any plans and consult with them on the impact 
of the action. The increase in rationalisation of the work­
place during the 1970s has led the Metalworkers' Union to seek489to regulate not only the price of joos but also their content,
and to promote the humanisation of work in industry and the 
4Q0services. ‘ Despite these de jure rights and entitlements, 
studies of the role of works councils in the introduction of 
new working methods show very limited participation.4^  Inform­
ation about proposed plans only occurs after the plans are made, 
although information is always given where wage payment methods
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and principles are affected. Altrnann found works councils
were unable to analyse the information they were given and
deduce effects on the position of the workforce from it. The
works council's role is usually reactive; there is seldom a
systematic plan of action vis-a-vis changes. Their low level
of information, knowhow and skill in deducing the advantages
and disadvantages of proposed changes leads works councils to
translate any nroblems into the familiar areas of securing
492wages and working conditions. This means they do not
recognise the new problems created by new technology since
the new pressures are often mental rather than physical.
Altmann points out that the works council is often out of
touch with those emnloyees soecifically affected since they
493are not represented on the works council. Ilis survey of
workforce attitudes reveals their lack of information about
changes in work methods, except where they affect wages, and
1 1 . .  4 9 4 1the limitation of tneir expectations to wages. * Tney view
the works council's role as a reactive one, dealing with405individual problems in the areas of wages and safety, "“ al­
though some expressed criticism at their lack of information 
and lack of contact with the works councillors.^^ Altmann 
concludes that the works councils did not understand the concept 
of humanisation of work and were sceptical about it. Generally, 
they lack the information, contacts and ability to put the
ideas on improvements to work and the working environment into 
497 1effect. Although his original research objective had been
to study how the works council articulated and dealt with the
problems of humanisation, he was forced to restrict his study
498to whether they recognised any problems at all.
Krahn's survey of small and mediun-size firms revealed a similar 
picture of works councils restricting their role to the resolut­
ion of individual problems and seeking the way of least 
resistance. Humanisation of work was given a very low priority 
amidst the pressures of competence, manpower and time which 
works councils in smaller firms faced. The works councils
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adapted to the real balance of power in the firm and sought 
only to obviate the worst effects of the changes in work 
methods. Employers only responded to the demands of human­
isation if this would reduce costs in terms of absenteeism 
and damage to materials and machines. He recommended the 
incorporation of more areas into collective agreements to 
concretize the general legal provisions and an increase in
the information and training workplace representatives receive499from the trade unions.
Studies of the problems of applying the provisions of collective
agreements in the workplace during the recession and their
500limited impact on actual working conditions,^ together with 
the evidence of employer association resistance to any further 
extension of collective agreements into areas like codetermin­
ation rights in the introduction of personnel information 
501systems, reveal the limited effectiveness of the reliance
502on de jure rights established at above-workplace levels. ^
In a system of cooperative conflict resolution, v/here persuas­
ion and negotiation are the main tools of works councils and 
employers, the way forward in the humanisation of work pro­
gramme appears to be to persuade employers that humanisation 
‘of work is their best option, both on long-term cost-effective 
grounds and in terms of their future relations with their 
workforces. Legislation may be enacted in this area if the 
employers reject all attempts at persuasion and their ignoral 
of the negative effects of new technology on their employees 
threatens the industrial peace at plant level.
(ii) Procedures for the Resolution of Conflict at Plant Level
As outlined in section I(i), the Works Constitution Act of 1972
sets out a general framework of conflict resolution, whereby
503internal agreement is favoured, ~ although provisions are 
made for reference to third carties - the labour courts and
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Conciliation Boards - where no agreement can be reached by
the two parties. In the 1972 Act, a general outline of an
individual grievance procedure is given in paragraphs 84 to
86. This involves a general right to raise a grievance with
504the employer direct or via the works council, 1 information 
on how the grievance is being dealt with, and provision for 
the details of the actual procedure to be fixed by collective
i  -  5 0 5or works agreement.
Studies show little evidence of formal grievance procedures
at workplace level apart from the general provisions in the
MCA 1 9 7 2 . Ebsworth and Miller found examples of general
procedures written into the works rules or conditions of
service agreement at company level. These involved a general
right of complaint and a choice of persons to whom complaints
507could be referred. They were not used in practice, where
informal resolution was preferred. Ebsworth noted that:-
'There was a considerable lack of knowledge 
on procedures even among lower management to 
whom it seems the majority of the workforce 
turn when they have problems. The ability to 
go either to management or the works council 
to settle grievances is taken for granted and 
not treated as a part of the formal grievance 
procedure . ..'50b
Dybowski describes the attitudes of the works council and
management to the MCA 1972 as the view that it is 'a general
framework for orientation' but not a direct influence on daily
relations in the workplace. The MCA 1972 is said to provide
a secure framework within which a flexible response to
509individual cases can take place. Legal boundaries are
recognised but dailv practices are not directly related to 
the..510
Despite some evidence from studies of the iron and steel
industries that shopstewards and senior stewards are involved
in the initial stages of resolution of individual, non-legal 
511issues, the overwhelining evidence is that foremen and works
sy
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councillors are the key actors involved in grievance handling51?and resolution at the lower levels. *" Bergmann and Bapf
point out that technical problems tend to be referred to
the foreman unless he is incapable of or unwilling to deal
with them. Foremen also deal with questions relating to wages
and working conditions where they are prepared to act as
grievance handlers and there are opportunites for informal
contacts between them and the workforce. Where they refuse to
deal with grievances, employees refer matters to the works
council and ask whether it is worthwhile proceeding with the 
513grievance.' Thun refers to the preference for spontaneous,
oral grievance resolution which seldom goes beyond the level
of foreman. Foremen seek to resolve issues such as wages,
work organisation, employee employer relations on the spot
and not refer them upwards to departmental management unless
514the issue is clearly beyond their competence.
Informality is also the keynote in the resolution of conflicts 
at levels above the immediate workplace. Despite the pre­
valence of the 'committee system' in the large firms of the
515chemical and metalworking industries,' the informal system 
of contacts between management and individual members of the 
works council provides a system of continuous resolution 
which helps to prevent the build up of p r o b l e m s . T h e  
informal system of resolution between works council and manage­
ment focuses on the works council chairman and the full-time
517works councillors in most firms, although in some firms,
the works council adopts a policy of no individual negotiations
with management to prevent the emergence of an elite group
of workforce representatives isolated from the remainder ofs 1 gthe representatives and the workforce.'" °
General conclusions on the operation of conflict resolution
procedures in the workplace confirm the dominance of the works
council as the main representative of the workforce and
519negotiator with management.' The position of the works 
council remains unassailable although the recession has reduced 
much of the scope for cooperation. Miller explains the low
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520level of manifest conflict' ' in the workplace by the fact
that although there are a proliferation of channels for
521grievance resolution, particularly in the steel industry
covered in his study, the channels are all part of one
522institution - the works council. Similarly, although
there is much evidence of informal conflict resolution in 
the workplace, this informality occurs within the legal frame­
work for cooperative relations defined by the WCA 1972 and 
collective agreements, which upholds the works council as 
the representative of workforce interests. This contrasts 
sharply with the informal resolution at workplace level in 
Britain, which does not take place within a statutory or 
agreed framework of principles for relationships between 
shopstewards and employers.
The actual form of the agreements made betweenmanagement Stthe works 
council vary fron the legally binding, written works agree­
ments to examples of custom and oractice. Works agreements
523must fulfill certain preconditions outlined in the WCA" and
can be obligatory agreements (in areas where the WCA provides
for compulsory arbitration in the event of no agreement
524between the two parties) or voluntary ones. ' They are few
in number in most firms and deal with general nrincinles and
525norms for groups of employees. Issues covered by works
agreements include wage matters (procedures for wage payment,
new methods, wage structures) (28%), working hours (22%),
holidays (7%), personnel matters (6%) and areas such as works
rules (5%), social matters (4%), safety (3%), and training 
5^6(3%).' Any conflicts about the right to draw up a work 
agreement, the execution and interpretation of agreements are 
dealt with by the labour courts. Conflicts about the content 
of an agreement still to be agreed are dealt with by the 
conciliation boards.
Works agreements only provide a basic framework of entitle-
527ments and procedures,' the daily practice of regulating
workplace issues relies on unwritten agreements.
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1 R e a  1 ungsabreden1 deal with the application of measures
within the. area liable to codetermination - for example, a
52single instance of a change in working hours. Advantages
of such agreements include, their flexibility and speed. They
have no fixed term and end once the aim is achieved. They do
not have to be written down but most commentators recommend
that a record be kept.""' A major problem of such agreements
is that employers seek to reduce codetermination issues to
unwritten agreements, which are not legally binding. Fitting’s
definition of issues open to unwritten agreements only allows
for purely individual issues and would probably not cover an
530issue like overtime for the whole workforce. However, the
practicalities of operating a plant do not allow for joint
meetings and the drawing up of a works agreement for provisionald 31measures even where they are liable to codetermination.
The existence of custom and practice, where the workforce comes 
to rely on certain actions of the employer without express 
agreement, is rare and continuing to decline in the face of 
increasing management control over wages and working conditions 
and centralised conflict resolution. Examples include trans­
fers only under certain conditions, showers during working
hours, flexible starting times, extra holidays, and the 'Pensum1 5 32Iri the docks.' Labour court rulings have established certain 
preconditions for the existence of a 1 hetriebliche Ubung \  
which include the regular repetition of the sane action (where­
by the court determines the number of repetitions necessary for
533establishing a practice) and the intentional commitment of
534the employer to the said actJ plus the agreement of the
employee. The reasons for the existence of custom and practice
include the fact that small firms may find it too troublesome
to establish formal rules, or an employer may be unsure of the
impact of a certain measure and experiment on an individual
basis initially. The emergence of custom and practice due to
a low level of management control is very rare as control is
increasingly centralised in the. hands of management and the 535works council '" and this type of custom and practice would 
also be legally questionable. Eeiter points out how the
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extension of statutory rulings on holidays have also reduced 
the instances of custom and practice in the area of unofficial 
hoi idays.
The Tact that so nanv substantive issues are clearly regulated 
by lav, collective and works agreements means that the
ootential for informal, low-level workplace bargaining is
" 536virtually non-existent in most German firms . J The trend is
towards the even greater consolidation of workplace issues in
trade union collective agreements and the centralisation of
decision-making in the workplace in the hands of the full-time
works councillors or the works council chairman and management
537representatives at works level.
3) Conclusion
The present chapter has described two very different systems 
of organising relations at plant level, particularly the 
resolution of conflict. The German system has been shaped 
by government legislation and is highly centralised, exhibiting 
a sophisticated approach to the resolution of industrial con­
flict via cooperative modes of regulation. The British 
system, in contrast, has developed ad hoc in response to 
variances in the power relationship between management and 
workforce; resolution machinery tends to be fragmented and 
uncoordinated, responding to immediate pressures on the shop- 
floor with little evidence of long or medium-term goals regard­
ing the relationship between the two parties and their re- 
spective interest representation.
The effects of influences such as national economic context, 
technological organisation and size of plant thus need to be 
considered against the background of two very different systems 
of workplace relationships. For example, the economic boom 
vears in the 1950s led to the emergence of a powerful shop- 
steward movement in Britain whereas in Germany similar develop-
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nents were prevented by the legal framework of workplace 
relations and the centralisation of wage bargaining in particular 
in the hands of the national trade unions executives. The
oresent economic recession has lee in Britain to an increasing
538'roll-back* of workplace trade union organisation whilst 
works councils continue to resolve, plant-level issues in the 
FRG, although the issues are more conflictual and complex than 
in the 1960s.
This continuity in relations and modes of conflict resolution 
in the FRG and the wide oscillations in the British system 
are also reflected in the comparison of different sizes of 
plant and different technologies in the two systems. Studies 
show a greater level of uniformity in workplace relations 
between large and small plants in the FRG than in Britain.
Firms belonging to different industry branches in the German 
system also show striking similarities in the concentration of
representation and negotiation in the hands of the works
539council and management. Gorge and Warner s study " shows 
how firms in Britain and Germany apply new technological 
processes in very different ways in order to uphold existing 
socio-technical traditions at plant-level.
The findings seem to indicate that whereas influences such as
economic context, technology and size of plant have had a
crucial impact on the shape of British workplace relations in
the absence of state regulation; " legislation and trade union
and employer association organisation and policies have had a
unifying effect on the workplace in the German system, reflected
in the continuity and uniformity in the modes of conflict 
541resolution.
Recent British studies underline the advantages of 'cooperative
542constitutionalism' as a model for workplace relations.
Reliance on voluntary regulation on the basis of personal good­
will anti informal contacts can easily break down in circum­
stances of economic, social and technological change and lead
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to 'uninhibited antagonism'. In such circumstances the actors
in a system of cooperative constitutionalism can 'fall back'
on a network of legislation and legal agreements. This can
result in 'antagonistic constitutionalism' where the legal
norms are used to carry on the conflict between employer and
employee. Evidence from the German studies indicates, however,
that this degeneration is rare and cooperative modes of
resolution continue even when the objective resources for co-
543operation are declining. In contrast, conflictual modes
of resolution persist in the British system even when there is 
considerable scope for cooperation.
Despite superficial similarities b e t w e e n  the two systems 
regarding the preference for internal resolution of conflict 
and general areas of conflict, there are considerable differ­
ences between the British and German systems of workplace 
relations. The legal framework for relations in Germany has 
left much scope for informal regulation of issues within the 
plant itself as will be shown in the following chapters. The 
absence of a viable framework for relations in Britain has, 
in contrast, led to an increasing formalisation and bureau- 
cratisation of regulation within the plant to control the 3 /j. A,level of conflict and enable managers to 'manage' their plants.
Streeck1s recent study goes further than this to show how the
problems of the voluntary system of industrial relations has
forced the government to pursue a neo-liberal policy of high
unemployment to reduce trade union power and permit extensive
rationalisation in a bid to improve general economic performance.
Such direct intervention of the state in the economy has not
been necessary in Germany where the 'social partners' have
been able to agree to viable solutions to improve economic 
545performance.
The problem of institutional inertia in the face of changing
contexts of industrial relations will be discussed in the
concluding chapter, which considers the important role of
5 A 6'traumas' in the promotion of institutional reform.
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Recent work on European systems of industrial democracy under­
line the kev influence of formal rules rather than structural
547factors (context) for actual participation. Wilpert con­
cludes that participation is thus more the result of socio­
political conditions, i.e. political will, than of technological
548and organisational influences. The following chapters will
consider in greater detail the relative influences of these 
different factors on actual modes of conflict resolution at 
plant level.
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CHAPTER 5: Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the West
German Electro-Technical and Metalworking  —   >2.
Industries - the Cas Studies
1) The Electro-Technical Industry: 3 Firms
I) Firm A - a Small Electro-Technical Firra^
(i) The Context of Conflicts Arising and Their Resolution
The firm develops and manufactures specialist measuring equip­
ment for paint and plastic coatings. It has a total workforce 
of 45, comprising administrative staff, labour technicians, 
skilled electronics workers on the shopfloor and a small number 
of unskilled workers to do the packaging work. The proportion 
of blue collar employees to white collar employees is approx­
imately 1:1.
Management organisational structure is simplified. The firm
is owned and managed by two electronics engineers. There are
25 departmental heads with approximately 10 employees in each 
department, who work alongside the workforce and do not occupy 
a separate office. There are 2 foremen in the production 
sector.
Three works councillors constitute the workforce representation. 
None are released from their jobs in the production sector.
The works council chairman is the only active representative 
and engages in any necessary dialogue with management. Only 
'20% of the workforce belong to a union and these are all in the 
production sector. There are no shopstewards.
Relations within the firm are dominated by the persons of the 
two owner-managers and the works council has little influence 
on management policy. Management characterised the relations
* Footnotes in Volume Two d . 84.
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with the works council as 'good' due to the fact that the 
firm has not had to face any major problems over the past few 
years. They referred, however, to an earlier period when they 
came into conflict with the works council about the interpret­
ation of the works Constitution Act 1972 (UCA) and several 
cases were referred to the labour court for a settlement.
During this period, management had many contacts with their 
employers' association and took courses on the WCA. Relations 
have since settled down. Their present view of the WCA 
recognises it as 'the basis behind our policies', especially 
in the area of wages and works agreements. The peace obligat­
ion and stipulation that the works council should work together
3witn management for the good of the firm are seen in a 
favourable light. Generally though, legislation such as the 
WCA is viewed as inappropriate in snail firms where personal 
relations dominate and management is considered to take their 
responsibilities vis-a-vis the workforce more seriously than 
in larger establishments.
(ii) Conflicts Arising^
Individual wages issues were seen as the only recurring conflicts
and represent individual employees' attempts to move into higher
wage groups in the production sector. White collar workers'
5wages are time-rated, production workers also receive a tine­
rated basic wage plus a bonus based on piecework. The wages 
system is based on the analytical system laid down in collective 
agreements at regional level and its operation is under the 
control of the production planning department.
The satisfactory economic prospects of the firm meant there 
had been no need for redundancies or transfer of employees to 
lower paid jobs. The firm did not operate any shiftwork, 
working conditions were clean and comfortable and all jobs 
were individual, there was no assembly-line pressure.
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There had been no instances of overt conflict between manage­
ment and workforce not even workforce participation in strikes 
called by the trade union. The dominant role of management 
was again shown by the statement that they would address the 
employees personally if there was any sign of trouble and 
dismiss them if necessary.
' iii) Conflict Resolution Procedures
The only formal written procedures were in the works rules 
which were based on recommendations in collective agreements 
and represented a general right of grievance reference to 
management and the works council.
Actual reference of issues differentiated between production 
and white collar employees:-
production________ . works , management
employee council
white collar . departmental vmanaging
employee ^ head or ^directors
personnel
department
The difference was seen as due to the fact that the white 
collar employees had no representatives on the works council, 
which comprises production employees, and work in close 
association with management representatives.
The two managing directors deal with all important issues, 
especially those involving money.^ Although general wages 
queries would be dealt with by the wages section, questions 
such as a wage advance to an individual are decided by the 
directors. The works council chairman deals with everything on 
the workforce side and meets with management when negotiation 
is necessary.
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The involvement of third parties in the internal resolution 
process i s  limited. The trade union and employers' association 
are consulted via letters and telephone calls on legal matters 
usually and the employers' association helped set up the new 
bonus scheme. They seldom come into the firm. There have 
been some instances of dismissal cases being referred to the 
labour court. As mentioned earlier, several conflicts over 
the interpretation of the MCA 1972 were referred to the court 
in the years immediately following the passing of the Act. A 
recent management decision about works holidays went to the 
second stage of the labour court process where it was decided 
in management's favour. The firm has had no experience of a 
conciliation board.
The results of the resolution process in terms of works agree­
ments are 4 agreements covering works rules, the bonus system, 
flexible working hours and works holidays, of which the latter 
proceeded from a labour court decision.
(iv) Key Influences on Conflicts and Resolution Procedures
The context of firm A promotes a low conflict rate and the 
emphasis on individual conflicts when any do arise. The 
procedures for resolution of issues reveal the dominant role 
of the managing directors in small owner-managed firms, and 
the emphasis on the person of the works council chairman in 
all interactions between management and production employees. 
The low level of trade union organisation further promotes the 
role of management in the determination of workplace issues 
and the individualisation of responses to conflicts in the 
workplace. However, the concentration of organisation among 
production employees provides some basis for works council 
resistance to management as seen in references to the Labour 
Court in respect of dismissal cases and collective issues of
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rights such as interpretation of the Works Constitution Act 
(WCA) and the question of works holidays. The concentration 
of organisation may also offer some explanation for the 
emergence of some individual wages conflicts in the production 
sector.
The fact that the context of firm A does not provoke a large 
number of conflicts in the workplace can be seen as hindering 
the emergence of any collective workforce representation. The 
factors promoting the low level of collective consciousness, 
in their turn, hamper the identification of possible areas of 
conflict with management.
(The key influences on the process of conflict resolution in 
firm A are outlined in diagrammatic form in the appendices).
7II) Firm B - a Medium-Size Electro-Technical Firm
(i) The Context of Conflicts Arising and their Resolution
Firm B is the headquarters of a company comprising 3 establish­
ments. Total workforce is 325, of which 100 are employed in 
firm R which houses the administration of the company and its 
laboratories as well as the assembly of the products. The other 
2 establishments house the mechanical engineering section, 
specialising in motorised lathes and drills used in the assembly 
(205 employees), and the small establishment (15) Is responsible 
for the one consumer product which the company manufactures.
The workforce in firm B comprises a mixture of white-collar 
employees - electronic engineers and technicians in the develop­
ment and design departments and administrative staff - and blue- 
collar employees. In the production departments the skilled 
employees deal with the more technical operations such as 
testing parts for correct current flows whilst unskilled female
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employees dominate the assembly sections. Trade union 
organisation is approximately 23% and is concentrated among
the older male production workers. Some of the white-collar
8workers are organised by the white collar union (DAG)' but 
are so few in number that management has no relations with 
the union. Firm B employs only 3 - 4  foreign workers, the 
remainder are German and live locally.
Firm S specialises in the production of tacometers and 
speedometers for public transport and commercial vehicles, 
according to customer specifications. The technology of firm 
E is considered not to provoke many conflicts - working con­
ditions are good, all jobs are sitting jobs, there are no
. 9shifts.
The company w as founded in 1905 and concentrated originally 
on precision mechanical engineering. The present site for 
firm 2 dates back to 1951. A degree of 'family ownership' of 
the company is revealed in the fact that the present director 
is the son of one of the founding members in 1951. Management 
organisation in the company is illustrated below:-
Director (legal training)
sales manager 
responsible for:-
- inland sales
- exports
- rail
- publicity
differentiated training
according to - buying
product assembled 
there
- quality control 
of end product
- quality control 
of incoming parts
- stores
- experimental 
section
technical manager
works managers (3}  ^^
e.g. firm 3 - 
responsible for 12 
departments:-
- 8 departments are
rinance manager
responsible for 
6 de par tments:-
- laboratory
- design
- production 
planning
- finance
- apprentice
foremen (8 in firm D)
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Staff ratios in the production departments vary from 2 in 
quality control of end product to 22 in the section assembling 
the electrical indicators for speedometers. The responsibilities 
of the foremen vary, although all their constituencies have less 
than 25 employees. In the survey data 6 foremen {1 5 % ) had no 
chargehand or equivalent under them, 2 (25%) said they had 
between 1 and 3 chargehands.
Workforce representation comprises 7 works councillors none
of whom are released from their jobs. All are production
workers and 5 are trade union members (IGM). The only works
council organisations are a joint works suggestion committee
17and an economic committee, *“ which 'doesn't do anything' in
management's view. The works council holds a 2 hour surgery
once a week for employee complaints and advice. Discussions
with works councillors revealed considerable difficulties in
actually forming a works council in the last election due to
apathy and reluctance to stand for election. Details on the
composition of the works council from the survey data showed 
134 members (57%) were in the age range 26 - 35 and 3 (43%)
at the end of the age scale 56 - 65. Similarly 4 had only
1 - 5  years service in the. works council whilst the other
three varied from 6 - 10 years, 11 - 15 years and 25+ years,
14the latter being the deputy works council chairman. 5 are
members of a trade union, 2 are not. Skilled and technical
15employees dominate the works council.
Shopsteward organisation had also suffered from indifference 
and a reluctance of members to become actively involved. Firm 
B had had 6 shopstewards some years ago but the works councillors 
said they had played an insignificant role as the works 
councillors themselves work alongside the workforce and are 
easily accessible for questions and grievances arising.
Replies by the workforce and works council to the question as 
to how relations in the firm could be improved further 
emphasise the unimportant role accorded to the influence of 
trade union organisation generally and shopstewards in 
particular.
Management's view of relations with the works council was 
that they are very good. The reasons for this were, firstly,
that there had been an absence of serious problems at firm B,
and, secondly, management acceptance of the MCA 1972 as a
basis for their relations with the works council. This
statement, however, was followed by an. outline of what
management views as the negative aspects of the WCA 1972.
These centre on the fact that management should he allowed to
manage and the WCA 1972 accords too many rights to the works
council, which permit it to interfere with the reasonable
process of management. Differences had arisen over the inter-
1 °pretation of the WCA 1972 but had been resolved internally. u
Generally, however, there was said to be a wide area of mutual
19understanding between management and works council. Works
council views of their relations with management showed an
emphasis on the importance of the WCA 1972 in its regulation
20of many details of workplace relations and on the works
council as the representative of workforce interests at work- 
21place level. Replies to questions about the obstacles to
their representative role and on necessary improvements to
their relations with management again reflected the problems
22of apathy and disinterest on the part of the workforce and
also management attitudes to the works council's role in the" 23 workplace.
17
(ii) Conflicts Arising
The wages system at firm B is based on the analytical system 
of job evaluation laid down in regional collective agreements 
for both white- and blue-collar employees. In addition, there 
is a bonus system for blue-collar employees with an upward 
ceiling of 130% to ensure quality levels in production are 
maintained. Replies by the foremen on the level of wage 
grievances arising show that problems relating to bonuses, 
transfers to new wage groups and changes in wage levels within
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Z.one wage group do sonetimes occur. Works councillors, when
asked about the extent of personal problems arising among the
workforce, described such problems as always relating to money
matters as individual employees seek internal wage rises.
There was some evidence of works council dissatisfaction with
25the wage system as it is at present constituted.
Work organisation in firm B was seen by foremen as based 
chiefly on individual jobs. There were sometimes transfers 
to a new wage system and within a wage system^ although 
the main personnel problems had arisen in the mechanical engin­
eering plant, where there had been short-time working. This 
was the result of the shift of emphasis from mechanical engin­
eering and electronics to micro-electronics. There had been 
no redundancies in the company thus far. Dismissals were rare
_p . 28m  f irr.i B .
Small technical changes in production occurred regularly. All
the foremen (8) referred to problems with the quality level of
production and 50% (4) said there were often problems relating
to technical malfunctioning. Working conditions, however,
posed no great difficulties apart from problems with ventilation
29where soldering was taking place.
Firm 3 does not operate a shift system although overtime is said
30to regularly occur. This was not seen as problematic by the 
works co\incil as a system of flexible working hours was in 
operation and employees who worked overtime could take time 
off at a later date. There was some indication of dissatisfaction 
of the workforce at the restriction of their freedom of choice 
regarding holidays - the works holiday took up 3 weeks in 
summer and management was now considering a 4 day works holiday 
at Christmas.
The form grievances took were mainly individual according to 
the foremen, although there were some group issues in the 
area of working conditions (75%) and holidays (38%).
There was no evidence of any overt conflict measures of any 
form having occurred in firm 3 3 . 3 1
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(iii) Procedures for the Resolution of Conflicts
The only formal procedure mentioned by management was the 
agreement on works rules based on guidelines in collective 
agreements. These rules included a very general procedure 
that where issues relating to the works rules arise they will 
be dealt with by management in conjunction with the works 
council. The works rules were seen by 83% of the foremen 
and by 43% of the works councillors as important procedures 
in their respective roles but only 33% (7) of the workforce 
cited them as indicative of the correct procedure for resolving 
grievances. Management's view of the correct procedure was 
for employees to refer an issue first to the foreman or 
immediate supervisor and then, if there is no settlement, to 
the works council. Some grievances take a written form, for 
example, applications for a wage increase or advance, dismissals 
and notice to leave jobs.
The responses of the workforce to the actual procedure used for 
resolving a selection of issues showed the dominance of the 
foreman in all issues except safety issues, where equal numbers 
referred to the foreman and to the safety representative (40%: 
40%); problems about social facilities, where the works council 
was contacted (62%); and problems concerning the employee's 
relationship with his immediate supervisor, where other 
management representatives (38%), the personnel department (29%) 
and the works council (29%) were contacted. The most common 
reason given for the choice of representative was that the
32foreman was the best representative of employee interest (81%). 
Reference of issues was by the employee himself (100%) to the 
foreman nearby (86%) or when he was on his round (14%). In 
95% of cases the issue was resolved by the foreman or immed­
iate supervisor orally. The majority of the employees5 contacts 
were with the foreman and chargehands, where they existed. 
Contacts with the works council ranged from 'sometimes' (48%) 
to 'very seldom1 (30%). This was despite the fact that a higher 
percentage of respondents were trade union members (43%) than 
in the company as a whole.
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The insignificant role of the works council at shopfloor level 
in the resolution of grievances was also reflected in the fore­
men's responses. Issues were referred to them by employees 
(100%) and resolution took place in talks between the foreman 
and employee (83%) and foreman and his supervisor (63%). Con­
tacts with the works council ranged from ’seldom' (50%) to 
'never' (38%) in respect of grievance resolution. Issues 
which could not be resolved at workshop level were referred to 
the works management (100%). The foremen stressed that their 
responsibility was the smooth-running of production not con­
flict resolution, although they dealt with small issues such 
as 'moving a stool from one side of the workshop to the other', 
queries relating to bonuses (38%), work distribution (100%), 
quality (88%), technical issues (75%), overtime (88%), holidays 
(88%), personal questions (75%) and problems between individual 
employees (100%). It was expected that any serious issues 
would be referred direct to works management.
The works councillors set their involvement in grievance 
resolution as low, 0 - 20% of all problems arising, but all 
were satisfied with their role in respect of grievance resolut­
ion. Issues were referred to them by employees (100%), 
although it was pointed out that employees often did not 
approach then directly but they hear of problems via rumours. 
Other resources of issue reference were works management (50%) 
and the works council chairman (43%). Individual works 
councillors claimed sorne involvement in the resolution of 
issues relating to holidays and safety (1007,), social facilities 
(43%), discipline (43%), transfers (57%) and bonuses (36%).
57% claimed to resolve some of these issues with foremen and 
57% with other immediate workforce supervisors such as depart­
ment heads in the laboratory. Works management and the works 
council chairman dealt with issues which could not be resolved 
at lower levels (100%).
226
At works level, the works manager dealt with production issues
and referred unresolved issues on to the technical manager who
acted as a sieve for issues being dealt with by the company
director. The technical manager was said to be able to resolve
most issues either on his own or with the finance manager,
where monetary issues were concerned. Any new agreements
on key issues like the works rules and other works agreements
involve the company director and works council chairman in
special meetings. The key role of the works council chairman
and his deputy is confirmed in the details of the works
33councillors contacts with the works management.
Actual procedures, differentiated for white-collar and blue- 
collar employees, are illustrated below:-
BC employee
Foreman
lWorks Manager 
Technical Manager
wCompany Director (in conjunction 
with the Finance, Technical and 
Sales Managers and Works Council 
Chairman).
The works council, in the form of the chairman or the deputy 
chairman, appears to be chiefly involved at the level of 
company director, where works agreements are decided upon.
Uorks agreements exist on the bonus system, holiday regulations, 
flexible working hours, works rules (company-level agreement 
not works agreement) and a suggestion scheme. Management 
emphasised that there was little need for detailed works agree­
ments as matters are regulated in detail by collective agree­
ments and the MCA 1972. Some criticism was expressed in the
VIC employee
Personnel Department 
vXHead of Finance
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statement that soon there would be nothing in the workplace 
not regulated by collective agreements. Both the foremen
and the works councillors emohasised the importance of the
° A * 35WCA 197 2"1 ‘ and collective agreements ' as guidelines in their
functions on the shopfloor. Works rules were seen as the 4th
36most important set of guidelines. Works agreements as the 
375th, together with other management guidelines by the foremen
Grievance resolution in firm B is overwhelmingly an internal 
management process. There is some reference of legal matters 
to the local employers' association and management attends 
some of their training courses but their role is seen chiefly 
as the negotiation of a wages settlement with the trade union.
The works council chairman said trade union representatives
33had never been invited into the workplace " due to the fact 
that so far there had been no major problems, management had 
abided by the law, but he did not rule out the possibility of 
greater trade union involvement in the future. The labour 
court had never been involved in the resolution of workplace 
issues - there had been no collective references to the court 
and the works council had thus far given its consent in the 
few cases of dismissal (usually on the grounds of alcohol on 
the premises) which had arisen. There had been no setting up 
of a conciliation board.
(iv) Key Influences on Conflicts and Resolution Procedures
As in the case of firm A, the context of firm R promotes a 
low level of conflict between workforce and management and 
resolution procedures are dominated by management. In firm B 
the dominance of management in the determination of workplace 
issues is even more completely secured by the absence of any 
effective works council resistance based on a relatively high 
level of trade union organisation in the blue-collar sector 
and a commitment to the trade union within the works council
* cf. Chart in Appendices for overview.
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itself. The two areas of possible future grievances are 
the system of bonus payments and the effect of a drop in 
orders on management decisions, as in the case of an extension 
of the obligatory works holidays to the Christinas period.
The effects of the market situation and changing technology 
are already providing a basis for conflicting policies of 
management and works council in the other key plant in the 
company, where the introduction of numerical control machines 
is leading to short-tine working on the one hand and the 
intensification of work via changes in shifts to exploit the 
capacity of the machines on the other.
The main area of works council involvement seems to be in the
area of works agreements on wages, working hours and holidays
39which require their involvement by law. Even here, involve 
rnent is restricted to the person of the chairman and his 
deputy.
11T.} ^irm C - A Large Electro-Technical Firm
(i) The Context of Conflicts Arising and their Resolution
Firm C is part of a multi-national company with a total work­
force of 348,000, of which 22,000 are employed in West Germany
in 46 plants. Firm C has a total workforce of 1900 of which
40the majority (67%) are semi-skilled and work in the production 
and assembly departments. The craft workers are employed in the 
maintenance department and repair workshops, and technical and 
research staff work in the laboratories. Some female workers 
are employed in the small assembly, canteen and administrative 
sections and have 2 representatives on the works council.
Only 16% of the workforce are foreign (9% Jugoslavian, 5% 
Turkish). Trade union organisation is stable at 50% (from a 
low level of 25% in 1972).
229
Firm C produces cathode ray tubes for colour television sets 
by mass assembly and thus works with both chemical and electronic 
components. The technology of the firm provokes a variety of 
problems both in the organisation of work and working conditions. 
57% of the workforce work 3 shifts and althou<fimaintenance 
workers generally work a normal shift, there is a considerable 
amount of overtime which has led to conflicts between the works 
council and management, and the works council and the workforce. 
The implications of this mass assembly technology in the field 
of electronics will be assessed in detail in the section on 
conflicts arising.
The organisation of the multinational company is based on 
region (13 regional offices throughout the world of which one 
is in VJest Germany) and on industry group (16 main groups 
based on the particular product produced). The board directors 
of the multi-national company represent technical, commercial, 
research and general (administration, finance, publicity) areas 
and control is centralised with production targets for each 
firm being decided by the central production planning department.
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The responsibility of the regional offices lies chiefly in 
the area of wages, tax, legal matters and general industrial 
relations in the country concerned. Within Germany, control 
over wages and industrial relations, in particular, is exer­
cised by the main company, which also houses the administration 
block. This centralisation has increased over recent years 
and has led to conflict withworks councils in the various 
plants, who have seen a reduction in their scope for co­
determination at plant level. The multinational company has 
been undergoing a massive reorganisation and rationalisation
process in response to the decline of the European and
41American markets for consumer goods. This has affected the 
German company as production lias been adapted to reduced 
market demands for consumer goods and reoriented towards 
investment goods. There have also been considerable technolog­
ical changes to cut the costs of production. Firm C saw a 
reduction in its workforce from 2,200 to 1,900 in 1981 and 
further reductions are expectedjto reach an optimum level of 
1,500 by 1984. These reductions accompany a considerable 
increase in the level of production in firm C. The management 
of firm C foresees increasing competition and pressures to 
rationalise during the 1980s. They are very aware of the 
competition between plants within the multinational company.
For example, if wage costs increase as a percentage of total 
costs in their own plant, orders will be transferred to other 
firms within the company. In fact, personnel costs in firm C 
have been low in comparison to the high level of productivity 
due to rationalisation^and work has been transferred to them 
from other plants thus far. The problems created by recent 
organisational and technological changes in the company are 
considered under conflicts arising. Management organisation 
in firm C is illustrated overleaf:-
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Production 
sectors only
Works Director (Firm C)
'•“ T —  " • * * ■ 181
Department Heads (48)
I~Foremen 
Chargehands
(2 in production 
sector)
(circa 5 per main 
department head) 
(circa 3 per 
department head)
Details from the questionnaire survey showed the majority of 
foremen had responsibility for sections of 50 employees or4 ^less and had between 1 and 3 chargehands working under43
them. Most of the foremen (91%) had been selected internally
on the basis of experience and had no craft or industrial
44qualifications as foremen.
Workforce Representation in Firm C
There has been a works council in the firm since 1954, the
year of its establishment, and shopstewards since 1969. The
shopsteward body drew up a list for the works council elections
45in 1972 which incorporated new candidates from its own ranks.
Management sponsored an alternative list of candidates, who
were non-trade tinion members. The newly elected works council
comprised 10 members from the management list, including the
works council chairman, and 9 from the shopsteward list. By
the end of 1972. all works council members had joined the
Metalworkers' Union (IGM) and rescinded all previous works
agreements with management. Each subsequent election has led
to a 307q turnover in works council members and the 1975
election produced a new chairman from the earlier shopsteward
body who continues as chairman today. The 1981 works election
produced a challenge to the existing works council from
members of the Christian trade union movement and there were
464 lists of candidates. - The present works council won 11 
seats and members of the Christian trade union (CGB) won 8 
seats. The challenge to the existing works council in 1981
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is seen as related to the question of overtime working, where
many employees ooposed works council policy of restricting
47the number of hours of overtime worked in the plant.
The present works council comprises 15 members (as a result
of reductions in the workforce), of which 4 are released from
48their jobs. ' The job composition of the works council is 4Qnixed, although unskilled workers dominate the council (47%).
50Both the chairman and liis deputy are staff members."' All but
one member belongs to the IGM. Two councillors are female.
51The main age range of the works council is 46 - 55 (60%).
There are 7 committees of the works council in all, of which5?3 are joint committees with management. ~ The job-released
members chair the committees in their different areas of
responsibility but all decision-making is collective by the
whole works council. The trend appears to be away from
regulation by committee to the job-released works councillors
5 3dealing with issues as they arise.JJ
Shopsteward organisation in the firm is seen as poor. Numbers 
are estimated at 30. The problems appear to have arisen from 
the involvement of the most active shopstewards in the works 
council from 1972 and, particularly, since 1975, and the lack 
of replacements for them on the shopfloor. The chairman of 
the shopsteward executive body (VKL) is a works councillor 
with job release, he has a deputy, a secretary and two 
other representatives of the shopstewards on the committee.
He views his role as works councillor and head of the shop- 
steward body as problematic but no other shopsteward will 
take on the responsibility and he at least can use his job- 
release to pursue shopsteward activities. The shopstewards 
as a whole meet twice a year, the VKL meets the works council 
once a month to discuss shopsteward matters. There is a 
tacit agreement with management that elections can be held 
during working hours but otherwise the management's stance is 
seen as anti-trade union. Trade union membership is said to 
be taken into consideration in the appointment of employees 
to posts above charge-hand and discrimination in promotion on
2.33
the grounds of trade union membership is said to particularly
o 4affect white-collar workers. Shopstewards also face
problems arising from the work organisation, where there has
been a shift from group organisation (14 per job) to
individual, dispersed jobs which make employees difficult to 
55contact. ° Increased work pressure also makes it difficult
to talk to them once they are located. Technological changes
have affected the solidarity of the employees and the climate
56’in the production sector. Job insecurity has promoted
57individual ism and sectional group interests. Details from
the questionnaires filled in by shopstewards showed wide
58variations in age ranges ° and jobs performed by the shop- 
5 9stewards, " supporting the view that shopstewards are evenly
albeit thinly distributed throughout the firm although not
on every shift. Constituency size was also variable although
& 079% of stewards had constituencies below 50 employees.
Works council and shopsteward views on the differing roles of
the 2 workforce representative channels largely coincided.
The works councillors emphasised the shopstewards' trade union
responsibilities and their role as a contact between the works
61council and the workforce, although it was felt they did 
neither in actual fact - the works council dealt with trade 
union recruitment and distributed the trade union newspaper-X L J
and the role of the shopstewards as information channels, 
especially when management held back information on its plans 
for the works, was negligible. Shopsteward replies emphasised 
their role as a 'go-between' for the works council and work­
force (75%), the distinction between their role as trade union 
and the works council as legal workforce representatives (50%),
and the fact that shopstewards dealt with small issues arising,
6 2the works council with large, important issues (25%).
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Relations between the Works Council and Management
The works director emphasised the role of personalities and 
their attitudes in relations with the works council, particularly 
those on the management side. Prior to 1972, management 
adopted a policy of everyone in the works being one family 
under the. influence of a patriarchal works director. Relations 
with the works council chairman were collegial. With the 
election of a new works council in 1972, the old relation­
ship between council chairman and the director ended and 
relations with the works council worsened due to management 
failings on the whole. These included opposition to the 
works council and the new WCA 1972 and a lack of- understanding 
for the expressed interests of the workforce. The works 
director retired early in 1975 and the present one, former 
head of the technical department, took over. The old 
personnel manager died early and was replaced by a younger 
man who is said not to view relations with the works council 
in terms of the need to stay one step ahead in the class con­
flict. Present relations with the works council are described 
as 'objective' and 'reasonable' despite the fact that they 
have different views in some areas. The works director 
stressed the need for full acceptance of the works council 
and the WCA 1972 to prevent confrontation as in the years 
following the introduction of the new Act, although he would 
resist attempts by the works council to exercise an influence 
not intended by the WCA 1972. Some works council decisions 
did annoy management but it was important not to become 
personally affronted by them. He acknowledged some tension 
between the works council and certain main heads of depart­
ments, who still carried on the old conflictual attitudes 
towards the works council.
The works council chairman does not acknowledge any change 
in basic management attitudes towards the works council 
during the 1970s.4'5 The works council always has to make 
the legal position clear by use of references to the labour 
court, conciliation boards and the involvement of other third
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parties before management will accept then. A turning 
point is seen in the decision of the labour court in 1930 
to order the firm to pay a fine of 20,000 German Marks if 
they went ahead and called for overtime working against the 
decision of the works council. This appears to have made the 
management act more sensibly vis-a-vis works council rights 
although its stance is still basically anti-trade union, a 
fact which is noted by the workforce and explains in part 
their apathy vis-a-vis the trade union. The management now 
knows at least what the functions of the works council are 
even if it does not always accept them.
Included in the problems of management acceptance of works 
council rights are the problems of insufficient information 
from management on areas such as the long-term oroduction andw  C? x
employment prospects, details of personnel costs as a proportion 
of total costs, price per unit. This information is refused 
on the grounds that it could lead to the firm suffering dis­
advantages vis-a-vis its competitors. Lack of information
on personnel ulanning also handicaps the activities of the
‘65works council.
Great emphasis is placed upon shopsteward and works council
training, especially on their entitlements under the law,
66in view of the employers' attempts to undermine the law.
It is also seen as vital that the works council is an active
body, willing to resist the employer instead of taking the
line of least resistance and succumbing to the pressure of
the employer to make them consider their interests as a
priority. This is acknowledged to be a difficult task both
in terms of the intellectual demands upon a council to present
a well-argued case against the employer and in the face of
the lack of support from the workforce who depend on manage-
6 7ment for their small privileges at work. Most works 
councils are thought to have been 'bought,'dutto management 
pressure and inducements and trie lack of support from the 
workforce. A few exceptional works councils do resist manage­
ment pressure to put forward workforce interests and are 
supported in this by the workforce. Their own position is
64
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seen as resisting management but without support from the 
workforce. The reasons for the lack of support include 
the problems of organising the shopstewards to explain work
council policies to the workforce, the lack of education of
68the majority of the workforce in the production sector''
and the break-up of the solidarity of the workforce via
continuous transfers and individual jobs as part of the
rationalisation process. The importance of workforce support
and its improvement is reflected in the replies of shop-
stewards, works council and workforce to the question of
69improving relations in the workplace.
Finally, on the question of the WCA 1972, the works council
acknowledges the improvements in the 1972 Act in comparison
to the 1952 Act. It was the WCA 1972 which gave young
shopstewards the impetus to become involved in works council
work in 1972 and the years following its introduction due to
the increase in the councils’ rights - Paragraph 9 9 ^  of the
WCA 1972 is viewed as the most important new right but even
so it incorporates a negative codetermination right because
the works council must present a well-argued case on the
points of law to overturn a management d e c i s i o n T h i s  is
despite the fact that employers are in the much better
72position to present a legal case to the labour court.
(ii) Conflicts Arising
The wages system in the production sector is based on a fixed 
wage rate plus bonus. The basic rate is calculated on the 
wage groups laid down in collective agreements. The bonus has 
a piecerate and quality factor (i.e. number of units per direct 
working hour and error quota) incorporated into a system of 
10 to 78 points (average performance = 60 points). Skilled 
workers have a time-rate based wage as do white-collar employees.
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Both the foremen and shopsteward responses indicated some 
issues arising in relation to the piecerate, the bonus pay-70meats. ' A lesser percentage indicated that some grievances
or aueries arose with reference to wage groups and levels
7 *within a wage group. f The works council said there were 
no major issues arising on the wages system,although numerous 
transfers did raise some problems concerning appropriate wage 
levels for employees.
Recently, there have been problems with monetary-based social 
benefits agreed at company level as management has sought to 
reduce expenditure in these areas. The problem for manage­
ment arises from the fact that 57% of the workforce in the 
German company celebrated 10 years of service in 1980. In 
1980, company management attempted to cut the special bonus 
given to employees on the completion of 10 years service.
This was rejected by the National Labour Court after individual 
employees had appealed against the management decision. Now 
company management seeks to remove the service factor from 
the Christmas bonus so that it becomes a. fixed sum unrelated 
to years service. Further cuts in canteen and travel subsidies 
for apprentices are foreseen by the works council and their 
problem is to show the workforce the total management strategy 
of cuts and reductions not just a series of isolated incidents.
Transfer of employees from one wage system to another as a
result of a job change occur s o m e t i m e s b u t  the most usual
77transfer occurs within one wage system. Both the works 
director and works council chairman referred to the large 
number of transfers of the second type as a result of technolog­
ical changes in production. In order to increase the flexibility 
of the workforce, firm C plans a course of training lasting 
1 I years and taking an employee through all the production 
jobs with an exam at the end in order to qualify as a 'cathode 
ray tube worker'.
As mentioned earlier, reductions in workforce numbers have
occurred via voluntary redundancies, especially in the case
7 3of foreign employees, ' and a nolicv of no new hirings. A
7.
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further reduction of 500 is planned for before 1984.
Management has agreed with the works council that there will 
be no economy-related dismissals, although there is
sone evidence of the use of behaviour-related dismissals,
79especially sickness, and employees leaving the firm if they
cannot obtain a post as chargehand or quieter job away from
SOthe assembly-line as they get older. Reductions in the 
manual workforce have occurred during the 1970s and early 
1930s. Management is now carrying out a survey of the white- 
collar sector, an overheads-value-analysis of indirect
O Ipersonnel, with the aim of reducing their numbers by 20%.°
An agreement between management and the works council stipulates 
that there will be no redundancies related to the survey and 
that 'reasonable transfers' will be permitted.
In conjunction with these personnel issues arising, the works 
council has referred the new wage calculation and payment 
system, now centralised in the head office in North Germany, 
to the labour court for a decision and further problems are 
expected at company level with the question of technicalO o
surveillance of the workforce.^  The labour court case is 
dealt with in detail in section, (iii).
The most intense conflicts between the works council and manage­
ment , which have also divided the workforce, are concerned with
P. 3the question of overtime working and extra shifts.'' Firm C 
operates a 3-shift system in production. During the 1970s the 
firm was operating 12 hour shifts and extra shifts on Saturdays 
rather than hire extra workers to meet production targets. The 
ramifications of a 2 year battle of the works council for 3 
hour shifts, no Saturday working and new hirings, which involved 
the labour court and other third parties, are outlined in 
section (iii). The result of a labour court decision was 
restriction to 8 hour shifts, in accordance with collective 
agreements, and the hiring of 48 new employees. The works 
council has also sought to limit overtime working bv main- 
tenance workers to a maximum of 12 hours per month. This has 
created opposition of some employees and subsequent problems 
in the works council election in 1981. Nov; all overtime has
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to be applied for in writing on a specified form. Extra
shifts are not agreed to when they are the result of low
84staffing levels.
The technology of firm C creates mainly group or a mixture
85of group and some individual jobs. Both foreman and shop-
steward replies show some problems arising in relation to the
assembly-line system (foremen = 82%, shopstewards = 50%), the
organisation of the work (53% : 27%), distribution of materials
and tools (82% : 67%), technical errors (foremen = 18% (often),
827. (sometimes)), shopstewards - 28% (often), 507> (sometimes),
and quality (82% : 85%,). The problems are probably closely
related to the increasing mechanisationJif the production line5
and both foremen and shopstewards point to the high level of
86large-scale and small-scale technical changes occurring.
The main problems resulting from the technological process in 
terms of working conditions are seen by the shopstewards as 
noise levels (45%), ventilation (45%), physical (25%) and 
mental (20%) strains. The foremen pointed to physical strains 
(46%) as the chief problem and ventilation (18%,), 46%, felt 
there were no problems with working conditions.
The form of problems arising, according to the foremen, is 
overwhelmingly individual (75% or more), except in the case 
of differences between workers (50%, of problems are group or 
mixed group and individual), and differences between workers 
and management representatives (40%, are group or mixed issues).
Overt conflict measures, apart from references to third
parties, have taken the form of warning strikes during collective
wage negotiations,^^ overtime bans^ and special works meetings.^
92The issues in conflict have centred on national wage rates,
93working conditions, and, in the responses of the works 
council, management attitudes (43%) and policies (29%). The 
most significant strike was in 1973, when 90% of the workforce
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was involved in a week long strike for a better wage settle­
ment and to secure a 5-day working week. The outcome was a
260 DM extra payment and management's agreement to pay
94employees for their breaktimes.
(iii) Procedures for the Resolution of Conflict Issues
The agreement on works rules includes a clause that if
employees feel themselves to have been discriminated against
or unfairly treated as a result of anything said or done by
management representatives or other employees, they can com-
95plain to the designated persons. External complaints pro­
cedures, such as the labour courts, are only to be used if 
there is no solution by internal means. The expressed aim 
of the works director is to limit written regulation of pro­
cedures in the workplace to just what is necessary to avoid 
any misunderstandings. Only 36% of foremen saw the works 
rules as the source of employees' knowledge about procedures
for resolving grievances, persons were a more important source 
96of information. 30% of employees claimed the works rules 
were their source of information about correct procedures.
The foreman was the main recipient of employees' grievances 
according to their responses in the questionnaire. Some issues 
were referred either to the foreman or the works councils- pay 
issues (foreman = 61%; works council ~ 30%), piecerate issues 
(foreman = 46%; works council = 33%), overtime issues (foreman = 
58%; works council = 24%). Other issues were referred to the 
foreman or the chargehand:- work organisation issues (foreman = 
49%; chargehand = 337.) , problems with other workers (foreman = 
537.; chargehand = 257.) . Working conditions were referred to 
all 3 actors:- (foreman = 427., works council = 247., chargehand - 
21%). Personal issues went to the foreman (53%) or personnel 
department (20%). The only areas in which the foreman did not 
dominate were technical -issues (chargehand - 52%, foreman =
36%), safety issues (safety representative = 52%, foreman = 217.)
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and social welfare facilities (works council = 73%, foreman -
15%). Problems with management representatives were also
referred to the works council (74%). The two main sources
of information on correct procedures (works rules - 30%,, works
council - 36%) would promote the roles of foreman and works
council, although employees explained their policy of references
97bv Dositive management attitudes (46%), positive works council
98attitudes (27%) and factors relating to the technological 
process (15%) and work organisation (15%>) which promoted 
equally recourse to the foreman and works council. References 
were overwhelmingly direct and by the employee himself (97%) 
and resolutions were communicated orally by the foreman (73%) 
or works council (18%).
The foremen said grievances were usually referred to them by 
the employees in person (91%) or the chargehand (46%), although 
the works council made some references (36%). Resolution of 
issues usually took place between the foreman and employee 
(73%), the foreman and his immediate supervisor (46%), foreman 
and works council (36%) or personnel department (36%). They
claimed to be able to resolve a large proportion of grievances
99at their level. Those which could not be resolved by them 
were referred on to the departmental manager (82%), personnel 
department (55%) and works council (27%).
Individual works councillors said employees usually referred 
issues to them (93%). Some issues were referred to the works 
council by its committees (50%) and the chairman (43%), 36% 
said shopstewards refer some issues to them. The most usual 
form of resolution was discussion with foremen (57%) or 
departmental managers (43%). Councillors with responsibilities 
in committees also resolved issues with the personnel depart­
ment (29%). Issues which could not be resolved at departmental 
level were referred to the chairman of the works council (100%) 
and to the personnel department (36%) and works council com­
mittees (21%). Responsibilities of works councillors were 
viewed as collective - 50% of works councillors designated 
the whole workforce as their constituency^^ and several did
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not reply to the question as to whether they were satisfied 
with their decision-making competences as they argued that 
as individual works council members they had no decision­
making capacity.
The role of the shopstewards in the conflict resolution jirocess 
is not viewed as significant by the 3 groups of respondents 
above. The shopstewards themselves pointed in their replievS 
to 2 different procedures for the skilled and semi-skilled 
employees:-
skilled employee  ^foreman > works council
semi-skilled employee ^ shopsteward----> chargehand— ^
foreman »works council
The most common actors referring issues to shopstewards were 
employees (65%), works council (25%) and other shopstewards 
(20%). The most usual forms of resolution where shopstewards 
were involved included shopsteward and employee (45%), shop- 
steward, works councillor and management representative (45%), 
shopsteward and chargehand (35%) and shopsteward and foreman 
(35%). Unresolved issues were referred to the departmental 
works councillor (40%) or the chairman (60%). The chairman 
confirmed that shopstewards often came to the works council 
office with queries. The most common issues in which the 
shopstewards claimed to play a part were:- overtime (60%), 
holidays (40%), facilities (40%), personal problems (40%), 
working conditions (35%), quality issues (35%).
There was some evidence of dissatisfaction among the shop-
101stewards with their role ' and the amount of information they 
102receive. The concentration of decision-making competence
in the works council, particularly the executive committee, 
means the shopstewards operate mainly as a source of information 
for employees on works council and management decisions and
for the works council on actual management practices on the
t ri 103 shoprloor.
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Although a number of works council committees exist in firm C, 
actual resolution of issues arising is being increasingly con­
centrated in the whole works council body (for major issues 
such as a new works agreement) and the members released from 
their jobs (for all day-to-day resolution of issues). A study 
of minutes from works council committee meetings with manage­
ment underline this distinction in the resolution process.
The wages and salaries committee meets irregularly (last entry 
was November 1981) to deal with major issues including dis­
cussion of a new bonus payment scheme (2 representatives of 
IGM were included on the works council side), additional pay­
ments for bad working conditions, a claim for a wage rise by 
chargehands, problems with the wage level of foremen in 
particular departments and the transfer of 11 employees from 
one department to another. The safety committee deals with
areas such as accident statistics in the firm, poor ventilation 
X 0 4problems, ’ reorganisation of particular rooms, the list of
elected safety representatives, introduction of VDUs. Minutes
105of the personnel committee ended in 1976 and details of all 
dealings with management, especially personnel management, 
are kept by the job-released members. These 3 to 4 members 
meet daily to discuss issues arising with management and keep 
a record of all oral arrangements made with them. “The variety 
of issues dealt with in these meetings with personnel manage­
ment include complaints by Turkish employees that they are 
never asked to do overtime, individual transfers and wage 
changes, holiday requests of foreign employees, complaints 
about canteen prices, the poor level of cleaning of toilet 
facilities, protests by the works council where transfers and 
appointments have been made without consulting them, instant 
dismissal cases and requests made by management for overtime 
working.
The whole works council meets monthly with the works director, 
personnel manager and main departmental heads. Minutes show 
that the works council, prior to the meeting, sends manage­
ment a list of issues they want to discuss and information 
they require. The works council is overwhelmingly the initiator 
in these discussions,^'^ which cover areas such as the economic
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necessity of short-time working when the firm is working over­
time, the call for a redundancy plan in the face of prospective 
job losses, protests about the continuation of management 
offences against the works councils' codetermination rights 
in the area of overtime and individual personnel measures, 
requests for improvements in canteen facilities and for 
information about the mechanisation process taking place in 
the firm. All agreements, even those pertaining to one depart­
ment only, are the result of the collective decision of the 
107works council, although they are signed by the chairman and 
the works director and personnel manager.
There is a wide variety of company-level and plant-level
agreements in firm C. Subject areas at company-level include
general rules relating to travel expenses, evaluation of
] 08employees in the executive grade, bridging loans for 
employees leaving the firm due to age or sickness, the intro­
duction of a new computer system for personnel records. 
Allowances for the Christmas bonuses are negotiated annually
at company level. Works agreements, according to management,
109are concluded on matters of principle ' such as wages, over­
time working, working hours, cxncl 16 are currently in
o p e r a t i o n . S o m e  of the agreements incorporate procedures 
111for complaints. Other types of agreements arising in firm C
include the large number of notices about details of works
112agreements for employees' information and internal notif­
ications which are for the information of specified persons 
113only. Temporary rulings deal with issues until a works
114agreement takes effect. Custom and practice exists in the
r .. 115area of starting times.
Details about the relative importance of these agreements in 
the work of the foremen and works council showed the foremen 
emphasised works rules, works agreements, departmental arrange­
ments and the Works Constitution Act in that order. ^ 6  «j*he 
works council all placed the WCA 1972 in first position, the
framework collective agreement second, and collective agreement 
117on wages third, works agreements and works rules came in 
fourth position.
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The involvement of third parties in the resolution of conflict 
in firm C has been extensive. The trade union and employers' 
association have been involved through their representation 
of the parties in labour court cases and their presence on 
conciliation hoards. Trade union representatives have also 
supported the works council with expert advice on important 
works agreements. The chairman said many contacts w e r e  
necessary in the mid-1970s when the works council was establish­
ing its presence in the firm against management opposition and 
the works council's own knowledge of the law was limited.
Since then they have gained in knowledge and expertise and 
do not need to contact the trade union as often. Management 
said their contact with the association is mainly on issues 
relating to collective agreements, court cases and conciliation 
boards.
There have been a number of collective references to the 
labour court at company level. At works level the main 
references have been on the question of the evaluation of the 
performance of white-collar employees (won by the works council), 
the new computerised system for personnel information and 
wages calculation (won by the employer) and the works council's 
call for a court order to prevent the employer initiating extra 
overtime against the decision of the Factory Inspectorate 
(Gewerbeaufsichtsamt). Only the issue of the computerised 
system was a straightforward labour court case, the other 
issues are considered in the section on conciliation boards.
In the case of the new computing system, the works council 
tried to persuade management to draw up a works agreement on 
a number of areas relating to the operation of the system.
VJhen management refused, the works council initiated a refer­
ence to a conciliation board but management rejected it, 
claiming the works council .had no right of codetermination in 
this area. Reference to the labour court led to the decision 
that the works council had a codetermination right and that 
a conciliation board was responsible for deciding the issue. 
Management refused a conciliation board and there was a works 
stoppage and collection of signatures in a bid to keep the
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old wages calculation system. A second reference to the 
labour court led to the rejection of the works council’s case 
as wages remained the same although they were subject to new 
calculation procedures. The trade union would not support 
an appeal to the next stage of the labour court system. Apart 
from the above labour court cases, if there has already been 
labour court cases in specific areas and a case law had been 
expressly accepted by legal experts, management tends to 
accept this.
Conciliation boards have been established on issues relating 
to the bonus system, performance evaluation of white~col1ar 
employees and overtime and extra shifts. The issue on bonuses 
was the evaluation of piecerates in the assembly sector. The 
works agreement on the bonus system includes a procedure 
whereby conflicts are referred first to a joint committee, 
which must meet to decide the issue within a week and reach a 
decision within a fortnight. In this Instance, no decision 
was forthcoming and the next stage of the procedure was ref­
erence to a conciliation board for a binding decision.
The conflict about the evaluation of white-collar employees
occurred after an evaluation of 258 employees; 92 of them
complained about their evaluation which was seen as subjective
(many were trade union members). After a series of discussions
the works council declared that negotiations had broken down
and it was time to move on to the next stage in the procedure
(laid down in the collective agreement on evaluation of per- 
118formance), “ which was a conciliation board. Management
claimed that the internal complaints procedure had not yet 
11°been completed " and refused to name its representatives for 
the board. The works council referred the question of pro­
cedural stage to the labour court, which decided the conciliation 
board was the next stage. Further reference to the labour 
court was necessary for the naming of the chairman and number
of representatives from the trade union and employers’ assoc- 
120iation, and after two conciliation board sittings had been 
held (one to assess the cases of 92 employees and one the 
cases of 4)^  a further reference was necessary to fix the value
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of the object of the conflict, upon which the fees of the19 ]external representatives are based. *" A works agreement 
was eventually concluded in 1977.
The conflict about working hours spans the years 1978 to 1980.
It began with a works council reference to the Factory
Inspectorate on illegal overtime working in the firm. Their
decision to threaten the firm with fines if the high overtime
122levels were not discontinued took 2 years to reach. The
firm reduced shifts to 10 hours and continued Saturday working 
and the works council referred the issue to a labour court, 
where an out-of-court settlement was reached that management 
would not introduce overtime without the agreement of the 
works council, would end 12 hour shifts and employ a further 
48 employees (July 1980). In November, the works council 
again appealed to the labour court to prevent management pro­
ceeding with overtime to do the normal monthly stocktaking.
The labour court threatened a fine of 20,000 Marks if any 
overtime was carried out without works council consent. Negot 
iatioris on a works agreement to regulate overtime were begun 
in 1931 with the help of trade union and employer association
representatives. A conciliation board was set up in the next
123stage of the procedure ' and a works agreement ensued, which 
reduced overtime to a maximum of 12 hours per month and days 
off in lieu of overtime worked. This led to opposition from 
the workforce and subsequent problems in the works council 
election of 1981. In general, the works council's experience 
of resolution procedures has shown they obtain better results 
by referring issues to conciliation boards than by internal 
discussion with management.
{iv5 Key Influences on Conflicts and Resolution Procedures
The context of firm C has considerable conflict potential as 
economic and market pressures have encouraged the development 
of intense cost-cutting and productivity-enhancing policies
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at multi-national company level, and workplace management, in 
its basic anti-trade union and-works council stance, has 
intensified the conflict in issues which have arisen, 
provoking references to external parties as the only way in 
which the works council can ensure the recognition of its 
legal rights and responsibilities. Conflicts have, however, 
been concentrated at works council-management level due to 
the. low conflict potential of the workforce and the emphasis 
of the works council on legal battles with management, either 
as a result of the lack of workforce support or as a factor 
which has promoted this low level of support.
The economic, market and technological pressures which lie 
behind the conflicts between management and works council 
also reduce the level of solidarity and potential for collective 
awareness and responses to conflicts arising. The context of 
staff reductions, increasing work pressure, the shift from 
group to more individual jobs in the work process and the 
high level of internal transfers has led to individualism and 
sectionalism within the workforce, which is threatening the 
coherence and effectiveness of works council policy on behalf 
of the collective body of employees. Shopsteward organisation 
is too weak to counteract these prevailing trends and has 
itself been further weakened by them. These problems are 
recognised by the works council which is forced to continue 
its present, mainly legal, strategy in the hope that some 
return to a measure of economic stability on the world market 
will reduce the pace of technological and organisational change 
in the workplace and permit them to 'pick up the pieces' and 
build a greater level of solidarity around collective policies 
of the workforce. (For illustration of these key influences 
see the chart in the appendices).
2) The Engineering Industry: 3 Firms
I) Firm I) - a Small Engineerincr Firm
    -    __________________
(i) The Context of Conflicts Arising and their Resolution
Firm D is the main plant of a firm employing 103 employees, of
v/hich approximately 90 work in firm I). The number of employees
fluctuates with the economic cycle, the highest level has been
138, the lowest 80 (in 1978). Most of the workforce are
skilled,together with 2 unskilled women responsible for fitting
124rubber seals and a few auxiliary fitters. The white-collar
sector is small - two bookkeepers, one industrial manager, 
one buyer and several secretaries. The workforce is predom­
inantly local and German. Trade union organisation is estimated 
1 ? 5^  A r  or 1  c— /at 65a,.
Firm D manufactures steel and aluminium window frames, doors 
and panelling according to customer specifications. The 
smaller works produces garden fencing, railings and steel 
bannisters, installs then and does repairs. Often orders have 
special requirements such as heat resistance, water resistance 
as well as being a particular size and shape. A large company 
nay order 40 frames with the same specifications, another 
order may he smaller and with different requirements. The 
technology of the firm is not seen as especially problematic 
by the works council apart from health risks outlined in 
section (ii).
The firm was established last century by the grandfather of 
the present owner-managers who are local men. One brother is 
production manager; one is business manager. Management hier­
archy is non-existent. Apart from the 2 owner-managers there 
is one foreman in production with a responsibility for minor 
technical problems arising in the stores, door and steel 
girder construction sections. The works council chairman
operates as a de facto chargehand in the rest of the production 
126sector.  ^ Production comprises stores, pre-assembly (where 
2 presses cut the metal to shape) and final assembly. The
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administration of the firm is kept to a minimum with book­
keeping, secretarial and technical staff. The latter design 
the products to customer specification and are responsible 
for the materials used In each order.
The representation of the workforce is carried out by a works
council with 5 members, 4 of which are blue-collar workers,
one is fron the administrative section. None are released
from their jobs. There are. no works council committees.
Issues are dealt with collectively when the works council
meets once a week and at the quarterly meetings with management
In practice, the works council chairman does most of the
grievance resolution on a day-to-day basis. There are also
5 shopstewards in the firm who meet quarterlv during working "127hours. The nead of the shopsteward body attends all works
council meetings. The works council chairman pointed to the 
problems of recruitment of shopstewards - 4 of the 5 present 
shopstewards were reluctant to stand for election. The reasons 
given include the lack of protection, the additional work 
involved which must be done in a steward's free time and a 
general lack of motivation of the workforce. There are no 
stewards in the girder construction section and stores because 
no-one was willing to stand for election.
The organisation of workforce representation is informal -
works councillors and shopstewards meet daily in the workplace.
Responses to the questionnaires showed that both the works
council and shopstewards view their roles in terras of the works
council as the legal representative of workforce interests.,
whilst the shopstewards have trade union duties such as recruit
128nent and organisation of warning strikes. The works
council also described shopstewards as a link between the works
council and workforce, passing on information and grievances
to the works council for resolution. Shopstewards do not,
129however, resolve any worker problems.
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Relations between management and works council were stormy 
in the years following the introduction of the MCA in 1972 
until about 1978. Management resisted the UCA on all points, 
refusing even to supply paper and pencils and the necessary 
legal texts for works council work. The works council’s 
response was to buy what was required and send the bill to 
management. Managemert. further struck off the workplace bonus 
for all employees who attended IOM training courses. The 
chairman explained the attitude of the management in terms of 
their 'penny-pinching' mentality common to owner-managers with 
a craft foreman background (Handwerksmeister). These small 
businesses are very dependent on cost cutting to win customers' 
orders and the owner-managers put their 'heart and soul' into 
the business, working long hours and rarely taking any holidays. 
They generally are the most vociferous against wage increases 
if they attend collective bargaining negotiations and resist 
spending any extra money apart from what is absolutely necessary 
to keep their businesses open. The stalemate between works 
council and management in firm D was only broken by the inter­
vention of trade union and employers' association representatives, 
who persuaded management of the illegality of hindering the 
works council by, for example, not allowing them time off for 
their duties, and helped the works council and management to 
reach a modus vivendi in their relations.
Reflections of earlier management attitudes are revealed in
their response to the works council's request for information
about new technical equipment and the firm's accounts -
management threatened to close the firm down if they persisted
130in their demands. ° The works council thus is forced to use 
informal means to obtain its rights by developing contacts 
with the employees in the book-keeping section.
Present relations with management are described as better than 
during the 1970s. There has been a growth in the recognition 
of the works council's role in the workplace and there are now 
no restrictions on meetings during working hours, although 
the works council discusses with management which dates would
252
be appropriate if there are urgent orders to be completed.
The attitudes of management vary but if it will cost them a 
lot of money to resolve an issue then conflict ensues. This 
is especially the case where safety and health precautions 
are concerned.
Generally, among works councillors, shopstewards and workforce
there is a great awareness of the need for improvements in
relations in the workplace. Emphasis is laid on an extension
of the MCA 1972 and the need to make its provisions more pre-
131cise to prevent management flouting the law. The works
council chairman pointed to the difficulties small works
councils face in ensuring management adheres to legal regulations.
Trade union organisation and workforce support for the works
132council are also seen as key areas for improvement. The
responses of the workforce also show recognition of the need 
for greater management cooperation (48%) and favourable 
economic circumstances (30%) for relations to improve.
(ii) Conflicts Arising
The wages system in firm D is based on a monthly salary for
white-collar workers and an hourly rate based on the wage
groups laid down in collective agreements for blue-collar
workers. Most blue-collar workers are in the wage groups 4 and
5. There was an attempt to introduce a system of performance
measurement at the close of the 1970s but the variety and
precision of the production work prevents any uniform 
133evaluation. There has been a reduction in the spread of wage
groups in production during the 1970s in line with works 
council policy of reducing differentials spread, although 
holiday workers are still in groups 1 and 2. Problems of 
irregular groupings have arisen in the white-collar sector 
but there have only been a couple of cases of unfair wage 
grouping.
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Transfers do occur within the firm but do not cause problems
as they do not involve, wage adjustments. Mage level reductions
'134are rare and occur only for personal reasons. " There have, 
however, been personnel problems due to economic pressure on 
the business, which is dependent on the fortunes of the con­
struction industry. In 1970 there was a threat of 18 dis­
missals due to a drop in business. Since then there have been 
few new hirings and management takes workers on short-term 
contracts of 6 months before deciding whether to employ them 
full-time. The firm is less susceptible to rationalisation 
than larger firms with a mass production process, although 
some staff reductions are likely with the introduction of 
numerical control machines in the cutting and pressing sections 
Apart from the dismissals for economic reasons in 1978, there 
has only been 1 dismissal for reasons of ill health. Mritten 
warnings have been given for laziness, absenteeism and drunken­
ness (3 cases).
Working hours do not present any major problems as there are 
no shifts. Overtime is common when urgent orders arise. The 
works council is then placed in a difficult position for, 
although it would like to see more workers employed, the urgent 
need forovertime if a contract is not to be lost is irrefutable
The main area of conflict in firm D is working conditions and 
technical facilities. In several areas of the firm very old 
machinery is in use and this requires a high employee effort 
in order to obtain an acceptable product. There are no over­
head cranes yet in the assenblv section and stores and the
13 5lifting of heavy metal sections causes back troubles later.
Noise levels are particularly high in the cutting and final
assembly sections due to the fact that the rooms are small
and there is no segregation of the machines fron the rest of
the workforce. Various attempts have been made to isolate
the noise by the use of overhead cabines but cost is the
136prohibitive factor. Dirt and poor ventilation of the
production sector are 2' further problems. Some dangerous 
materials have been in use including asbestos and glues which
2 54
are poisonous. The use of asbestos to insulate doors has 
been ended now and special pracaut 
glues now used instead of welding.
e ions are taken with the
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Distribution problems did arise due to hold-ups in supplies
from other firms but employees filled in the waiting times
13 8 ’with other jobs.
All problems arising were seen as collective issues, apart from
problems between members of the workforce and workforce and 
139management.
Overt conflict measures had occurred in 1979 and 1980 when
the workforce was involved in warning strikes during regional
collective bargaining rounds. A special meeting of white-
collar workers has been called to deal with the problem of
irregular wage groups in that sector. The works council has
140on occasions rejected management's request for overtime.
(iii) Procedures for the Resolution of Conflicts
Firm D has no written procedures to deal with conflicts apart 
from the provisions in the MCA 1972. Written procedures are 
seen as unnecessary because all issues in practice go via 
the works council.
The central role of the works council is reflected in replies 
from members of the workforce. In all issues the works council 
is the main reference point for the employee s '11+1 g rievances. 
The reasons for this include the negative attitude of manage­
ment representatives (41%) and also the fact that the works 
council is the main source of information about who to refer 
grievances to for resolution (52%). Contacts with the works 
council are direct (707,). 60% of. employees responding went
to the works council on'their own, 26% with a colleague and
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14% with several colleagues. Resolution was seen to occur
via the works council (67%) and foreman (25%). Details about
the extent of workforce contacts with worker and management
representatives showed that the works council was the most 
142common contact and the works council chairman in particular
143was often seen in the workplace. This is not surprising in
view of the fact that works council members are found in each
section working alongside the workforce and the chairman does
144a tour of all the workshops every day.
Responses of the works council showed that references to the
works council came mainly from employees and then the works
council chairman and management. All references were oral and
145were dealt with orally by the chairman and his deputy in
-i / r
conjunction with the foreman, management and the wages office. 0 
All upward reference of problems went to the chairman and 3 
councillors also mentioned the head of the shopsteward body as 
one they referred issues to for resolution. The majority of 
councillors said they personally were able to deal with less 
than 20% of issues arising. The chairman estimated his con­
tribution at 61 - 80% of all issues arising. The two channels 
for conflict resolution are seen as the works council and 
management. A few employees have gone direct to management in 
the past but have seen this is to their own disadvantaget^The 
works council's role as interest representative is now accepted 
even by those not organised in a trade union.
Shopstewards' replies supported the key role of the works 
council in grievance resolution, pointing to the works council 
and chairman as the persons to whom the workforce referred 
grievances. Shopstewards did claim to have some approaches to 
them from workforce members as well as from the works council 
and head of the shopsteward body. The majority of these were 
whilst on the job. Whilst problems were directly resolved by 
the chairman and management in the majority of cases, the shop- 
stewards saw themselves as playing a part in the resolution
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process via their discussions with the works council in their 
147joint meetings. They directed all grievances which came
to their attention to the chairman or other works councillors 
if he was unavailable.
The emphasis on oral resolution of issues in firm D is reflected 
in the low number of works agreements, of which there are 4. 
These cover payment of wages when visits to doctors or dentists 
are made, time off for training for shopstewards and extra 
training allowance for works councillors, holiday regulations240 *
and a workplace wage supplement of 60 pf per hour. The
reduction in the number of workgroups in the firm is set down
149in the minutes of a meeting with management. The works
councillors viewed the WCA 1972 and collective agreements as
the chief sources of regulation in the workplace not works
«. 150agreements.
There has been limited third party involvement in the resolution 
of conflicts arising in firm D. Reference has already been 
made to the intervention of trade union and employer association 
officials in the 1970s to help stabilize relations between the 
works council and management. They were also involved in the 
reference of 18 dismissals to the labour court in 1978, when 
the employees and employer were represented in court by union 
and association officials. There has only been the one ref­
erence to a labour court. As a result of its decision, 16 
dismissals for economic reasons were rejected and 2 were 
accepted for which the employer paid compensation of 4,000 and
6,000 DM, This decision is seen to have created such a shock 
for management that they now prefer to seek an internal settle­
ment of all issues. A conciliation board case on works council 
rights to time off was said to have been planned in 1972 but 
the conflict was resolved after the informal intervention of 
the trade union and employers association, who told management 
that they would not win the case.
Both the factory inspectorate and trade association have been
151involved in workplace issues as well as an industrial 
doctor.
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The works council chairman estimates that 20% of issues in 
1972 had to he referred to third parties for resolution due 
to management's reluctance to recognise the works council and 
the works council's lack of knowledge and experience. In 1982 
most issues can be resolved internally apart from dismissals 
and redundanciesj should they arise.
(iv) Key Influences on Conflicts and Resolution Procedures
The economic vulnerability of small engineering firms is a key 
factor in the predominance of management definitions and 
policies in the workplace in this sector. Management in such 
firms often represents ad hoc responses to prevailing economic 
circumstances rather than long-term production strategies, 
which would permit the works council some involvement in the 
day-to-day running of the plant by their influence on general 
policies. In small firms, works councils also lack a support 
base in the workforce as well as the necessary expertise 
within their own ranks to counter the dominance of management 
in all areas of decision-making.
In firm D, the respective personalities of the 2 owner-managers 
and the works council chairman and their policies help to 
explain the existence of some works council resistance in the 
involvement of third parties in the workplace resolution 
process. The WCA 1972 thus provides the works council with a 
measure of legal support for the enforcement of management 
recognition of their role as workforce interest representatives.
* cf. chart in appendices for overview.
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(II) Firm E - a Medium-Size Engineering Firm
(i) Context of Conflicts Arising and Their Resolution
Firm E is part of a larger company employing a total workforce 
of 6,000. Firm E has 226 employees - 126 production workers 
and 100 white-collar workers in the administration, design 
and research departments. The production workers are mainly 
skilled craftsmen with a few unskilled female workers employed 
in assembling small electrical parts. All are German workers 
and local. 90% of production workers and 23% of white-collar 
workers belong to the IGM. The region has considerable 
employment problems as it is close to the border with East 
Germany. The local population has seen a succession of firms 
setting up in the region with the help of state subsidies and 
then closing down a few years later. Very few firms have 
created new job opportunities.
The production in firm E is centred on medical equipment and 
centrifuges for laboratories in particular. Firm E makes the 
rotary parts for the centrifuges and for other types of 
machinery according to customer specifications. The very 
large research laboratory in the plant is responsible for the 
materials used to meet specifications such as the need to keep 
blood at a specific temperature and metals which are not 
corroded by acids. The precision parts produced are then en­
cased in complex electronic equipment.
Firm E has been in existence since pre-war years and was rebuilt 
after 1945. A larger company held shares in the firm and 
bought the firm up in 1970. Since the takeover, rationalisation 
in firm E has been extensive. Workforce numbers have been 
reduced from 370 to 226 and production is being automated to 
increase turnover. At present, NC-machines are being introduced 
in the production sector. The focus of future rationalisation 
is, however, expected to be the white-collar sector.
The structure of management organisation is illustrated overleaf
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Foremen
VChargehands
The departmental managers (Obermeister) occupy their own offices. 
One is responsible for pre-assembly including lathe operators, 
milling cutters, fitters. One covers actual assembly including 
production planning, actual assembly of parts and the final 
assembly (paint shop). The foremen work alongside the production 
workers as do the chargehands.
The works council comprises 7 members, 3 of which are from the 
white-collar sector (dispatch, design and administration) and 
4 from the production sector including the works council chair­
man. There are no job releases or works council committees.
A works council was first elected by firm E in 1970. The 
impetus came from the company's main plant, whose works council 
came to firm E and called elections for a works council there. 
Previously there had been a handful of IGM shopstewards who 
had had little role in workplace affairs. There are considerable 
problems with workforce representation in firm E - very few 
workers are willing to stand as shopstewards in the fact of 
discrimination from management and possible job loss in an area 
of high unemployment. Workers are also reluctant to stand for 
the works council - the chairman described his reluctance to 
be elected in 1981 and he only stood for the post because no- 
one else was willing to do so. Older workers predominate in 
the works council although the chairman is in his thirties.
Management dominates all affairs in firm E adopting a patriarchal 
policy towards the workforce and rejecting the involvement of 
the works council in all but the areas where works council 
agreement is required by law, i.e. hiring, dismissals. The
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works council does not have the acceptance or the respect of 
management; all attempts to establish a basis for 'trust 
relations' have been rejected by management. The works 
council chairman argued that the MCA 1972 has thus far not been 
put into practice in firm E. Management either rejects its 
provisions outright or finds its own restrictive interpretation 
to undermine it. So far, the works council has been able only 
to operate on the basis of hindering management decisions 
temporarily (Kitverhinderung} not joint decision-making with 
management (Mitbestimmung). Mo changes in the poor relations 
are expected in the near future as economic circumstances are 
to the works council's disadvantage. There is some evidence 
that the works council is adopting a 'legalistic' approach to 
their relations with management but they do not have the will 
or the support of the workforce to cany this approach to its 
logical conclusion and refer issues to a labour court or 
conciliation board.
(ii) Conflicts Arising.  .-........ „ ... xZ.
All employees are paid either an hourly or monthly rate of pay
and no problems have arisen in this area as yet. The main
areas of conflict are personnel cutbacks and working hours.
144 jobs have been cut since the firm's takeover in 1970. There
has been no redundancy plan because the number of those dismissed
has been below the legal requirement for a redundancy nlan each
152time management has enacted a cutback' and natural fluctuation 
of the workforce has also been used. Further cuts are expected 
with the introduction of NC-machines in production and conflict 
is expected on the issue of the information the works council 
should receive about the introduction of such machines because 
so far they have been given no information at all and can onlyICOregister the arrival of the machines in the workplace . 1 J ~j JqX) 
evaluation surveys have now begun in the white-collar sector, 
where future cutbacks are expected with the introduction of
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VDUs and other computer technology. The white-collar workers 
have not .supported the works council in the past and there is 
some speculation about whether their attitudes will change 
with the inpact of rationalisation in their own sector. The 
obstacles to a change in their attitude include the lack of 
awareness that their jobs arc at risk and the fear of repression 
by the employer, which encourages then to seek security in 
anonymity.
The problem of working hours arises from the effects of poor
production, planning which has led to periods of overtime
followed by short-tine working. Management seeks to introduce
overtime without the agreement of the works council, especially
if the chairman is away on holiday. Often the works council
only finds out about overtime from employees who have been
asked to do it. The works council is reluctant to agree to
overtime in the face of staff cuts and short-time working but
fears that management will use it against then at company
level, portraying them as 'wild and irresponsible' when, for
example, overtime is needed to meet the deadlines for new
154eouipment to be put on show at trade fairs. u
(iii) Procedures for the Resolution of Conflicts
There are no formal procedures in firm E . Employees, if they
have any grievances at all arid are brave enough, to express
them, take their issues through tire management hierarchy. The
works council deals collectively with issues referred to it
15 5by management such as new hirings and overtime working.'
There is little contact with works management: on the resolution 
of issues as there are no works agreements. The company has 
so far rejected all attempts to establish works agreements 
although there are said to be some agreements at company level.
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The involvement of third parties in the workplace has been
limited to legal advice from the trade union. The company
has its own legal department to advise it. There has been
one case of a works council reference to a labour court when
the heating broke down and the workforce was sent home. The
management refused to pay the workforce for the time, spent at
hone and told then that they would have to do extra hours to
make up their pay. The works council referred the issue to a
court which decided against then. The management then decided
to pay for the time spent at home anyway as a conciliatory
gesture to the workforce and thus succeeded in undermining the
works council's position in the workforce still further. This
experience has led the works council to believe that resort to
a labour court is ineffective and can be directly prejudicial
to their already shaky position. Thus the management continues
to openly dispute the works council’s interpretations of the
MCA 1972 and the works council is unable to prevail against
management and establish itself as a codetermining a^ent in1 56 "workplace affairs.
(iv) Key Influences on Conflicts and Resolution Procedures
The major influence on conflicts and procedures for their 
resolution seems to be the economic and market context of firm P.. 
The experience of firms in the region withdrawing, with consequent 
high unemployment, and of a takeover within firm E itself weighs 
heavily against conflict initiation by the workforce and works 
council and lends support to management policies. The central­
isation of decision-making on personnel issues at company level 
further inhibits works council involvement in the regulation 
of workplace issues. The large white-collar sector in firm E 
has not supported the. works council's role in the workplace 
and large scale rationalisation in the production sector has 
further reinforced the reluctance of blue-collar workers to 
take any stand against management policies.
* ck chart in appendices ror overview.
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Some areas of conflict with management have emerged but it 
seems doubtful whether the works council has the experience 
and will to resist management’s decisions. One unfavourable 
experience with a labour court case has further reduced the 
possibility of the works council realising the provisions of 
the WCA 1972 in practice in firm E.
(Ill) Firm F - a Large Engineering Firm
(i) The Context of Conflicts Arising and Their Resolution
Firm F is the main plant of a large German company with branches
overseas, employing a total workforce of 33,000. Firm F has
a workforce of 10,100 of which 5,000 work in the production
sectors. 5,100 are employed in the central administration of
the company and on the technical and research side. 95% of the
157production workers are skilled and 98% are German workers.
Trade union organisation in the plant has increased since 1971, 
when there were only 32 trade union members and only 3 works 
councillors were in a trade union to 97% of production workers
1 (TO 1 5  Qin the IGM 1 and 40% of white-collar workers in the IGM.
Firm F produces steel products such as industrial ovens, 
foundries, pipe-systems for industrial complexes, metal fittings. 
The firm also constructs whole plants at home and abroad. The 
technology of the firm is not thought to create particular 
problems for the workforce. 90% of the workforce do a normal 
shift, only 10% work 2 shifts. Problems are, however, fore­
seen with the introduction of microtechnology and the possibility 
of a 3 shift system to exploit the full capacity of the new 
equipment. Thus far there has been no major rationalisation 
programme in the production sector because the firm con­
centrates on the production of individual components to 
customer spiecif ications. The work is consequently varied and 
interesting especially in the industrial ovens section. There 
is some mass production in the metal fitments sector but their 
work is also very varied.
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The mid 1970s saw a shift in the market structure of the company
from home markets to overseas markets so that 60% of present
day production is for export. The reasons given for the shift
include the decline in government investments in West Germany
and their indecisiveness about the construction of nuclear
power plants. The shift in markets led to a restructuring of
the company in 1980 to create 2 separate companies, one to con-
160centrate on the construction of power plants, the other 
encompassing production of components and administration.
Firm F belongs to the latter company, which is the leading 
company in the group? and is also the main plant in that 
company. The market situation for the company is favourable 
at present with orders to keep them in production until the 
end of the 1980s.
The organisation of management within the company is complex 
as the company is subdivided into specialist departments such 
as 'industrial ovens' with their own organisation and staff 
as in a small firm.
Company Board (8 members responsible for areas
such as finance, technical, 
personnel, sales etc.)
N/Company Sections (8 in all including industrial
ovens, industrial machinery, 
personnel etc.)
vBusiness Sections (Examples include pipesysterns
for nuclear power plants, 
industrial pipe systems etc.)
Main Departments (e.g. wages and salaries,
personnel planning, administration)
Sections
Departments
Groups (Foreman level)
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The works council comprises 29 members, 13 white-collar and 
16 blue-collar representatives. 26 belong to IGM and 3 to 
DAG. 7 members are released from their jobs and have specific 
areas of responsibility such as a works council committee, the 
chairmanship and deputy chairmanship of the works council.
There is an extensive network of works council committees - 
12 in all.161
There are approximately 130 shopstewards in firm F with con­
stituencies of circa 30 workers. Each department sends 1 
representative to the shopsteward executive body of 13 members 
(8 production workers, 5 white-collar workers). Their main 
role is to act as an information channel between the workforce 
and works council with the responsibility of organising any 
industrial action viewed as necessary. Their role will be 
particularly important if real conflicts arise over closures 
and rationalisation of the production process. 'Understandings' 
exist between the works council and management that shopstewards 
can hold meetings inside the works, although not in working 
hours, elections are during working hours and their executive 
body can meet during working hours. Their security, however, 
is seen as based on the fact that the workforce is prepared to
take action if management discriminates against the shopstewards.
162The worker director recognised the importance of shopstewards 
as information channels for the works council and in influencing 
workforce opinion but claimed they played no role in the 
resolution process.
The works council described their relations with management 
as a conflict situation, the intensity of which depends on 
what is happening in the workplace. Relations are 'relatively 
good' at present because of the lack of economic pressure. 
Management now accepts the position of the works council in 
the firm,(although this is seen to be dependent on the support 
of the workforce for the works council), and they conduct their 
relations in a 'reasonable, businessmanlike manner' but there 
is no partnership. The works council chairman argues that
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there needs to be equal rights for there to be a partnership 
and the works council is there to represent workforce interests 
not form an alliance with management. Resolution of conflicts 
proceeds on the basis of generosity and good intentions in 
the evaluation of problems - if management is helpful in its 
interpretation of the law in one area, the works council will 
return the favour elsewhere. Changes are called for in legis­
lation, including the extension of the coal, steel and iron 
model of codetermination, more rights in the area of economic 
decisions, and the burden of proof in dismissal cases to lie 
with the employer not the employee. Restriction in represent­
ation to legal norms, however, is seen as a hindrance to 
effective interest representation as it takes decades for there 
to be any changes in the law. The works council emphasises 
the importance of being able to justify their case by argument­
ation where differing interpretations of the law exist.
The works director described relations with the works council 
as 'comfortable 1(bequem). He accepted it as a 'necessary 
institution' but argued it was often a nuisance and a hindrance 
to managerial decision-making. The WCA 1972 regulates many 
areas and everyone knew the basic principles of the Act. In 
some areas, he emphasised, management is prepared to go further 
than the law, but if they do not keep to the law then they are 
quickly reminded to do so. The WCA 1972 has to be accepted 
and management have more or less learnt to live with it but 
he opposed any further changes in the law as this would lead to 
an extension of present rights.
(ii) Conflicts Arising
The wages system is based on time rates, in accordance with the 
evaluation system laid down in collective agreements with some 
additional allowances for difficult working conditions* and 
created no serious problems. Employees worked a normal shift 
system with 10% on a 2 shift system. Overtime was worked in
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the design and planning departments and there were a few 
individual problems connected with overtime working. Working 
conditions were seen as good on the whole with special allow­
ances for heavy physical work, dirty and unpleasant conditions 
and work associated with VDUs.
The restructuring of the company had created some personnel 
problems associated with the increase in the number of 
employees working abroad and a shift in site for some employees. 
There had, however, been no redundancies and transfers had 
been unproblematic due to collective agreements on wage 
guarantees and the fact that the most flexible workers are 
accorded the highest wage group. Foremen were always careful 
to discuss suitable workers for transfers with the shopstewards 
prior to issuing a transfer request.
Problems are expected in the white-collar sector with the intro­
duction of microtechnology and its effects in terms of de­
qualification, wage and job losses and risks to health. The 
works council has called in medical experts to assess the risks 
to health and establish guidelines on breaks, restriction of 
hours on VDU work and job variety, which they hope to fix in 
works agreements with management.
Overt conflict measures had taken the form of warning strikes
163during collective wage negotiations and some workplace 
strikes at departmental level about the bad behaviour of a 
foreman and grievances about overtime. The works council 
described the aim behind such action as to speed up the resolut­
ion process by bringing the works director into the department 
to deal with the issue on the spot with the works council. Such 
action is very limited and planned well in advance by the shop- 
stewards in discussion with the works council. It takes
the form of a special works meeting to ’discuss the workforce’s 
request for information from the management’ so that the work­
force does not lose any wages as a result. The works council 
emphasised the level of trade union membership and activity of 
the shopstewards in persuading the workforce as the 2 important
factors behind the existence and success of such action at 
workplace level.
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(iii) Procedures for the Resolution of Conflicts
'Porks rules are outlined in a company-level agreement but they 
do not contain a grievance procedure. The works council chair­
man and worker director said they rely on the grievance oro-16 5ceciure outlined in the MCA. Employees know they can refer
questions to the foreman or works council and there is no need 
to write down the details of a procedure.
Actual procedures are said to be determined by the employees1
’intrinsic knowledge’ of who to refer which issues to in 
16 6practice. ' Issues are only referred to the foreman if he can
resolve them, otherwise employees refer them to a shopsteward
167or works councillor. The foremen interviewed estimated
that they could resolve 75% of personal employee problems,
168most technical problems ° and dealt with most of the overtime 
issues arising. All wage-related issues go to the works council. 
vany of the foremen were previously shopstewards and have close 
contact with their own stewards, viewing then as the first 
point of contact if they have a problem with an employee before 
the issue is passed on to the departmental manager and works170councillor. Foremen meet at least once a week with the
departmental works councillor and those interviewed stressed 
the importance of cultivating a good working relationship with 
him because his agreement is necessary on transfers and changes 
in working hours. The departmental manager, an engineer, is 
the foreman’s immediate superior and they meet daily to deal 
with production questions. The foremen argued that they had 
lost much of their decision-making competence with the intro­
duction of the FJorks Constitution Act, which had shifted many 
decisions to works council - management level, where works 
agreements now regulate moot of the issues which used to be 
dealt with, by then. This loss of competence is viewed in a 
positive light as it has reduced conflicts at shopfloor level 
and facilitated the development of good relations with the 
workforce. The more positive shopfloor climate, in its turn, 
promotes speedy, effective resolution of minor issues at a low 
level.
16
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The. dopartwental works councillor deal with snail issues 
arising on a day-to-day hasi.s with departmental management 
and pass unresolved issues on to the works council committees. 
Their role is said to depend on the personality of the works 
councillor himself and the type of issues arising in his depart­
ment. .
'forks council committees deal with routine individual issues
arising which need the works council’s consent - individual
171personnel issues for example. They are also responsible
for drafting works agreements in their area and making 
recommendations to the whole works council on whether an 
agreement with management should be accepted with some reservat­
ions, accepted unconditionally or rejected.
The works council as a whole, however, actually decides on a
works agreement and si5ns it. The worker director is the. key
negotiator on the management side and he views the works council
chairman as his counterpart. Many issues can be resolved by
discussion at works level although issues such as redundancies,
large scale technical changes, additional allowances to large
sections of the v/orkforce have to be referred back to the
X 7 7company board for their approval. "'ost agreements are at
works level because of the extreme diversification of the173company's operations.' " The works council provided a list
of 60 agreements concluded since 1971 and covering a wide range 
174of issues. Tories agreements are seen as general solutions
to be supplemented by informal oral agreements in practice.
The works council sees them as an advantage because thev 
establish ’the rule of law' in workplace issues. They are 
necessary for management because they establish guidelines 
for individual managers and prevent a ’free for all’ with the 
risk of workplace strikes, which are costly and sully the 
company's public image.
The involvement of third parties in the resolution of workplace 
conflicts in firm F has'been relatively limited in recent years.
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Management belongs to an. ev;plovers1 association and sees its 
role as limited to basic isues which have relevance beyond 
the individual firm, particularly wages. The trade union was 
very active in helping the works council build up trade union 
organisation in the firm in 1971 and gives legal advice on the 
interpretation of collective agreements and important works 
agreements such as redundancy plans and new wage agreements.
3 trade union representatives sit on the company's supervisory 
board.
The labour court has played a role in individual dismissal cases
and individual wages problems concerning construction site 
175employees. During an earlier period of management opposition
to the works council, collective issues were referred to the
17 rcourts and most were decided in favour of the works council. u
Management is now reluctant to see such issues referred to a
labour court and the threat of reference has been used to
177force an internal settlement of some conflicts. Currently,
the works council is referring the issue of works council 
travel expenses to a labour court.
One reference to a conciliation board in 1972 on the issue of
redundancies, which resulted in a very favourable decision tor
170the works council, ° has had the effect of promoting internal 
settlement; henceforth. The ’works council is wary of referring 
issues to a conciliation hoard, however, and views It as a last 
resort in redundancy cases to show the workforce that the works 
council has done its utmost to represent their interests. Both 
the works council ant3 management favour internal settlement by 
negotiation and estimate that 907. of issues arising can be 
resolved this way.
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"fc(iv) Key Influences on Conflicts and Resolution Procedures
Factors such as a favourable economic and market context and 
a craft-based technology in firm F promote a low level of 
conflict in the workplace. The diversification of company 
operations and its reflection in the specialised departments 
in firm F favour an extensive role for the works council in 
the regulation of workplace issues which do arise. The works 
council's role, as seen in the earlier case studies, is by 
no means realised by the mere provisions of the WCA 1972, 
although they provide a basis for works council action to 
secure recognition from management. A number of factors have 
supported the works council's fight for acceptance by a reluct­
ant worker director in firm F. These include the high level 
of trade union organisation among the skilled production workers 
and foremen and the development of a shopsteward organisation 
which receives the support of the workforce and, in its turn, 
is effective in its support of the works council. The size 
of the firm and its influence on the number of works councillors 
released from their jobs has also enabled the works council to
build uq> its expertise and maintain a vigilant eye on manage-
179ment policy and practice.
The high level of trade union organisation and extensive shop-
steward body in firm F were’ similarly not 'given' factors upon
which the works council could rely but had to be built up
180during the early 1970s. c The trade union motivation of 
those individuals who, with the help of IGM, w e r e  involved in 
this work continues to be reflected in the attitude of the 
works council to its relations with management, whereby a 
partnership is rejected and relations are viewed as a conflict 
over differing interests in which the works council represents 
those of the workforce.
The experience of decisions by both the labour court and concil­
iation board which favoured the works council have promoted 
its recognition and power in the workplace and reduced manage­
ment's open resistance to its role. This experience contrasts 
with that of the works council in firm E whose weak position 
was further undermined by a negative labour court decision.
* cf. chart in appendices for overview.
3) Mass Assembly in the Metalworking Industry
I) Firm G - a Motor Vehicle Production Plant
(i) The Context of Conflicts Arising and Their Resolution     - -    - . . ■      —  -   -
Firn G is part of a large company producing motor vehicles and
employing 119,446 employees. Firm G employs 16,541 workers of
which 50% work on' the production line, 36% are maintenance
workers and the rest are white-collar workers. Foreign
workers comprise 8% of the workforce. Trade union membership
181is 90% and divided between 3 unions, of which IGM has the 
largest share with 90% of the blue-collar and 78% of white- 
collar workers in membership with the trend towards IGM member­
ship among white-collar workers. Firm G is one of the 2 big
employers in the region and has attracted many employees from
182smaller works where low wages and job insecurity prevail. c
Firm G produces spare parts for other plants within the company
worldwide. There have been several changes in production
methods during the 1970s and early 1980s3from the long assembly-
lines of the early 1970s to the introduction of industrial
robots interspersed with a few human workers on the new belts.
The questionnaire survey was undertaken in the gear box assembly
section where problems relating to the conveyor belts dominate.
Details are also given of interviews with maintenance workers
and workers from the metal pressing department, whose technology-
183related problems are very different.
The company comprises 6 plants within Germany. It does not 
belong to an employers' association and negotiates its own 
collective agreement with the trade union at company level. 
Management organisation in firm G is illustrated overleaf:-
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Works Board (Directors for sales, production 
finance, personnel)
vSections (For example:- personnel, production, 
sales quality control etc.)
vMain Departments (7 in all including gearbox assembly)
Departments
Sub-De ;artments
Foreman Level
The 2 levels have 
similar functions 
(Each with its own 
budget - 'Kostenstelle’)
(Each responsible for 
circa 100 employees)
Deputy Foremen or (Each responsible for
Chargehands
i
30 - 35 employees)
Technical Equipper (A technical post with responsibility
for tools and material)
The main departmental heads and posts above this level are 
higher executive posts (leitende Angestellten). Deputy foremen 
and above up to departmental manager are white-collar employees. 
The chief negotiator in the firm is the personnel manager, also 
known as worker director.
The works council in firm G comprises 37 members, 5 are white- 
collar workers, 32 blue-collar. All are released full-time 
from their jobs by informal agreement with the works management
and have responsibilities in the departments where they were
1 1 A 184 r . 3 jr -i 185previously employed, for particular groups of employees
and on works council committees. The main committees are
personnel, wages, safety and ergonomics, social, planning
186and the executive committee. u Due to the fact that 2 other
trade unions apart from the IGM are represented on the works 
187council, IGM members,meet separately prior to all full works 
council meetings and actual policy is decided then.
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The shopsteward body has 700 members each with an average
constituency of 20 employees, although actual size varies
188depending on the extent of dispersionjof the workforce.
Shopstewards elect section spokesmen and each section sends
1 representative to the executive shopsteward body which has
8 members. The chairman of the shopsteward body is released
full-time from his job. Informal agreements with management
allow the monthly shopsteward meetings, the section shop-
steward meetings and executive body meetings to take place
during working hours on the firm's premises with full pay.
Individual shopstewards are allowed whatever time they need to
189fulfill their duties in the workplace. The very favourable
agreements on shopsteward work are seen as the result of strong
190trade union influence at company level, particularly, and 
also have their advantages for management as the shopstewards 
explain management policies to the workforce and reduce the 
possibility of conflict and misunderstandings.
The survey of shopstewards revealed their view of their role 
as a mediator between the workforce and the works council (637o)
191and between the workforce and management representatives (557,). 
Their view of the distinction between a shopsteward's role and 
that of the works council emphasised the role of the shop- 
steward as a communicator of employee problems to the works 
council, which resolves them with management (587o); and shop- 
stewards as the trade union, the works council as the legal 
workforce representatives (39%).
The works council's replies similarly emphasised the trade 
union - legal distinction in their respective representation 
of workforce interests (100%), also the role of shopstewards 
in carrying out trade union duties whilst the works council 
represents workforce interests at workplace level (577o). Works 
councillors described the shopsteward's role as that of an 
information channel from the workforce to the trade union and 
to the works council. Attempts are being made to include the 
shopstewards in works council work to a greater extent by 
exerting pressure on the foremen to resolve minor issues with
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the shopstewards instead of calling the works council in.
Some managers and foremen are now beginning to accept this
192shopsteward role. The works council has also called for
regular meetings at departmental level with shopstewards, works 
council and management representatives. This has been refused1 QOso far. J A works councillor explained the refusal as being 
due to the fact that shopstewards are often critical of manage­
ment policies and express this criticism at such meetings.
There is some works council criticism of shopsteward attitudes, 
particularly of their executive body, when joint decisions made 
in meetings with the works council are not represented to the194workforce, ' and there have been some conflicts where the
shopstewards have not agreed with compromise solutions worked
195out by the management and works council, The organisation
of effective channels of communication is also seen as a major 
problem in such a large firm. The old information channels 
which proceeded from the executive works council committee to 
the executive shopsteward committee to section shopsteward 
committees and on to individual shopstewards and the workforce 
led to a great loss of information along the way. A new 
channel, which informs section steward leaders direct in a 
monthly meeting and shopstewards in section meetings, is at 
present being devised.
Shopstewards interviewed pointed to general problems of a lack
of commitment among some stewards, rivalry between time and
salaried employees and some problems with finding candidates
196in areas like maintenance. The support of both works
councillors and foremen was essential for them to develop a
role in the resolution process as ’experts’ in particular 
197areas. Generally, cooperation between shopstewards and
foremen is good, and shopstewards were satisfied with the
works council, which had a good trade union understanding and
promoted trade union policies in the workplace. There were
some complaints about delays in the resolution of issues and
non-availability of works councillors, also some suspicion
199about works council salaries. The cooperation between
shopstewards and works council in firm G is, however, seen
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as exceptional by full-tine trade union officials as are
200the extensive rights of the shopstewards.4"'
The background to present day works council and management
relations includes the election of a new works council in 1972,
in which the former leader of the shopsteward body and shop-
201stewards formed the majority of the members. The new
works council had criticised the previous members for their 
elitism, lack of information to the workforce and slowness to 
exploit the provisions of the MCA 1952. Their policy emphasised 
information and communication between the works council, shop- 
stewards and the workforce. The basis for cooperation with 
management was, it is argued, greatly improved by the intro­
duction of the WCA 1972. In some areas,such as the number of 
job releases and the policy of no individual personnel measures 
without the consent of the works council, management has gone 
beyond the provisions of the law. The works council is felt 
to exercise much influence on management and if management is 
uncooperative, as seldom is the case, there are many ways of 
exerting pressure on them to conform.
Management accepts the WCA 1972 as the basis of cooperative 
relations with the works council. Its advantages include the 
clear regulation of the relationship and the pressure it exerts 
on management to consider the interests of the workface in 
its decisions. The foremen interviewed argued that the WCA 1972 
gives protection to the foreman in his job by ensuring manage­
ment does not issue orders which endanger health and safety 
and by removing conflict issues to works council - management 
level so foremen can develop better relationships with the 
workforce. Both management and the works council described their 
relations as cooperative, although the works council did not 
see it as a friendship or partnership but rather as a mutual 
interdependency based on business interests. Several reasons 
were given by them for the 'cooperative style' of management 
policies in firm 0. The fact that representatives of the 
Social Democratic Party'at the national and regional levels 
of government were able to exert political pressure on the
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company by their shareholdings and representation on the 
?03company board0 was seen as a crucial factor in determining 
management adherence to the law and cooperation with the 
works councils. A change in government was expected to have 
a detrimental effect on the relationships. Thus far the works 
council had had no serious conflicts with management and had 
found them to be a willing negotiating partner.
Both the works council and shopstewards emphasised the 
advantages of the WCA 1972 , preferring a solid legal base to 
relations with management instead of having to rely on good 204human relations. Both called for extensions to its provisions
particularly in the area of codetermination in economic issvies
205such as investments, and for the extension of the 1951 Coal,
Iron and Steel model of codetermination at company level to
their firm.0 Generally, they were satisfied with the level
of information from management. They had so many sources of
information even at company level and did not find the secrecy
obligation on information restrictive because they ignored it
207where there was a direct impact on the workforce. Similarly
208the peace obligation ° on the works council and the call to
209work together for the good of the firm were not seen as 
unduly restrictive although problems did arise with the works 
council's long-term view of issues, which was sometimes not 
understood by the workforce. The solution was in the works 
council's hand - they should inform the workforce properly 
about their policies and how they are spending their time via 
the shopstewards, works meetings and direct discussions on the 
job.
Both the works council and shopstewards emphasised the need
210for more training of works councillor and shopstewards. The
works council pointed to improvements required in trade union 
211organisation. The shopstewards called for an extension of
shopsteward rights (46%) and workforce support for shopstewards 
(42%) to increase their involvement in negotiations with 
management and exert a greater trade union influence on some
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works councillors, who spent so much time on works council work 
that they neglected their trade union responsibilities. Their 
views were supported by the responses of workforce members, 
who called for improvements in workforce support of both the 
works council (237,) and shopstewards (217o) and in management 
cooperation (287,). 28% of the respondents,however, felt no
improvements were necessary.
(ii) Conflicts Arising
(1) Wages
Skilled craft workers are paid time rates. The wages of the 
production workers are based on a system of job evaluation.
The old job evaluation system created approximately 30 groups 
in the production area. The groups have been reduced to 12 
wage levels for specified areas of work in an attempt to protect 
against wage losses due to dequalification as a result of 
rationalisation. In this new system a large number of similar 
jobs are grouped together in a wages system, which does not 
lay down the specific details of a particular job but uses 
general headings such as 'Production of Part X 1. Production 
workers tend to be in group 4, more flexible workers and 
technical equippers are in a higher group. Craftworkers are 
classed with deputy foremen as specialised workers. The 
'standards' department and works council work out all the piece- 
rates on which job grades are based by time-and-motion studies.
The personnel manager argued that the new system had led to 
a reduction in wage conflicts. The works council, however, said 
wages problems were constantly arising at an individual level. 
Some workers object to being paid the same wage as everyone 
else because they feel their job is more difficult. Most have 
now accepted the new system as a necessary protection of wages 
against the effects of rationalisation, although there are 
still problems with some craft workers; 95% of foremen questioned 
said they sometimes had grievances about wage groups and wage 
1evels referred to them.212
279
In the specific departments investigated varying levels of
wage grievances were recorded. In gearbox production, the
foreman said there had been many problems with the older more
213complex system but less now there were fewer wage levels.
At most, there are a few individual workers who feel that 
they are being underpaid. In the maintenance section, the 
works councillor said there were still a lot of attempts to 
get into higher wage groups and several craft workers complained 
that they do not get the piecework rates arid other allowances 
which the production workers are paid. In the pressing works, 
the foreman estimated there were 20 - 30 grievances a month 
about individuals being, in their view, wrongly accorded a 
particular wage group. “ Employees interviewed complained 
that the strenuous physical work in the press works was not 
sufficiently recompensed in the wage groups and the groups did 
riot adecmately reflect the differently sized parts employees 
dealt with - some worked on car wings yet were still paid the 
same as others with smaller sections to handle. The grievances 
had not led to a collective demand by the workface thus far.
(2) Personnel Issues
215Mass redundancies occurred throughout the company in 1975
due to the introduction of new vehicle models with fewer sections
to assemble and new technological processes. In firm G no
compulsory redundancies occurred. Various methods were used
to reduce the number of employees including.no new hirings, non-
replacenent of the natural fluctuation, voluntary redundancies
among older workers and non-renewal of short-term contracts of 
^ 21 fforeign workers. ° Mass transfers have also been employed. 
Various agreements have been concluded to protect transferred? 17workers,*" of which the new wage systems is but the latest.
The fact that wages are. now the same in similar production 
processes, such as assembly-line work3has reduced the problems 
associated with transfers, although initially the new system 
cost management a great deal of money as differentials were
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reduced. Details from the foreman and shopsteward questionnaires 
show that transfers to different wage systems do occur but 
transfers within one wage system are the most usual and occur 
often. c In the pressing section there are many transfers within 
the same system, which do not lead to any changes in wages.
Only during slack production periods are workers transferred 
to other systems. A similar situation exists on the gearbox 
assembly-line - transfers within systems take place when there 
is an oversupply in certain areas. Problems only arise when 
an employee cones from maintenance,where different wage groups 
exist.
Short-time working has been introduced on several occasions.
In 1982 there were 10 days of short-time working, affecting
3,000 employees. This was due to a drop in sales overseas.
The usual system is for employees on short-time to be inter­
changed with those working so that it is evenly distributed.
Often production is reduced for just 1 model and just one line 
is closed. The works council agreed to short-time working in 
1982 on condition that it excluded those aged 59 and over and 
that there would be no increase in production during a specified 
period.
Some dismissals do occur but all respondents emphasised that
it was the ultima ratio in serious cases of sabotage, theft 
219and alcoholism. Some employees leave voluntarily, often
220because they cannot get used to assembly-line work.4-
(3) Working Hours
In the production sector 2 shifts are worked; in the foundry
and pressworks 3 shifts. Workforce respondents did not view
shiftwork as problematic. Only 18% of shopstewards cited shift-
221work as an obstacle in their work.
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Overtime is a problem in some of the repair workshops, where 
employees often have to work Saturdays and Sundays to complete 
their workload. The works council is divided in its opinions 
about overtime - some argue,that if the management can prove 
it is necessary then they should gr-ant it, others argue that 
it is part of a cutback in personnel and new hirings should 
be made. The works councillor responsible for the maintenance 
section appreciated that some repairs have to be carried out 
at weekends but employees should have days off in lieu to 
maintain a 40-hour week. He does foresee problems, however, 
with the workforce, who are ready to work overtime as well as 
be on continuous night shifts to increase their wages regardless 
of the effect on their health.
(4) Working Conditions
222 223The most common problem areas are noise levels, ventilation294and dirty conditions. ° Noise levels are often cited as
obstacles in the work of foremen, shopstewards and works 
225councillors because they hinder communication in the prod-926 227uction sector0 and the press works. ' 27% of shopstewards
in production also mentioned physical exertion as a problem
as did employees in the press works. It was a c c e p te d ,  however,
that the firm is attempting to improve conditions.
(5) Technology-Related Issues
The introduction of the new 'transfer' lines, whereby the flow 
of production is not controlled by the machine but by the 
individual worker who only allows the parts through as he Is 
ready to deal with them, led to problems in the maintenance of
228the flow of work and ensuring group work functions effectively. 3 
The new belts equipped with robots are creating problems because
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they employ so few workers and these workers will be separated 
from one another by great distances, unlike the old belts where 
they work facing each other and with colleagues on either side. 
Few workers are willing to work on the new belts. These 
social problems also arise with the high number of transfers 
of workers, which break up friendship groups, although the 
wages problems have now been largely resolved.
Other problems associated with the assembly-line production
process include the pressure of work, which affects maintenance
workers too as they are pressurised by foremen to repair the
229belts as soon as possible, and problems of keeping production 
230flowing. Materials supply was mentioned as an increasing
231problem due to personnel cutbacks in that department. 27%
of shopstewards and 247. of foremen reported that problems
232occurred often due to the assembly-line process.
233 234The size and organisation of the maintenance and assembly
departments were also cited as obstacles in the work of shop-
stewards and works councillors due to the problems in contact-
235ing and talking to workers, and the time spent on fulfilling 
such duties.
The form of conflicts is overwhelmingly individual, although 
foremen pointed to some group issues in the area of working 
conditions (9.5%), work organisation (4.8%,) and working hours 
(4.8%).
236Forms of overt conflict included spontaneous workplace action
237and warning strikes in conjunction with company-level wage
238negotiations. There had also been special workplace meetings,239 240talks to halt production, overtime bans and demonstrations.
242The main issues in conflict were company wage rates, the
243 244attitudes of management, workplace wage rates and working
245conditions.
There had been 3 warning- strikes in 1981 each lasting 1 - 2  
hours and involving 50 - 607> of the workforce. This was 
because wage negotiations were being long drawn out and the
241
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action was directed at forcing a decision by the management 
representatives. Workplace stoppages had taken place due to 
attempts to cut bonuses^^ and non-adherence by management to 
an agreement whereby the workforce accepted a low wage 
settlement on condition that there would be no price rises247
in the cars produced. The works council had refused to
cooperate with management on certain occasions^especially on 
the question of overtime working by maintenance workers.
Conflict measures were taken when management made sudden 
decisions without consultation but such instances were rare due 
to the favourable economic conditions during the late 1970s.
More conflict is expected in future as jobs came under threat 
and negotiations become tougher year by year. So far, the works 
council has been able to rely on pressure exerted by the works 
council and union at company level to prevent serious job 
losses. The works council said it desired more support from 
the workforce in its negotiations with management and relied 
on shopstewards to organise it, although there were problems240with the solidarity of the workforce and their willingness
249to engage in conflict with management. Although attendance
was high at works meetings, which are paid, there was low
support of trade union meetings and warning strikes according
250to shopstewards. The low level of solidarity was explained 
by the fact that many workers commute long distances to the 
firm and only see one another at work.
(iii) Procedures for the Resolution of Conflicts
An agreement on works rules has been negotiated at company 
level. It includes a general clause that offences against 
the works rules are to be dealt with in agreement with the 
works council and provisions for employees to make a complaint 
orally or in writing to departmental managers. They can be 
accompanied in this by the works council or go alone. Both 
the works council and the personnel manager stressed that an
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employee is free to refer a grievance to whoever he prefers.
The only instances of written grievances occur in important 
issues which could be referred by an employee to a labour
251court if he is not satisfied with the workplace decision.
Most grievances are said to be oral and are dealt with orally, 
usually by telephone. Only 19% of employees surveyed claimed 
that the works rules were their source of information about 
who to refer grievances to. Those interviewed stated that 
there was nothing written down about grievance procedures^ 
although management recommended a procedure which common sense 
dictated and which they use if they do not want to upset their 
immediate superiors. If they were only consulting on a specific 
issue, however, it was deemed alright to go direct to the shop- 
steward or works council. The procedure recommended by manage­
ment is illustrated below:-
Employee > Chargehand > Foreman ^Works Council
(1) Actual Procedures 
A) Stage One
The responses of workers from the gearbox assembly section
revealed the shopsteward as the main first reference point with 
252grievances. Pay issues were referred in equal measure to
shopstewards, chargehands and foremen. Organisational and 
technical issues were the domain of the chargehand, and safety 
issues went to the safety representative. The works council 
was contacted on the issue of social facilities (47%), personal 
problems ( 2 2 %) and problems with management (28%).
Reasons for referring issues to specific actors included the 
fact that they were seen to be the best representative (47%,) 
and positive shopsteward (19%,) and management attitudes (26%). 
References were always oral and by the employee himself (98%,) 
to the shopsteward who worked nearby (50%) and the foreman who
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either worked nearby (20%,) or was on his round of inspection
(20%). The availability of specific actors was a crucial
factor in who issues were referred to. Shopstewards work
253alongside some employees and some shopstewards have 20 years
service in that role and ate able to resolve many issues.
254Some employees work more or less on their own and refer
issues to the foreman when he comes on his round, or to the
works council if there are problems in their relationship with
the foreman. Employees see their choice as limited to shop-
stewards or foremen. There is little or no contact with
management above the level of underdepartmental manager
(Kostenstellenleiter) and very rarely do employees see, let
255alone speak to, their works councillor.
Issues were resolved by shopstewards (53%) or the foreman (40%) 
in gearbox assembly. All the respondents w e r e members of the 
IGM and 287. had been shopstewards or were at present shopstewards, 
including 2 deputy stewards.
Employees from the maintenance section, interviewed during the
256pilot study, referred most issues to the chargehand or fore-
257man, and transfers were referred to the works council. There 
were a number of factors hindering effective shopsteward work 
including problems of recognition from chargehands in the 
machine repair section, conflict between IGM stewards and 
employees from other trade unions in factory maintenance and
problems of solidarity among the electricians who work on their
258own.
Replies from employees in the press works showed that references 
were made to the shopsteward, chargehand or foreman depending 
on who is available at the time.
B) Stage 2
Issues were overwhelmingly referred to shopstewards in the
gearbox assembly by employees (88%). Other referees included
chargehands (15%), the shopsteward executive (12%) and works
council (12%). 76% of stewards said employees came to their
259shopsteward with grievances in the first instance either 
while they were working (70%) or during breaktiraes (427,). 
Shopsteward meetings were also a location where issues were 
referred on to them (27%). A high percentage of stewards (61%) 
said they resolved issues with the chargehands, 587, with fore­
men, 497o with the works council and management representatives^^ 
and 33% with the employee concerned. The common issues dealt 
with included conflicts between employees and management (64%),
personal problems (427,), working conditions (42%), piecerates 
261(39%), social facilities (337,), conflicts between employees 
(337,) and quality of work issues (24%).
The time spent on resolving grievances was under 1 hour per day
262for the vast majority of stewards (94%). Unresolved issues
263were referred to the departmental works councillor with
264whom there was a high level of contact. Contacts with other
representative bodies such as the works council and its com­
mittees and the shopsteward executive body occur only in formal 
265meetings. Contacts with management above foreman level were
266very rare.
C) Stage Three
Replies from the foremen in the gearbox assembly department 
confirm the important role of the shopstewards in the resolution 
process. 52%, had issues referred to them by shopstewards and 
43%, resolved issues jointly with shopstewards. Other important 
referees of issues, apart from shopstewards, were the employees 
themselves (1007,) and chargehands (577,). Only 147, of the fore­
men said the works council referred issues to them but 247, said
they resolved issues with the works councillor. The process 
of resolution is an oral one with only 10% of foremen claiming 
they receive written grievances.
Foremen who were interviewed emphasised their responsibility
for technical aspects of the work and administrative work in
connection with their section. Circa 40% of their time is spent
on office work, 60% on the shopfloor. The main issues dealt
with by them were quality of work (100%), allocation of work
(90.5%), piecerates (90.5%), safety (90.5%) disputes between
individual workers (90.5%,) and technical issues (76.2). The
usual procedure was to try to regulate a conflict with the 
? 7shopstewards, then to call in the works councillor for dis­
cussion and then to go with the employee in question to the 
under-departmental manager if there was still no resolution of 
the issues.
Most of the foreman's contacts are with his section,including 
shopstewards and chargehands. The under-departmental manager 
and he discuss the technical side of production and meet daily. 
The aim of both is to resolve issues without involving depart­
mental management or those above him. The works councillor is 
consulted on special problems or queries about the WCA 1972 
and its applicability in specific situations. Contacts with 
the personnel department are by telephone and deal with issues 
such as transfers, absenteeism and sickness records.
D) Stage Four
The works councillors from the gearbox assembly department said 
issues were referred to them by employees (86%,), shopstewards 
(100%), foremen (43%,) and the shopsteward executive body (43%). 
Shopstewards are the most common referees as they come to the263works councillor with problems in their department.
Individual employees come up to the works councillor when he
269tours the department and some come to his office if they
know him personally.
Most issues can be dealt with on the spot or by telephone with
270the foreman (71%) or departmental management (71%). Depart­
mental management is the highest level contacted by individual 
works councillors. Issues not resolved at this level are
usually referred on to works councillors in appropriate works
271council committees. Major issues affecting a whole section
and requiring the agreement of the works council and management
at the highest level are referred on to the executive committee
272or works council chairman.
Issues dealt with by individual works councillors include piece-
rates (71%), overtime (867>)» conflicts between employees and
management representatives (100%), working conditions (71%,).
Time spent on issues is usually under 2 hours per day, although
some issues* such as transfers, and some circumstances* such as
when a departmental manager is not in the plant or is on
273another shift, can lead to delays in resolution.
Apart from obstacles to their work related to noise levels,
274system of shifts, the size and organisation of the depart- 
275ment, 43% of works councillors claimed individual management
representatives were hindrances where they did not accept shop-
stewards and all issues had to be dealt with by a works council- 
276lor, or where they referred requests for overtime to the 
works council chairman'if they knew the individual councillor 
would not agree to i t 7 ^
E) Stage Five
The works council committees are responsible for resolving 
issues which arise in the day-to-day running of the firm and 
involve some specialist considerations such as technical knowl­
edge in respect of safety and ergonomic issues. The personnel 
committee is the only committee with an independent decision­
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making capability and the only parity committee. It meets one 
day a week with management (personnel department) and one day 
a week on its own. The wages committee draws up new wage-work 
areas but all its decisions must be referred on to the whole 
works council. The planning committee was only recently 
established in response to management's refusal to draw up a 
works agreement on information about the effect of new 
technology on jobs. It employs its own expert and provides 
information and advice to the works council on the probable 
effects of specific management plans.
All major issues are referred on to the whole works council.,
which meets once a month with extra meetings if particular
problems such as short-time working arise. Prior to the full
meeting, the members of the IGM meet together to make the
278actual decisions. The other 5 members from other trade
unions seldom vote against these decisions in the plenary 
session.
F) Stage Six
Actual negotiations are conducted by the works council executive 
committee and the personnel and works managers. Few workplace 
problems are referred up to company level. The aim of works 
management is to resolve issues, such as special holiday 
arrangement, dissatisfaction of whole sections with their wage 
group and serious instances of group theft, decentrally.
Most questions concerning the firm are, however, dealt with at
279company level, where wage agreements and agreements on
280general working conditions are negotiated by management and 
trade union representatives. Other company-level agreements 
cover works rules, flexitime, reorganisation of production 
planning, general conditions about the use of replacement 
workers ('Springer'), regulations about the transfer of older 
workers and redundancies.
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The few existing works agreements include regulations on the
support of employees in hardship and breaktimes for assembly-
line workers. The policy of management is described as central
control at company level with informal agreements where
necessary at works level. The fact that the same negotiating
parties meet at company and works level means, however, that
there is a lot of overlap between the agreements and their
281application at all levels.
The foremen cited the Works Constitution Act (76%) and works 
rules (76%) as the foremost procedures regulating their role 
in the firm, followed by works agreements (62%,) and the general 
agreement on working conditions (52%). Works councillors 
emphasised the WCA 1972 (100%), the general agreement on working 
conditions (86%) and wages agreements as the key procedures. 43% 
also mentioned works agreements and departmental agreements, 
although the latter were not written down but were implicit 
due to long tradition - for example, special arrangements about 
breaks in the press works.
(2) Third Party Involvement in Resolution Procedures
In firm G there have been very few instances of recourse to the
labour court. In the area of individual references, dismissals
282never occur without the agreement of the works council so 
that cases only arise where an employee goes against the 
decision of both the works council and management. This rarely 
happens. The works council could remember two examples ofo o qcollective references at plant level in the early 1970s.
284There have been a few cases at company level. Both manage­
ment and the works council, however, favour internal settlement. 
Management said its policy was not to let a conflict go so far 
that the works council has to resort to a labour court. The 
works council pointed out that it usually had no need to refer 
to a labour court as it has many other means of exerting 
pressure,including political pressure at company and concern 
levels.
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However, trade union officials have been greatly involved in
conflict resolution in firm G. There have been no formal
conciliation boards. Instead, full-time trade union officials
285have joined the works council and management in discussions. 
Management said its policy was not to call in a conciliation 
board as it had no wish to transfer responsibility for 
important decisions to retired labour court judges with no 
specialised knowledge of the issues. They prefer to negotiate 
with the works council for as long as is necessary to reach 
an agreement. If there is no agreement then the issue is left 
at stalemate.
The IGM plays a very important role in firm G. The leading 
286negotiator on the workforce side in the annual wage negot­
iations with the company is the regional trade union represent­
ative of the area where the main plant in the company is
situated. The committee which supervises a trade union
287negotiated collective agreement on wage differentials, is
288a trade union body, as is the wage commission. Trade union O O Qrepresentatives also sit on the supervisory board of the concern.
The exceptional influence of IGM in firm G has historical roots 
in the development of the concern from a nationalised company 
to a company under British control in 1945, which was trans­
ferred back into national and regional government control in 
1958. The important role of the trade union is said to strengthen 
the works council’s hand in negotiations with management and 
leads to what must be some of the most favourable conditions 
for works council and shopsteward activity in West German 
industry.
VC(iv) Key Influences on Conflicts and Resolution Procedures
Both the economic / market context and technology of firm G 
contain considerable conflict potential in their direct threat 
to jobs, qualifications and humane working conditions. Most of
* cf. chart in appendices for overview.
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this conflict potential, however, has been reduced due to the 
close cooperation between the works council and management 
both at firm and company levels. Management has in fact gone 
far beyond the legal requirements in its cooperative stance 
towards the works council and shopsteward organisation. One 
important reason for management cooperation is the political 
pressure for cooperative policies exerted by national and 
regional government representatives and trade union officials 
on the company's supervisory board. However, the evidence 
from other vehicle production plants in West Germany, which is 
outlined in brief in the following addendum, point to organisation­
al factors which promote a bureaucratic structure for conflict 
resolution in what is intrinsically a highly conflictual context 
for industrial relations.
II) Addendum - Other Motor Vehicle Production Plants in
West Germany
Visits were made to two other plants in other companies in
West Germany. Impressions gained from discussions in these
plants, together with details from articles about other motor
290vehicle production plants in West Germany, ' provide the 
basis for the brief comparison with findings from firm G 
outlined below.
The technical and market contexts of most of the motor vehicle 
production plants are similar and produce similar conflict 
areas. These include the rationalisation of production with 
the resulting pressures of work due to cutbacks in personnel 
and the breakup of the old system of workgroups in favour of 
an individualisation of work processes. Market pressures had 
led in all the firms considered to mass redundancies during 
the 1970s and a policy of no new hirings. The works councils 
emphasised the need to influence company planning of production 
to a greater extent in order to prevent mass job losses, mass 
transfers of skilled workers to the conveyor belts (with wage 
and status losses) and ambiguous policies of overtime and extra 
shifts followed by redundancies and short-time working.
The formal organisation of works council and shopsteward activity
also bears many similarities with firm G. These include
291extensive job release of works council members, elaborate
shopsteward organisation based on the concept of section shop-
steward bodies and an executive body for the whole plant and
management agreement to some shopsteward meetings during work-
292ing hours at the firm’s expense. " Most firms have a number
of unions competing to represent the workforce although IGM is
293the dominant union in all cases.
The procedural systems are generally informal - there is seldom 
a formal grievance procedure and works agreements are few in 
number as the majority of issues are regulated at company
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level. The actual system of resolution is based on the 
individual works council members who deal with issues arising 
in their old departments and refer unresolved issues on to 
works council committees and the whole works council for a 
solution.
Key differences emerge from the different histories of works
council-shopsteward activity and the differences in policies
developed towards management decisions made in response to the
pressures of the technical and market contexts of the firm.
294Some of the plants have seen the removal of works councils
which were active during the prosperous years of the 1960s and
their replacement by shopstewards trained during the late 1960s,
as in the case of firm G. The reasons for the change include
the charge that the former works council did not represent
workforce interests, for example, by agreeing to hundreds of
dismissals by management. In other firms there are oppositional
groups of shopstewards but they have been unable to overturn
295the old works council. Some of the works councils which
were active during the 1960s have succeeded in shifting towards 
a more legalistic, as opposed to social partnership, strategy 
vis-a-vis management. Others have sought to maintain the
old social partnership in the face of increased conflict during 
the 1970s and have thereby alienated themselves from the work­
force and active shopsteward groups by agreeing to mass trans­
fers of skilled workers without any wage guarantees, extra
shifts and temporary 3 month hirings, and new systems of work
297measurement seen as detrimental to the workforce.
The most effective works councils, in terms of their success
in representing workforce interests, are those which developed
from shopsteward training during the 1960s and early 1970s.
298The policies of the works council in one plant visited
accord closely with those of the works council in firm G and
have enjoyed some success, although their context of operation
is less favourable than in firm G due to the fact that it is
299part of a foreign-owned private multi-national company with 
none of the resources to exert informal political pressure on
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the management to reach a compromise favourable to the interests 
of the whole workforce.
The least effective works councils, and those firms with the 
highest levels of overt workplace conflict, occur where the 
works council seeks to maintain a policy of social partnership 
in the face of rising conflict levels. Their policies amount 
to a ’sell out’ to management interests in actual fact and 
give rise often to oppositional groups based on political 
factions in the workplace. The problem arises where a works 
council is insensitive to the changes in the context of its 
relations with management and the opposition to its policies 
in the workplace is not strong enough to force a change in the 
composition of the works council which would introduce new 
policies more in line with the changed context of industrial 
relations
This brief outline of the similarities and differences in the 
conflicts arising and their resolution within plants belonging 
to the same group in terms of technological process and product 
gives some support to the view that technological and market 
contexts often give rise to similar conflicts and formal 
procedural organisation. The actual resolution of conflicts, 
however, is more dependent on factors specific to a particular 
plant such as the history of the relations between works council 
and management and the development of workforce representation 
policies and strategies to meet the demands of a changing con­
text of industrial relations. Further consideration of these 
influences on conflicts and their resolution at plant level 
follows in chapters 6 and 7.
4) The Steel Industry: 2 Plants 
I) Firm H - a Steel Producing Plant
(i) The Context of Conflicts Arising and Their Resolution
Firm H is part of a large steel producing and steel processing
concern employing 108,000 workers. It employs 7,900 workers
and 350 apprentices. Most of the employees are production
workers (4,300). There are 2,000 maintenance and 1,600 white-
collar workers in the administrative block. Foreign workers
total 1,800^^ and work in production areas where mechanisation
301levels and qualifications required are low. The majority of
the production workforce is unskilled and is given 4 - 6  weeks
302training to do their jobs. Trade union organisation levels
303are 99% among blue-collar and 68% among white-collar workers.
The IGM is the only union organising in the firm. The area in 
which the firm operates is the main centre of German steel 
production. During the 1970s,10,000 jobs were lost in the 
production and 20,000 in the craft area of German steel production304
in the town and there is a lack of alternative job opportunities 
due to the monostructure of the labour market in the area.
Firm II produces the steel for other plants in the concern, which 
manufactures steel pipelines^^ and comprises blast furnaces, a 
rolling mill and large research laboratory and quality control 
laboratories. Production is continuous process based on a 4 
shift system operating throughout the year. Production is stable 
at circa 3.5 to 3.8 million tons a year.
The concern dates back to the nineteenth century when it pro­
duced seamless pipes from steel blocks. Firm H was established 
in the 1920s. During the Second World War, the company director 
was head of the Industry Group (Reichsgruppe Industrie) under 
Hitler and the concern was broken up after the war and placed 
under British control. In 1951, the company came under the 
regulations on codetermination in the iron, coal and steel
296
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industries which ensured equal representation of shareholder
and workforce representatives on the supervisory board and a
worker director on the company board who is recommended by
the workforce representatives. Reorganisation of the company
during the 1970s has called into question the applicability of
the Montan model of codetermination, although a 6 year
moratorium on any changes in codetermination has been agreed by
306the Federal Labour Court. Management organisation in firm H
is illustrated below:-
Works Board
Technical Director Financial Director Personnel
(Chairman) Director 
Departmental Managers
Section Managers ('Betriebsleiter)
I1st Assistants
I
Works Engineers ('Betriebsingenieur1)
Foremen
The works council comprises 33 members all with job release
under an informal agreement between management and the works
307council. All but one member belong to the IGM. Members
308have responsibilities on works council committees and in
309the production and white-collar sectors.
There are 420 shopstewards in firm II in the production sector.
Full shopsteward meetings are held once a month during working
310 311hours, departmental meetings are held as necessary. The
executive body has 19 members including 16 representatives from
all the departments and groups of employees in the firm. Each
representative on the shopsteward executive body is responsible
for one area and receives and passes on information to it.
298
During the years 1968 - 1973 there was generalised conflict
between the works council and shopsteward bodies. This was
based on a personal conflict between the works council chair-
man, a 'left-winger* said to have polarised the workforce by
his views, and the head of the shopsteward body. The problems
312were only resolved as the 2 leaders stepped down from office.
Some individual problems still exist between the works council and 
shopstewards but the general power struggle has now ended. Co­
operation between the 2 bodies is seen as dependent on the 
leaders and their deputies as well as a good information
policy so that shopstewards are informed and their opinions
313sought before the works council reaches a decision and before 
any information becomes public knowledge.
The shopstewards' role is described by the works council in
terms of ensuring that trade union policies are represented
in the workplace and developing workforce consciousness,
especially in view of the new trade union strategy of a flexible
response during collective bargaining negotiations.33<^  Shop-
stewards also provide the link between the workforce and the 
315works council, providing information about what is happening. 
They have a 'minimal involvement with the resolution of worker 
problems', as this is the role of the works council. The 
works council views shopstewards as potential works councillors, 
encouraging extra training33  ^ and recommending specific 
stewards for election to the works council.
Problems arise in finding employees willing to stand as shop-
stewards in the face of possible job losses and the lack of
' 317facilities for them to fulfill their duties. Changes in
the technological process have broken up workgroups of 50 men 
and tied employees more to their jobs, both of which make the 
shopstewards' work more difficult. Management attitudes to 
the shopstewards, especially those of the foremen, are 
important too.318
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Relations with management were described as better than in 
most industries because of the possibilities for informal 
contacts and the person of the Worker Director laid down in 
legislation for the steel industry. The informal aspect of 
relations with management was emphasised, especially the 
relationship of mutual trust with the personnel manager and his 
department which ensured that conflicts could be resolved via 
personal discussions. Both sides respect each other's 
responsibilities and seek to work within the realm of what 
is possible and reach peaceful solutions to conflicts, although 
their roles are different. Problems with management represent­
atives occur at concern level and at the level below works 
management. The present head of the concern is described as 
being anti-trade union and always ready for a battle, 
challenging the workforce representatives to prove how
seriously the workforce think about an issue before management 
319will give in. Problems also arise with department and
section managers in the works who still operate on the basis 
of class warfare and often disregard the law. They obstruct 
attempts by works councillors to reach agreements with them 
on the spot and are often called to explain their attitudes
320to the personnel department and works council executive body.
The WCA 1972 is seen as useful in that it guarantees legal
entitlements which can be realised, in the last resort, through
the labour courts. This has been used as a threat in the past
to ensure management cooperation, particularly with the
technical managers who have no legal training and are afraid
to break the law. The disadvantages of the WCA 1972 include
the fact that its norms are not necessarily trade union norms
and this means the works council is not always able to achieve
321what shopstewards and the trade union desire. The
institutional framework of the law is useful in providing 
opportunities for informal contacts and creating readiness to
negotiate. Emphasis is, however, placed on the person of the
322 323worker director, personnel manager, and works council and
the informal contacts between them.
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(ii) Conflicts Arising
Firm H has its own wage system based on 20 groups, which have 
been arrived at by summary rather than analytical methods of 
comparing jobs. No employee falls below group 7, most are in324
groups 10 - 14. The system is accepted by the whole work­
force with only individual problems arising about which group 
a specific employee fits into. Employees are paid a timerate- 
based wage. A bonus system used to be in operation. This was 
fixed by works agreement at 15% during a period of high 
production and has remained at that level despite a decline in 
production. The works council has argued the decline in pro­
duction is not due to a decline in worker performance but is 
the result of a management decision in response to a fall in 
market demand, therefore the bonus level should remain the 
same.
Problems of possible wage losses have arisen with changes in
technology and the transfer of workers to lower paid jobs as
well as the amelioration of poor working conditions, which
formed the basis of higher paid unskilled jobs in the 1960s
and early 1970s. The transfer of skilled workers to lower
paid production jobs in the late 1970s led to the creation of
a new grade of steelworker, who receive higher wages and are
given special jobs to do in production. The recent closure
of a department led to a works agreement to secure wage
325guarantees for transferred workers. An agreement on wage
guarantees for 7 months for workers who remain in the same job 
although the demands of that job have changed has also been 
agreed. )
Job losses in firm H have been limited so far. The firm 
produces high grade steel and has not been affected by EEC 
restrictions affecting mass steel production. Production is 
for the plants within the same concern and has been limited to 
meet their needs. There has, however, been a slow reduction 
in staffing levels by voluntary redundancies and early retire­
ment at 57, and the aim is to reduce present levels to 6,500
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whilst maintaining the same level of production. In 1979, 
internal settlements were agreed with foreign workers in the 
plant who were no longer able to cope with the newly mechanised 
production process, which demands•greater verbal skills and 
entails no physical exertion. In general, the job situation 
is viewed optimistically for the employees at present in the 
plant. The new coking plant will involve no job losses as the 
same number of employees will produce double the capacity. 
Additional jobs will be created by the new rolling mill.
In 1982, however, problems leading to short-time working for
33% of the workforce emerged with a stagnation in the market
326for oil drilling pipes and a U.S. embargo on pipes as a 
reaction to West German sales to the U.S.S.R.
During the 1970s there has been considerable rationalisation 
and mechanisation of the production sector. Future mechanisat­
ion is expected to be restricted to the white-collar sector, 
where job losses and dequalification are likely.
The technology of steel production creates problems with
working conditions. The continuous process system operates
327on a 4 shift basis throughout the year, and,in order to
abide by collective agreements on a 40 hour week, employees
in production have an extra holiday of 13 days per annum which
has to be taken during one of 2 holiday periods laid down in
a works agreement. This process of production creates problems
328in the organisation of breaktimes and ties workers to their
• u 329 jobs.
Working conditions have been greatly improved as a result of
330government policies on environmental pollution and mech- 
331anisation, although this has threatened wage losses. Up 
to now, wage losses as a result of the decline in physical 
exertion necessary have not been serious.
Problems within the workforce are usually individual ones 
332only, although the ideological power struggle between the 
old works council chairman and shopsteward leader divided 
the whole workforce and shopsteward body. The early retire­
ment of the chairman due to ill health and the assumption of 
the former shopsteward leader to the office of works council 
chairman has ended the political confrontation and permitted 
the works council and shopstewards to concentrate on represent­
ing workforce interests.
Overt conflict measures have occurred at departmental level and
at works level. In 1972 and 1973 the majority of the workforce
opposed low trade union wage settlements and this led to action
being taken in the rolling mill, main workshop and transport
333section to enforce a higher wage settlement for the works.
In 1972, the action was limited to the rolling mills where 
workers demanded a higher basic wage and management acceptance 
of recommendations made by a parity commission on their wage 
levels. In 1973, 2,000 workers were involved in strikes against 
a low wages settlement and demanded an additional payment for
3 3 4
all workers. W/ork stoppages have taken place during heat­
waves to secure extra breaks. In 1979, the workforce struck to 
secure a 35 hour working week in negotiations between the 
trade unions and employers. Management did not introduce any
sanctions after this strike but have developed a harder line
335in their dealings with the works council and shopstewards.
Whilst at regional level, the employers' association has 
opposed trade union demands determinedly. This led in 1982 
to protest demonstrations and warning strikes involving the 
whole workforce, although specific departments took a leading
(iii) Procedures for the Resolution of Conflicts
In the agreement on works rules there is a clause which permits 
employees to refer grievances directly to the works council.
In practice, the works council estimates that circa 60% of 
grievances are referred to the foreman and 40% to the works 
council. Trust relations between the foremen and workforce 
are described as very strong partly because the 2 groups work 
side by side, partly because the foremen view themselves as
303
members of the workforce too yet with technical expertise so
337they can give advice and assistance where necessary. There
are some individual problems between foremen and employees but 
this is rare. Work-related issues, such as complaints that an 
employee always gets the dirty jobs or wants to be promoted to 
first smelter are usually referred to the foreman. Private 
problems, such as a desire for a specific holiday period, are 
referred to the foreman in 60% of cases and to the works council 
in 40% of cases. Problems relating to the labour law are always 
referred to the works council.
Foremen are an important contact of individual works councillors 
in the departments. The individual works councillors deal with 
individual issues arising in their area with foremen and depart­
mental management, although the decisions are formally made in
338works council committee meetings.
Works councillors spend an estimated 707o of their time in
339preparation for and attendance at committee meetings. Most
problems arising can be dealt with either by individual 
councillors or committees which can become joint committees with 
management where controversial issues need to be decided, as in 
the case of the personnel committees. Serious issues such 
as short-time working and redundancies are dealt with by the 
executive committee of the works council which meets once a 
week and includes the chairmen of all the other committees.
The key negotiating partners of the works council at works 
level are the technical, finance and personnel managers who 
constitute the works board. The technical manager is the 
main spokesman of the board. The works council also has close 
contacts with the worker director of the steel pipes works of 
which firm H is now a part. They view him as a trade union 
man in a management position'^"'' and invite him to important 
works council meetings. He comes to at least one works meeting 
a year and meets regularly with the works council chairman, 
making recommendations and alterations to any works agreements 
drawn up at works level. The close connection between the
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offices of personnel manager, worker director and the works
council is revealed in management organisational changes at
342present underway in firm H. The informal agreements arrived
at in firm H are viewed as dependent on the persons of the worker
3 4 3director and personnel manager. The works council also has
formal and informal contacts with the worker director at con­
cern level.
Works agreements are mostly drawn up on w a g e s and working hours
344and provide the skeleton of workplace administration. The
flesh is provided by informal regulation by the works council 
and management on a day-to-day basis. The increased central­
isation of management which has arisen as a result of recent 
organisational changes,3^3 is causing problems in the drawing 
up of works agreements as works management always has to refer 
back to the company level for their approval.
Contacts between the works council and the trade union are 
many and varied. The shopsteward executive maintains contact 
with the local IGM office and a number of employees are 
represented in trade union committees.3^  Trade union officials 
attend workplace and shopsteward meetings and provide expert 
advice to works council committees either by telephone or by 
works councillors actually going to the local trade union office.
There have been no collective references to a labour court for 
over a decade. Individual appeals total about 6 a year and 
occur in cases of dismissals for economic reasons and for 
offences against the works rules, particularly the prohibition 
on alcohol on the premises.
References to a conciliation board have been rare as an internal 
settlement can usually, be reached. One reference was made in 
1975 on a works agreement to curtail health risks in the work­
place. The conciliation board decided the works council had 
a codetermination right and that the issue should be referred 
to a labour court. Management and works council then drew up 
a works agreement with the help of health and safety experts
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without referring it to a labour court. The reason for the
lack of an internal settlement in the beginning is seen
partly as a personality clash. When the persons concerned
left, the issue was resolved pragmatically. In 1977, the
works council referred a management call for short-time working
347to a conciliation board, which decided that short-time 
working was necessary due to a drop in production but cut 
the period from 3 to 2 months and agreed extensive financial 
compensation for those employees affected.
Most issues, however, have been resolved internally by manage­
ment and the works council. The works council argues that the 
opportunities for informal contacts and conflict resolution 
provided by the institutional framework of the Iron, Coal and 
Steel Codetermin^ation Act make recourse to third parties out­
side this framework largely unnecessary.
(iv) Key Influences on Conflicts and Resolution Procedures
The economic context of firm H has, until recently, been a 
favourable one leading to limited job losses which have occurred 
by way of voluntary redundancy settlements and early retire­
ment. Changes in technological processes in the steel industry 
have led to problems of dequalification but in firm H have 
created additional jobs too. Although the system of production 
involves 4 shifts, this is not seen as a source of conflict 
between the workforce and management but as an inevitable con­
comitant of the industry of steel production.
Personality factors both among management representatives and 
shopstewards and works councillors have in themselves promoted 
conflicts at workplace level in the past but these are out­
weighed by those influences promoting informal conflict resolut­
ion in the workplace and at company level through the institutions
* cf. chart in appendices for overview.
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of Montan Codetermination. Historical factors explain the 
importance of the 1951 Act as it applies to the steel industry 
in West Germany today.
The context of firm H, therefore, has promoted a low level of 
conflict and a high level of informal resolution of problems 
arising. Changes in the context over the past 3 years are 
provoking some conflicts between management and works council 
and threaten the continuation of the informal modes of 
resolution outlined earlier.
II) Firm I - a Steel Processing Plant
(i) The Context of Conflicts Arising and Their Resolution
Firm I is a subsidiary of a company employing a total workforce 
of circa 31,800 employees. Firm I has a workforce of 2,600 of 
which 2,070 work in the production sector, 400 in the admin­
istration and 130 are apprentices. 90%, of blue-collar and 
60%, of white-collar employees are members of IGM. No other 
unions are represented in the firm. Skilled craftsmen work
in the maintenance section of production; production workers
348are trained for their jobs over several weeks.
The technology of firm I involves the production of lightweight 
steel parts for the construction and motor industries and cast 
iron and ingot moulds for the steelworks. The actual site 
comprises hot and cold rolling mills, a foundry, a processing 
plant and finishing section.
The joint stock company, of which firm I is a subsidiary, owns 
several steel production plants, 10 steel processing plants,
2 packaging firms, a dolomite works, an electricity works and 
a plant producing building materials. The company comes under 
the 1976 provisions for company-level codetermination. Firm I 
has its own advisory board (Beirat) by special agreement with 
the company comprising 4 workforce representatives (2 works 
councillors, 2 trade union officials), 4 management represent­
atives and a worker director.
The organisation of management in firm I is illustrated 
overleaf:-
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Works Board
TWorker Director Sales (home) Sales (abroad) Technical Director
/
\ 'Administration 
Head of Administration
Departmental Manager
Group Managers
Production 
Head of Production
Works Manager
vKAssistant Works Manager
vKHead Foremen (Obermeister)
Foremen
Chargehands
IColumn Leaders
The works council in firm I has 19 members of which 5 are
released from their jobs full-time including the chairman and
349his deputy. There are 7 works council committees and 3
350joint committees with management. The shopsteward body 
comprises 70 shopstewards, whose role, according to the works 
council chairman, is to pass on information to and from the works 
council and to represent trade union policies in the workplace. 
P^eplies of works councillors in the questionnaire survey 
distinguished between shopstewards as the trade union and the 
works council as the legal workforce representatives (777,).
Other descriptions of the 2 roles included the trade union and 
the interest representation of the workforce (417,) and shop- 
stewards as mediators between the workforce and works council 
(357,). Shopsteward replies also emphasised the trade union —  
interest representation distinction (617,) and the shopstewards' 
mediating role (547,). Their description of their duties con­
centrated on trade union duties (617,), looking after individual 
trade union members (537,) and mediating in conflicts between 
employees (387,).
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An agreement has been concluded between the works council and
351management on 2 shopsteward meetings per annum. The works
council chairman pointed to problems in the operation of shop-
stewards as information channels due to their low level of 
352training and work pressures upon them. Generally, they 
are considered to be ineffective and employees are said to 
refer issues direct to the works council because of this.
The shopstewards themselves pointed to the following obstacles
to their work:- noise levels (437.), time pressures (327.),
shiftwork (297.), dispersion of their constituencies (25%),
353the lack of interest of employees in their work (25%) and 
problems related to work organisation in their sections (21%).
On improvements to their work, 61% called for greater work­
force support for shopstewards, 437. for an extension of the 
role of shopstewards in the workplace and 43% for more training. 
Responses from employees supported the need for improvements in 
the role of the shopstewards in the areas of extending their 
role (40%), supporting them in the workplace (307.) and extra 
training for shopstewards (20%).
Relations between the works council and management are described 
as good. Management shows understanding for works council 
claims and the works council in return understands the firm’s
354difficulties and cooperates with management to overcome them. 
Each side is said to respect the other's interests, although
35the works council rejects any idea of a friendship or alliance
with management for the works council is there to represent the
interests of the workforce. The personnel manager emphasised
the important influence of the 1976 Codetermination Law and
the agreement on a works-level joint committee. Previously,
most issues had to be referred to the main administration at
company level where there was little understanding of workforce
problems. Since 1976, there is a worker director at company
level who does accept that workforce interests need to be taken
356rnto consideration, and a worker director at works level who 
can resolve a wider range of issues at workplace level than was 
previously the case without one.
All the workforce respondents emphasised the need for improve-
357ments in legislation on the Works Constitution and company-
358level codetermination, although the works council and
management described it as a safety net or basis for relations,
359which in practice are informal. The institutional framework
provided for by the legislation ensures that many conflicts do
not arise because the workplace actors meet together and discuss
problems in advance. When conflicts do arise they are discussed
360in a factual and sensible way. Both view legislation as
ensuring a basic consensus for the resolution of conflict 
despite the deterioration in the economic context of relations. 
41% of works council members did, however, see a need for 
improvements in management's policy of cooperation.
Responses to the questionnaires further showed problems relating
361to the workforce's support for the works council and the
362level of trade union organisation in the workplace. 30% of
employee respondents saw a need for improvements in the economic 
context before relations could improve. 30% felt no improvement 
in workforce representation were necessary.
(ii) Conflicts Arising
The wage system in firm I is based on an analytical evaluation
in accordance with conditions laid down in collective agreements
although the firm has 15 not 10 wage groups. Most jobs are
based on an individual evaluation and bonus system. In the
rolling mills there is a group evaluation of wage levels.
Maintenance workers are paid on a time rate basis. The problems
associated with wages are caused by the large number of trans-
363fers taking place due to technological changes, and the need 
for a new evaluation of individual jobs altered by the changes
• 4-  u  i  3 6 4m  technology.
Personnel problems arising are associated with management's 
reaction to market changes including technological changes
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mentioned earlier, redundancies and transfers. The shift of
production from hot to cold rolling mills in the mid 1970s
led to staff cuts of 1,900 in 1978. 80% of the cuts were
achieved by voluntary redundancies, 20% by compulsory
redundancies agreed by management and works council in a
redundancy plan. The questionnaire responses showed dismissals 
365occur sometimes and the workforce has experienced short-time
, . 366working.
Working conditions vary according to the department. 3 shifts 
are worked in the foundry and 2 shifts in the rest of the 
production sector, although 3 shifts are also worked there when
orders are increased. Most problems associated with shiftwork
arise in the 3 shift sector. The main difficulties associated 
with working conditions are noise levels (shopstewards = 86%, 
foremen = 83%), dirty conditions (shopstewards = 57%, foremen =
67%) and poor ventilation (shopstewards = 367>, foremen = 337.) . 
Shopstewards also mentioned physical exertion as a problem 
(43%). The personnel manager argued that the problems of working 
conditions are largely unresolvable due to the cost factor 
involved.
Problems relating to holidays occur often in those departments 
where the number of foreign workers is high, such as in the 
processing plant. The main area of grievance concerning 
facilities for the workforce is the lack of provision of rooms 
where employees can spend their breaktime.
The form of conflicts arising is mainly individual* although 
group issues do occur in connection with wages issues, working
conditions and conflicts between employees, according to the
C . 367foremen s responses.
Overt conflict measures have mainly been associated with annual 
wage negotiations. In 1981 the workforce staged 2 warning strikes, 
each one hour in duration. Two works councillors mentioned action 
in connection with grievances about working conditions and one 
in connection with management policy. The measures have taken 
the form of warning strikes and workplace meetings or 
demonstrations.
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(iii) Procedures for the Resolution of Conflicts
At company level there is an agreement on works rules incorporating 
the right of all employees to put forward a complaint if they 
have reason to believe they have been put at a disadvantage 
or unjustly treated by either management or other employees.
The details of the procedure should be set down in a works 
agreement. In firm I there are no written procedures for refer­
ring grievances. The personnel manager argued the undesirability 
of written procedures as they restrict the flexibility in the 
handling of problems arising. At most, there is a recommended 
procedure for blue-collar workers, which is illustrated below:-
employee— ^foreman— works council— > personnel manager
Actual procedures for white-collar and blue-collar employees 
were thought to be as follows:-
A) white-collar employee— >group manager— -^personnel manager
(or direct contact with the personnel manager 
by telephone).
B) blue-collar employee— >works councillor in department
(or — »works council office).
This was substantiated by replies from workforce respondents, 
who cited the works council as their main resource in cases of
grievances, except where technical issues were concerned which
368 369were referred to the chargehand, personal problems and
370grievances about other employees were referred to the shop-
stewards. The 3 main resources of employee grievances were
371the works council, shopstewards and foreman. Reasons given
for their choice of referee were the positive attitudes of the 
works council (70%) and foremen (75%). Their knowledge about 
appropriate procedures came from the works rules (60?o) and 
talks by the works council (55%).
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372References were always oral and direct to the referee either
by the employee affected (80%) or together with a colleague
(20%). Resolution of the grievance was overwhelmingly oral 
3 7 3(95%) by the works council (60%), foreman (40%) and shop- 
steward (40%). Details of the extent of workforce contact with
actors in the workplace showed a high level of contact with the
374 375works council and shopstewards as well as management
4- 4- *  3 7 6representatives.
The shopsteward respondents were mostly skilled workers (79%)
377with constituencies of 30 employees or less. 687o said
employees usually addressed grievances to shopstewards or works
councillors, with shopstewards usually as the first point of 
378reference. Persons referring issues to shopstewards were
employees (79%), works councilors (46%) and other shopstewards
(32%), with the location of the reference being whilst the shop-
steward was on the job (82%), in breaktimes (36%) and at shop-
steward meetings (54%). The shopstewards' most common contacts,
379apart from the workforce, were works councillors and charge-
1, a 380 hands.
Details of their role in the resolution process showed that
3889% spent less than an hour a day dealing with employee grievances. 
The usual problems dealt with included working conditions (71%), 
social facilities (57%), personal problems (50%), allocation 
of work (43%) and overtime issues (43%). They were resolved 
orally (93%) by the shopsteward and foreman (54%) and with the 
works council and management representatives (43%). Unresolved 
issues were referred on to the works council chairman (75%) and 
works councillors at departmental level (64%).
The foremen who agreed to complete the questionnaire survey were
all members of IGM and the majority were industrial foremen by
qualification. Constituency size was between 26 and 75 
382employees with 1 - 3  chargehands and the same number of 
shopstewards. Most of their time was spent on the shopfloor 
(40 - 60%) and in their'office (20 - 40%).
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Preference of grievances was made to them by employees (100%)
383and works councillors (50%), orally c and on the shopfloor
usually. Resolution was also oral and by foremen and
management at group level (50%) or foremen and works council
(33%) and shopstewards (33%). The foremen's role in the
resolution process was not seen by them as extensive. 507,
spent under half an hour a day on grievance resolution and
resolved issues concerning personal problems (83%), discipline
(83%), technical (50%), safety (50%) and holidays. Unresolved
problems were referred to departmental management (67%) and
works council members (50%). The foremen's contacts revolved
around chargehands, departmental management, shopstewards and
385works councillors'. 1
Individual works councillors spend most of their time on their 
ordinary jobs unless they have job release or are involved in 
works council committees. Issues are referred to them by 
employees (94%), the works council chairman (59%), committees 
(537,) , shopstewards (47%) and foremen (41%) „ References are 
oral, either direct or by telephone, and written (29%)* to works 
councillors on the job (59%), at works council meetings (65%) 
and to the works council office (47%). The time spent on 
resolution varied with the issue in question:- easy problems 
took under 2 hours at departmental level, difficult problems 
from one week to over a month if a works agreement needed to be 
drawn up. The most usual issues at departmental level con­
cerned working conditions (71%), facilities (65%), holidays 
(59%), transfers involving changes in wage groups (53%) and 
safety issues (47%,)* and were resolved together with depart­
mental management (71%) and foremen (53%,). The majority of
works councillors estimated that they could resolve under 40%,
386of issues arising at their level. Unresolved issues were
referred on to the works council chairman (827,) and works 
council committees (35%).
387Individual works councillors and the works council committees 
deal with routine matters arising whilst major issues are 
resolved by the works council chairman and personnel manager,
388
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who discuss and draw up all works agreements. The worker 
director deals with questions involving major principles and 
signs all works agreements together with another board member.
389Many questions are covered by agreements at company level. 
Agreements at works level deal mainly with the wages system, 
working hours and redundancy plans and establishing general 
guidelines in areas open to codetermination. Both the personnel 
manager and works council chairman preferred informal regulation 
to legal contracts such as works agreements and regulated many 
issues via telephone conversations and personal discussion. 
Neither the foremen nor works councillors cited works or depart­
mental agreements as important guidelines in their work. The 
foremen emphasised works rules (67%) and collective agreements 
on conditions (50%) and wages (33%). Works councillors saw the 
WCA 1972 as the key influence on their activities (77%), then 
collective agreements on conditions (357o) and wages (35%) .
Resolution of conflicts in firm I is very much an internal 
process with limited third party involvement. Management views 
the main responsibility of the employers’ association as the 
negotiation of collective agreements with the trade union. The 
works council’s contacts with the union are mainly on admin­
istrative and legal issues but there is little need for 
extensive legal knowledge in the practice of workplace 
industrial relations so consultation with the union is limited. 
Both saw problems arising from trade union and employer
association stances during collective bargaining rounds and
390their attempts to induce conflicts at workplace level.
Some cases have been referred to the labour court by individual 
391employees and the company agreement on pereonnel issues was 
referred to a labour court by several works councils in the 
company who objected to decision-making competences being taken 
away from the works council. There have,however, been no 
collective references from firm I.
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Firm I has never experienced the establishment of a conciliation 
board - the redundancy plan of 1978 was agreed internally by 
management and the works council. References to third parties 
are seen as indicative of a lack of trusting cooperation between 
the works council and management.
(iv) Key Influences on Conflicts and Resolution Procedures
F.conomic and market pressures on firm I have led to large 
scale technological changes which have affected jobs and wage 
levels of the workforce during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Despite the high level of potential conflict, the problems 
associated with technological change have been resolved by 
uncontroversial means through informal discussions of personnel 
management and the works council chairman. Factors such as the 
large number of foreign and unskilled workers employed by the 
firm help to explain the low level of conflict activity and 
active support for the works council and shopstewards. This, 
in turn, provides some clues as to why works council represent­
ation has developed into a 'one man show' whereby the chairman 
resolves all major issues with management and is taken into 
their confidence, being given extensive information on production 
planning and investment programmes. The person of the worker 
director at company and workplace level and of the personnel 
manager in the firm are also important influences on this 
development in that they actively seek the cooperation of the 
works council chairman in the running of the firm.
k cf. chart in appendices for overview.
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5) Conclusion
A Brief Analysis of the Survey Data in the Light of Existing 
Information on Conflict and Conflict Resolution in West 
German Industry
392The survey data supports the assumption made in chapter 4 
that legislation plays an important role in establishing the 
framework of workplace industrial relations in West Germany.
Despite opposition from management to aspects of the WCA 1972, 
especially in the smaller firms, the legislative provisions 
were generally accepted as providing the basis of their relat­
ions with the workforce and their representatives. In the 
larger firms, the WCA was seen more as a safety net providing 
the minimum requirements of cooperation in what was mainly an 
informal relationship between management and works council. In 
the smaller firms, some of the provisions were seen as in­
appropriate and there was criticism of the extent of the regul­
ation of workplace issues by the WCA and collective agreements.
In many of the firms the wages systems were based on the
393analytical system set down in collective agreements ' and both 
the foremen andthe works councils emphasised the importance of 
collective agreements on wages and working conditions in their 
respective roles in the workplace. The WCA was also a crucial
394factor in the operation of workplace relations on the shopfloor.
In the question of references to the labour courts, references 
by individual employees occurred in the smaller firms only 
where the works council rejected management’s application for 
dismissals. Rejection occurred only in the instance of dis­
missals for economic reasons in firm D. In the larger firms, 
dismissals tend to be the ultima ratio in cases of absenteeism^ 
discipline, worker performance and sickness and the works council 
usually agrees to them.2^  Dismissals for economic reasons in 
the larger firms are covered by redundancy agreements or 
voluntary redundancy in the case of individual employees if 
they occur at all. Larger firms can make use of non-replacement
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of natural fluctuation to obviate the need for economic dis­
missals in many cases. There were very few instances of
employees appealing to the labour court against the decision
396of both the works council and management.
The study shows the high proportion of collective references 
to the labour courts in the years immediately following the 
enactment of the WCA in 1972, when there was considerable 
management opposition to the new extended role of the works 
council. In many of the firms the works council's role came 
to be accepted after legal precedents on the application of 
the law in practice had been set. In some of the firms the 
works council still uses the threat of a reference to the 
labour court to keep management opposition in check. In firm C, 
management opposition has continued throughout the 1970s which 
means the works council is forced to make the legal position 
clear by further references, although management will accept 
clear legal precedents. There were some instances of collective
397references of specific management decisions in the smaller firms 
but the bulk of references came from the larger firms, particularly 
those under the 1976 Codetermindaiton Law who do not have the 
same opportunities to appeal to company board pressure on works
management as those under the 1952 Montan rulings or in the
398special case of firm G. There was no discernible pattern
in the subjects of the references, which included the evaluation 
of worker performance, the introduction of new computerised 
systems, overtime and shiftwork, works council travel and 
information, executive employees and personnel matters. After 
a period of stormy relations in the early 1970s,the relationship 
between the works council and management in most firms has 
stabilised and the expressed preference of both is for internal 
resolution of conflicts with possibly the informal involvement 
of trade union and employer association officials. The 
deterioration in the economic climate does not appear to lead 
to an increase in collective references to the labour courts 
but may create more conflicts of interest, which are the preserve
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of the conciliation boards.
Findings on the extent of reference to conciliation boards
confirmed their low level. The smaller firms had no experience
of such boards. In the larger firms, only firm F had made a
reference of redundancies to a board and in firm H short-time
working had been referred to a board. In both cases the board
was a last resort measure to show the workforce that the works
council had done its utmost to defend their vital interests,
399i.e. jobs. The reasons behind the low level of references
include the preference for informal internal resolution by both 
parties. Management generally does not wish to transfer decision­
making on important issues to a retired or active labour court 
judge with little knowledge of the firm's affairs and prefers 
to negotiate with the works council until a compromise is 
reached, works councils also prefer internal resolution with
the informal involvement of trade union and employer association
400officials where necessary. The influence of the chairman
is too unpredictable for the management or works council to relish 
reference of issues to a conciliation board. Firm C is an 
exceptional case since the works council can obtain better 
results from referring issues to a conciliation board, even with 
the risks involved, than from discussion with management. Manage­
ment 's opposition to the works council in this instance overrules
their desire to keep conflicts within the firm and retain control
401over decision-making on key issues. In general, however,
the parties prefer internal resolution procedures with some 
assistance from trade union and employer association represent­
atives to a formal conciliation board with a neutral chairman. 
References to conciliation boards are thus expected to remain 
at a low level despite the deterioration in the economic climate.
On the role of the trade unions and employers' associations, 
the findings showed considerable trade union activity in the 
years immediately following the enactment of the WCA 1972 in 
the larger firms. Works councils emphasised the importance of 
the trade union in the years before they were able to develop 
their own expertise on the WCA and also in the development of
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trade union organisation in the firm. The trade union's role 
in later years seems to be confined to legal and expert advice 
in difficult and important areas, such as the drawing up of a 
works agreement on a new wages system, and to legal represent­
ation when references are made to a labour court. In the 
smaller firms in the electro-technical industry, the trade 
unions played no role in the relations between works council 
and management. In firms G and H, the trade union continues 
to play an exceptional role in the conduct of workplace rel­
ations due to its influence at company level and the effect
this has on management's attitudes towards the trade union both 
at company and plant levels.
Management responses on the role of the employers' associations 
emphasised the negotiation of collective agreements as their 
main responsibility. As in the case of the trade unions, the 
employers' associations were more closely involved with the 
workplace in the years following the enactment of the WCA 1972 
when management required training, advice and representation 
on legal matters. Now their role at workplace level is con­
fined to legal representation in court cases.
Other third parties mentioned included the Factory Inspectorate 
and medical experts, both of which were called into the work­
place by the works council.
The empirical studies revealed the dominance of management in
the smaller owner-managed firms in all aspects of the running
of the firm. Management hierarchy was very simplified with
all decisions emanating from the top. In the larger companies,
decision-making was often centralised at company level with
403little scope for agreements at works level, although in 
two instances (firms F and I) agreements were at plant level 
due in the one case to the extreme diversification of the 
company's operations and in the other case to a special agreement 
on an advisory board and worker director at plant level.
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Patriarchal attitudes towards the workforce and opposition to 
the works council and trade union were particularly prevalent 
in the small owner-managed firms and medium-size firms in 
both the electro-technical and metalworking sectors. In such 
instances, management viewed themselves as the sole technical 
experts capable of managing the firm and resisted works council 
interference with the 'natural' process of management. In the 
larger firms it was recognised that management of the workforce 
would be impossible without the cooperation of the works council 
and, in some instances, the shopstewards too.
Foremen tended to stress their production responsibilities and 
their role as technical experts, limiting their role in actual 
conflict resolution to issues relating to the technical aspects 
of the work, safety, discipline and personal problems of 
employees, where they resolved .a high proportion of issues 
arising. They argued that the WCA 1972 had removed many con­
flicts from the shopfloor to works management level, where 
they were resolved in conjunction with the works council, 
particularly wages issues. This had improved the climate of 
relations on the shopfloor and left the foreman free to deal 
with the technical issues of the production process. Most 
issues could be resolved on the shopfloor informally. This 
was true of all the firms where foremen were employed in the 
production sector.
On the centralisation of workforce representation in the works 
council, the empirical survey showed that the works council 
was the key, and often the only, channel of workforce represent­
ation at plant level. Within the works council itself, the chair­
man was a dominant figure in all negotiations with works manage­
ment. In the smaller firms, the chairman was in effect the 
sole workforce representative and conducted all negotiations 
and contacts with management. There was no bureaucratisation 
of works council organisation in the small and medium-size 
firms. In the larger firms, the works council chairman was in 
effect the key negotiato'r with management on all important 
issues.
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There were extensive works council committee systems to deal 
with routine matters arising and offer expert advice on specific 
areas of workplace relations but they seldom had their own 
decision-making competence ,^8 "^ which was reserved for the 
full works council or the works council executive committee 
in the largest firms. In firm C there had been an actual 
reduction in the number and role of the committees and a shift 
in decision-making to the job-released works councillors on a 
day-to-day basis and the full works council on key issues.
There was some evidence of very long service of works council 
chairmen in particular.^ 5-83 The works councillors who were 
replaced in the elections during the 1970s had often served 
many years on the works council. Professionalisation appears 
to be restricted to those works councilbrs who are released 
from their former jobs - this applies to the whole works council 
in some larger firms in the metalworking industry."^ 88
Alienation of the workforce from the works council occurred in 
some of the smaller firms such as firm B, where the works 
council was viewed either as impotent or unnecessary and all 
reference of grievances went via the management hierarchy.
This was particularly true where management pursued paternalistic 
policies towards the workforce and sought to restrict the works 
council as a workforce representative.^8  ^ Evidence of criticism 
of the works council was also found in the very large firms, 
for example firm G, where the workforce rarely saw their works 
councillors, who spent much of their time in committee meetings. 
Although there were instances of workforces being split in 
their support of or opposition to specific decisions made by 
the works council,^ -80 works councils such as the one in firm C, 
which were seen to be actively representing what they considered 
to be vital workforce interests,usually evoked a positive 
attitude in the workforce even if they did not always fully 
agree with their policies. All works councils emphasised the 
vital need for workforce support in their work and many 
employees agreed with the works councils' view that support was 
often not forthcoming and needed to be improved. Few works
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councils, however, were taking active steps to develop their 
support base in the workplace apart from those trying to 
develop shopsteward organisation and functions. The evidence 
appears to support the assumption that only those works 
councils with an active trade union consciousness, often 
having been shopstewards themselves in the past, are able to 
develop a workforce support base to sustain their independent 
policies vis-H~vis management.
The composition of the works councils in most firm was pre­
dominantly blue-collar due to the fact that white-collar workers 
referred issues through the management hierarchy and saw no 
need for a workforce representative body. The process of 
rationalisaiton now taking place in the white-collar sector 
may, however, develop a new awareness of a conflict of interests 
between white-collar workers and management and the recognition 
of the impotence of individualistic responses to the attack on 
qualifications and jobs. In the larger firms, where the admin­
istrative and research sectors are mass organisations,there 
is evidence of high levels of trade union organisotion among 
white-collar workers.
Findings on shopsteward organisation and roles confirmed 
Kotthoff's and Dzielak's^^ view that the number of shopstewards 
was a better indicator of trade union influence in a firm than 
trade union organisation levels, although a high level of union 
organisation and extensive shopsteward system were often found 
together in the largest firms.
In the smaller firms, unionisation is often low, especially 
in the electro-technical industry, and shopstewards are often 
non-existent as their role is viewed by Lhe works council and 
the workforce alike as unnecessary. In the metalworking 
sector, the smaller firms did have shopstewards but there were 
problems of few workers being willing to stand for shopsteward 
posts and the restriction of their role to basic trade union 
duties.
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In the medium-size firms, such as firms C and I, unionisation 
was higher than in the smaller firms and shopstewards did 
exist but their organisation was viewed as ineffective. 
Facilities for the shopstewards amounted to two full meetings 
a year during working hours.
In the largest firms, trade union organisation was high and 
the shopsteward system in the production sector was extensive 
with meetings at works and departmental levels based on informal 
agreements with management. Their role was usually defined as 
the provision of a link between the works council and the work­
force and provision of information on what was actually taking 
place on the shopsfloor. In firm G, the shopstewards' role as 
a link between the trade union and the workforce and even 
management and the workforce was emphasised.
In chapter 4, the assumption that the shopstewards' effective­
ness was dependent on the attitudes and policies of the works 
council was outlined.410 The findings in chapter 5 emphasise 
the importance of a trade union motivation of the works council
if shopstewards are to be viewed as necessary and given the
support from the works council they need to be effective. This
motivation can arise from intensive trade union training and
A X1work with shopstewards who later become works councillors.
More importantly, significant trade union influence at both 
company and workplace level, as in the case of firm G, can 
ensure that works councillors maintain their trade union 
motivation whilst having extensive contacts with management, 
by the exertion of pressure from above and below in the form
of the shopstewards. The cooperation between the works council
and shopstewards in firm G, however, can be seen as exceptional 
in West German industry. Elsewhere, where shopstewards do 
exist, they are usually subordinate to the works council and 
are unable to operate as a check on the works councils' 
representation of workforce interests. In very few instances, 
the shopsteward body is strong enough to offer significant 
opposition to works council policies. However, this opposition 
is often based on political factionalism which only promotes
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management interests by dividing the workforce and provoking
412conflicts within the workforce body.
The position of the shopstewards generally in German industry 
is a weak one and recent technological and organisational 
changes, which have promoted individualisation of the workforce 
and a consequent reduction in workforce solidarity, have 
weakened their position still further.
In relations between the works council and management the key
influence on whether they were cooperative or not was management
policies and attitudes. These in turn were influenced by
economic pressures, the organisation of the firm and whether
the works council was seen to be vital in the smooth running
of production. Some works councils argued that the basis for
cooperation had been improved by the WCA 1972 once managements
came to accept it as the basis for their relations with the
works council. However, the crucial factor in cooperative
relations was felt to be a good economic situation which
413meant few serious conflict issues had arisen thus far.
Where conflicts had arisen in the larger firms some works 
councils had instituted legal action against management, 
appealing to worker representatives at company level, refusing 
to agree to overtime and dismissals and, in some cases, encour­
aging workforce action in the form of special workplace meetings 
to promote speedy resolution. This latter mode of action was, 
however, dependent on shopsteward organisation in the workplace. 
Some works councillors pointed to other sources of pressure 
they could use against management including non-cooperation in 
a generous evaluation of problems arising and accusations of 
management non-cooperation, where the firm lays particular 
stress on its cooperative relations with the workforce. The 
effects of a recession on cooperative relations between the 
works councils and management were an unknown factor in the 
firms surveyed.
414
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The survey confirmed the high level of management control of 
wages by means of ’scientific1 systems of work measurement, 
especially the analytical system of evaluation. This was 
combined with a bonus payment to production workers in the 
electro-technical industry. Only in firms G and H were summary 
systems of wage evaluation in operation to protect against 
wage losses in the increasing rationalisation of the production 
process. Wage issues were overwhelmingly individual and usually 
involved attempts to move into a higher wage group (although in 
firm G there were indications of craft worker discontent with 
the present wages system). Problems of wage loss are expected 
as jobs are dequalified and skilled workers are transferred to 
lower paid jobs. In firm C, the increasing centralisation of 
the wage payment system with the large scale introduction of 
computer technology was also creating problems between the 
works council and management.
Key issues in the area of personnel matters were:- dismissals, 
mass redundancies and transfers, particularly in the production 
sector, although there was evidence that rationalisation was 
now being concentrated in the white-collar sector. Dismissals 
tended to be the resort of smaller firms when demand fell, 
although there had been an increase in behaviour-related dis- 
misssals in firm C. The larger firms were usually involved with 
mass redundancy measures, which were handled by voluntary 
redundancy and early retirement, a policy of no new hirings 
and non-replacement of natural fluctuation; voluntary redundancies 
were concentrated particularly among foreign workers. Transfers 
of employees were common due to technological changes but only 
created problems where they involved a change from one wage 
system to another. Job mobility was encouraged by the training 
employees received and the fact that the most flexible workers 
were in the highest wage groups. Collective and works agree­
ments on wage guarantees provided at least temporary financial 
security for transferred employees.
327
Problems had arisen with management refusal to provide inform­
ation on the introduction of new technology and its effect on 
jobs and health. Only the works councils in the largest firms 
were able to respond to management reticence by setting up 
specialist committees and hiring their own expert technical 
and medical advisors. Increasing mechanisation in the production 
sector had led to the break-up of work groups and increased the 
pressure of work whilst reducing the problems of physical 
exertion and poor working conditions. The attention of the 
works councils was now being focused on the white-collar sector, 
where the introduction of micro-technology was leading to wage, 
job and qualification loss.
Management policies of no new hirings to ensure a reduction 
in the workforce had led to conflicts about excessive overtime 
and extra shift working in both small and large firms, especially 
among craft workers. The extension of works holidays was a 
conflict issue in the smaller electro-technical firms and in 
firm C, the large electro-technical firm, reductions in social 
expenditure at company level had led to court cases.
The survey confirmed the view that there is seldom a formal 
grievance resolution procedure in the workplace and works rules 
only include a general right of grievance without specifying 
the stages involved. Procedures are informal and employees 
are said to be free to refer issues to whoever they'wish to, 
although they develop an 'intrinsic knowledge' of who is able 
to deal with specific issues. References are overwhelmingly 
direct and oral, except in the case of issues such as wage 
increases, dismissals, notices to quit, where there is the 
possibility of referring the issue to a labour court for a 
decision. These references are made in the written form in 
larger firms once they go beyond departmental level. At shop­
floor level, the key actors in the resolution process are the 
foremen and works councillors.415 The foremen was the main 
reference point for production workers in the electro-technical 
industry, with the role of the works council being focused on 
resolution of key issues with works management. In the larger
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metalworking firms, shopstewards played a role as the initial 
contact for assembly-line workers, referring issues on to works 
councillors at departmental level. Most issues arising could 
be dealt with at this level or below in the larger firms. In 
the medium-size firms, the works council chairman and works 
council members with job release resolved the majority of issues 
on the spot with management representatives.
The number of works agreements was low in most firms, especially 
the small firms, and dealt with basic issues such as wages 
systems, works holidays, working hours and works rules. In 
the larger firms, agreements w e r e  made formally at company 
level and at plant level were usually informal and oral applic­
ations of the basic guidelines laid down at company level.
Firm F was an exception to this rule due to the diversification
416of the company’s operations.
The only example of custom and practice in the definition of 
workplace relations w as found in firm C, where starting times 
were not regulated from above. There were no examples of 
individual or group ’bargaining' with the foreman such as is 
the case in many firms in the U.K.
The empirical survey points to some similarities between firms 
from the electro-technical and metalworking industries whatever 
their size. These include the effect of collective agreements 
on wages systems and the UCA 1972 as the basis of relations 
between management and workforce representatives. Centralisation 
of management decision-making and a low level of works agree­
ments were common to all the firms but one, as was the preference 
for internal resolution of differences despite the framework 
of legal entitlements. The foreman's position as a technical 
expert had been promoted by the shift in non-technical work­
force issues to works level with the WCA 1972. In all firms 
the works council was the key workforce representative, although 
the organisation of its representation varied according to the 
size of firm, and it was* a predominantly blue-collar worker 
representative body. Management responses to economic pressure 
had led to similar problems with extra shifts and overtime 
working in all the firms.
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Size and type of industry appear to have influenced the extent 
of dismissals and collective references to labour courts. The 
applicability of company-level legislation, either the 1951 
or 1976 laws, also influenced the extent of collective legal 
references, trade union influence at workplace level and 
management policy towards the works council and shopstewards.
Economic circumstances were also a crucial factor in the 
relationship between works council and management. For most 
of the firms surveyed, the circumstances had been favourable, 
thus promoting cooperation. It was, however, recognised that 
a deterioration in the economy would lead to conflicts in the 
workplace. Although legislation provided a framework for 
relations in the workplace which was cooperative, conflicts 
over vital interests, provoked by market pressures, would 
place an intolerable strain on these relations.
The various influences on the constitution of workplace 
relations and particularly on the processes of conflict resolut­
ion will be considered in detail In chapter six.
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CHAPTER 6: Analysis of the Main Influences on Conflicts
and Conflict Resolution at Plant Level in the 
FRO and Comoarison with U.K. Findings----------------------------------------------V_____ __— _______________________________ _ ...    ......
1) The Main Influences on Conflicts Arising at Plant Level 
in the FRG
I) Similarities and Differences in Conflicts Arising
1*Market changes during the 1970s had affected all but one firm.
The changes reflected the trend towards exports as internal 
markets declined due to saturation or cuts in government 
expenditure. This trend introduced an increase in market 
competition for the German firms surveyed and the subsequent 
pressure to rationalise production. Common problems emerged 
from this pressure for greater rationalisation. In all firms 
there had been a reduction in the workforce during the 1970s, 
although the means used to effect this reduction varied between 
firms. Transfer of employees had been at a high level as firms 
attempted to adjust their operations to the requirements of 
new technological processes introduced. Most transfers had 
occurred within one wage system but there had been problems 
where employees had been demoted to lower wage groups.
Collective agreements on temporary wage guarantees for such 
employees had alleviated much of the potential conflict 
associated with dequalification of workers but more widespread 
dequalification was expected, especially in the white-collar 
sector, during the 1980s. Apart from the wages problems 
associated with transfers, several works councils were increas­
ingly aware of the detrimental effect of large-scale^ transfers 
on the social organisation of the workforce and on the levels 
of workforce solidarity. This was negatively affecting their 
role as workforce representatives and also the effectiveness 
of the shopstewards1 work.
Apart from the wage problems associated with transfers and 
regrading of existing jobs as a result of technical changes in 
their content, wage conflicts were generally confined to attempts
* Footnotes In Volume Two p. 114.
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by individual employees to move into higher wage groups by 
means of formal petition to the job evaluation specialists.
The majority of conflicts arising in the firms surveyed were
2individual conflicts or 'queries', which was a term used by 
works council and management alike.
In the larger firms, policies of no new hirings and non-replace­
ment of natural fluctuation in the workforce had led to problems 
associated with increased working hours in the form of overtime 
in maintenance sections and extra shifts in the production 
sector. The problems of overtime working in the smaller firms 
were more related to the difficulties of production planning 
in small firms and the need to respond to urgent customer orders 
with overtime working.
Rationalisation measures had been concentrated in the production 
sector during the seventies in the firms surveyed and it was 
a common expectation of the workplace actors that future 
measures would be focused on the white-collar sector with the 
large-scale introduction of microtechnology. Problems associated 
with rationalisation such as job losses, dequalifications and 
new health risks were expected among the white-collar workforce 
in the firms. The rationalisation of the work in administration 
was already affecting blue-collar workers as shown in the problems 
of centralisation of wage payment and technical surveillance of 
the workforce in firm C.
All the firms had experienced conflicts about the interpretation 
of the 1972 Uorks Constitution Act, especially in the years 
immediately following its introduction, although the actual 
subject matter of the conflict varied.
Similarly, there had been conflicts about specific management 
decisions in all the firms surveyed, although the decision in 
question varied from firm to firm.
Industrial action in the form of trade union warning strikes
during the annual round of collective bargaining had occurred 
in all but the smallest electro-technical firms,J where trade
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union organisation was low; overtime bans and special work­
place meetings to discuss issues in conflict were also a 
common experience in the firms considered.
Differences emerged, firstly, in the means used to reduce
staff levels as part of the drive towards rationalisation of
the production sector. The smaller firms made use of dismissals
4for economic reasons whilst the larger firms used a combination 
of no new hirings, early retirement, non-replacement of natural 
fluctuation, non-renewal of employment contracts of foreign 
employees and voluntary redundancies (particularly among 
foreign employees). The effect of these differing means was 
that staff reductions in large firms were less conflictual 
than in small firms, although the specific market context of 
particular firms such as firm I and firm F, which required 
rapid reduction of staff levels over a short period of time, 
led to compulsory redundancies and greater conflict potential 
between management and workforce. Market pressures also 
influenced the levels of short-time working, which had been 
experienced by firms in the metalworking branch.
Secondly, wage systems in operation in certain plants led to 
wages problems. In firms B and C there were conflicts about 
the operation of the bonus system and its application to 
individual employees. In firm G a company threat to cut 
bonuses in 1973 provoked a workplace strike led by the tool­
makers. The system of piecerates in the production sector in 
firm C created problems and in firm G problems arose among 
maintenance workers because they did not receive the piece­
rates and allowances found in the production sector. There was 
evidence of discontent among other groups of workers such as 
the press workers in firm G, who wanted to be upgraded in the 
wage system. In firm C, there w as considerable controversy 
about the company system of job evaluation for white-collar 
employees, which w as viewed as too subjective by the employees 
and the works council.
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Problems concerning working conditions and work organisation 
also varied between plants due to their differing technological 
and work organisation contexts. Working conditions and work 
organisation were generally less problematical in the electro­
technical branch, particularly in the smaller firms, whereas 
problems with working conditions were general in the metal­
working sector and included noise levels, dirty working con­
ditions, ventilation, heavy physical work and safety. Apart 
from this difference between the two branches of industry, 
there were differences relating to specific technological 
processes. Craft production of items according to customer 
specification was the least problematic in terms of working 
conditions and work organisation, regardless of whether the 
firm was small or large, as in the case of firm F. Continuous 
process production, as found in firm H, created some difficulties 
due to the system of 4 shifts and the fact that employees were 
'tied' to their jobs but conditions had improved greatly during 
the 1970s with the introduction of new technology and greater 
observance of anti-pollution and safety provisions. The most 
problematic technological process was the assembly-line in mass 
production in both the electro-technical (firm C) and metal­
working sectors (firm 0). Its effect on working conditions
«
included high noise levels, ventilation problems, physical and 
psychological pressures of work, shift problems and dirty con­
ditions. Respondents in firms C and G referred to difficulties 
of production flow and work organisation on the assembly-line.
The minority of collective grievances which did arise were con­
cerned with issues such as working conditions, work organisation 
and working hours, particularly in the metalworking sector and 
assembly-line production. The fact, however, that firm C did 
not record any collective grievances in these areas indicates 
that conflict potential in a workforce is not solely related 
to the existence of problem areas such as working conditions 
but also depends on the perception of the workforce and its5ability to act as a collective.'
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Conflicts about the interpretation of the Uorks Constitution 
Act varied. In small firms the problems were often related to 
management's non-recognition of the works council's basic right 
to exist and included issues such as time off for works council 
duties, basic facilities for works council activity, non-con­
sultation and lack of agreement with the works council on co­
determination issues such as overtime and, in some cases, 
management's reluctance to hold any meetings with the works 
council. Some of these basic issues were evident in larger 
firms with a history of paternalistic management such as 
firm C, although interpretation disputes in the larger firms 
usually went beyond basic recognition of the works council by 
management and covered areas such as facilities for shop- 
stewards, the extent of works council travel allowances, and 
perceived delays in grievance resolution. Common to the plants 
surveyed was the question of information on the introduction 
of new technology, although the extent of the absence of 
information varied - in firm E, a small firm, the works council 
received no information at all about the introduction of NC- 
raachines, in firm G, a large firm, the works council received 
extensive information about new technological processes but not 
about the expected impact of new technology on jobs and wages.
Similarly, conflicts about specific management decisions were 
common to all the firms whilst the details of the decisions 
varied from problems about the extension of compulsory works 
holidays in firms A and 8 to problems concerning the extent of 
company-level codetermination and its effect on plant-level 
operations in firms C, H and I.° Generally, the conflicts 
in smaller firms reflected the problems of small firms in highly 
competitive markets and the need to make quick short-term 
adjustments to the market. The conflicts in the larger firms, 
which were all part of a larger company, concerned company 
decisions which were part of longer-term policies of adjustment 
to a changing market environment.
Finally, conflicts between'different workgroups were found mainly 
in the large metalworking plants and involved production and
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maintenance workers. The power struggle between the works 
council chairman and senior shopsteward in firm H was exceptional 
among the firms surveyed.
II) The Main Influences on the Similarities and Differences
in Conflicts Arising
The main influences on the similarities in conflicts arising 
in the firms included the common market pressures towards 
greater rationalisation of production, reduction in labour costs 
and the effects of new technological processes in terms of the 
individualisation of work organisation. In all firms there 
were areas which reflected the common conflicts of interest 
between labour and capital. Trade union and employer association 
agreements on analytical systems of job evaluation, wage 
guarantees in case of transfers and their extensive regulation 
of issues such as basic wage rates also provided a common 
environment within which industrial relations at plant level 
operates. Their policies affected not only conflict issues 
but their form (individual grievances) and overt expressionsn
of conflict (warning strikes).”’ Finally, the impact of the 
MCA 1972 was reflected in the conflicts about its interpretation 
as well as the actual form in which conflicts were expressed 
(individual 'queries', overtime bans, special workplace meetings) 
A simplified diagram of the main influences on the similarities
in conflicts arising is included overleaf.
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The main influences on the differences in conflicts arising 
included specific market pressures in particular product areas, 
industry branch (electro-technical - metalworking) and the 
products and technological processes associated with it, size 
of firm and form of management, level of workforce solidarity 
and key personalities on both the management and workforce 
reoresentation sides.
Size of firm, for example, was associated with different forms 
of management and management policies (absolute rule of owner- 
manager, paternalism, business relationship) and this affected 
the type of issues arising under the interpretation of the 
WCA 1972. Owner-managers in small firms and paternalistic 
managements in medium—size firms both questioned the basic 
right of the works council to exist. Management employees in 
large companies, on the other hand, recognised the existence of 
works concils and only came into conflict with them about the 
details of their operation. Size was also associated with 
differing management responses to market pressures and varying 
conflict levels arising from their decisions. The provisions 
of company-level codetermination in the FRG based on size of 
firm, mean the size factor influences conflicts about decisions 
made at company level. Levels of trade union organisation at 
plant level were associated with the size of workforce as was 
the level of workforce trade union activity, the level of 
collective grievances and disputes between different groups of 
v/orkers.
Industry branch (electro-technical, steel, engineering and 
other metalworking branches) influenced the subject of issues 
in conflict, with working conditions and work organisation 
showing greater conflict potential in the metalworking branch and 
working hours being the object of conflicts in the electro­
technical and steel sectors. Wage systems also varied according 
to industry branch as true bonus systems were more prevalent 
in the electro-technical sector. The steel industry occupies 
an exceptional position'with reference to company-level co­
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determination (1-lontan Codetermination Law 1951) and this was 
reflected in the conflicts concerning company-level decision­
making in this sector. Hostility towards the works council 
and trade union was more prevalent in the electro-technical 
industry and was associated with paternalistic management 
policies towards the workforce. Likewise workforce indifference 
towards the works council and trade union was greatest in the 
electro-technical branch.
The varying technological processes in the firms were associated 
with different products, each subject to varying market pressures 
Assembly-line production created the greatest amount of conflict 
in terms of working hours, working conditions, wages issues 
and work organisation and was associated with the highest 
levels of collective grievances of all the firms surveyed.
Finally, the effect of individual personalities on both the 
management and workforce sides on conflicts arising was sig­
nificant in many of the firms covered in the survey, particularl 
in firm C.
A simplified diagram of the main influences on the differences 
in conflicts arising is included overleaf.
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III) Analysis of the Theoretical Hiatus of the Main Influences
The empirical survey was carried out within a national industrial 
relations system and shows the effect of a common external 
environment, comprising industrial relations legislation, 
general market context and representation by one industrial 
union and one employers' federation at national and regional 
levels,on the similarities in conflicts arising in the firms.
The differences in conflicts arising have been accounted for 
by differences in industry branch, size of firm and its 
organisation as well as workplace-specific influences such as 
differing technological processes, management styles and 
policies, levels of trade union organisation and general work­
force solidarity and the impact of key personalities on the 
industrial relations climate at plant level.
i) Different Levels of Influence:- national, Cxtra-Plant
and Plant Levels
National level influences were significant in the definition 
of general areas of plant-level conflict, which included those 
relating to market pressures to rationalise production and cut 
labour costs, conflicts concerning the actual role of the works 
council in the workplace and conflicts of interest between 
management and workforce. Industrial relations legislation, in 
particular the Works Constitution Act 1972, was not only an 
object of conflict but also influenced the expression of con­
flict via its prohibition on strike action at plant level and 
provisions for the cooperation of works council and management 
on all plant level issues.
The influence of extra-plant elements, especially the relations
between the trade union and employers' association, was
important in providing a basic framework for plant-level
industrial relations in 'terms of establishing basic wage rates,
systems of wage payment, working conditions and working hours as
well as more recent agreements on areas such as wage guarantees 
and protection for older employees.
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Differences between the firms were mainly the result of 
differing plant-level influences, although industry branch 
was a significant factor exercising a general influence on 
key areas of conflict and general patterns of management policy 
and. style as well as levels of workforce organisation. In the 
more traditional industry branches such as steel and metal­
working, management - workforce representative relations have 
stabilised and there is mutual recognition of each others' 
role and interests, although hostility towards workforce 
representatives is still apparent in some areas of the steel 
industry. In the newer industry branches, such as the electro­
technical branch, relations have not stabilised. Management 
has adopted a hostile policy towards both the works council 
and the trade union and the working conditions of the industry 
do not pronote a collective workforce response towards manage­
ment. Works council and trade union activity in this branch 
is understandably very difficult.
Size of the firm was associated with differing market contexts, 
management styles and policies in response to market pressures 
and the role of the works council, level, of trade union 
organisation and the resources and expertise of works councils. 
All of these factors influenced the conflict situation at 
plant level. Conflict was generally more blatant in small 
firms, where management questioned the right of the works council 
to exist and undertook dismissals for economic reasons. However, 
.the combination of managerial dominance and weak trade union 
organisation and works council resources in such firms reduced 
the conflict potential of the workforce. In the larger firms 
both works council and management had wide resources with which 
to reduce the conflict potential of, Lor example, large-scale 
staff reductions and they recognised each others' roles in the 
firm. Medium-size firms, such as firm C, had the greatest 
conflict potential due to the combination of paternalistic and 
absolutist management policies involving crude responses to 
market pressures and opposition to works council rights on 
the one hand, and the greater resources of the works council 
to perceive and act upon conClict issues on the other.
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Technological processes have been shown to have an important 
influence on conflicts relating to working conditions and 
work organisation. The lowest conflict levels in these areas 
were found in areas of small-scale production to customer 
specification in the electro-technical sector; the highest 
conflict levels were in mass assembly in both the electro­
technical and engineering sectors. There was evidence of an 
association between the technological process and wage systems 
in operation. The wages systems with the most conflict pot­
ential were found in assembly-line production as they involved 
individual piecerates and bonuses.
Management organisation, policy and style, associated with size 
of firm as well as the particular industry branch, influenced 
both the subject matter and extent of conflicts arising in 
the workplace. A distinction has been made between the follow­
ing management types:- owner-manager in small firms who acts as an 
absolute ruler, paternalistic management in medium-size firms 
which seeks to pursue a policy of absolute rule but is 
hampered by a certain level of works council - workforce 
opposition, and managerial employees in large firms, who recognise 
the advantages of works council cooperation in the management 
of the workforce and promote joint rule, although management 
at company level, which reflects more the owner-nanager type, 
can create problems for this relationship.
Works council organisation, policy and style are also associated
with size of firm and industry branch as these affect levels of trad
10union organisation ' and other resources available to the works 
council (via provisions in the■WCA 1972). Where low levels of 
trade union organisation exist, such as in small electro­
technical plants, neither the works council nor the workforce 
perceived or acted upon potential conflict issues. In larger 
firms where the works council could draw on greater legal 
resources, even though trade union organisation was low (firm C), 
the alternative policies include a legalistic approach to 
relations with management or a junior partnership with them.
In the former case, conflict potential is increased, albeit to 
a limited extent, in the latter it remains low or non-existent.
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Finally, the case studies revealed the importance of individual 
personalities in specific firms, especially the key plant-level 
actors, in promoting conflicts in areas such as authority 
issues and status as well as intensifying conflict areas which 
already existed.
The empirical survey of conflicts arising at plant level in 
the FRG has indicated the need to consider different levels 
in the industrial relations system and its external environment. 
Influences at national -and regional levels provided a common 
environment for plant-level conflict issues and defined the 
main areas of conflict in all the plants relating to general 
market pressures, legislation on the constitution of relations 
between works council and management and terms covered by 
collective agreements. Plant-level influences were important 
in specifying the details of these general areas of conflict.
The studies show how the impact of factors at one level of the 
industrial relations svtem can be reinforced or counteracted 
by influences at another level. Examples of this include firm I, 
where severe market pressures led to compulsory redundancies but 
the history of cooperative relations at plant level meant these 
could be resolved internally without the need for a conciliation 
board. In firm C, problems with the interpretation of the 
"dorks Constitution Act 1972 were reinforced by management’s 
hostility towards the works council. These effects of different 
levels again underline the importance of considering all levels 
of influence on conflicts at plant level. The studies indicate 
the need to go beyond national level to consider the impact, 
for example, of the international economic climate on conflicts 
arising at plant level. In addition, levels below the plant 
need to be studied, particularly in the case of large companies, 
where individual sections such as maintenance, administration 
and the assembly-1ines tend to operate, in many respects, as 
independent industrial relations systems and show considerable 
differences in the subject natter and extent of conflicts arising.
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ii) The Relative Importance of Structural, Historico-Ci.il tural
and Action Influences
Structural influences such as market context, size, technology 
and industry branch have been shown to have an important impact 
on conflicts arising both in terras of similarities and differences 
in conflicts between firms. There has been evidence of an 
association between factors such as size and management policy 
and style and levels of trade union organisation, which in 
their turn have an impact on conflicts in. the workplace. It 
is acknowledged that structural factors have emanated from 
decisions made by human actors and are not 'neutral' or 'givens' 
but need to be examined in the light of historical developments 
to understand their present form and influences. They do, 
however, provide the present da}? context within which the plant 
level actors have to operate and hence a check on the decisions 
made by the actors. Structural influences are not fixed or 
immutable as shown in the cases of decrease in firm size due 
to staff reductions, changes in technological processes and 
shifts within an industry branch as in the case of firm B from 
a concentration on mechanical and electrical engineering to 
electronics and microtechnology. Any changes in structural 
factors will lead to changes in conflicts arising at plant level, 
both in their subject matter, their form and extent.
Uistorico-cultural influences refer to the organisation and 
policies of extra-plant actors including the state, the courts, 
trade unions and employer associations. Their influence on 
conflicts arising was expressed in terras of similarities in 
conflicts due to the common contexts of influence from the 
state, trade unions and employers' associations which all firms 
shared. It affected areas of conflict such as works council 
rights, wage rates and job evaluation, issues relating to 
decision-making at company level in firms where legislation was 
applicable. Specific labour court decisions, however, affected 
the climate of plant level relations in different ways:-
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promoting the role of the works council in some firms, under­
mining its role in others. This will be considered in more 
detail in the section on conflict resolution procedures.
His torico-cultural influences are differentiated from purely 
structural influences because they not only represent structures, 
which are the result of decisions made by the actors*but also 
the actors themselves. They also reflect even more cleanly than 
structural influences the historical development of the national 
industrial relations system and its cultural values and priorities.
Action influences were most apparent in the differences between 
firms in the conflicts arising. An association did exist 
between factors such as management style and policy and size 
of firm and industry branch. Management hostility towards the 
works council and low levels of workforce organisation and 
activity were more apparent in the electro-technical branch as 
a whole and particularly in the smaller firms than in the 
traditional metalworking branches. There was, however, 
indications of the importance of key personalities on. both 
management and workforce sides in actually influencing the 
intensity of conflicts arising and extent of conflict in firms 
at all levels - shopfloor, department and plant level. In 
some firms, such as firm I, the effect was to promote a co­
operative relationship and fewer conflicts. In others, such 
as firm C, individual actors promoted high levels of conflict.
iii) The Relative Importance of 'Variables' and 'Constants'
In a comparison of two national industrial relations it is 
assumed that 'constants,' such as size, technology, market 
context and the conflict of interest between capital and labour, 
will lead to similarities in conflicts arising, whereas 
'variables', such as the organisation and policies of trade 
unions and employers' associations, the role of the State and 
the legal system, prevalent cultural values and priorities, wil1
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produce differences in conflicts arising. Within a national 
industrial relations system, the 'variables' produce simil­
arities in conflicts, the constants differences. This was 
indeed the case in the empirical studies undertaken in the 
German firms, where a common context of legislation and collective 
agreements and the general economic environment promoted 
similarities in basic areas of conflict in the workplace. The 
differences between the firms in terms of size, technology, 
industry branch as well as personalities, promoted differences 
in conflict issues and the details of the basic areas of conflict. 
In the one case where it was possible to consider several firms 
in the same industry branch, with similar technological 
processes and similarities in size, the motor industry, the 
similarities between the firms extended beyond basic areas of 
conflict into actual conflict issues such as mass redundancy'', 
mass transfer of employees, shift and overtime problems and 
working conditions. There were, however, still areas of 
differences in conflicts arising as a result of differences in 
company ownership (semi-nationalised foreign-owned, private 
German company), differences in the models produced and the 
markets they were destined for, differences in the evolution 
of relations between management and the workforce and the 
development of workforce organisation in the individual firms.
The influence of the state, trade unions and employer associations 
was particuarly significant in the area of works council rights, 
basic wage rates and job evaluation as well as conflict resolution 
procedures (covered in the next section). Factors such as size 
and technology influenced conflicts about redundancies and 
dismissals, working conditions and work organisation.
iv) The Pattern of Conflicts Arising
The main pattern of conflicts arising appears to be that of 
collective rights with reference to the Works Constitution Act 
1972 and collective agreements,initiated by the works council, 
in particular, the works council chairman.
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The present studv has made a distinction between conflicts of
12rights and conflicts of interests.' " Tire former arise in con­
junction with the fixing of employee entitlements by legislation 
or collective agreements, especially where such agreements are 
regarded as legal contracts. The latter represent those issues 
which are not covered by legislation or collective agreements.
The case studies reveal that most conflict areas in the work­
place in the FRG are covered by legislation or collective 
agreements. In some areas, actual substantive entitlements are 
fixed, as in the case of basic wage rates, the details of 
specific wage groups and the calculation of wage guarantees in 
cases of transfer. More often, procedural entitlements are 
fixed, for example, that management must seek the agreement of 
the works council on the introduction of overtime and extra 
shifts and in cases of redundancies and dismissals.
In small firms, conflicts of rights over substantive entitlements 
do arise as the conditions in collective agreements are viewed 
by management as excessive and as maximum levels. This type 
of conflict is rare in larger firms where the conditions in collect 
ive agreements are viewed as minimum conditions;, representing 
a safety net for smaller firms.
Conflicts over procedural entitlements in both collective 
agreements and, more particularly, the Works Constitution Act 
arise in both small and large plants, although there are 
differences in the quality of the issue. The case studies 
reveal how in smaller firms, management often resists basic 
entitlements accorded the works council by the WCA 1972, such 
as time off for works council duties. In the larger firms, 
management generally abides by the letter of the WCA 1972, 
although conflicts do arise about the spirit of the Act with 
reference to specific conflict issues such as the type of 
information provided by management on the introduction of new 
technological processes.
Conflicts of rights are -thus more apparent in small firms, 
which do not abide by the basic provisions of legislation and 
collective agreements. In larger firms there is scope for
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conflicts of interest because conditions go far beyond the
basic legal requirements in both substantive and procedural
areas. Despite this fact, the case studies show that the
plant— level actors do not regard themselves as dealing with
conflicts of interest, which are the prerogative of trade
unions and employers1 associations at regional and national 
13levels. “ The reason for this can be seen in the extensive 
coverage of all potential plant-level conflicts via the pro­
cedural provisions of the WCA 1972. Since the WCA defines the 
type of relationship management and works council should foster 
and provides for the involvement of third parties where the 
relationship breaks down, conflicts arising at plant level 
tend to be viewed in terms of this legal relationship and 
automatically become issues of rights. Examples of this include 
the reference of redundancies to a conciliation board for 
resolution, the reference of cuts in welfare benefits to the 
labour court on the premise that the benefits constitute a 
custom and practice and objections to individual management 
representatives dealt with on the basis of the right of the 
works council to object to the appointment of management 
representatives.
These examples reveal another facet of the conflicts arising 
in the German firms surveyed, that is the fact that they are 
generally based on a reaction by the works council to a specific 
decision by management rather than on initiatives by the works 
council to actively promote workforce interests (an exception 
to this is the summary system of job evaluation in firm G, which 
was the result of the works council's policy of safeguarding wage 
levels when changes in technological processes were Introduced). 
In most firms, there was little evidence of a collective response 
by the workforce to conflict issues. References were mainly 
In the form of individual queries about an individual employee's 
position with regard to wage levels, holiday entitlements and 
transfer. The collective response was left to the works council, 
which often has a limited perception of conflict issues and 
limited ability to initiate a conflictual reaction to an issue 
due to the low level of support from the workforce. This led
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to a situation in the snail electro-technical firms where very 
few conflict issues were perceived at all. The situation in 
assembly-line production ia the car production plant was some­
what different due to higher levels of workforce support and 
the more obvious nature of collective conflict issues regarding 
working conditions and work organisation in the assembly section 
and wages in the maintenance section. liven in this case, 
however, the works council was the key factor in both the per­
ception and the initiation of conflict, aided by the shop- 
steward organisation. The significant role of the works council, 
and in particular the chairman, in the perception and initiation 
of conflict at plant level, provides a further explanation for 
the prevalence of conflicts of rights since their role is a 
legal one as defined by the WCA 1972.
Within the general category of 'conflicts of right' arising 
in the German firms there is evidence that procedural rights 
provoke more conflict than substantive rights. Many conflicts 
are expressed as procedural conflicts, i.e. management did not 
inform the works council about overtime being worked, rather 
than in substantive terms,i.e. how much overtime is being 
worked. Some of the most severe conflicts turned on works 
council procedural rights14 and once these had been resolved, 
often by reference to a labour court, the resolution of the 
substantive conditions of a particular issue appeared to be 
straightforward as if managerial acceptance of the codetermination 
right of the works council promoted cooperative resolution of 
conflictual issues. This appears to be. substantiated by the 
low level of references to conciliation boards, which deal 
specifically with major conflicts of intaest, such as mass 
redundancies, and the predominance of the internal resolution 
of conflictual issues. The legislative provision of a frame­
work for cooperative relations based on a codetermination right 
of the works council also appears to have the effect of dis­
arming issues of their conflict potential by joint discussions 
before an issue breaks with full* force on the shopfloor. This 
in turn explains in part the low level of collective response 
to conflict issues by the workforce.
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The empirical survey has, therefore, provided evidence of a 
pattern of conflicts arising at plant level in German firms 
which is one of collective procedural rights initiated by the 
works council in response to action taken by management. This 
pattern is the result of the institutionalisation of the conflict 
between capital and labour by the WCA 1972 and collective agree­
ments, especially as regards the status and role of the parties 
at plant level and basic wage rates and working conditions.
v) Evidence of Convergence and Divergence in Conflicts 
Arising at Plant Level in the FRG and U.K.^5
i) Conflicts Arising at Plant Level in the U.K.
Studies of engineering firms in Rritain show some similarities 
in conflict issues arising with their German counterparts.
These include conflicts about the recognition of workforce 
representatives, their status and role in the workplace, problems 
involving mass redundancy and dismissals since the late 1970s, 
and wages issues. Although there are some similarities in 
conflicts arising as regards general conflict issues, the 
differences both in the details of the conflict issues and the 
quality of specific conflicts arising are striking. Wage 
conflicts predominate in British firms and include conflicts 
about actual rates of pay at plant level, collective conflicts 
about pay differentials and problems associated with poor 
control exercised by systems of payment by results.^ Although 
there was evidence of a conflict between craft and production 
workers over pay differentials in firm G, this type of conflict 
was exceptional in the firms surveyed. Similarly, conflicts 
associated with demarcation, recruitment to trade union member­
ship and the problems of work allocation and manning levels in 
British firms with more than 1 union on the shopfloor were 
not found in the German firms surveyed, where, on the whole, 
all production and maintenance workers, and often man}? white- 
collar workers, belonged to one industrial union. In German 
firms, transfers led to some problems in terms of wage
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guarantees hut not to trade union disputes. The collective 
agreement on wage guarantees had contributed to the general 
mobility of labour on the shopfloor in German firms.
In British firms, conflicts arise about the recognition, status 
and role of workforce representatives as they did in the German 
firms. The conflicts in British firms appear, however, to be 
more intractable in their nature than the German conflicts 
due to the absence of legal entitlements and recourse to third 
parties to resolve the disputes, although ACAS was involved 
in dismites about trade union recognition from 1975 to 1979.JU
Similarly, the conflicts which arise on the proper use of 
procedures to resolve issues are less easy to resolve in British 
firms because of the lack of legal provisions on procedures and 
an absence of agreed procedures in the workplace. Conflicts 
are often caused by obscure and inconsistent procedures which 
lead to misunderstandings and the tactical use of procedures 
b y both sides to serve their own interests. Informal plant- 
level agreements are also used tactically, being withdrawn 
without notice or ignored depending on how the actors view 
their interests in a specific situation.
Earlier studies of British metalworking firms pointed to problems 
of systematic overtime, overmanning, resistance to change and 
wage drift as indications that the plant-level actors were not 
coming to grips with the changing economic and technological 
environment of their world competitors. This contrasts sharply 
with the picture of extensive rationalisation, shift to overseas 
markets and redundancies in the German firms during the 1970s. 
Studies of British firms in the 1980s will no doubt reflect 
the pressure to rationalise which has arisen as a result of the 
Conservative government's policies, and thus reveal greater 
similarities in the conflicts arising in German and British 
companies than was the case during the 1970s, although ration­
al istion in German companies is shifting more towards the white- 
collar sector in the 1980s.
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There are also considerable differences in conflict expression
in British and German firms. Studies of British firms show
the resort to low level unofficial strike action or conflict
measures such as working-to-rule, go-slows and overtime bans
17in response to conflict issues. In German firms, even those 
with high levels of trade union and shopsteward organisation, 
action is limited to workplace meetings to discuss an issue in 
conflict and to works councils' refusal to agree to overtime, 
which is their legal entitlement in specific circumstances. 
Neither the empirical survey nor other studies of German firms 
have provided any example of an endemic strike situation as 
found in some British companies.
ii) Influences on Conflicts Arising
An outline of the lack of a positive definition of plant-level 
relations by either the state or the trade unions and employers' 
associations has been given in chapter four. During the 1970s 
there was an attempt by the Labour government to influence 
areas such as health and safety, discipline and dismissals and 
trade union recognition,and their policies had some effect on 
stabilising relations in these areas. The Conservative govern­
ment has limited its intervention to subjects such as picketing 
and the closed shop and the trend is towards active state 
intervention to restrict these activities rather than just a 
reversal of Labour’s previous positive intervention. In com­
parison to the role of the state in plant-level relations in 
the FRG, however, the role of the British state has been 
marginal.
A consideration of the impact of the market context on plant- 
level relations during the 1970s shows an apparent absence of 
the market pressures to rationalise, which were such an 
important influence on conflicts arising in the German firms 
during the 1970s. The subsequent decline in the British share 
in its own home markets as well as markets overseas is one
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result of the lack of response by companies and trade unions
alike to the changing market context. The present government's
policies have subjected firms to the full force of market
competition and the resulting rationalisation process is
provoking similar conflicts to those found in the German firms
in the seventies. The delayed response from British firms,
however, tends to reduce their options in the introduction of
rationalisation processes. Whereas the German firms were able
to adont a policy of early retirement, voluntary redundancy
18and mass transfers together with non-replacement of the 
natural fluctuation in staff, British firms are often faced 
with compulsory mass redundancies and closures.
White argued that in Britain the main motivations, pressures
and influences on workplace relations originate within the
19 20plant itself. Earlier studies, such as that by Cole,
emphasised the importance of structural factors, such as 
economic and technological influences, on plant-level relations, 
in terms of whether they promoted management or workforce control. 
Studies of British firms during the 1960s and early 1970s high­
lighted the importance of the absence of management control in 
areas such as wages levels and payment systems, work allocation 
and manning and economic conditions which favoured the bargaining 
power of workgroups and shopstewards. This led to fragmented 
workplace bargaining between individual employees or groups
of employees and the rate fixers*with shopstewards dealing
21with only the most intractable bargains. The wages 'system' 
became the result of numerous bargains* and the fact that 
groups could not control the bargains of other groups and risked 
a drop in relative wage levels as well as the threat of losing 
trade union members if they did not keep up in the bargaining 
stakes meant a wages 'free-for-all' which led to the demoral­
ised payment-by-results systems and inequitable pay structures 
as described in the studies of British firms, particularly in 
engineering and car manufacture, in the 1960s and early seventies. 
The abdication of management control left the definition of 
the workplace context to’fragmented groups of workers, divided 
by trade union, departmental and sectional loyalties. This in
355
turn helps to explain the fact that wages and work organisation 
were continuous sources? of workplace conflicts. Relations 
between management and workforce were described as 'adversarial' 
or 'conflictual'. Unlike the FRG, there were no countervailing 
influences to lessen the conflictual climate. On the contrary, 
the absence of control and agreed rules for interaction promoted 
the resolution of conflict by trials of strength.
f.tud.ies of British firms in the late 1970s and early 1980s give 
some indication of a trend towards systems of job evaluation 
and the exercise greater management control over wages systems, 
together with an increase in the hierarchy and integration of 
shopsteward bodies. These changes reflect new government 
economic policies and a shift in the balance of power towards 
management with increasing unemployment. These new influences 
are expected to lead to a reduction of the difference in conflicts 
arising in British and German firms with respect to issues 
relating to demoralised pay systems and the effects of ration­
alisation. However, differences in conflicts arising will 
continue to exist due to the specific inf luence of legislation, 
in the form of the UOA 3972 and Company Codetermination Acts, 
the centralised organisation and policies of trade, unions and 
employers' associations and differences in the personalities of 
key plant-level actors and the history of their relations on 
nlan.t-level relations in the FRG.
iii) The Theoretical Status of the Main Influences
Both intra-nlant and extra-plant influences have affected the 
conflicts arising at plant level in Britain. Until recently, 
both the state and the trade unions and employers' associations 
have been conspicuous by their lack of definition of plant- 
level relations, and recent attempts by various governments to 
define certain aspects of plant-level relations have been 
limited. The governments have, however, played an important
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role by naans of their economic policies, which have either 
promoted or restricted the bargaining power of employees. Thus 
the extra-plant: environment has not led to uniformities in some 
aspects of the system of plant level relations as has been 
the case in the FRG. Intra-plant influences have had a greater 
impact in Britain on conflicts arising at plant level and it 
is therefore to be expected that greater diversity will 
characterize actual plant-level relations in Britain than in 
Germany.
British literature on the workplace reflects this emphasis
on intra-plant influences. Much of the work in the 1950s and
1960s focused on the effect of structural influences* such as
size of firm, technology and management organisation*on the
levels of conflict and type of relations between management 
9 2and workforce. More recent studies have highlighted action
variables including the values, goals and interests of specific
workplace actors to explain the conflict situation at plant 
2.3level. The influence of his torico-cultural variables has 
only been assessed in terns of the preference of state, trade 
unions and employers for a voluntary system of industrial 
relations. It could, be argued that in the British system, 
plant-level structures are more likely to influence the pattern 
of plant-level relations and conflicts arising than in the FRG, 
where other influences are significant as well. Further, that 
there is more scope for the influence of the plant-level 
actors' own goals, values and personalities on plant-level 
relations in Britain.
The operation of the 'variables' and 'constants' model within 
a. national system leads to 'variables* such as the role of 
the state, cultural values, trade union and employer association 
organisation and policies, promoting similarities in the 
pattern of conflicts arising between firms and the 'constants', 
such as size, technology etc.. promoting differences. Within 
the British system,the variable factors have encouraged work­
place autonomy in. the regulation of its own relations and the
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constant factors have been crucial in determining the type of
relations which emerge together with action influences relating
to the goals and values of specific plant-level actors. Studies
of firms in the same industry branch and with the same
technological processes, such as car manufacture, have shown
considerable differences in the levels of conflict arising?
with some firms exhibiting endemic strike situations whilst
24others are relatively peaceful. Recent studies comparing 
firms of similar size, industry branch and product manufacture 
have revealed the inconstancy of 'constant' influences such as 
technological process and management organisation.
25Sorge's study of the introduction of CNC-raachines into engin­
eering firms in Britain and West Germany has shown how the 
application of technology is adapted to the present patterns
of decision-making, status and organisation of a company.
? 6Woodward," likewise, emphasised the importance of managerial
decision-making in firms. Prais's study of the size of
companies in Britain and West Germany revealed differences
27in the methods used to increase the size of firm according 
to national predilections. These studies underline the fact 
that present day structures are products of past decisions 
made by specific actors in different national contexts. Their 
findings point to the continuation of differences in conflicts 
arising in firms within differing national contexts even with 
respect to the socalled 'constant' influences. The influence 
of size and technology across national systems of industrial 
relations only provides a general outline of likely areas of 
conflict. Other influences need to be considered to discover 
specific conflict areas and the significance attached to 
these conflicts by the plant-level actors. These influences 
include the historico-cultural set of variables as well as 
action variables.
iv) The Pattern of Conflicts Arising in the U.K.
ihe comparison between conflict areas in British and German 
plants reveals the limitations inherent in any consideration
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of conflict solely in terms of subject matter or their assoc­
iation with the technical, market or power contexts of plant- 
level relations. Apart fron general conflict areas such as 
wages, redundancies and dismissals, transfers and work 
allocation? working conditions and the recognition and status 
of workforce representatives, there were differences in conflicts 
arising. In Britain, conflicts arose concerning trade union 
demarcation, manning and working arrangements, differentials 
in w a g e s and fluctuation in earnings, which were not found 
in the German firms. The fact that wage conflicts arise in 
both systems also does not reveal the considerable differences 
between collective wage conflicts between groups of employees 
in Britain and individual wage 'queries' in Germany.
In contrast to the pattern of conflicts in the German firms,
described as one of collective procedural rights initiated by
the works council in reaction to management decisions, the
British pattern could be described as collective procedural
and substantive interests initiated by groups of employees
and their representatives in pursuit of their own interests
as well as in reaction to management decisions. During the
1970s, there have been some attempts to introduce a distinction
between conflicts of rights and conflicts of interests, between
grievances and claims,in the British system. Several studies
point to an increase in conflicts of rights referred to ACAS
as indicating an increase in the formality of workplace
relations in large firms, where most of these references come
28from. ° Generally, however, formal and legal entitlements, 
both in terms of procedural and substantive issues, are limited 
in British firms. This leads to most conflicts being about 
interests rather than rights for although employees may define 
an issue as one of rights due to the existence of a custom 
and practice arrangement, they have no objective source of 
appeal unlike the works councils, and the resolution of the 
issue amounts to a trial of strength based on a conflict
over interests. The outcome of this trial of strength is
dependent on those factors influencing the relative power 
position of the two parties, including objective resources 
as well as the actual perceptions of the two sides. In British
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plants both the procedural and substantive aspects of the 
relationship between management and workforce are the subject 
of a conflict of interests due to the absence of externally 
inposed 'legal' entitlements. The opportunity for cooperative 
resolution of substantive issues on. the basis of agreed pro- 
ceriural positions (often after a court battle), which exists 
in the German firms, is absent in British plants as the 
settlement of both areas of conflict is left to the plant- 
level actors and thus to a trial of strength between the two.
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2) The Main Influences on Conflict Resolution Procedures
at Plant Level in the FRG
I) Similarities and Differences in Conflict Resolution
Procedures
In all the firms surveyed there was a low level of formal
procedures and works agreements. There was no evidence of
formal grievance procedures or any other plant-level procedures
agreed by the two parties or unilaterally imposed. Works rules,
usually agreed at company level, only provided for a general
right of employees to refer grievances without specifying a
procedure. Written grievance reference was rare and only used
in cases which could ultimately be referred to a labour court
or, in larger firms, where individual grievances went beyond
departmental level and concerned aspects of the employment
2 9contract. In all but one firm there was a limted number of 
works agreements. Works agreements were drawn up to cover 
basic issues such as wages systems, working hours and annual 
works holidays. All other agreements were made informally.
Most conflicts arising were resolved at departmental level or 
below with only serious issues affecting whole sections of the 
workforce or with legal implications being referred to higher 
levels of decision-making. Although foremen emphasised their 
technical role and argued they had little role -in conflict 
resolution, they were usually able to resolve most issues 
arising from the workforce at their level. The works council 
was the key workforce representative in all the firms, although 
the specific form of their involvement varied according to the 
size of the particular firm.
A distinction was made between actual procedures for reference 
of grievances used by blue-collar and white-collar employees. 
The former usually referred issues via the works council, the 
latter via the management hierarchy. The reasons for this 
differentiation in actual procedures include the different 
work locations of the two groups of employees, the absence of 
white-collar representatives on many works councils, and the
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close working relationship between white-collar employees and 
management representatives.
Finally, in all firms there was very limited reference of issues 
to conciliation boards. No references were made by small firms. 
References made by large firms included the following issues:- 
redundancies, short-time working, health risks, working hours, 
bonus svsterns and performance evaluation of white-collar employee• s i  J. u
Differences in conflict resolution orocedures reflected varying 
levels of works council organisation in terras of the number 
of committees, job-releaseu works councillors and the relative 
distribution of decision-making competence between individual 
councillors, the executive body and the works council chairman, 
works council organisation was non-existent in small firms and 
extensive in the large firms. Shopsteward organisation also 
varied between firms. It was almost non-existent in small 
firms and in the electro-technical branch. In large metal­
working firms there was an extensive hierarchy of shopsteward 
organisation but actual shopsteward involvement in the conflict 
resolution process was only extensive in firm G, where they 
were the first source of reference for employee grievances, in 
part due to the non-availability of foremen on the assembly-lines 
Facilities for shopstewards were most generous in firms C. and H, 
where trade union and works council influence at company level 
was significant.^0 Plant-level conflict measures appeared to 
be related to the level of shopsteward organisation and their 
involvement in the conflict resolution process.
The relative importance of specific actors in the process of 
conflict resolution varied with size of firm and industry branch 
on a scale ranging from management domination of the whole 
process of resolution (snail electro-technical plants) through 
to joint resolution at all levels found in the large metal­
working plants. The specific role of the works council varied 
greatly. In the small electro-technical plants the works 
council chairman only dealt with issues referred to him by 
management because they legally required the works council's
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consent. In the small metalworking plants, the works council 
chairman was also the main representative of the workforce but 
in firm D, especially, he did not confine himself to dealing with 
management references but also pursued certain workforce interests 
in the light of trade union policies. The chairman and works 
councillors with job release were the key representatives in 
the medium-size electro-technical plant and were pursuing a 
policy of reducing the number of works council committees. 
Elsewhere, in the large plants, the procedure for conflict 
resolution had a similar pattern:-
minor
individual
issues
Stage 1
Stage 2
Foreman - individual works councillors
Departmental - individual works 
Manager councillors
routine issues 
requiring Stage 3
works council 
consent.
Issues requiring
specialist
knowledge
Personnel - works council committees
Management (personnel)
Representative
Major
collective 
issues:- 
redundancies, 
short-time 
working etc.
Stage 4 : Works
Management 
(+ Worker 
Director in 
certain plants)
works council executive 
committee or works 
council chairman
Reference of conflicts to third parties varied between firms.
Most firms had experience of individual and collective references 
to labour courts, although the former were relatively more 
frequent in small firms and the latter in large and medium- 
size firms. The large firms had all been the subject of 
extensive trade union involvement in the late 1960s (shop- 
steward and trade union organisation) and the years immediately 
following the enactment of the WCA 1972 (legal advice and 
support). The involvement of other third parties such as the 
Factory Inspectorate and medical experts varied with the 
issues which had arisen in specific firms.
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II) The Main Influences on the Similarities and Differences 
in Conflict Resolution Procedures
The main influence on the similarities in conflict resolution 
procedures amongst the firms surveyed was the Works Constitution 
Act and its general procedural provisions. These accounted for 
the low formalisation of procedures and grievances in the 
workplace, the low level at which most problems were resolved, 
the role of the foremanas technical expert and confidante of 
the workforce, the central role of the works council as work­
force representative as well as the general patterns of reference 
of conflicts to third parties and the preference for internal 
resolution of issues arising.
The differentiation of procedures used by blue-collar and white- 
collar workers was related to the organisational separation of 
the two groups of employees and the different management hier­
archy under which they work in fheir departments. It is also 
associated with the differences in view as regards the need for 
a plant-level representative body.
The low level of works agreements reflects the extensive 
regulation of substantive issues by collective agreements at 
national and regional level, as well as the growing centralisation 
of decision-making at company level and the increase in the 
number of compnay agreements between management and works 
council at that level. This reduces the scope for regulation 
at plant level. The low level of works agreements is also a 
consequence of the expressed preference of plant-level actors 
to retain their flexibility of response to specific situations 
as they arise. Works agreements are thus reserved for basic 
issues such as details of the plant-level wages system, timing 
and arrangements for annual works holidays and special allowances.
The WCA 1972 provides a general framework for the procedural 
resolution of issues arising at plant level, which focuses on 
the works council and works management. The Act provides for 
the joint resolution of conflicts and lays down specific areas
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where management requires works council consent to proceed with 
a measure. The system of cooperative conflict resolution at 
plant level., based on an acceptance of the free market system 
and a recognition o f the mutual rights and responsibilities 
of both management and works council, is supported by the 
regulation of key controversial issues, such as wage levels 
and job evaluation methods and wage guarantees in cases of 
transfer, at levels above the plant. Likewise, the concen­
tration of the regulation of major plant issues, such as transfers, 
redundancies, discipline and dismissal and individual wage 
levels at plant level, in the hands of the works council and works 
management promotes a non-controversial environment at shop- 
floor level, where the foreman's role involves the resolution
of technical, organisational and nersonal issues in his
31 *particular section. most issues arising at shopfloor level 
can be resolved pragmatically by the actors at that level.
There is, however, some evidence of conflict between the works 
council and management at departmental and company levels, hot1: 
of whom are not directly involved in the cooperative system of 
relations outlined in the MCA 1972.
In all firms the works council was the key workforce represent­
ative. Trade union influence at plant level was generally weak 
and was exercised through the works council. There was little 
evidence of a power struggle between the works council and
trade union representatives at plant level. The latter were
either non-existent or played a very secondary role to the 
works council, with one exception (firm G). Despite the low 
level of direct trade union influence, most works councils 
emphasised that their position in the plant was dependent on 
trade union support and strength at national and regional levels. 
In the larger firms, the workforce tended to deny that they—1 *  s  j
personally experienced any benefits from trade union membership, 
or from having a works council in some instances, but they still 
argued the necessity of both the trade union and their works 
council for their continued general, well-being in the workplace.
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The reference of conflict issues to third parties, or lack 
oi reference as in the case of the conciliation boards, was 
related to the provisions in the MCA 1972 for third party 
involvement. There were some similarities in the firms' 
experience of third party references - most had experience 
of both individual and collective references to the labour 
courts, albeit to varying degrees, and many firms had required 
the involvement of trade union and employer association officials, 
particularly in the years immediately following the introduction 
of the MCA 1972 and in labour court cases. The general low 
level of reference to conciliation boards reflects the reluc­
tance, particularly on the management side, to involve out­
siders in the actual resolution process of 'interest' rather 
than 'rights' issues and to support the considerable costs such 
references incur.
The main influences on the differences in plant-level conflict 
resolution procedures were size of firm and industry branch 
and the association of these two factors with differences in 
management policy and style as well as organisation, different 
levels of trade union involvement at company and plant levels, 
and varying levels of complexity of works council organisation.
The size of the firm influenced both rnanagment organisation 
and, with respect to the differing provisions of the Works 
Constitution Act dependent on size of firm, works council 
organisation. Differentiation and specialisation of management 
and works council functions and structures increased with size, 
as reflected in the large number of works councillors released 
from, their jobs full-time and the extensive network of works 
council committees in the large firms. These factors then 
influenced the different stages in the processes of conflict 
resolution from the shopfloor to plant level. In the small 
firms the resolution process centred on the works council 
chairman and works management. In the larger firms, the process 
included individual works councillors, foremen, departmental 
management, works counc-il committees ami their counterparts 
on the management side, the works council executive committee
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and chairman with works management, and in the firm covered by 
Montan company-level codetermination, the worker director.
Size of firm also had some influence on shopsteward organisation 
as well as trade union organisation, as both were seen to be 
more necessary by the workforce, works council and management 
as size increased.
Size of firm was also associated with differing management styles 
and policies including their policies towards workforce rep­
resentatives. Most hostility was expressed by management in 
small firms, who sought to dominate all the processes of 
resolution. In larger firms, there was less hostility and 
greater recognition of the part the works council, and in some
cases shonstewards, could olay in the management of the work- 32force.'0 Firm C was an interesting example of the problems 
which arise in the gradual transition from paternalistic to 
more rational management styles and policies, associated with 
me dium-size firms.
Industry branch was another significant influence on conflict 
resolution processes. In the case studies of electro-technical 
firms it was shown how management representatives dominated all 
levels of the procedural process for conflict resolution apart 
from plant level where there was some works council involvement. 
Management style was generally paternalistic and hostile to the 
activities of workforce representatives. Decision-making 
tended to be centralised at company or concern level and there 
was opposition to the drawing up of agreements at plant level.
In the traditional metalworking firms there was general 
acceptance of the role of the works council and joint regulation 
of at least the key conflict issues arising.
Trade union organisation and shopsteward. organisation were low 
in the electro-technical plants and high in the traditional 
metalworking plants, especially in the plant covered by Montan 
company codetermination'legislation (H) and the serai-nationalised 
plant (0 ), where the trade unions still exerted considerable 
influence at company level. However, even the smaller metal-
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working firms had some shopsteward organisation, although its 
involvement in actual resolution of conflict was limited.
Both the dominance of management and the weakness of trade
union organisation in the electro-technical industry were
related to factors such as the individualisation of work
organisation, the low level of technology-related conflict
issues, the low level of external trade union involvement in
33the promotion of trade union organisation at plant level * 
and centralised, paternalistic management traditions. These 
led both management and workforce to question the need for 
workforce representation and to the dominance of management 
viewpoints. On a scale of involvement of workforce represent­
atives in the resolution of conflict, the loxyest level of 
involvement was in small electro-technical plants followed by 
small metalworking plants, then the medium-size electro-technical 
plant, steel processing, and steel production plants and car 
manufacture with the highest level of involvement. The form 
of the workforce representatives' involvement also varied 
from the dominance of the works council chairman or the works 
council executive of job-released members to the involvement 
of all works councillors, where all were released from their 
jobs, and of shopstewards in the largest metalworking plants.
In these latter examples, special factors were in operation 
due to the fact that the steel production industries are subject 
to the Nontan Codetermination legislation and to the semi­
nationalised status of firm G, both of which meant management 
were willing to go beyond the provisions of the WCA 1972 in the 
granting of concessions to the works councils.
With reference to the involvement of third parties in the 
resolution of plant-level conflicts, size was an important 
factor since larger firms had more resources on both the 
management and works council side to resolve issues internally, 
especially in those firms mentioned above where trade union 
and works council representatives could exert considerable 
influence at company level to promote the resolution of issues 
at plant level. Other influences, however, also came into plax? 
in the explanation of why some firms refer more issues to
368
third parties than others. Changes in works council-management
relations which provoked instability and a lack of consensus
necessary for internal resolution often led to the involvement
3 fof third parties, as in firm C. Personalities also played 
a role as was the case in firm H, where the conflict between 
the works council chairman and the shopsteward leader meant 
issues, which previously had been resolved internally, were now 
being referred to a conciliation board. Experience of past 
references to third parties can either promote further ref­
erences (firm F) or discourage them (firm S), depending on the 
results of the references. Finally, the sheer intractability 
of certain issues, such as compulsory redundancies, can lead 
to the involvement of third parties in the resolution process, 
although the absence of workforce pressure on the works council 
in firm I meant even this issue could be resolved internally 
by the pi ant-level actors.
The general pattern of resolution in larger firms is for minor 
individual issues to be resolved at shopfloor or departmental 
level between individual works councillors and management 
representatives. R.outine issues requiring works council consent 
and specialist issues are referred to works council committees 
and representatives from the personnel and other departments. 
Major collective issues, such as redundancies, mass transfers 
and works agreements on new wages systems, are dealt with at 
plant level by the works council executive and works management, 
although in practice the works council chairman tends to 
dominate this level of resolution.
The question of the initial referee of workforce complaints is 
very dependent on factors such as work organisation, the level 
of shopsteward organisation and availability of referees. In 
electro-technical plants with low or non-existent shopsteward 
organisation the referee is usually the foreman, even in mass 
assembly plants.. Maintenance workers generally refer issues 
to the foreman. Assembly workers in the metalworking industries 
find shopstewards often 'the most readily available first ref­
erence point, whilst white-collar workers refer issues to the 
management representative in their specific departments.
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III) Analysis of the Theoretical Status of the Main Influences
The theoretical status of the main influences producing simil­
arities and differences in conflict resolution procedures 
between firms was similar to those which produced similarities 
and differences in actual conflicts arising. Those influences 
producing similarities were at national and extra-plant level, 
historico-cultural influences and those elements called 
’variables', which produced differences between different 
national industrial relations systems but similarities within 
a national industrial relations system. The influences 
producing similarities in conflict resolution procedures in the 
firms surveyed related to the common context of Works Constitution 
legislation and collective agreements in the particular industry 
branches under consideration. These influences reflect historico- 
cultural developments and decisions, which resulted in the 
present significance of the state and trade union and employers' 
associations in the regulation of plant-level relations, both 
their procedural and substantive aspects. All structures, both 
those relating to size, technology, organisation and the role 
of the state and collective groups in industrial relations, are 
the result of a series of decisions made by different actors 
over the course of industrial relations systems historical 
development. However, those structures relating to the role 
of actors, rather than inanimate structures such as size, are 
more closely related to specific historico-cultural preferences.
Those influences producing differences in the type of processes 
used to resolve conflicts in the workplace were plant level and 
extra-plant where industry branch is concerned. They were 
structural and structure-related influences such as management 
styles associated with a particular size of plant. Action 
influences were also important, especially in the reference 
of conflicts to third parties. In the variables-constants 
model, it was the constant factors shared by the two national 
industrial relations systems which produced differences within 
a national system.
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Size of firm was an important factor producing differences in 
the structures and processes of conflict resolution between 
firms, although it needs to be seen as operating within the 
framework laid down by the WCA 1972, which, for example, 
provides for a greater number of works councillors and more 
extensive organisation of works council activity with increasing 
size of firm. The significance of industry branch needs to 
be seen in conjunction with legislation on codetermination in 
the iron, coal and steel industries as well as traditions of 
trade union involvement and management philosophy and style 
in different industry branches. Action influences were 
particularly significant in the exceptional situations, where 
the role of certain actors led to internal resolution of the 
most controversial conflict issues (firm I), or the reference 
of issues, which could have been resolved internally, to 
third parties (firm C). An additional important factor in 
these situations was the development of the relationship between 
the works council and management, where there was a breakdown 
In the previous pattern of conflict resolution and instability 
of present day relations, also past experience of reference of 
issues to third parties.
The actual conflicts arising in the individual firms did have
some influences on procedures as in the case of firm G, where
the problems of information on new technology led to the setting
up of a special committee to ascertain the likely effects on
jobs and wage levels of the introduction of new technology.
Similarly, the emergence of basic conflicts of interest such
as mass redundancies tended to be referred to third parties
for resolution. Specialised issues dealing with complicated
job evaluation systems, work organisation and technology are
expected to promote the role of expert committees, although
final decision-making resides with the whole works council.
The similarities of procedural systems once size was accounted
for appears to discount the effect of the internal plant
35technologv on procedural systems in German firms.
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IV) The Patterns in Conflict Resolution Procedures
i) The Form of Conflict Resolution. Procedures
Resolution procedures are often differentiated into official
procedures, standard practices and actual practice in the
36British literature. These were the categories used in the 
questionnaire survey. Empirical results revealed that actual 
practice was the only suitable category for use in the German 
firms since official procedures and standard practices were 
not generally operative. Processes of conflict resolution 
were internal to the plant, informal, low level on the whole 
with a distinction in the procedures for white-collar and 
blue-collar workers and, to a certain extent, for the main­
tenance and production workers. There was also some evidence 
of a choice of first stage for the referral of complaints 
depending on the subject matter of the complaint:- technical, 
administmtive and personal issues were referred to the charge- 
hands and foremen; and wages, social facilities, working con­
ditions and legal issues to works councillors. The general 
pattern of conflict reference was as follows:-
enrolovee 
11 '(shopsteward) - in large metalworking firms
/ I'ichargehand) - in large metalworking firms
foreman : works councillor Idepartmental : works councillor 
manager
Ipersonnel management : works council 
| committees
works management : works council chairman
or works council as a 
whole or just its 
executive committee
Formalisation of issue reference and the procedure increases 
in large firms after departmental manager level. All the firms 
surveyed Fit into this general pattern of conflict resolution*
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although in the smaller firms there, is often only one stage 
(employee to works council chairman and works management).
The structure of workforce representation is dominated by the 
works council. The shopstewards play at most a role as the 
first source of reference for employees and pass issues on 
to the works councillors for resolution. There was no 
evidence of groups of employees raising collective grievances 
and attempting to resolve them with management representatives.
ii) The Function of Conflict Resolution Procedures
The categories used by Hyman to describe the functioning of
conflict resolution procedures included the following:- judicial
37model, bargaining model and conciliation model. In his 
study of the now defunct engineering procedure his findings 
showed that wages issues dominated the procedure and he thus 
concluded that the procedure was being used as a bargaining 
tool.3o
The empirical study of German, plant-level procedures has 
emphasised the role of the MCA 1972 as providing a general 
procedural system by outlining a framework of issues likely 
to arise in any plant and specifying the type of involvement 
of workforce representatives in each case, in addition providing 
for the involvement of third parties if internal resolution 
is not possible. An analysis of the function of the WCA 1972 
as the plant-level procedural system shows that the actors 
do not employ it in an administrative sense to apply agreements 
to specific plants, except where works council and management 
are called upon to apply the provisions, for example, of 
collective agreements on the guarantee of wage levels in cases 
of transfers. Since wage rates are not the subject of plant- 
level regulation, the WCA 1972 is not used as a bargaining 
tool to obtain higher wage rates, although individual employees 
do attempt to move into higher wage groups within the system 
of job evaluation. The judicial use of the VJCA 1972 has been
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evident in those cases where i ssnes have been referred to
labour courts because management refuses to abide by the legal
provisions for the facilities and involvement of the works
council. Such cases were particularly prevalent in the years
immediately following the enactment of the WCA 1972 and are
arising in conjunction 'with the introduction of new technology
and the definition of works council rights in this area.
Generally, however, a legalistic use of the WCA 1972 is seen
as indicative of poor relations between management and works 
3 9council and the last resort of works councils which are 
unable to rely on sufficient workforce support to bolster 
their position vis-a-vis management.
The main use of the WCA 1972 is constitutional, i.e. the 
definition of relationships between management and works 
council at plant level, their respective status, rights, functions, 
responsibilities, and the promotion of a cooperative model of 
joint regulation of issues arising. Within the relationship 
defined by the WCA 1972, agreement on the substantive details 
of plant-level issues can occur, as can the application of 
the terms of collective agreements at national and regional 
level to specific workplace situations. The evidence of a 
low number of works agreements indicates that these processes 
occur informally.
Thus, the WCA 1972 is not intended to act as a procedure to 
apply agreements or negotiate agreements in the traditional 
sense as found in the U.K. and the U.S.A. but it represents 
a constitution for the workplace, an outline of how a factor}/ 
should run. It leaves considerable scope for each plant to 
develop its own substantive agreements in accordance with pre­
vailing conditions. The operation of the WCA 1972 in the 
case studies appears to indicate that once agreement can be 
reached on the status and rights of the respective actors at 
plant level, albeit after a number of legal battles, agreement 
on substantive terms can proceed via joint cooperation apart 
from cases of a serious' conflict of interests such as commilsoryx j
mass redun.danc ies .
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Conflict rasolution procedures reflect the state of relations 
between management and workforce at a given time. The VIC A 1972 
has as its aim the establishment of cooperative relations 
between management and workforce and it can be argued that to 
a great extent power bargaining, which is characteristic
of the British system of industrial relations, has been 
replaced by technical and legal discussion by two sets of 
experts in the field of plant-level issues arising. The general 
procedural framework outlined by the Act cannot, however, be 
compared with the narrow formalism and piecemeal approach to 
the development of plant-level procedures in British firms during 
the 1970s, which have given rise to problems associated with 
a lack of flexibility of response to problems arising day-to- 
day on the shopfloor.
V) Evidence of Convergence and Divergence in Conflict
Resolution Procedures at Plant Level in the FRG and the U.K.
i) Similarities and Differences in Conflict Resolution
Procedures
The following details about plant-level procedures in British 
firms are taken from the literature survey in chapter 4 and 
compared with the empirical findings from the German firms.
This comparison revealed some similarities in the general outline 
of procedures in German and British firms, notably the greater 
formalisation of procedures with increasing size of firm, the 
general preference of plant-level actors for internal resolution 
of issues arising, the importance of dismissal cases in small firms, 
the generally low level of formalisation of plant-level procedures 
and substantive agreements, problems of non-recognition of 
workforce representatives by lower management and the realisation 
of the importance of high trust relations for procedures to 
function effectively.
In small British fir is very informal and highly personalised
modes of resolution operate. These are accompanied by manage- 
nerit hostility towards any form of consultation with workforce
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representatives, a low level of trade union organisation and 
management dominance of the resolution process as was the 
case in the snail German electro-technical firms. In the 
larger plants (1000 + employees), there are indications that 
procedures are more formalised. Here, there is greater 
’professionalisation of industrial relations management, a more- 
advanced organisation of workforce representation with full­
time senior stewards and joint shopsteward committees, and 
generally a higher level of management recognition of trade 
unions and shopstewards as was the case in the larger German 
firms. These influences have increased during the 1970s in 
Britain as a result of government legislation on aspects of 
plant-level industrial relations, a shift towards company-level 
collective bargaining and the increasing size of companies.
Other common factors in British and German plants with respect 
to conflict resolution procedures include the preference for 
internal conflict resolution by the parties at plant level, 
the low levels of formalisation of plant level procedures and 
substantive agreements, an emphasis on procedures rather than 
on substantive agreements to regulate issues arising, and 
problems of non-recognition of 'workforce representatives by
4°lower management. Individual dismissal cases are particularly 
prevalent in smaller firms but ACAS, as the labour court in 
Germany via its informal pre-court hearings, seeks to help 
the parties reach a joint agreement without recourse to legal 
proceedings.
Since proposals made by the Royal Commission on the need for
the greater formalisation of plant-level procedures as one
area of a larger strategy to create order in plant-level
relations, there has been a growing realisation among
practitioners and theorists alike that high trust relations
between the two parties are important for such procedures to
41be effective. Purcell's description of 'cooperative con­
stitutionalism' as the method most likely to produce good 
relations at plant leveTl bears a close ressemblance to the 
MCA 1972 - a cooperative pi ant-level’ constitution.
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Despite these similarities between the two plant-level systems
of conflict resolution it must be emphasised that they operate
within two very different wider contexts of industrial
relations. In Britain there is no legally defined constitution
for plant-level relations, which means that conflicts about
the role, status, rights, duties and facilities of workforce
representatives, which inevitably arise in all industrial
relations systems, can only be resolved by overt conflict
measures in which one side seeks to enforce its viewpoint on 
42the other. Despite the common reluctance of management and 
shopstewards to permit a greater formalisation of substantive 
agreements at plant level, shopstewards have favoured the 
formal isa tlon of procedural arrangements, which would provide 
some guarantee for their role and status at plant level, which 
at present is non-existent.
The common preference for informality in the conduct of plant- 
level relations operates in two very different contexts. In 
tlie German system, where there is considerable regulation of 
issues at national and regional levels in collective agreements, 
informality at plant level is viewed as a necessity in. order 
to be able to react flexibly to issues arising within the 
general confines of agreements and legislation on plant-level 
relations. In the U.K. the informal system has been seen as 
the result of the plant-level actors' inability to agree on 
both the procedural and substantive issues at stake. Thus 
'unwritten, informal understandings' only mask the basic conflict 
of interests between the two parties. Where they do represent 
agreement between the actors concerned, they are dependent on 
the continuation of the actors in office and their mutual good­
will. This is .seen as an unstable basis for relations in 
times of great economic and technological change.
Changes in the form of conflict resolution procedures and 
substantive agreements in the larger British companies during 
the 1970s towards greater formalisation have provoked problems 
in plant-level relations. Several studies point to a relation 
between the formalisation of plant-level procedures and an
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/ j. 5increase in plant-level conflict. " Others point to a rise
in conflict flue to an increase in. company-level as opposed
to plant-level regulation oP substantive issues, such as44wages, in British companies.""' Terry explains this as the
result of the traditions of workplace autonomy in the
regulation of both procedures and substantive issues. Recent
changes are seen bv the olant-level actors as encroachments
45on their freedom to regulate their own environment.
These changes towards centralisation and formalisation of 
regulation at plant level do not in'fact reflect the general 
ethos of the Donovan Commission proposals of 1968, which 
foresaw the establishment of a works constitution to cover 
issues regulated by the MCA 1972 in German firms including:- 
comprehensive, authoritative bargaining machinery, joint dis­
putes procedures, agreement on the role and facilities for 
shopstewards, agreement on how to handle redundancy and 
disciplinary cases and joint discussion of safety issues. One 
of the shortcomings of these proposals was that their implement 
ation was left to the actors involved in the immediate conflict 
situation, with company management being responsible for the 
definition of a workplace constitution. The problems of joint 
agreement on such a constitution and its maintenance in times 
of severe economic and technological pressures by voluntary 
me ans on 1 y are inrlense.
Purcell similarly called for the development of an attitude 
of ’cooperative constitutionalism* in British firms as t,he 
best means of responding to the increasing pressures of theA fsgeneral economic environment.’"' The formal structures of a 
constitution are insufficient without high trust attitudes 
which promote a cooperative approach to conflict resolution.
His thesis, however, rests on the voluntary response of the 
plant-level actors to crisis situations arising in their 
relationship, such as the threat of closure or loss of an 
important order, which, in his view, were calculated to bring 
both sides to their right senses.
378
The German plant-level constitutional provisions avoid the 
problems of formalisation of procedures and substantive 
agreements at plant level by outlining a general framework, 
within which the plant-level actors can develop the details 
of their relationships in accordance with the particular con­
text of the plant itself. hone of the actors interviewed, 
apart from management in the smallest firms, felt that the 
provisions were too formal and prevented a flexible response 
to plant-level issues arising. The MCA 1972 does not rely on 
the plant-level actors themselves to generate a cooperative 
system of conflict resolution, -which is an idealistic hope 
in view of the basic conflict of interests between the two 
parties. Instead, the Act provides opportunities for co­
operation and deterrents to conflictual activity. These 
include provisions for monthly meetings between the works council 
and management, provisions for management to obtain the consent 
of the works council on key issues such as working hours, wages 
and working conditions, and prohibitions of industrial action 
of any form, with the reference of unresolved conflicts to 
third parties such as labour courts and conciliation boards.
The system of cooperative conflict resolution laid down by the 
1 AC A 1972 has not become established in German firms without a 
struggle, as revealed in the numerous court cases on its pro­
visions in the years immediately following its enactment. In 
the smaller firms the system is still virtually non-existent 
as management dominates the whole resolution process. However, 
in the majority of firms surveyed, cooperative modes of resolution 
had become established in one form or another and were most 
successful, in terms of joint cooperative resolution of conflicts,
where the works council was sunnorted by its close ties with
47the trade union both inside the plant and outside.
The increasing pressures from economic competition and 
technological innovation, which are creating major conflicts of 
interest such as mass redundancies, dequalification and con­
sequent wage reductions' for employees, do put strains on co­
operative nodes of resolution internal to the firm and there
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will be increasing involvement of trade union and employer 
association officials in the resolution of such major issues. 
However, the premises of conflict resolution procedures, which 
involve the rationalisation of conflict expression and regulation, 
are based on the recognition of such inevitable conflicts of 
interests not their elimination. On this basis, the WCA 1972 
provides a framework for conflict rationalisation, which thus 
Far has been effective both in periods of economic prosperity 
and recession.
ii) The Theoretical Status of the Main Influences on Conflict 
Resolution Procedures
Superficially, the pattern of conflict resolution procedures 
at plant level in Britain and West Germany appears to be 
similar:- internal to the plant, informal in both their pro­
cedural and substantive aspects and low level. The functions 
of the procedures vary, however, with a bargaining model in 
Britain and a constitutional model for plant-level relations 
in the FRG. An appraisal of the key influences on plant-level 
resolution procedures shows similarities in the type of influence 
producing both similarities and differences between firms in 
both national systems. As was the case with the main, influences 
on conflicts arising, the similarities in procedures are 
promoted by national and extra-plant factors (trade union - 
employer association relations), the differences by plant-level 
factors, particularly size of firm.
Recent government legislation on industrial relations issues, 
representing a change in the national context of plant-level 
relations, and the growth in the size of companies together 
with the trend towards company-level bargaining have all promoted 
a greater formalisation of plant-level procedures over the past 
decade. The absence, however, of a legally defined works 
constitution for all firms and the continuing low level of 
substantive regulation at extra-plant level, apart from some
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company wage agreements, continue to promote considerable 
differences in the substance if not the form of plant-level 
procedures for conflict resolution in British and German firms.
The analysis of the main influences on conflicts and conflict 
resolution procedures at plant level in British and West 
German firms supports the assumption that historico-cultural 
structures, or 'variables' in the original model in chapter one, 
produce differences between two national industrial relations 
systems not only in terms of resolution procedures and 
processes but in actual conflicts arising as well. Contrary to 
structuralist arguments, his torico-cultural influences do not 
only affect relationships, for example, between size of firm 
and formalisaiton of resolution procedures in terms of degree, 
but substance too. The positive determining role of the state 
and trade unions and employers' associations on plant-level 
relations in T-est Germany promotes a level of uniformity 
in conflicts arising and the basic shape of conflict resolution 
processes which is not found in British firms. The limited 
role of the state and trade unions and employers' associations 
in shaping British plant-level relations, in particular the 
processes of conflict resolution, has highlighted the influence 
of plant-level factors and produced discontinuities in conflict 
issues, levels and resolution between firms.
In the light of these very different historico-cultural 
structures and the difficulties of finding 'constant' factors 
to compare between different national industrial relations 
systems/'^ as well as between firms in the sane system, structural 
deterministic arguments that industrial societies are becoming 
increasingly similar in the problems they face and the ways 
in which they resolve these problems are not expected to 
orovide sufficient explanatory power for the realities of 
industrial life in the foreseeable future.
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3) Areas of Further Research into Conflicts and Conflict
Resolution at Plant Level
I} Conflicts at Plant Level
The study of conflict issues at plant level has underlined the 
importance of factors such as economic context and technological 
process on the type of issues generated in a specific firm. 
However, the generation of conflict issues alone does not account 
for actual conflicts arising but needs to be studied in con­
junction with the perception of issues by both management and 
workforce, in particular, their representatives. Whilst economic 
context and technological processes do influence perception of 
issues as well as the issues themselves, other factors need to 
be taken into consideration, particularly those influencing the 
level of collectivisation, as opposed to individualisation, of the 
workforce. These latter influences include size of firm, owner­
ship relations, management policy and style, levels of trade 
union, especially shopsteward, organisation, personality 
factors as well as the macro- and industry-level influences 
of legislation on industrial relations and the organisation 
and policies of trade unions and employers’ associations.
In the light of changing conditions in the 1980s, the thesis’s 
assumptions about the perception of conflicts and types of 
conflicts arising in British and German firms need to be re­
assessed. These assumptions are that in the FRG most conflicts 
are seen in terms of procedural rights under the WCA 1972 and 
are initiated, if at all, by the works council. In Britain, 
in contrast, conflicts are viewed as involving collective pro­
cedural and substantive interests and are taken up not only 
by workforce representatives, but also by the workforce itself.
It is expected that there is greater uniformity in conflicts 
arising between firms in the FRG and greater diversity in the 
U.K. The comparison between Britain and the FR.G revealed 
substantial differences in conflict issues between British and 
German firms in the same industry branch.
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At national level, there have been changes in the economic 
context and in the policies of the state, trade unions and 
employers' associations, which may have influenced conflicts 
arising as well as resolution processes at plant level. These 
include monetarist economic policies, attempts to restrict 
trade union action by government legislation in Britain, a 
decline in the economic consensus between the government and 
collective bargaining parties in the FR.G, as well as high 
levels of unemployment in both countries. In Britain, there 
are indications of a decline in the influence exerted by the 
collective bargaining parties, especially the employers' 
associations, on plant-level relations. In the FRG, in contrast, 
their influence Is increasing in the economic recession. The 
effect of the changing levels of influence of both the state 
and the collective bargaining parties on plant-level relations 
needs to be investigated in terms of their effect on conflict 
levels. In Britain, the change may lead to a heightening of 
the conflict situation at plant level, in the FRG to an 
alleviation of conflict during the economic recession.
The study has indicated that legislation does, in the long term, 
affect the perception of conflict by the actors at plant level 
and hence actual conflicts arising. Further investigation of 
how legislation subtly alters perception, i.e. the processes 
of influence, would be interesting*especially in the light of 
attempts to significantly alter the climate of industrial 
relations in the U.K. towards greater cooperation.
Continuing at national level, the study has shown how labour 
court decisions promoted the effectiveness of works council 
representation in some firms and reduced it in others. Further 
study needs to be undertaken into the courts' reasoning behind 
specific decisions on works council - management relations and 
how these decisions influence future processes of resolution 
in the firms in question.
The effects of the current recession on both actual conflict 
areas and conflict perception at plant level provides a large
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area of potential investigation by industrial relations 
researchers in Britain and the FRG. Questions include its 
effect on actual conflict issues in the area of wages, working 
hours, redundancies and transfers with the resultant de­
qualification of work, especially as German firms approach 
the limits of staff cuts by voluntary means and wage guarantees 
expire. The recession may promote a higher level of collective 
grievances or a greater individualisation of action or passivity 
from the workforce, depending on current levels of trade union 
organisation and past traditions of collective action in 
specific firms. The economic downturn may also provoke manage­
ment attacks on basic works council rights or, more likely, 
new areas of conflict in relation to the introduction of new 
technology, investments and staff cuts. Within the FRG, the 
effect of the recession may be to increase the differences 
between firms in terms of conflicts and resolution processes.
In Britain,the recession may lead to greater similarities in 
conflicts arising between British and German firms than in the 
1960s and 1970s, as British companies are now forced to meet 
the pressures of international economic competition by staff 
reductions and technological innovation.
At plant level, technological innovation may lead to similar 
conflict issues in German and British firms in both the blue- 
collar and white-collar sectors. Of particular importance is 
the effect of changes in technology on the social organisation 
of the workforce and hence on trade union organisation, and 
shopsteward / works council activity. The changes may lead to 
greater solidarity, particularly in. the white-collar sector, 
or desolidarity via the individualisation of work organisation 
and mass transfers. Further investigation of the association 
between particular industry branches, such as the electro­
technical branch or chemicals, with a low level of collective 
response to issues needs to be carried out. Reasons probably 
include a combination of management styles and low levels of 
trade union, particularly shopsteward, organisation.
Size of firm appears also to be associated with certain levels
of trade union organisation and management styles and policies, 
which affect conflicts as well as processes of resolution. Of
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particular interest is the medium-size firm, where the trans­
ition from informal, paternalistic management styles towards 
greater professionalisation and bureaucratisation is taking 
place. This is expected to lead to problematic relations 
between management and workforce representatives and relatively 
high conflict levels with unstable resolution processes.
Ownership relations are often related to size of firm and they 
influence conflicts and resolution processes. Further invest­
igation is needed of the association between ownership relations 
(owner-manager, family business, national company or foreign- 
owned, semi-nationalised or nationalised) and patterns of 
conflict and conflict resolution. Other important factors 
include the firms' development (via merger, takeover, internal 
differentiation) and the position of the firm in question 
within a larger company. In both the FRG and the U.K., there 
are indications of an increase in the regulation of issues at 
company level and the effects of this on plant-level relations 
needs to be studied.
The relation between specific management styles and policies, 
particularly on wage systems and relations with the workforce, 
need to be investigated. Empirical studies indicated an 
association between size of firm and the industry branch to 
which it belongs on the one hand and management styles and 
trade union organisation on the other. The dynamics of this 
process of influence need to be considered in greater detail, 
especially in view of the fact that trade union organisation 
has a significant impact on workforce representatives' activity 
and the organisation of their activity.
Personality factors were found to be important influences on 
both conflict levels and resolution processes in some firms. 
Further investigation of the circumstances under which this 
occurs and the key persons involved needs to be undertaken.
More information is required on whether this factor is a more 
important determinant of the climate of plant-level relations 
in Britain than In the FRG due to the absence of an externally 
imposed structure of relations in the former.
385
Finally, the stability of plant-level relationships was found 
to be problematic and dependent on a number of factors including 
personalities, tine in office and congruency of expectations.
The WCA 1972 is thought to pronote stable relations, although 
unwillingness to cooperate by either management or workforce 
representatives can thwart this.
II) Conflict Resolution Procedures at Plant Level
The empirical survey has indicated the preference of plant-level 
actors in both Britain and the FRG for informality and flexibility 
in the resolution of plant-level issues. Further study is 
needed on the reasons for this preference and the different 
quality of informal relations in German and British firms.
The recession may promote greater formalisation and legalisation 
of relations at plant level or simply extend informal processes 
via the inclusion of trade union and employer association 
officials in the informal resolution processes. The effect of 
the recession on the formalisation of works agreements and on 
overt conflict measures also needs to be further investigated.
Indications of a recent hierarchism of shopstewards in British 
firms and an extension of management control at plant level 
need to be considered in tine light of their effect on resolution 
procedures. There may be similarities in the relationship 
between senior stewards and ordinary stewards in Britain and 
leading works council members (with job release) and other 
works councillors and shopstewards in the FRG. In the FRG, 
further investigation of the shift from works council committees 
to the executive committee in the resolution of conflicts in 
the electro-technical industry is necessary. Shopsteward 
involvement in resolution processes in the FRG has been seen 
as mainly indirect, where it occurs at all, and the most 
important effect is their influence on the works council's 
perception of issues and representative activity.
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The thesis has described the ’constitutional’ use of procedures 
to regulate relations in the FRG whilst actual resolution 
processes remain informal. More information is required on 
the details of constitutional usage of procedures and the 
possibilities of such usage in the U.K. context under specific 
conditions. Further, whilst procedures in the U.K. are 
usually thought of in terms of a transmission of issues from 
the workforce to increasingly higher levels of management, it 
is suspected that procedures in the FR.G are more often used 
for a downward transmission of information from the works 
council and management to the workforce.
The applicability of the patterns of third party involvement in 
plant-level conflict resolution to other sectors of German 
industry and to the British context needs to be assessed, i.e. 
the prevalence of individual legal references in small firms 
and collective references in large firms. The use of conciliation 
boards remains at a low level. Further study of the reasons 
behind and influences on reference to a conciliation board is 
necessary. Important factors are thought to include a high 
level of trade union, and especially shopsteward, organisation, 
which exerts pressure on the works council to refer unpopular 
decisions to a third party. Poor and unstable relations between 
management and works council in firms of medium and large size 
with a medium-level of trade union organisation also tend to 
promote references as the works council is not in a strong 
enough position to enforce management cooperation nor is it so 
weak that it becomes subject to management's absolute rule.
In interest disputes the conciliation board thus becomes the 
sole resort of the works council to enforce managerial recognition 
of some of its points of view. The effect of such references 
on future relations also needs to be investigated in greater 
detail, especially as regards processes of resolution.
The empirical survey has indicated the importance of parity5 0company-level codetermination'v for the effective operation of 
the WCA 1972 in German firms. The reasons behind this need 
to be studied in more depth than has been possible in the thesis 
but it has been suggested that parity codetermination ensures
387
trade union influence on co rap any level management and hence on 
works management too and promotes trade union organisation and 
shopsteward involvement at plant level. Problems arise with 
management representatives who are not specifically covered 
by the MCA 1972, these include company management and depart­
mental management. Codetermination at company level provides 
a solution for the former problem, and adequate trade union 
influence on works management ensures that departmental manager 
abide by the general provisions of the Act and do not seek to 
undermine the position of the works council. Further study 
would highlight the effects of the WCA on the role of manage­
ment at all levels and reveal differences between the FPvG and 
the U.K.
Further investigation of the actual processes of conflict 
resolution in German firms would permit the development of 
a scale of works council involvement in conflict resolution 
and provide more details of the influences on works council 
organisation and activity. These, in turn, could be contrasted 
with findings from British firms to highlight similarities and 
differences. As indicated earlier, it is expected that the 
common context of legislation will promote similarities in the 
form of procedures in German firms, although their actual 
operation in practice is dependent on other factors.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Discussion of the Industrial Relations
System Model and Modifications based 
on the Empirical Results
1) Levels in the Industrial Relations System (IRS) Model
Three main levels of influence in the industrial relations 
system were identified in chapter one:- national, industry and 
plant levels. Although the study focussed on conflict and 
conflict resolution at plant level, the plant had to be studied 
in its wider context to understand why specific patterns of 
conflict and conflict resolution had emerged and the meanings 
behind particular structures and processes for the actors 
concerned. The wider context of the plant was particularly 
significant in a crossnational study of industrial relations 
systems.
The empirical results showed how national-level influences 
promoted similarities in conflicts arising and resolution pro­
cesses within a national system and differences between two 
national systems. Industry and plant-level influences promoted 
differences in conflicts arising and resolution processes 
within a national system and had been expected to produce 
similar patterns between national systems. The comparison of 
the two national systems was not detailed enough to provide 
sufficient evidence of this latter effect, although the general 
findings appear to indicate that the influence of the national 
level on both the industry and plant levels limits the extent
of similarities between the same industry branch and plant size1*across different national systems.
Although it is important to consider the operation of aspects 
of the industrial relations system in context, it is expected 
that different levels will assume a greater or lesser import­
ance in terms of their influence on specific processes in the 
system depending on the subject matter under investigation.
* Footnotes in Vol. Two p. 117.
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For example, a cross-national study will highlight the effect 
of national level influences; a comparison of different 
industries within a national system will focus on industry 
level influences; whereas a comparison of different plants 
within an industry in one national system will tend to emphasise 
plant-level factors. The cross-national comparison of plant- 
level processes will of necessity include a study of the effect 
of all three levels.
The comparison of the British and West German systems showed 
how the different levels can exercise an active or a passive 
influence on the conflict situation at plant level. In the 
FRG, the state, trade unions and employers’ associations have 
actively influenced both the conflict situation and resolution 
processes at plant level, whereas in the U.K., despite recent 
legislation, they have tended to leave the plant-level actors 
to deal with the conflict situation in their own way. Both 
types of influence need to be included in an assessment of 
plant-level processes. The empirical survey showed how the 
influence of one or more levels is reinforced or counteracted 
by the effect of other levels. Despite the influence of the 
state, trade unions and employers’ associations, promoting a 
reduced level of conflict and cooperative modes of resolution, 
factors at industry and plant levels in firm C led to a 
relatively high level of conflict for a German firm and the 
involvement of third parties in the resolution of conflict, 
indicative of a lack of cooperation between the plant-level 
actors. In other firms, plant-level factors reinforced the 
effect of higher level influences and there was a low level 
of conflict and cooperative modes of resolution.
The empirical survey indicated a need to incorporate additional 
levels of influence into the IRS model, particularly the 
international economic context which exerted similar pressures 
to rationalise among the German firms studied and hence similar 
conflicts at plant level. Company-level factors were also 
included in the model, as policies at this level influenced 
conflicts in the plant and resolution processes depending on
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the level of decision-making autonomy permitted in the plants 
and the extent of trade union influence at company-board level. 
In large plants additional influences below plant level were 
seen to be significant, particularly in the car assembly plants, 
where different departments faced different conflicts and 
resolution processes, although within the same plant context.
In conclusion, the study has shown the need to consider the 
plant in its wider context, which includes various levels of
influence, in order to adequately explain and understand current3methods of operation and structures. This is especially true 
of a cross-national study. The findings indicate that plant- 
level influences tend to have greater explanatory power in an 
assessment of conflicts and conflict resolution in the U.K. 
than in the FRG, due to the absence of an active policy to 
define plant-level relations on behalf of the state, the trade 
unions or employers' associations.
2) Components of the Industrial Relations System Model
In the present study, a distinction has been made between 
environmental influences and social action influences. The 
former relate to those elements in the context of actor relation­
ships which influence their decisions and action, and the 
latter focus on the actors themselves and how they shape their 
environment by their decisions and actions. The social action 
dimension was seen as an important addition to Dunlop's original 
model, which had emphasised the environment not the actors and 
had been accused of structural determinism in its view of the 
actors' roles and decision-making. A further distinction has 
been made between two types of environmental influences. 
'Constants' were defined as those elements which produced similar 
effects whatever the national system and included elements such 
as size of firm, technological processes, the basic conflict 
of interest between capital and labour. 'Variables' were those 
elements thought to promote differences and incorporated the
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role of the state in industrial relations, the structure and 
policies of trade unions and employers' associations, including 
their view of the plant level in the IRS, social structures 
and cultural value systems vis-a-vis the role of management, 
economic system, industry etc. Constants were expected to 
produce similarities across national systems especially in 
the area of substantive rules and actual conflicts arising. 
Procedural rules were thought to be more closely allied to the 
variables and hence to differ across national systems.
The literature survey illustrated the fact that present day 
structures are the result of past decisions by actors in a 
specific national context. This applies to both constants 
and variables, although the connection between actor decision­
making and variables is clearer since the variables represent 
organisations of actors and their values and policies directly, 
whereas constants tend to be inanimate structures. The study 
emphasises both the historico-cultural influences, including 
past actor decisions, on present day structures, and current 
policies, values and decisions, which are akin to social 
action influences, on both structures and processes of conflict 
resolution in the plant today. The structural components of 
the actors' environment and the actual decisions made by 
actors in relation to their environment are not viewed as 
mutually exclusive determinants of the conflict resolution 
system in the plant but facets of the same process. The relative 
importance of structural determinants and the actors' decisions 
themselves can only be assessed after empirical analysis and 
historical survey of a given conflict situation, whether at 
national, industry or plant level. The illustration of the 
process of influence below does not assume environment first 
influenced actor decision-making but shows the interaction 
between these two components:-
...Past environmental >past actor 1 both shaped-- ^current—>
context decisions 7 the current actor
environment- decis- 
•J al context ions
 ^conflict levels----- > output ---- > creates the ^future
resolution future en- actor
process vironmental decisions
context
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The implications of this process for the study of conflicts and
conflict resolution were as follows. Constants are the creation
of actor decisions in a specific environmental context. Although
their outward form and structure may be similar across national
systems, the meanings attached to them and their operation in
4practice is likely to differ. The assumption that constants 
promote similarities in terms of conflicts arising and sub­
stantive rules is thus viewed as problematic. This was indeed 
the case in the empirical survey, where there were considerable 
differences in conflicts and substantive rules as well as 
resolution processes between the German and British plants.
The findings appear to refute the argument that structures 
such as size of firm and technology chiefly determine relation­
ships and output in the IRS, whereas historico-cultural and 
social action influences only affect this basic relationship 
in terms of degree not substance. However, further comparisons 
of firms in two different national systems need to be under­
taken to substantiate these tentative findings. A comparative 
study which considered two different industry branches across 
two national systems and the two branches within the same 
national system would indicate relative levels of similarities 
and differences in conflicts and resolution processes in 
greater detail than has been possible in the present study.
Modifications to the categories of influence included in the 
original IRS model include the following. At national level, 
the involvement of official third parties, including labour 
courts, in the resolution of workplace conflicts. The study 
did not consider the effect of social structure on conflict 
relations at plant level but included an assessment of cultural 
value systems as they have developed during the course of history 
and as they affect the IRS today in terms of a 'system ideology' 
such as voluntarism or legalism and centralisation. At 
industry level, the significance of industry branch, whether 
electro-technical, steel, mass assembly of vehicles, on conflict 
issues and resolution processes was confirmed. The specific 
economic context of each branch was a major factor, as was its
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legal position as it relates to Montan Codetermination legis­
lation. A company level has been incorporated into the model 
as factors such as type of ownership, the relation of the 
plant to the company, the development of the company, company 
management and their policies have been shown to have an import­
ant influence on plant-level conflict situations and relation­
ships .
At plant level, the empirical survey revealed the significance 
of management organisation, style and policies, especially as 
regards w a g e s and jobs, the importance of trade union, and 
specifically, shopsteward, organisation for workforce per­
ception of conflict and the policies of their representatives. 
'Personalities' were found to have an influence on both conflict 
levels and processes of resolution at various levels of the 
company on both the management and workforce sides. It was 
generally an important factor where extremes of cooperation 
or conflict existed, and was particularly associated with 
changes in plant actors, which brought individuals with their 
own particular perceptions of workplace relationships to the 
fore and tended to produce unstable relations until new com­
promise solutions were agreed. An example of this was found 
in firm C, where instability arose due to the replacement of 
the works council, who had shared management's patriarchal 
view of industrial relations, with a new set of actors intent 
on pursuing a policy of active representation of workforce 
interests based on the new WCA 1972. Personality factors are 
thought to be significant in firms deviating from the 'norm' 
in terms of conflicts arising and conflict resolution.
The instability of relationships at plant level was found to 
have a significant influence on conflict levels and was 
associated with a high level of external reference of issues 
to third parties due to the absence of consensus in the work­
place as to how conflicts were to be settled. This instability 
was found to be indirectly related to environmental changes.,
such as new legislation-on workplace relations^which need to
5be worked out by the actors at plant level. It is often
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directly associated with changes in key plant-level or company- 
level actors, which leads to a hiatus in previous patterns of 
resolution and introduces new perceptions, values, ideas into 
the workplace situation. Generally, the German system seems 
to promote a higher level of continuity and hence stability 
in workplace relations by means of provisions for building up 
cooperative relationships (i.e. regular meetings of management 
and workforce representatives), protection of representatives 
from immediate sectional or individual workforce pressures and 
longer terms in office of representatives. Some instability 
has, however, been introduced into the representative-workforce 
relationship by the problem of alienation of the workforce.
The question as to whether there can be stable relations based 
on class conflict as well as cooperation and consensus was 
answered to some extent in the empirical studies of individual 
firms. These showed it was possible to have stable relations 
based on a perception of differing interests where both sides 
agreed on resolution by negotiation. Where there was no agree­
ment on the modes of resolution, such as in firm C, relations 
were unstable, as shown by the level of unresolved conflicts, 
the involvement of third parties, the problems of calculating 
each other's actions and the level of distrust. Thus stable 
relations require consensus on resolution processes though not 
on actual substantive issues.
3) The Relative Significance of Industrial R.elations System
Influences in the Study of Conflict and Conflict 
Pvesolution at Plant Level
The relative significance of influences according to level will 
vary with the issue under consideration. The study of conflict 
and conflict resolution at plant level across two national 
systems led to the emphasis on extra-plant influences to explain 
the differences in the two systems. The study of conflict in 
two plants of the same industry branch in one national system 
is expected to emphasise plant-level influences in particular, 
although the processes still need to be seen in the wider context 
to explain similarities arising.
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Significant influences included the role of the state, national 
values about conflict and its resolution, ideas about the 
priority of the community and the individual, the position of 
industry in society and the plant within the total IRS. These 
factors led to the emergence of a 'system ideology', which 
influenced both sets of actors in the workplace as well as 
providing part of the context in which they operated. Other 
influences included industry branch and various plant-level 
factors.
The empirical study revealed how both extra-plant and plant- 
level influences had an impact on conflicts and resolution 
processes. Whereas extra-plant influences provided a basic 
framework of conflicts and resolution, plant-level influences 
provided the specific details. Thus there was no evidence to 
support the view outlined in chapter one that constants 
influenced conflicts arising and variables their resolution. 
Both constants and variables influenced conflicts and resolut­
ion processes. The main distinction appeared to be between 
influences external to the company, and company and plant-level 
influences; the former promoting similarities within a national 
system and the latter differences in conflicts and resolution 
procedures. Between two national systems, the influence was 
reversed* although the fact that plant-level factors had been 
influenced by extra-plant factors restricted the extent of 
similarities across national systems as a result of plant-level 
influences.
A significant finding which emerged from the study was the 
importance of the perception of conflict by the actors as well 
as the objective conflict situation. Where there was a low 
perception of conflict there was little need for detailed 
resolution procedures and management tended to deal with all 
issues arising. Influences on perception included management 
policy and style (associated in part with size of firm and 
industry branch) and the policies of workforce representatives 
(related to level of trade union organisation and number of 
shopstewards, extent of contacts with trade union officials
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outside the workplace and trade union policy for the industry 
and influence at company level). Thus two distinct patterns 
of conflict perception emerged: -
electro-technical industry - industry developed since the 
emergence of works councils, low trade union involvement 
and organisation, anti-trade union stance by management—> 
low perception of conflict by the workforce.
metalworking industry - industry developed before the emergence 
of works councils, high trade union involvement and organisation, 
management has generally come to terms with the existence of
the trade union ^relatively high perception of conflict by
the workforce.
Also associated with these two patterns was a greater objective 
basis for conflict in the metalworking industry, although recent 
redundancies in the electro-technical sector have increased 
the potential conflict base there too. The extent to which 
these recent developments will lead to a change in conflict 
perception of the workforce in this industry is problematic.
4) Processes in the Industrial Relations System Model
With respect to the study of conflicts and conflict resolution
at plant level, the present study has defined processes as'the actual
practice of conflict resolution as opposed to the details of
6formal procedures for conflict resolution. Thus the study of 
processes included the consideration of actors involved in the 
process, their actions with respect to conflict resolution or 
non-resolution and an assessment of the function of the processes 
based on the actors’ perception of their role, their policies 
and action.
In the illustration of the industrial relations system in chapter 
one, processes were situated between the inputs from the national,
industry and plant levels and the outputs from the conflict ::e:
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resolution processes. Their position indicates the influence 
of environmental factors on resolution processes at plant 
level. In the empirical study, constants influenced processes 
by way of the conflicts they give rise to, for example
increased competition— -—  ^management policies----^conflict issues— :
in the economic to rationalise pro- relating to staff
environment duction by staff cuts cuts, dequalif-
of the plant and introduction of ication etc.
new technology
 >major conflict issues > resolved at management-
affecting whole work- works council or company
force level. Problem of co­
operative processes of 
resolution with respect to 
major conflict issues
Constants further influenced processes by their effect on areas 
such as the size and solidarity of the workforce and their 
association with particular styles of management and policies, 
both of which affect resolution processes. Variables were seen 
to influence resolution processes by way of legislation on the 
regulation of plant-level issues and type of relationships 
between management and workforce representatives, and the 
removal of certain conflict issues, such as wage rates, from 
the plant to higher levels in the system.
Thus both constants and variables influenced processes by
influencing actual conflicts arising, as well as the actors' 
perceptions of conflict issues and means of resolving them. 
Processes of resolution, in their turn, can, via a feedback 
effect, influence the level of conflicts arising as a result 
of changing perceptions of conflict and conflict-related activity 
on the part of management and workforce representatives. This 
can lead to an upward spiral of conflictual activity or a 
dampening effect on conflict depending on the actors' experience 
of resolution processes and, particularly, the attitudes and 
behaviour of the other party at plant level.
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The flow of influence from environmental factors through conflict 
issues to resolution processes is one aspect of the dynamics 
of the system:- environmental factors give rise to conflicts 
which require resolution; the type of conflicts and their extent 
do influence resolution processes. However, the study has 
also given examples of plants where a low perception of conflicts 
on the part of the workforce and their representatives, despite 
the objective conflict situation, led to simplified pattern 
of resolution based on the management hierarchy.
This finding points to the need to consider not only the 
objective conflict situation but subjective aspects too in an 
assessment of the influences on both conflict levels and resol­
ution processes at plant level.^ Often the two aspects are 
interrelated, as seen in the example of small electro-technical 
firms and large metalworking firms in the empirical survey:- 
in the former case, factors such as technological process, work 
organisation and size of firm promote low conflict levels as 
does the low level of trade union organisation, management 
hostility to any workforce representation and a subsequently 
weak workplace representative body, which influence perception 
of conflict. The opposite is true for large metalworking plants 
where the objective conflict situation and high perception of 
conflict combine to produce high levels of conflict and, in the 
FRG at least, complex resolution processes to deal with them.
In other examples* the relationship between the two aspects of 
the conflict situation at plant level was less obvious due 
to the influence of other factors.
5) Output in the Industrial Relations System Model
In Dunlop's model of the industrial relations system, the out­
put of the system was described in terms of rules to regulate 
the system. Wood argued that the IRS was in fact not an 
autonomous subsystem of' society as a whole but part of the 
economic subsystem with the role of integrating the labour 
resource into the economic system, thus its output was des­
cribed as rules to govern the production system.
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A debate has ensued about what is meant by the ’rules' of the 
system. Dunlop did not view them solely in terms of the rules 
emerging from formal negotiations between the two parties but 
included in his definition forms such as custom and practice 
and informal rules. But are rules the only form of output 
from the system? The problem of describing output solely in 
terms of rules lies in the fact that this implies consensus 
and cooperation between the parties at plant level, when in 
fact the parties are involved in a conflict situation. The 
empirical survey has shown the possibility of the parties 
being unable or unwilling to find a solution to specific con­
flict situations or of the resolution process for specific 
issues spanning several years and involving many references to 
third parties, as in the case of firm C. Thus the output of 
the system can include non-resolution of issues as shown in 
some examples from firm G, where both sides agreed to differ, 
although this usually resulted in a compromise solution at 
some future date. The works councils interviewed emphasised 
that it is pointless for them to put forward demands which are 
unresolvable; that they do not ask for something which will 
bankrupt the firm in the long- or short-term; and major issues 
such as changes in working conditions, can take several years 
to resolve in order to spread the cost of their introduction. 
The fact that workforce representatives in the FR.G generally 
adopted similar values to management on the need to keep the 
plant in business and were willing to work within the system, 
meant there were few instances of unresolved issues and ’rules 
satisfactorily described the output of the resolution process. 
There was no evidence of the workforce unilaterally imposing 
their own rules in the operation of the production system and, 
apart from small firms, little evidence of unilateral decision 
making by management in areas immediately affecting the work­
force since the vJCA 1972 provides for codetermination of keyg
plant-level issues.
Studies of conflict resolution in the British context reveal 
more evidence of non-resolution of issues on a joint basis 
and more examples of regulation by means of unilateral rules
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imposed by management and, sometimes, the workforce, due to 
an absence of common values on the aims of the production 
process and the means of resolving conflicts arising. Generally, 
however, as long as a plant continues in operation, rules 
of some form or another must be generated to regulate the 
labour resource in the production process. Where no rules 
are generated by either side, the plant will cease to operate 
and the question of a plant-level industrial relations system 
is no longer applicable.
The study has shown the importance of distinguishing between 
official rules for regulating the production system and effect­
ive rules. The latter are the significant rules. The dis­
tinction was particularly important during the 1960s and early 
1970s in the British context as the two differed markedly. The 
problem was not so apparent in the FR.G due to the absence of 
unilateral workforce regulation of the labour resource.
6) Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Industrial 
Relations System Model
Both conflict and conflict resolution are integral parts of 
the IR.S model and indeed provide the rationale for the system, 
whose goal has been defined as the regulation of the labour re­
source in the economic subsystem of society. If no conflicts 
existed between the labour and capital resources and other 
interest groupings within the system, there would be little need 
for a regulative and integrating process to reconcile the 
different interests and direct them towards the goals of the 
system. There are also, however, common interests as well as 
conflicts between the different groups, of which two of the 
principal ones are the representatives of the capital owners and 
the owners themselves and the labour force. These common 
interests include the continued operation of the firm based on 
its successful operation in a competitive, economic environment.
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Conflict resolution has been described as the processes by 
which the labour resource is integrated into the economic 
subsystem as differing interests are channelled into com­
promise solutions which promote the continued operation of the 
production system. This process takes place within Communist 
and Socialist economic systems too although the labour resource 
in such countries has the State as its main protagonist.
I) The Role of Power in the IRS Model
Dunlop's original IR.S model viewed power as external to the 
IRS. He defined the power context of the IRS as the wider 
societal relationships based on the relative status and influ­
ence of the three key actors in the IRS:- the state, trade 
unions and employers' associations. He saw the power context 
as 'given* and expected it to vary between societies as it was 
influenced by their respective political systems.
Chapter three provided some explanation for the current power 
context in the FRG -and U.K. In Britain, due to a policy of 
non-intervention by the state in industrial relations pursued 
until recently, market and technology influences had shaped 
the relative power positions of trade unions and employer assoc­
iations and the plant-level actors. With a few exceptions, 
employers had been the dominant force in industrial relations 
until the 1960s, when economic circumstances favouring the 
power of shopsteward organisation emerged. Rather than come 
to terms with this new situation, management tended to continue 
their unilateral regulation of the plant, whilst informal shop­
floor regulation grew apace. In the FRG, the dominant role of 
the state in shaping all areas of society, including the 
industrial relations system, and the powerful, centralised 
organisations of labour and employers led to legal definitions 
of their power relationships, which lessened the impact of 
market and technology influences on relative power positions.
The study also considered the power situation in individual 
plants, where there were wide variations due to a number of
*
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different influences, including industry branch and technolog­
ical process and size of firm, which affected levels of trade 
union organisation and the activities of workforce represent- 
atives as well as management organisation, style and policies.
In some plants, management regulated all aspects of work uni­
laterally; In others, the works council was pressing for 
recognition of its role in the process of regulation; elsewhere 
the works council was accepted as joint regulator of plant-level 
issues. The legal basis of industrial relations in West 
Germany, however, again reduced the impact of the economic 
situation and technological process on the power position of 
labour.^
In a study of plant-level issues, therefore, the power context 
at national, industry and individual plant levels needs to be 
taken into consideration. Power is not solely located outside 
the IRS but is a basic element of the IRS. The basic IRS 
model in chapter one illustrated power as one of the significant 
inputs into the process of conflict resolution. The empirical 
survey, however, also showed that power relationships could 
influence conflict levels by their effect on the perception of 
conflicts and how best to react to them. The modifications to 
the original illustration thus include power relationships in 
the catalogue of behavioural factors which are influenced by 
the plant environment and in their turn influence conflict 
levels and resolution processes. (See diagram at the end of 
this chapter).
Power relations are seen as the result of both objective and 
subjective influences, which determine the relative power of 
both parties and whether they make use of their power to pursue 
their own interests or acquiesce in a perceived 'common interest 
value system'.
II) The Role of Ideology in the Industrial Pvelations 
System Model
Dunlop introduced the concept of a system ideology into his 
model of the IRS to describe common values about the aims and 
operation of the system held by all the actors. In chapter three.
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examples of a system ideology in both the British and West German 
systems have been given. In the former, it was described as a 
voluntarist tradition, where the state left the regulation of 
the system to the trade unions and employers' associations. In 
the latter case, the system ideology encompassed the important 
role of the state in shaping the IRS, even at plant level.
System ideology, however, is not something which can be seen 
as a 'given' factor but needs to be investigated in the actual 
operation of the IRS. There are now indications of some change 
in the voluntarist tradition of the British system as both the 
state and employers question its validity in the face of growing 
shopfloor power. Recent state intervention in specific areas 
of the IRS in Britain has led some trade unionists to reconsider 
the benefits of legal entitlements to protect trade union 
activity rather than their reliance on immunities from pro­
secution* as the latter are being steadily undermined.
The problem of 'conservative bias' in the concept of a system 
ideology only arises if this ideology is presumed to be stable 
and generally accepted by all actors. Empirical study shows
this is not the case. The status of a system ideology is
problematic and needs to be investigated in specific instances.
A general study of the national system of industrial relations 
may sometimes lead to the mistaken view that there is unquestion­
ably a system ideology. The detailed study of actual relations 
at plant level calls this view into question. In reality, 
each group of actors tends to develop its own value system* 
which is more or less congruent with the value system of other 
groups. Where there is a high level of congruency, this con­
tributes to stable, cooperative relationships, particularly in 
the area of conflict resolution. Where there is a low level 
of congruency, instability in relationships arises.
The empirical study of the West German IRS points to the sig­
nificant role of the state in the development of a common value 
system amongst employees and employers, trade unions and 
employers' associations'via legislation on relationships in 
the IRS. However, the values propagated by legislation need
404
to have their basis in the socio-cultural context of society 
in order for them to be acceptable to both parties. In the 
West German system, important common values include concepts 
such as the common good, common interests, cooperative modes 
of conflict resolution and the need to work within the limits 
laid down by the state, viewed as the representative of the 
common good.11 The role of the state in industrial relations 
has contributed to the development of a system ideology within 
which the conflict of interests between different groups of 
actors in the system can be expressed. The empirical study of 
individual firms showed, however, that the system ideology is 
not universally accepted. Examples were given of firms where 
one side or the other did not accept the principles inherent 
in the legislation of cooperation on the basis of codetermination. 
In such circumstances the conflict situation between the parties 
at plant level was enhanced*and unstable, unpredictable relation­
ships and resolution processes ensued. Unlike Britain, however, 
the conflict between different value systems was not limitless 
but subject to regulation by third parties, particularly the 
labour courts, in line with the legislative framework for 
industrial relations.
In Britain, the existence of a system ideology is less likely
due to the low level of state involvement in the definition of
the IRS and the consequent absence of a general authoritative
framework of values for the regulation of the basic conflict
situation to which the system actors can appeal. It appears
unlikely that the trade unions and employers' associations or
the plant-level actors are able to develop their own common
12ideology when left to their own devices. Voluntarism can be 
seen less as a common value system, which presupposes active 
consent and purpose, than the result of a lack of agreement on 
common principles for the operation of the IRS, which survived 
as long as management was in a dominant position but began to 
crumble when labour strengthened its position in the 1960s.
'System ideology' is thus a factor which requires empirical 
investigation in a given IRS, particularly at plant level and 
the level of trade union - employer association relations, to 
ascertain its validity in practice.
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The location of 'system ideology1 in the original illustration 
of the IRS in chapter one was set at national level in the 
socio-cultural value system and in the relationship between 
state, trade unions and employers' associations in the IRS.
At plant level, the goals and values of the workplace actors 
were included among the inputs into the processes of conflict 
resolution. Modifications to this after empirical investigation 
include the differentiation of those actors' goals and values 
which are congruent, and thus form part of a system ideology, 
and those which are incongruent. An active role of the state 
in the formation of the IRS tends to promote a system ideology 
and large areas of congruency in the goals and values of the 
actors which offset their differences in interest. This con­
gruency, of course, influences the subjective power position 
of the actors and tends to restrict the use of power to the 
limits laid down by the system ideology.
An investigation of both the congruency and incongruency of 
the goals and values of the actors thus enables researchers to 
draw some conclusions about the existence and influence of an 
IRS ideology.
Ill) The Pvole of Change in the Industrial Relations System 
Model
Dunlop's study of the IRS was criticised for its inadequate 
assessment of the implications of change, both from the system's 
external environment and from within the system itself, on the 
system's operation. This neglect was seen as the result of 
his emphasis on the stability of the IRS based on a common 
system ideology. In the present study, the existence of a system 
ideology is seen as problematic and system stability cannot be 
assumed. This is particularly true in any study of conflict 
resolution in the IRS. The empirical studies of German firms 
have shown how change is a significant factor at plant level 
in the IRS and can be the result of external or internal forces. 
Examples have been given of how changes in the economic and 
technological environment of the plant affect conflict issues 
arising as well as processes of resolution. In the 1970s,
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pressures to rationalise production led to redundancies, short- 
time working and the introduction of new technological processes, 
with ensuing problems associated with the adjustment of the 
workforce to the new technology. These issues need to be 
resolved at works or company level and often require the assist­
ance of third parties due to their controversial nature. Further­
more, changes in government legislation, particularly the 1972 
WCA, provoked many conflicts at plant and company levels, which 
were usually resolved by reference to labour courts. Internal 
forces promoting changes in conflict issues and resolution 
processes include changes in plant-level actors as a result of 
works council elections, management promotions or retirement.
Trade union involvement in the plant by way of shopsteward 
training and programmes to increase unionisation can also lead 
to changes in both the conflict situation at plant level and 
the operation of resolution procedures as the result of the 
changing perceptions of plant-level actors.
Thus it is clear that factors in both the external and internal 
environment of the plant can change and that these changes affect 
both conflicts arising and the ways in which conflicts are 
resolved. It appears that constants in the plant's environment 
are more open to change than variables. The latter are assoc­
iated with the actual values and attitudes of the actors them­
selves and hence with resolution processes per se.
In the discussion about what factors lead to significant changes
in the way conflicts are resolved at plant level, British
commentators have emphasised the need for major crises at the
13level of individual firms and a general shift in the social 
relations of power to support the trust relationships necessary 
for the cooperative resolution of conflicts.3^ The difficulties 
of promoting changes in resolution processes are related to 
the need for a change in the values and perceptions of the actors 
concerned. Much more research in the area of values, perceptions 
and bases of legitimate actions is required before general rules 
can be formulated on what: factors will generate genuine co­
operative relationships at plant level. Empirical research
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undertaken thus far shows that major crises do not necessarily 
lead to changes in attitudes regarding conflict resolution in 
the long-term. The example of the German system indicates that 
a major shift in the social relations of power in favour of 
labour is not necessarily a prerequisite for trust relation­
ships. Whatever methods are employed to alter perceptions, 
however, they must be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the 
actors concerned. The significant role of the state in the 
promotion of cooperative plant-level relations in the FRG, for 
example, is supported by general social values about the role 
of the state in society. This would not be the case in the U.K., 
where the main examples of cooperative resolution processes 
occur where management has pursued a policy of cooperation with
the workforce and its trade union representatives for its own 
15reasons.
The present study indicates that mere changes in environmental
factors will not necessarily lead to changes in relationships
in industrial relations unless one or more of the actors involved
desire an improvement of relations based on joint regulation of 
16issues. The study of the reasons for such shifts in policy 
will necessitate an investigation of why and how attitudes and 
perceptions change. Similarly, in the German situation con­
siderable changes in environmental factors have not necessarily 
lead to the destruction of cooperative relationships built up 
at plant level. Where consensus has been reached on the pro­
cedural aspects of conflict resolution, substantive conflicts
arising from changes in environmental conditions can be resolved
17by cooperation and joint negotiation. This does not, however, 
rule out the possibility of changes in procedural relations as 
the result of changes in attitudes and perceptions of the actors 
in the German system. This issue of change requires considerable 
empirical research before the possibility of formulating any 
general rules on the factors involved can arise. The work of 
psychologists and behaviouralists is particularly significant 
in this area.
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7) Typology of Conflicts and Conflict Resolution Processes
in the IRS Model
I) Gonf1icts
In the present study, the term 'conflicts' was chosen in preference 
to 'grievances' as the latter implied a particular perception 
of conflicts based on the existence of collective agreements 
or legislation which established legal entitlements. The use 
of the generic terra 'conflicts' meant differing perceptions of 
conflicts could be investigated by empirical research. The 
questions addressed to the plant-level actors covered details of the 
type of conflict arising (subject matter), its form (individual/ 
collective) and the extent of conflict.
From the empirical survey and literature survey two patterns of 
conflict emerged:-
FRG:- collective procedural rights initiated by the works 
council in reaction to management decisions.
U.K.:- collective procedural and substantive interests initiated 
by groups of workers and their trade union represent­
atives in pursuit of their perceived interests and in
reaction to management decisions.
The key characteristics of conflicts arising were:- their form 
(procedural/substantive; individual/collective; right/interest), 
their iniator(s), and the motive behind their initiation (pursuit
of own interests, defensive reaction to decisions by other actors).
These elements provide a more comprehensive assessment of the 
type of conflict relationship existing at plant level than the 
mere study of the subject matter of conflicts arising.
II) Resolution Procedures
Resolution procedures have been defined as a means of channelling 
conflicts arising in the IPvS so that they can be resolved
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peaceably and compromise solutions can be reached. The reason 
for their existence is based on the need to limit the extent of 
overt conflict manifestation to ensure the continued operation 
of not only the IRS but the wider social system too.
The empirical study has emphasised the actual processes of 
resolution at plant level, although details of the formal 
provisions for resolution were also investigated.
The results of the survey have indicated two patterns of conflict 
resolution which may provide a useful basis for future research 
into conflict and conflict resolution procedures
FRG:- Basic legislative framework for procedures but no
formal plant-level procedures. Conflict resolution is 
generally internal to the plant, with major issues 
resolved at works level, other issues being resolved 
at section level. Constitutional function of procedures, 
i.e. the definition of plant-level relationships. Low 
level of works agreements.
U.K.:- Mo legislative framework but increasingly formal plant-
level procedures. Internal resolution of conflicts
preferred, traditionally at section level, though
indications of a shift to more centralised resolution 
18at plant level. Bargaining function of procedures,
i.e. to secure own interests in the workplace. Emphasis
19on informal regulation of conflicts, low level of 
works agreements.
The key characteristics of resolution procedures were thus:- 
their form (in terms of formal / informal, external (third party)/' 
internal, level (individual, workgroup, section, department, 
works etc.); the actors involved and the type of involvement 
(i.e. unilateral decision-making, joint decision-making, con­
sultation, information etc.); and the function of the procedures 
(legal, administrative, "bargaining, constitutional).
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The illustration of the patterns of conflicts arising and 
resolution procedures in the British and German systems show 
the close association between conflicts and procedures:-
Conflicts
U.K. Form:- procedural/ 
substantive 
collective 
interests
Initiators:-
Motive:-
workgroups, 
represent­
atives (trade 
union)
Procedures
increasingly formal 
internal
low level with some recent 
centralisation
Actors:-workgroups and shopstewards 
management
own interests, 
reaction to 
management 
decisions
FRG Form:- procedural
  collective
r ights
bargaining
legislative basis but informal 
in plant. Internal. Mix 
of centralised and low level 
resolution
Initiators: works council /ctors:-works council - management
constitutional useMotive:- reaction to
management j 
decisions con-j; 
cerning the 1 
position of 
works council \ 
in the plant j
The illustrations show some similarities between procedures in 
the British and German systems, including the emphasis on 
internal resolution and, with the changes in shopsteward 
organisation in Britain during the 1970s/early 1980s, the com­
bination of low level resolution of minor issues and resolution
20of major issues at plant level. The study has, however, shown 
the importance of looking beyond the outward form of procedures 
to their actual function in the perception of the actors using 
them, and the association between their function and the 
specific contexts of plant-level relations. Despite some 
similarities in procedural forms between the two systems, the 
very different contexts of conflict resolution mean procedures
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fulfill different functions. In the German system, conflict
resolution at plant level takes place within a legal framework
of workplace relations and the informal processes of resolution
provide flexibility in the application of the legal provisions
21to a specific workplace context. In Britain, legal provisions 
on workplace relations are limited and the problems associated 
with the absence of a framework for workplace relations led to 
the formalisation of workplace procedures in the 1970s and 
ensuing difficulties caused by bureaucratic inflexibility at 
workplace level. Whereas conflicts in the German system tend 
to relate to the application of legal entitlements and many of 
the original conflict issues concerning the WCA 1972 have now 
been settled, in the British system there is still conflict 
about the actual definition of workplace relations. These latter 
conflicts, representing disagreements about the fundamental 
organisation and nature of the IR.S (procedural issues), are 
generally more difficult to resolve peaceably than disputes 
which occur within an agreed framework for relations (substantive 
issues).
8) Areas of Further Theoretical and Empirical Research
on the IRS Model
I) The Components of the IK.S Model
i) Levels
The study has emphasised the need to incorporate macro-environ­
mental as well as organisational levels into the study of plant- 
level processes. A number of different levels were included, 
chiefly national, industry, company and plant levels of influence. 
Further study is required of the significance of different levels 
depending on the area of industrial relations under investigation. 
For example, the significance of national and industry levels 
in a general study of one national IRS; the focus on the plant 
level to emphasise the differences in the operation of industrial 
relations within one national system. In a comparative study,
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national and some industry-level influences (trade union and 
employer association organisation, policies and relations) will 
promote differences; influences at industry and plant levels 
associated with markets and technologies as well as, in some 
cases, organisational aspects such as size and management hier­
archies, will show similarities across national systems.
ii) Influences
Further study is needed of the effects of what have been des­
cribed as 'constants’ and 'variables' on the structure and 
processes of industrial relations activity. The strict division 
between the influence of 'constants' on forms and structures 
and of 'variables' on processes and perceptions was not borne 
out by the empirical survey. 'Constants' were shown to have 
an effect on processes and perceptions, for example, by provid­
ing the objective power base of the actors, and variables were 
found to influence forms and structures as well as conflicts 
arising both directly, (for example by the provisions of the 
WCA 1972) and indirectly, by changes in attitudes and policies 
of the actors. The study showed that the effect of variables, 
such as legislation, trade union and employer policies, can 
substantially alter the 'general* rules formulated about the 
effect of constants, such as technological process, on levels 
of conflict and plant-level relations. Further testing is 
required of the hypothesis that 'constants' provide the objective 
environment for conflicts and resolution process, whereas 
variables provide a subjective environment via their influence 
on the attitudes, and thus the policies, of the actors.
The inclusion of West Germany into the study of conflict and 
conflict resolution in industrial relations systems has shown 
the crucial role which the state can play in shaping industrial 
relations systems. The effectiveness of state policy in the'"
FR.G is related to general social values supporting the role 
of the state as a neutral arbiter in social conflicts and the 
effect legislation has had on the change in actor perceptions 
towards a common system ideology at plant level in particular.
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Poole has indicated that an active state role in industrial
relations is associated with legalistic and regulatory patterns
of industrial relations, and consultative relationships where
22corporatism exists. Further study of the effect of different23roles of the state in the economy and society generally on 
industrial relations would provide greater understanding of the 
operation of different systems and contribute to the debate on 
which factors lead to significant changes in the operation of 
industrial relations.
iii) Subjective Influences
The study has sought to incorporate a variety of types of
influence on conflicts and resolution processes, including
structural, cultural and action influences. Further investigation
is required of the circumstances in which these different types
of influence have a significant effect. Socio-psychological
influences, in particular, have been neglected in the study of
industrial relations phenomena in favour of structural influences*
which are easier to measure and quantify. Factors like actor
perception and attitudes have, however, been shown to have an
important influence on both conflict levels and actual processes 
24of resolution. The study of areas such as a high conflict
25perception of actors and the influences on this will need 
to consider both structural factors (for example, number of 
shopstewards, technological features, number and form of con­
tacts with the trade union, modalities of trade union influence 
at company level) and socio-psychological aspects, such as 
attitudes towards opponents and own role based on a study of 
the historical development of these attitudes through concrete
experiences and the significance of key personalities in
26specific circumstances. Structural factors provide an environ­
ment in which the actors operate as well as defining certain of 
their characteristics such as number and skill levels etc. 
Perceptional factors are crucial for the ways in which the 
actors perceive and act upon these environmental influences.
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iv) Processes
In the investigation of conflict resolution,emphasis has been 
laid on the processes of resolution rather than on formal pro­
cedures and structures. The latter do have some effect on actual 
resolution but do not describe actual practice at plant level3 
which is also dependent on the influence of other factors 
including structural and perceptional elements. Investigation 
of actual processes in the IR.S will include behavioural studies 
of the type of encounters between the actors and the motivations 
behind them. Further study is required of influences on the 
behaviour patterns of the actors, including resort to third 
parties, resort to industrial action or negotiation based on 
cooperative processes, the use of committees and role of sig­
nificant individual actors in the resolution process. The 
effects of specific behaviour patterns on future relationships 
and resolution processes (feedback effect) as well as on actual 
perceptions of the actors is an area for further investigation.
The study showed the trend towards the concentration of 
resolution in the hands of key workforce representatives and 
works management in both the U.K. and the.FRG. Further research 
is required of the reasons for this and the extent of workforce 
support for such patterns, especially in the U.K. The relation­
ship between the argumentation used to support the actors’ 
positions on conflict issues and their actual behaviour patterns 
also needs closer investigation.
v) Output
As indicated earlier, further consideration needs to be given 
to the meaning of 'rules’, seen as an output of the IRS. The 
empirical study and literature survey showed how joint rules 
form only one type of regulatory measure, unilateral rules 
of both management and the workforce are also significant. 
Further study is required of the effect of different types 
of rules on the operation of the IRS and the actors' relation­
ships at plant level. Unilateral rulings, for example, are,in
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certain circumstances, indicative of a conflict relationship 
between the actors and promote such a relationship; elsewhere 
they express a consensus of the actors on how issues are to be 
regulated. The meanings behind the rules for the actors concerned 
requires empirical study.
The study has also shown how non-regulation can form one of the 
outputs from the IRS. The extent of non-resolution of issues 
needs to be further investigated, particularly in the U.K., 
where it is expected to be higher than in the FRG. The effect 
of non-resolution on the IRS and the wider economic system also 
requires further empirical study, particularly its effect on 
the systems' stability and continued operation and on the inter­
vention of the state and other parties to ensure regulation 
occurs in ways which support the operation of other systems in 
society.
II) The Mature of the IRS Model - Stability and Change
Further investigation is required into the evolution of a 'system 
ideology* in the IRS and its association with the wider value 
system in society as a whole. The study of the German system 
has indicated the significant role of the state in the develop­
ment of a system, as opposed to interest group, ideology, since 
it is viewed as the guardian of general social values and system 
stability. In West Germany, the state tends to.be seen as a 
neutral overseer of relationships in society and is permitted 
to intervene to ensure they develop in accordance with general 
social values. This has promoted a system ideology in the IRS 
based on cooperation and joint responsibilities for the operation 
of the system. In the Japanese situaticn3other actors, such as 
the giant companies, have promoted a system ideology in the IRS.
The study of the West German and British systems has indicated 
the importance of a system ideology for stability in the IRS.
A socially-based system ideology in the IRS promotes greater 
stability than one based on a business partnership between
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capital and labour and the need to achieve one s own interests
27by a measure of cooperation with the opposing side. Doubts 
have been raised as to whether ’voluntarism1 was in fact ever a 
’system ideology’ supported by all the IRS actors or just the 
outcome of a lack of agreement about how the system should 
operate and the absence of one dominant actor able to impose 
its own views on the others. Changing economic circumstances 
which promoted a stronger role for labour led to the decline 
of voluntarism as a ’system ideology', although labour still 
supports its principles. Further study is required of the 
assumption that conflicts originating in a lack of agreement 
on the principles of the IRS (i.e. no system ideology) are more 
serious than those about substantive issues within an agreed 
framework. The study has shown how 'system ideologies' are
only one component in the ideological framework of the IRS, for
different groups develop their own ideological outlooks, which 
may or may not be congruent with each other. Stability is 
associated with a greater rather than a lesser measure of con­
gruency of actor ideologies. The factors involved in the 
development of specific ideologies will require further invest­
igation of structural, cultural and action influences in their 
historical context.
Change in the IR.S can arise from changes in the external environ­
ment and in the system itself. More study will be required of 
the relationship between the two types of change - on whether 
the latter type is always the result of changes in the environ­
ment or whether it can be self-generating and in what ways.
The fact of continued stability in the pattern and style of 
relationships in the face of external environmental changes has 
already been pointed out. This has been tentatively explained 
in terms of the importance of attitudes and perceptions in both 
relationships and the way the environment is viewed, analysed 
and acted upon by the actors. Attitudes and perceptions are 
less open to change than environmental factors. Further invest­
igation of the circumstances under which changes in attitudes 
and perceptions do take'place would promote the understanding 
of the relationship between context* processes and output in 
the IRS, particularly with respect to conflict resolution.
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9) Illustration of the Modified IRS Model and Resume
of its Uses in Industrial Relations Pus search
The model of the IRS,incorporating the modifications discussed 
in this chapter, is illustrated overleaf. An outline of the 
key modifications is given below;-
1) The model reflects both a temporal and spatial study of
the IRS since it incorporates the historical factors
28behind the evolution of the present system.
2) The model represents an attempt to reflect both the 
similarities and differences between national systems 
by distinguishing those elements producing similarities 2 9(’constants') and those producing differences (’variables').
3) The model includes the decisions of actors in the system 
as an important influence on the form and operation of the 
system and does not view the decisions as solely 
determined by environmental factors. Actor perception
of the environment and actor interests and values have a 
crucial impact on decisions made. The significance of 
actor decisions on the system is viewed both in its 
historical and current perspective.
4) The model incorporates both ideologies and cultural value 
systems. A system ideology is defined as the sum total
of congruencies in the ideologies of the different actors as to 
how the system is to operate, and it is related to the common 
value system at national societal level. The existence 
of diverging ideologies is, however, also recognised at 
all levels of the system.
5) Since the model has been developed to consider conflict 
resolution, it includes not only the existence of different 
ideologies based on perceived and actual conflicts of 
interests in the system, but also a consideration of differ­
ing power positions not only at national level but also at
plant level. Power positions reflect both objective and 
subjective power resources, which are related to the 
nercoptions and values of the actors concerned.
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6) The model is based on a view of society as a unit com­
prising diverging and converging interests and values.
The stability or instability of a specific social system 
requires empirical investigation and should not be assumed. 
Pressures for change and instability arise both from within 
the system, with its varying interest groups, and from 
without in the wider international context. This view 
holds true for the IRS, which is seen as a subsystem of the 
economic system.
7) The model has emphasised the importance of both structural
and cultural environmental factors as w e l l  as actors' goals
and values in shaping the processes of conflict resolution. 
An attempt has been made to investigate the causal links 
between context, processes and output in the IRS. The 
significance of actor nercentions and interests as ano  *- j*
intermediary factor between context and processes has been 
highlighted.
8) In accordance with the view of society and the IRS as 
comprising diverging and converging interests and values, 
the possibility of non-resolution of conflict issues in 
the output from the system has been included in the model. 
Depending on the seriousness of the matter at issue for 
the system and the extent of non-resolution, the absence 
of rules to regulate conflicts can lead to instability and 
eventual collapse of an IRS. Examples of this include, at 
plant or firm level, the bankruptcy and demise of a company 
or one of its subsidiaries.
Various uses of the model of the IRS have been indicated in
chapter seven. A rdsume of possible uses is given below:-
1) The IRS model permits the investigation of the influence 
of different levels, including international, national,
industry, company and plant levels, on industrial relations
30phenomena. It facilitates investigation of two national 
systems of industrial relations, the operation of one 
national system, differences between the operation of
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1) different industry branches and between companies and
cont*plants within an industry branch or a single company.
The significance of different levels will vary with the 
subject natter under investigation and indications have 
been given of their varying significance.
2) The IRS model can be used in the study of the current
operation of industrial relations and in the historical
evolution of specific patterns of industrial relation
behaviour by means of an investigation of the environmental
context and actor decisions which originally shaped the 
31current system and the evolution of the system through 
to its present day operation and structures. The inclusion 
of socio-cultural influences and the role of the state and 
judiciary permit an assessment of pre-industrial society 
influences and their effect on current systems of industrial 
relations. The present day system is viewed as the result 
of actor decisions in specific contexts in the pre-industrial 
as well as industrial era.
3) The model provides a comprehensive illustration of the 
varying influences which need to be considered in the study 
of industrial relations issues. The inclusion of structural, 
cultural and social action influences precludes any biased, 
and thus incorrect, assessment of the key influences on 
specific issues and processes. The model ensures that 
aspects of industrial relations can be viewed in their 
wider societal context and thus permits an investigation
not only of the form and structures of the IRS but also the 
processes and meanings behind the structures and processes.
4) In the present study, a differentiation has been made 
between 'constants' (environmental factors thought to pro­
mote similarities in all IP.Ss) and 'variables' (thought to 
promote differences). The empirical application of the 
model has shown that the distinction made by Dunlop between 
the technical, marke,t and power contexts of industrial 
relations is much more complex in actual practice, since 
the power context ('variables') significantly influences 
the operation of the technical and market contexts and
421
4) thus reduces the extent of similarities between systems.
cont . Further research is required into the subtleties of the 
interaction between the two types of influence; the inter­
action is included in the model by the incorporation of a 
feedback effect.
5) The modifications made to the model as a result of the 
empirical findings reflect the importance of social action 
and behavioural influences in the investigation of the 
processes of industrial relations, and facilitate the 
investigation of actors' goals, values and perceptions, 
viewed as key influences on both the processes and structures 
of industrial relations. The status of social action 
influences such as these is complex - neither that of an 
intermediary between context and process nor fully independ­
ent. It is questionable whether independent influences as 
such exist at all, since factors such as size, technology, 
and market context are all subject to the influence of 
actors' policies and decisions within their perceived 
environment.0 Thus structural and social action influences 
are seen as interdependent and the modalities of this inter­
dependence needs to be investigated in specific instances.
6) The model can be used in an investigation of the causal 
links between context, process and output in industrial 
relations. As indicated earlier, the actors provide the 
crucial link between context, which is essentially inanimate, 
and processes, reflecting the activity and relationships 
between living actors as they regulate issues arising. The 
influence of contextual features is not determining but 
subject to the way the actors perceive and act upon the 
environmental influences in accordance with their particular 
values, goals and interests.
7) The model has been shown to be of use in studying one 
element of the processes in the industrial relations system - 
conflict resolution' - in its wider context. Fmnpirical 
application of the model has led to modifications in the
model so that it better reflects the reality of industrial
422
7)
cont
3)
relations in two national systems. The model has been 
’used not only to describe how the systems operate in 
practice but in an explanation of why they operate in 
the way they do. A number of hypotheses on the relative 
significance of different elements of the system have 
been proposed. These result from findings accruing from 
the application of the model to an empirical research 
situation - a crossnational study of conflicts and conflict 
resolution at plant level.
The adjustments made to Dunlop's original concept of an 
industrial relations system ensure- that the present model 
more accurately reflects the reality of industrial relations, 
which are marked by both conflict and cooperation, instab­
ility and stability, in varying measures. Further applic­
ation of the model to specific empirical issues will 
promote its sophistication and reflection of the reality 
of industrial relations phenomena. It would benefit, in 
particular, from further investigation of behavioural and 
psychological aspects of industrial relations activity in 
relation to environmental factors.
The modified industrial relations system concept, as out­
lined in the present study, will be a useful tool in 
crossnational studies of industrial relations phenomena, 
in particular, due to its comprehensive scope and ability 
to generate hypotheses and accommodate empirical findings 
as indicated in this study.
»
1 2 6 0 2 4 9  <5 9 1 6 0 2 4 )
XV O L U M E  T W 0
\
S q ' M O '2—4-
II
Appendices 
Footnotes 
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Volume Two
Appendix 3 
Appendix 4
Bibliography
Page No.
1
Summary of Key Areas of Questioning in 120
the Interview Schedules and Questionnaire Survey — ■ - - —
Interview Schedules 122
2.1 Works Council (Betriebsrat) 122
2.1 a) Schedule given to Works 122
Council
2.1 b) Schedule of Interviewer 124
2.2 Management (Betriebsleitung) 130
2.2 a) Schedule given to Management 130
2.2 b) Schedule of Interviewer 132
The Questionnaires 137
3.1
■ .......... .......—
Workforce (Belegschaftsmitglieder) 137
3.2 Foremen (Meister) 145
3.3 Works Council (Betriebsrat) 157
3.4 Shopstewards (Vertrauensleute) 165
Diagrams of Key Influences on Conflict 177
Issues and Resolution Procedures in the
Case Studv Firms
4.1 Firm A 177
4.2 Firm B 178
4.3 Firm C 179
4.4 Firm D 181
4.5 Firm F, 183
4.6 Firm F 1854.7 Firm G 187
4.8 Firm H 190
4.9 Firm I 193
194
1 . Works Cited 194
2. General Bibliography 216
1Footnotes Chapter One
1 Behrend, Hilde, 'The Field of Industrial Relations',
BJIR vol. 1, No. 3, 1963, p. 383 - 394.
2 ibid., p . 384.
3 Dunlop, J.T., 'Industrial Relations Systems', 1958.
4 Pirker, T. et al., 'Arbeiter, Management, Mitbestimmung',
1955.
Neuloh, 0., 'Der neue Betriebsstil', 1960.
Popitz, H. et al., 'Technik und Industriearbeit', 1957. 
Spiro, H.J., ' Codeterminaticn. in Germany', American 
Political Science Review, December 1954.
Blumenthal, 'Codetermination in the German Steel 
Industry', 1956.
Blume, 0., 'Normen und Wirklichkeit einer Betriebs- 
verfassung', 1964.
5 Bergmann, J. et al., 'Gewerkschaften in der BRD', 1974. 
Dzielak, W. et ah, 'Organisationspolitische Voraus- 
setzungen gewerkschaftlicher ArbeitskampffMhigkeit', 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte» 1979, p. 680 - 691.
IMSF-, * Die Septemberstreiks 1969', 1969.
Steinhauay K., 'Streiks in der BRD 1966 - 1974', 1975. 
Streek, W . , 'Gewerkschaftliche Organisationsprobleme 
in der sozialstaatlichen Demokratie', 1981.
6 Erd, R. , 'Verrechtlichung industrieller Konflikte', 1978.
Esser, J., ' Staatsf ixierung oder S t&rlcung der eigenen 
KrHfte Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte No. 6, 1981.
Hoffmann, R . , *Rechtsfortschnitt durch gewerkschaftliche 
Gegenmacht', 1968.
Schmidt, E., 'Ordnungsfaktor oder Gegenmacht', 1971.
7 Altmann, N. et al., 'Bedingungen und Probleme betrieblich 
initiierter HumanisierungsmaBnahmen', 1980.
8 Steinkilhler, F., 'Werktage werden besser - die Durch-
setzung und Anwendung des LRTV II', 1977.
9 Bdhle, F. et al., 'Arbeitnehmer^politik und betriebliche
Strategic. Zur ..Institutionalisierung und Wirksamkeit 
staatlichaund kollektiverInteressendurchsetzung', 1980.
10 Dunlop, op. cit.
11 Parsons, T. et al., 'Economy and Society’, 1966.
12 Dunlop, op. cit., p. viii - ix.
13 ibid. p. 30, c/f. Parsons, op. cit., p. 48 - 49 on the
4 subsystems:- economy, polity, integrative and pattern 
maintenance subsystems.
14 ibid. p. 385.
15 ibid. p. 7.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
2
ibid. p. 33.
ibid. p. 34.
ibid. p. 35
ibid. p. 47
ibid. p. 34.
ibid. p. 60.
ibid. p. 61.
ibid. p. 90.
ibid. p. 92.
ibid. p. 94.
ibid. p. 99.
Dunlop, J.T.
58
’Political Systems and the Industrial 
Relations System', International Institute of Labor 
Studies Bulletin No. 9, 1972. Excerpts in Barrett, B., 
'Industrial Relations and the Wider Society', p. 363 - 373.
ibid. p. 365.
Dunlop, J.T., 'Industrial Relations Systems', p. 307.
ibid. p. 341.
ibid. p. 388,
ibid. p. 307
ibid. p. 319.
Poole,.M., 'Theories of Trade Unionism', p. 21.
Hyman, R., 'Strikes', 1977, p. 68.
Singh, R . , 'Systems Theory in the Study of Industrial 
Relations - Time for a Reappraisal?1, IRJ 1976, p. 59 - 71. 
Kirkbride, P., 'Industrial Relations Research and the 
Case for a New Approach', Management Decision, Vol. 17,
No. 4, 1979.
Lumley, R., 'A Modified Rules Approach to Workplace 
Industrial Relations’, University of Aston Management 
Centre, Working Papers Series No. 109, 1978.
Bains, G.S. et al., 'A Strategy for Industrial Relations 
Research in Great Britain', BJIR Vol. XII, No. 1, 1974, 
p . 91 - 113.Hyman, R., 'Industrial Relations - a Marxist Introduction',
1975.
Blain, A.N.J. et al., 'Industrial Relations Theory - a 
Critical Preview', BJIR 1970, p. 389 - 407.
ibid. p. 67.
338 Craig, A.W., 'A Framework for the Analysis of the 
Industrial Relations System' in Barrett, B, , op. cit.,
p . 8 - 20,
39 ibid.
40 Webb, S. B., 'Industrial Democracy', 1897 .
41 Flanders, A., 'Collective Bargaining - a Theoretical 
Analysis', BJIR Vol. VI, No. 1, 1968, p. 1 - 26.
42 Blain, A.N.J., 'Pilots and Management - Industrial 
Relations in the U.K. Airlines', 1972.
43 Blain et al., op. cit.
44 ibid. p. 406.
45 Blain, op. cit. p. 327.
46 Hyman, R., 'Strikes', 1977, Chapter 3, p. 72.
47 Hyman, op. cit. p. 72.
48 ibid. p. 72 - 73.
49 ibid. p. 72.
50 Craig, op. cit.
51 ibid. p . 11.
52 ibid. p. 19, c/f Walker.
Walker, K.F., 'Using the Systems Approach Effectively', 
Employee Relations No. 2, 1981, p. 23 - 25.
Walker, K.F., 'Australian Industrial Relations Systens', 1970 
Walker, K.F., 'Towards Useful Theorizing about Industrial 
Relations', BJIR, Vol. XV, 1977, p. 307 - 316.
Walker, K.F., 'Worker Participation in Management in 
Practice' in Thakur, C.P., p. 226.
53 Hyman, R . , 'Industrial Relations - a Marxist Introduction1,
p . 12.
54 Hyman, R . , 'Strikes', p. 68.
55 Wood, S.J. et al., 'The Industrial Relations System Concept
as a Basis for Theory in Industrial Relations', BJIR. Vol. 
XIII, 1975, p. 291 - 308.
56 Schienstock, C., 'Towards a Theory of Industrial Relations' 
BJIR, July 1981, p. 170 - 189.
Reynaud, J.D., 'Industrial Relations and Political Systems 
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Industrial Relations in 
Western Europe','BJIR 1980, p. 1 - 12.
57 Wood, op. cit.
Walker, K.F., ’Using the Systems Approach Effectively’, 
Employee Relations No. 2, 1981, p. 23 - 25.
Blain, A.N.J. et al., op. cit.
Walker, op. cit.
Reynaud, op. cit.
Dunlop, op. cit. p. 388.
Craig, op. cit. p. 10.
Gill, J. / Golding, D., 'Conceptualising Industrial 
Relations as a Training Intervention', Employee Relations 
Vol. 2, No. 4, 1980, p. 24 - 28.
Hill, S. / Thurley, K., 'Sociology and Industrial 
Relations', BJIR, Vol. XII, 1974, p. 147 - 170.
Hyman, R., 'Industrial Relations - a Marxist Introduction
1975.
ibid. p. 12.
'The Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers' Associations 1965 - 1968', 1968.
Bains / Clegg, op. cit. p. 92.
ibid. p. 95.
Blain, A.N.J. et al., op. cit.
Wood, op. cit.
Poole, M., op. cit. p. 117.
Hyman, R., 'Industrial Relations - a Marxist Introduction
p . 5 - 6.
c f. Allen, V.L., 'The Sociology of Industrial Relations',
1971.
Brav.ermann, H., 'Labor and Monopoly Capital', 1974. 
Nichols, T. et al., 'Living with Capitalism', 1977.
Fox, A., 'Industrial Relations - a Social Critique of 
Pluralism', in Barrett, op. cit. p. 302 - 324.
Goldthorpe, J.H., 'Industrial Relations in Britain - 
Critique of Reformism' in Clarke, T. et al. (1977), 
p. 184 - 224.
c f.Goldthorpe, J.H. 'Social Inequality and Social 
Integration in Modern Britain' in Wedderburn, D. (ed), 
1974, p. 222.
Eldridge, J.E.T., 'Panaceas and Pragmatism in Industrial 
Relations', IRJ Vol. 6 , No. 1, 1975, p. 4 - 13.
579 Hyman, R., 'Inequality, Ideology and Industrial Relations', 
BJIR Vol. 12, 1974, p”. 171 - 190.
80 Dahrendorf, R., 'Class and Class Conflict in Industrial 
Society', 1959.
81 Dahrendorf, R., 'Sozialstruktur des Betriebes', 1959.
82 Dahrendorf, R., 'Class and Class Conflict', op. cit.
p. 257.
83 Ingham, G.K., 'Strikes and Industrial Conflict', 1974.
84 c/f Clegg, H.A., 'The Changing System of Industrial
Relations', p. 278.
Hill/Thurley, op. cit.
Knowles, K.G.J.C., 'Strikes', 1952.
85 Bergmann, J. et al., op. cit.
Miiller-Jentsch, W. , 'Bedingungen kooperativer und 
konfliktorischer Gewerkschaftspolitik', Leviathan 1973.
86 Lupton, T., 'On the Shopfloor', 1963.
87 Crouch, C., 'Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations
Crisis', 1977.
88 Kahn-Freund, 0., 'Industrial Relations and the Law', in 
Barrett, op. cit. p. 385 - 400.
89 Palmer, G., 'British Industrial Relations', p. 145.
England, J. / Weekes, 'Trade Unions and the State - a 
Review of the Crisis', IRJ Vol. 12, No. 1, 1981, p. 11 - 26
90 Hepple, B., 'Individual Labour Law' in Bains, G.S. (1983), 
p. 392 - 417.
Lewis, R., 'Collective Labour Law* in Bains, G.S. (1983), 
p. 361 - 392.
91 England and Weekes, op. cit. p. 25.
Bright, D. / Sawbridge, 'Industrial Pvelations of Recession1 
IRJ Vol. 14, No. 3, 1983, p. 33.
92 Flanders, A., 'Collective Bargaining - Prescription for 
Change', 1967.
Fox, A. / Flanders, 'The Reform of Collective Bargaining', 
BJIR Vol. VII, 2, 1969.
93 England / Weekes, op. cit. p. 24.
94 Daniel, W.W. / Stilgoe, 'The Impact of Employment 
Protection Laws', PSI No. 577, June 1978, p. 84.
95 Hepple, op. cit. p. 414 (with respect to individual 
labour law).
96 Edwards, P.K., 'The Pattern of Collective Industrial Action'
in Bains G.S. (1983), p. 234.
97 Sisson, K. / Brown, 'Industrial Relations in the Private
Sector' in Bains, G.S. (1983), p. 153.
98 Gospel, H.F., 'Trade Unions and the Legal Obligation to
Bargain', BJIR Nov. 1983, p. 351.
99 Palmer, op. cit. p. 235.
100 Booth, A., 'Corporatism, Capitalism and Depression',
BJS Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, 1982, p. 219.
101 Conrad, W. , 'The Federal R.epublic of Germany' in Blum, A.A. ,
1981, p. 209 - 238.
102 Dahrendorf, R. , 'Sozialstruktur des Betriebes', 1959,
p. 66 (citing McPherson).
103 Ramm, T., 'The Legality of Industrial Action and Methods
of Settlement Procedure' in Aaron et al. (ed) 'Industrial 
Conflict - a Comparative Legal Survey', 1972.
104 Unterseher, L., 'Arbeitsrecht - eine deutsche
SpezialitHt', KJB 1972, p. 190 - 201.
105 Pvamm, op. cit.
106 Bahl, V., 'Lohnverhandlungssysten der Weimarer Republik',
GMH, 1973, p. 397 - 411.
Hartwich, H.H., 'Sozialstaatspostulat und gesellschaftliches 
Status Quo', 1977.
Mommsen, 11., 'Die Gewerkschaften und die Durchsetzung des 
Sozialstaates in Deutschland', GMH, Heft 2, 1981, p. 76 - 86
107 Erd, op. cit.
Esser, J. et al., ’Gewerkschaften aLs SHule im Mode11 
Deutschland, KJB 1980/81 , p. 51 - 62.
Hoffmann, op. cit.
Leminsky, G., 'Wandel gewerkschaftlicher Strategien nach 
dem zweiten Weltkrieg', GMH 1981 (Heft 2).
Leminsky, G., 'Humanisierung der Arbeit aus eigener Kraft', 
GMH, Heft 4, 1980, p. 213 - 220.
108 Lehmbruch, op. cit.
Lehmbruch, G., 'Liberal Corporatism and Party Government', 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 10, 1977, p. 91 - 126.
109 Alemann, U., 'Auf dem Weg zum industriellen Korporatismus', 
GMH, 1979, p. 552.
110 Bergmann, J. et al., op. cit.
Schmidt, E., op. cit.
Streeck, W. , 'Das'Dilemma der Organisation' in MeiBner, W. 
et al., 1Verteilungskampf und StabilitHtspolitik', 1972,
p. 130 - 137.
7111 Streeck, W. et al. , 'Rail Unions in Britain and West 
Germany', 1982.
112 Dunlop, op. cit., p. 317 - 334.
113 England / Weekes, op. cit. p. 20.
114 Lammers, C.J. / Hickson, 'Towards a Comparative Sociology 
of Organisations' in Lammers C.J. et al. (1979), p. 3 - 20.
115 Kerr, C. / Dunlop, 'Industrialism and Industrial Man', 1962.
116 Child, J. / Kieser, 'Organisation and Management Roles in
British and West German Companies' in Lammers, C.J. et al. 
(1979), p. 253.
117 Maurice, M . , 'For the Study of 'the Societal Effect'' in
Lammers, C.J. et al. (1979), p. 42 - 60.
118 Sorge, A. et al., 'Societal Differences in Organising
Manufacturing Units', Organisation Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
1980, p. 59 - 86.
119 Marsden, D., 'Industrial Democracy - Job Regulation and
Internal Labour Markets' in Diefenbacher, H. (1981), p. 359 - 
372.
120 Lawrence, P., 'Managers and Management in West Germany',
1982, p. 82.
121 Granick, D., 'Managerial Comparisons of Four Developed
Countries', 1972, p. 371.
122 Maurice, M. et al., 'Societal Analysis of Industrial
Relations', BJIR Nov. 1979, p. 322 - 336.
Sorge, A., 'The Evolution of Industrial Democracy',
BJIR Vol. 14, 1976, p. 274 - 294.
123 Clarke, P., 'Cultural Context as a Determinant of
Organisational Rationality' in Lammers, C.J. et al. (1979), 
p. 272 - 286.
Eyraud, F., 'The Principles of Union Action1, BJIR Vol. XXI, 
No. 3, 1983, p. 358 - 376.
Gallie, D., 'In Search of the New Working Class', 1978.
124 Sorge, A., 'The Cultural Context of Organisational
Structure', in Warner, M. (1977), p. 72.
125 Eyraud, op. cit., p. 373.
126 Faucheux, C. et al., 'Social Psychology and Industrial 
Relations', in Stephenson (1979), p. 33 - 49.
127 Shalev, M. , 'Industrial Relations Theory and the Comparative 
Study of Industrial Conflict', BJIR 1980, p. 26 - 43.
128 Wood, S. et al., 'A Critical Evaluation of Fox's 
Radicalisation of Industrial Relations Theory', Sociology, 
Vol. 11, No. 1, 1977.
129 Poole, M. , 'Theories of Trade Unionism', 1981, p. 47.
130 Flanders, A., 'Industrial Relations:- What is Wrong with 
the System?', 1965.
131 ibid. p. 10.
132 ibid. p. 18.
133 ibid. p. 19.
134 Flanders, A., 'Collective Bargaining - Prescription for 
Change', 1967.
135 Flanders, A. / Fox, A., 'The Reform of Collective Bargaining
from Donovan to Durkheim', BJIR 1969, p. 151 - 180.
136 Fox, A., 'Industrial Relations - a Social Critique of 
Pluralist Ideology', in Barrett, op. cit., p. 302 - 324.
137 Goldthorpe, op. cit.
138 Clegg, H.A., 'Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining',
1976, p . 4.
139 loc. cit.
140 Clegg, H.A., 'The Changing System of Industrial Relations',
1979, p. 271 - 272.
141 Clegg, H.A., 'Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining', 
1976.
142 Fox, op. cit. also his article 'A Note on Industrial 
Relations Pluralism', Sociology, Vol. 13, 1979, p. 105 - 109
143 Clegg, H.A., 'Pluralism in Industrial Relations', BJIR 
Vol. 13, 1975, p. 309.
144 Turner, II.A. , 'Labour Relations in the Motor Industry', 1967
145 Royal Commission Report, op. cit.
146 Bergmann, op. cit. p. 15.
147 HoB, D., 'Die Krise des institutionalisierten Klassen- 
kampfes', 1974.
148 Express Pvedaktionskollelctiv, 'Spontane Streiks 1973', 1974, 
IMSF 'Die Septemberstreiks 1969', 1969.
149 Schmidt, op. cit.
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
9
Miiller-Jentsch, W. , 'Entwicklungen und Widersprilche in der 
westdeutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung', KJB 1973, p. 150 - 162.
Mliller-Jentsch, W. , 'Bedingungen kooperativer und 
konfliktorischer Gewerkschaftspolitik', Leviathan I,
Heft 2, 1973.
Esser, J., 'Staatsfixierung oder StMrkung der eigenen 
Kraft’, GMII, No. 6, 1981.
Jacobi, 0., 'Gewerkschaftliche Lohnpolitik under dem Druck 
anti-Keynesian Wirtschaftspolitik', in Bergmann, J.
'BeitrHge zur Soziologie der Gewerkschaften', 1979, p. 326 - 
362.
Streeck, W. , 'Das Dilemma der Organisation' in MeiBner, W. 
et al. (ed) 'Verteilungskampf und StabilitHtspolitik1, 1972, 
p. 130 - 167.
Streeck, W . , 'Gewerkschaftliche Organisationsprobleme in 
der sozialstaatlichen Demokratie', 1981.
Streeck, W . , 'Gewerkschaftsorganisation und industrielle 
Beziehungen', in Matthes, J., 'Sozialer Wandel in West- 
europa', 1979, p. 206.
Seglow, P. / Streeck, W . , 'Rail Unions in Britain and West 
Germany', 1982.
Miller, D., 'Social Partnership and the Determinants of 
Workplace Independence in West Germany', BJIR, March 1982, 
p. 44 - 62.
ibid. p. 62.
Streeck, W . , 'Qualitative Demands and the Neocorporatist 
Manageability of Industrial Relations', BJIR, July 1981.
Miiller-Jentsch, W. , 'Neue Konfliktpotentiale und 
institutionelle StabilitHt', in Matthes, op. cit. p. 185.
Inkson et al., 'A Comparison of Organisation Structure 
and Management Roles', in Hickson, D.J. (1981).
McMillan, C.J. et al., 'The Structure of Work Organisations 
across Societies', in Hickson, D.J. (1981), p. 37 - 47.
Pugh, D.S., 'The Comparative Study of Organisations’, in 
Salaman, G. (1973), p. 50 - 65.
Hickson, D.J. et al., 'The Culture-Free Context of 
Organisational Structure', Sociology, No. 8, 1974, p. 59 - 80.
Hage, J., 'Choosing Constraints and Constraining Choice', 
in Warner, M. (1980), p. 50.
Horvarth, 'The Cultural Context of Organisational Control', 
in Hickson, D.J. (1981), p. 173 - 183.
10
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
166 Hofstede, G. 'Hierarchical Power Distance in Forty 
Countries', in Lammers, C.J. (1979), p. 97 - 119.
Child, J., 'Organisational Structure, Environment and 
Performance - the Role of Strategic Choice', in Salaman, G. 
(1973), p. 91.
Child, J. / Kieser, op. cit. p. 267.
Sorge, A. (1980), op. cit. p. 59 - 86.
Mansfield, R., 'The International Study of Organisational 
Structure', in Mansfield/Poole (1981), p. 11 - 22.
Loveridge, R . , 'Centralism v Federalism', in Thurley, K. / 
Woods (1983), p. 189.
Purcell, J. / Sisson, K., 'Strategies and Practice in the 
Management of Industrial Relations', in Bains, G.S. (1983), 
p. 117.
Thurley, K. / Wood, 'Business, Strategy and Industrial 
Relations Strategy', in Thurley/Woods (1983), p. 209.
Poole, M., 'Divergence and Convergence in Management 
Structure', in Mansfield/Poole (1981), p. 53.
Gospel, H., 'The Development of Management Organisation 
in Industrial Relations', in Thurley/Woods (1983), p. 109.
McMillan, op. cit.
Brown, W. et al., 'A Survey of the Factors shaping Shop- 
Steward Organisation in Britain', BJIR Vol. XVI, 1978, 
p. 139 - 159.
Poole, M., 'A Power Analysis of Workplace Labour Relations', 
IRJ Vol. 7, 1976.
Boraston, I. et al., 'Workplace and Union', 1975.
Ingham, G.K., 'Size of Industrial Organisation and Worker 
Behaviour', 1970.
Brown, op. cit.
Edwards, P.K., 'Strike-Proneness of British Manufacturing 
Establishments', BJIR, July 1981, p. 135 - 148.
Prais, S.J., 'Strike Frequencies and Plant Size', BJIR 
March 1982, p. 101.
Turner, I-I.A. et al., 'Management Characteristics and Labour 
Conflict', 1977. .
11
185 ibid. p. 74.
186 Nash, M. , ’Industrial Relations in the Small Firm',
Employee Relations, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1980, p. 15 - 18.
Also:-
Clifton, R. et al., 'The Impact of Employment Legislation 
on Small Firms', 1979.
Ford, J., 'Who Breaks the Rules? The Response of Small 
Businesses to External Regulation', IRJ, Vol. 13, No. 3,
1982, p. 40 - 49.
Stanworth, M.J.K. et al., 'Management Motivation in the 
Smaller Business', 1973.
187 Altmann, op. cit.
188 Krahn, K., 'Zur Anwendung praxisrechtlicher Bestimmungen 
bei der Gestaltung betrieblicher Arbeitsbeddn^n^e-n 3‘ in 
Pdhler, W. (ed) '... damit die Arbeit menschlicher wird',1979
189 Baroth, H.D., 'In unseren Betrieben', 1977.
190 Kern, H. et al., 'Materialien zur Humanisierung der 
Arbeit' , 1,975.
191 Curran, J. et al., 'Worker Involvement and Social Relations 
in the Small Firm', Sociological Review, Vol. 27, 1979,
p. 317 - 342.
192 Allen, G.C., 'The Structure of Industry in Great Britain', 
1970.
193 Hannah, L. et al., 'Concentration in Modern Industry', 1977.
194 Prais, S.J., 'The Evolution of Giant Firms in Britain', 1976.
Also:-
Loveridge, op. cit. p. 173 (centralisation of capital has 
occurred via mergers with a federal administration so that 
former companies retain control over their establishments) 
and Gospel, op. cit. p. 109 (on the preference for loose 
federal structures in British companies).
195 Ford, op. cit. p. 82.
196 Rlauner, R., 'Alienation and Freedom', 1964.
197 ibid, p. 6.
198 Woodward, J., 'Industrial Organisation - Theory and 
Practice', 1965, p. 50.
199 Reeves, T. et al., 'Study of Managerial Control', in 
Woodward, J., 'Industrial Organisation - Behaviour and 
Control', 1970, p. 37.
200 Davies, C. et a l ' T e c h n o l o g y  and Other Variables', in 
Warner, M., 'Sociology of the Workplace', 1973, p. 149 - 163.
12
201 ibid. p. 161.
202 McMillan, op. cit.
203 Burns, T. et al., 'The Management of Innovation', 1961.
204 Reeves, T., Woodward, J. et al., 'Technology and 
Organisational Behaviour', in Woodward, J., 'Industrial 
Organisation - Behaviour and Control', 1970, p. 3.
205 Blauner, op. cit.
Walker, C.R. et al., 'The Man on the Assembly Line', 1952, 
Goldthorpe, J.II. et al. , 'The Affluent Worker', 1969.
206 Blauner, op. cit. p. 11.
207 Goldthorpe, op. cit.
208 Form, W.H., 'Technology and Social Behaviour of Workers in
Four Countries', American Sociological Review, Vol. 37,
1972, p. 727 - 38.
209 Sayles, L., 'Behaviour of Industrial Workgroups', 1958.
Euler, H.P., 'Das Konf1iktpotential industrieller 
Arbeitsstrukturen', 1977.
210 Sayles, op. cit. p. 131.
211 Popitz, H. et al., 'Technik und Industriearbeit', 1957.
212 Peach, D. et al., 'Grievance Initiation and Resolution', 1974
213 Kerr/Dunlop, op. cit. p. 296.
214 Manwaring, T., 'The Motor Manufacturing Industry in Britain', 
IRJ Vol. 14, No. 3, 1983, p. 20.
215 Sorge, A. et al., 'New Technology and Craftsmen's Skills
in Great Britain and West Germany', ER, Vol. 4, No. 5, 1982, 
p. 21 - 23.
216 Wilkinson, B., 'The Shopfloor Politics of New Technology', 
1983.
Also Gennard, J. / Dunn, 'The Impact of New Technology on 
the Structure and Organisation of Craftunions in the 
Printing Industry', BJIR, March 1983, p. 17 - 32.
217 Hirszowicz, M., 'Industrial Sociology', 1981, p. 25.
218 Weekes, D., 'Organisational Theory - Some Themes and 
Distinctions', in Salaman, op. cit. p. 375.
219 Kirkbride, P., 'Industrial Relations Theory and Research', 
Management Decision, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1979, p. 326 - 340.
220 Silvermann, D., 'The Theory of Organisations', 1970, 
chapter 7.
13
221 Child, op. cit.
222 Gouldner, A.W., ’Wildcat Strike1, 1954.
223 Lane, T. / Roberts, 'Strike at Pilkingtons', 1971,
224 Chinoy, E., 'Automobile Workers and the American Dream',
1955.
225 Goldthorpe, J.II. et al. , 'The Affluent Worker - 
Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour', 1968.
22.6 Kerr, C. / Siegel, 'The Interindustry Propensity to Strike',
in Evans/Creigh, op. cit. p. 233 - 253.
227 Partridge, B.E., 'Towards an Action Theory of Workplace 
Industrial Relations', 1976.
228 Mann, M., 'Consciousness and Action Among the Western 
Working Classes', 1973.
229 Runciman, W . , 'Relative Deprivation and Social Justice',
1966.
230 Goldthorpe, J.H., 'Social Inequality and Social Integration' 
in Wedderburn, D. (ed) 'Poverty, Inequality and Class 
Structure’, 1974, p. 228.
231 ibid. p. 8.
232 Kern, H. / Schumann, M. , 'Industriearbeit und Arbeiter-
bewuBtsein', Vol. 1, 1970.
233 Osterland, M., 'Die Auswirkungen der Krise auf Lebens- und 
Arbeitsalltag', 1976.
234 Dzielak, W. et al., 'Konstitutionsbedingungen industrieller 
Konf1ikte1, 1976/77.
235 Jures, E.A. et al., 'Politische Kultur im Betrieb', 1981.
236 Gross, H. et al., 'Die Handlungsbedeutung von Konflikt-
verarbeitungsmustern', 1982.
237 Schumann, M. et al., 1Tendenzwende im ArbeiterbewuBtsein?', 
Frankfurter Hefte, No. 4, 1977, p. 69 - 74.
238 Arzberger, K. et al., 'Wirtschaftliche Rezession,
Konfliktpotential und Reformbestrebungen in der Arbeit- 
nehmerschaft', GMH, No. 6, 1976, p. 375 - 380.
239 Herkommer, S. et al., 'Organisationsgrad und BewuBtsein', 
GMH, No. 11, 1979, p. 709 - 720.
240 Herkommer, S., 'Okonomische Entwicklung und das gesellschaft 
liche BewuBtsein von Arbeitnehmern', GMH 1976.
Also:-
Bierbaum, Chr. et al., 'Trend zum Konservativen', GMH, No. 7 
1976.
14
241 Hartmann, op. cit. p. 18 - 19.
242 Loveridge, op. cit. p. 185.
Marchington, M. / Loveridge, 'Management Decision­
making and Shopfloor Participation', in Thurley/Wood 
(1983) , p. 81.
243 Walker, K.F., 'Psychology and Industrial P\.elations' , in
Stephenson/Brotherton (1979), p. 20.
244 Rose, H., ’Industrial Behaviour', 1978, p. 263.
245 c f.Brotherton, C.J. et al., 'Psychology in the Study of
Industrial Relations', IRJ No. 6, 1975, p. 42 - 50.
Strauss, G., 'Can Social Psychology contribute to 
Industrial Relations?', in Stephenson/Brotherton (1979), 
p. 365 - 397.
246 Walton, R.E. / McKersie, 'A Behavioural Theory of Labor 
Negotiations', 1965.
247 ibid. p. 13.
248 ibid. p. 5.
249 loc. cit.
250 loc. cit.
251 Peterson, R.B. / Tracy, 'A Behavioural Model of Problem- 
Solving in Labour Negotiations', BJIR 1976, p. 159 - 173.
252 ibid. p. 159.
253 Deutsch, M. , 'The R.esolution of Conflict - Constructive 
and Destructive Processes', 1973.
254 ibid. p. 17.
255 ibid. p. 71.
256 ibid. p. 5.
257 Coser, L.A., 'The Functions of Social Conflict', 1956.
Coser, L.A., 'Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict',,
1967.
258 Galtung, J., 'Institutional Conflict Resolution', Journal 
of Peace Research, No. 4, 1965, p. 348 - 397.
259 Hill, S. et al., 'Sociology and Industrial Relations',
BJIR 1974, p. 147 - 170.
260 Poole, M. , 'A Power Analysis of Workplace Labour', IPvJ Vol. 7,
Mo. 3, 1976, p. 51.
261 Parker, S.R., 'Research into Workplace Industrial Relations',
in Warner, M. , 'Sociology of the Workplace', 1973 , p. 19 - 35..
15
262 Thomson, A.W.J. / Murray, V.V., 'Grievance Procedures',
1976.
263 ibid. p. 101.
264 Fiirstenberg, F., ' Zur Methodologie der Mitbestimmungs- 
forschung', in Diefenbacher, op. cit. p. 31 - 49.
265 Kotthoff, H., 'BetriebsrHte und betriebliche Ilerrschaft',
1981.
266 Soziologisches Seminar GUttingen, 'Entwicklungsbedingungen 
kollektiver Interessenvertretung im Industriebetrieb',
1930.
267 Dzielak, op. cit.
268 Wilpert, B., 'Research into Industrial Democracy - the 
German Case', IRJ No. 1, 1975, p. 56.
269 Henemann, G., 'Towards a General Conceptual System of 
Industrial P^elations' , in Somers, op. cit.
270 Dunlop, op. cit. p. 29.
271 ibid. p. 30.
272 Wood, op. cit. p. 297.
273 Parsons, op. cit. p. 307.
274 Wood, op. cit. p. 296.
275 Dunlop, op. cit. p. 89.
276 ibid. p. 90.
277 Dunlop, ibid. p. 24:- 'The smaller the unit to which the 
term (i.e. industrial relations system) is applied, the 
larger the context, and in general the larger the influence 
of givens outside the system'.
278 Reynaud, op. cit.
279 Poole, M., 'Theories in Trade Unionism', 1981, p. 21.
280 Easton, D., 'A Systems Analysis of Political Life', 1965.
281 ibid.
282 Craig, op. cit.
283 Batstone, E. et al., 'Shopstewards in Action, 1977, p. 144.
284 Poole, M., 'A Power Analysis of Workplace Labour Relations', 
IRJ Vol. 7, No. 3, 1976, p. 31 - 42.
16
285 Dunlop, op. cit. p. 16.
286 ibid. p. 17.
287 loc. cit.
288 Giner as cited by Poole, M. , 'Theories of Trade Unionism',
1981, p. 49.
289 ibid.
290 Blyton, P. 'Crossnational Currents in Joint Consultation', 
in Mansfield/Poole (1981), p. 66.
291 Blyton, op. cit. and Mansfield, R., 'Methods in Cross­
national Research', in Mansfield/Poole (1981), p. 54 - 58.
292 Poole, M., 'Industrial Democracy in Comparative Perspective'
in Mansfield/Poole (1981), p. 23 - 38.
293 Marsh, A.I., 'Disputes Procedures in British Industry',
1968.
294 Armstrong, E.G.A. et al., 'Normative Consensus, Constitution 
alism and Aspects of Ideology in Industrial Relations - the 
Case of the Footwear Industry', Journal of Management 
Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1978, p. 26.
295 For example, congruency >  low perception of conflict and
cooperative modes of resolution; incongruency J> high 
perception of conflict and conflictual modes of resolution.
296 Martin, R., 'Sociology of Power', 1977, p. 48. (On how
power relations exist where there is interdependency.
They can be conflictual (zero-sum) but also mutually 
convenient).
297 Dunlop, op. cit. p. 93 - 97 (i.e. substantive rules).
298 ibid. p. 26.
299 ibid. p. 25.
300 Guillebaud, C.W., 'The Works Council - a German Experiment
in Industrial Democracy', 1928.
301 c f. Streeclc, W. , 'Qualitative Demands and the Neo-
corporatist Manageability of Industrial Relations', BJIR 
July 1981. (On the effects of plant level strikes in the 
FRG in 1969 on trade union policies and labour legislation).
302 c f. Dunlop, op. cit. p. 384.
303 Marsh, op. cit.
17
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
Hyman, R.. , 'Disputes, Procedures in Action', 1972.
Marsh, A.I. / Jones, 'Engineering Procedure and Central 
Conference at York in 1959', BJIR. No. 2, 1964.
Wedderburn, K.W. / Davies, 'Employment Grievances and 
Disputes Procedures in Britain', 1969.
Peach/Livernash, op. cit.
Sayles, op. cit.
Peach/Livernash, op. cit.
Thomson/Murray, op. cit.
Koch, K., 'A Study of the Relationship between Worker 
Representatives, Trade Union Representatives and their 
Constituents', 1974.
Marsh, A.I. et al., 'Workplace Relations in the 
Engineering Industry', 1981.
Maitland, I., 'The Causes of Industrial Disorder', BJIR 
November 1980, p. 353 - 364.
Ebsworth, D., 'Industrial Relations in the West German 
and British Chemical Industries', 1981.
Brown, W. (ed), 'The Changing Contours of British 
Industrial Relations', 1981.
Parker, S.R. et al., 'Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey', 1968, 1973, 1975.
Beynon, H., 'Working for Ford', 1973.
Lane/Roberts, op. cit.
Batstone, op. cit.
Denzin, N.K., 'The Research Act', 1978.
Blauner, op. cit.
Turner, H.A., 'Labour Relations in the Motor Industry', 1967.
Blauner, op. cit.
Kern/Schumann, op. cit.
Woodward, J., 'Industrial Organisation - Theory and 
Practice', 1965.
18
Footnotes Chapter Two
1 Geiger T. 'Die Klassengesellschaft itn Schmelztiegel' , 1949.
2 ibid. p 184.
3 Dahrendorf R. 'Class and Class Conflict in Industrial
Society' , 1959.
4 ibid. p 257.
5 ibid. p 227.
6 Hawkins K. 'A Handbook of Industrial Relations Practice',
1979. p 132.
7 Singleton N. 'Industrial Relations Procedures', 1975. p 4.
8 Thomson A.W.J./Murray 'Grievance Procedures', 1976.
9 Dahrendorf, op.cit. p 225-227.
10 Flanders A. 'Industrial Relations - What is Wrong with
the System?' 1965. p 23.
11 Deutsch M. 'The Resolution of Conflict*, 1973.
12 ibid. p 377. ■ *
13 R. Hyman, 'Disputes Procedures in Action' , 1972. p 3 9 -  *
14 ibid. p 52. ' ■’/. Y  A..,*....:,’% 7
15 Thomson/Murray, op.cit. p 118-123. „• ’i ■/
16 Goldthorpe J.H. 'Industrial Relations in Great Britain1,
in Clark T ./Clements (1977) p 184-224.
17 Fox A. 'Industrial Relations - a Social Critique of
Reformism', in Barrett R. (1975).p 302-324. .4
Fox A. ’Beyond Contract-Work, Power and Trust Relations', 
1974. v '
18 cP. Hyman, op.cit.
Friedman H./Meredeen, 'The Dynamics of Industrial
Conflict' , 1980. - '
Marsh A.I./Jones, 'Engineering Procedure and Central
Conference at York in 19591 ,HB'JiR 
1964.
Marsh A.I. ‘Disputes Procedures in British Industry’, 
(Parts 1 and 2). 1967. ’ '".'V.
19 Clack G. 'Industrial Relations in a British Car Factory1,
1967. p 99.
19
20 Marsh A.I. op.cit. 1967. (Part 2) p 88-90.
Purcell J. 'Lesson of the Gill's Attempt to Reform
Workplace Industrial Relations', TRJ Vol.10 
no.2 1979. p 18-20.
Singleton, op.cit. p 75.
21 Fox, op.cit. (1974).
22 Brown W. 'A Consideration of Custom and Practice', BJiR
1972. p 42-61.
23 cf. Armstrong P.J. et al. 'Ideology and Shopfloor
Industrial Relations', 1971. 
Storey J. 'Workplace Collective Bargaining and
Managerial Prerogatives', IRJ 1976/77. 
p 40-55.
24 Partridge B.E. 'Towards an Action Theory of Workplace
Industrial Relations', 1976. p 3.
25 cl, Deutsch, op.cit. p 377.
Walton R.E./McKersie, 'A Behavioral Theory of
Labor Negotiations', 1965.
26 Purcell, op.cit, p 4-22.
M27 Kotthoff H. ' Betriebsrate und betriebliclie Herrschaft',
1981. p 271.
28 Deutsch, op.cit. p 365.
29 Turner H.A. 'Management Characteristics and Labour
Conflict', 1977. p 67.
30 Purcell, op.cit. p 15.
31 Dahrendorf, op.cit. p 223.
32 Marsh, op.cit. 1967. (Part 1) p 26.
33 Singleton, op.cit.
34 ibid. p 75.
35 Marsh, op.cit. p 26-27.
36 Mack R.W./Snyder, 'The Analysis of Social Conflict
Towards an Overview and Synthesis', 
in Smith C.G. (ed), 'Conflict Resolution 
- Contributions of the Behavioural 
Sciences', 1971, p 3-35.
37 ibid. p 30.
38 loc.cit.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
20
loc.cit. 
ibid. p 29.
Singleton, op.cit. p 78.
Dunlop J.T. 'Industrial Relations Systems', 1958. p 16. 
ibid. p 24.
Flanders, op.cit. p 11. 
loc.cit.
Goodman J.F.B. et al. 'Rules in Industrial Relations
Theory', IRJ, 1975. p 27.
Kahn-Freund 0. 'Intergroup Conflicts and their Settlement', 
in Flanders A. 'Collective Bargaining',
1979, p 76.
Aaron B. 'The Settlement of Disputes over Rights', 1974. 
p 422.
ibid. p 423.
ibid. p 422.
Chamberlain N.W. 'Collective Bargaining', 1951. Chapter 5. 
ibid. p 99.
Kuhn J.W. 'The Grievance Process', in Dunlop J.T. et»al.
'Frontiers of Collective Bargaining', 1967. 
p 252-270.
ibid. p 261.
Kennedy V.D. 'Grievance Negotiation', in Kornhauser A.
(ed) 'Industrial Conflict', 1954.
Schaub C. 'Der Betriebsrat', 1973. p 286.
Ramrn T. 'Structure and Function of Labor Courts', in 
Aaron B. 'Dispute Settlement Procedures in 5 
West European Countries', 1969.
Aaron B. 'The Settlement of Disputes over Rights', 1974, 
p 426.
Rarnra T, 'The Legality of Industrial Actions and Methods
of Settlement Procedure1, in Aaron B. et al. (ed) 
'Industrial Conflict' 1972. p 270.
Schregle J. 'Die' Reeelung von Arbeitsstreitigkeiten',
GMH 1980. p 326.
21
59 Unterseher L. ' Arbeitsrecht - eine deutsche SpezialitHt'»
(con.) KJB 1972. p 196.
Wedderburn K.W. 'Conflicts of 'Rights' and Conflicts
of 'Interests' in Labor Disputes', in 
Aaron B. et al. 'Dispute Settlement 
Procedures in 5 West European Countries', 
1969.
60 Wedderburn, op.cit. p 44, 'Collective agreements ... are...
Intended to be 'binding in honour' 
only or...to be enforceable through 
social sanctions but not through legal 
sanctions.'
61 R.oyal Commission Report, op.cit. p 126.
62 Marsh, op.cit. - Part 1, p 16.
63 loc.cit.
Singleton, op.cit. p 58, 'Substantive consequences of some 
importance may turn on questions of interpret­
ation and the intentions of the parties on any 
disputed matter are seen by the parties as a 
further question of interest for discussion 
and settlement by them rather than matters of 
construction on the terms of the written 
agreement'.
64 Hawkins, op.cit. p 141, (distinction negotiation and
grievance procedures) 'Industrial Relations 
Code of Practice', 1972. p 27. (distinction 
individual grievance procedure and collective 
disputes procedures)
Marsh, op.cit. Part 1. p 5-6.
Thomson A.W.J. 'Disputes Procedures', in Robertson D.J.
'Labour Market Issues of the 1970s',
1970. p75.
65 cF. CBI. 'Disputes Procedures for the Avoidance and
Settlement of Disputes Arising at the Place of Work',
1970.
66 cP. TUC view in Thomson, op.cit. p 84.
67 In Wedderburn, op.cit. p 211.
68 Flanders, op.cit. p 26.
69 Marsh A.I. 'Employer Relations Policy and Decision-Making'
1982.
Poole M.J.F. et al. 'Managers in Focus', 1981. p 152.
70 Crouch C. 'Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations
Crisis', 1977. p 66.
71 Mack and Snyder,'op.cit. p 30
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
22
ILO 'An Examination of Grievances and Communications within 
the Undertaking1, 1965. p 7-8.
Thomson and Murray, op.cit. p 18.
op.cit. p 26-27.
also Ramsay J.C. 'Collective Agreements - a Guide to
their Drafting', IPM, 1974.
Thomson and Murray, op.cit. p 8.
Marsh A.I. et al. 'Workplace Relations in the Engineering
Industry in the UK and the FRG', 1980. 
p 33-34.
Singleton, op.cit.
Schregle, op.cit. p 331.
Singleton, op.cit. p 16. 
in Wedderburn, op.cit. p 211.
Thomson and Murray, op,cit. p 121.
Marsh, op.cit. - Part 1, p 4,
Thomson and Murray, op.cit. p 139.
Kennedy, op.cit. p 288.
Ross, op.cit. p 141. (Where there were 36,000 grievances 
awaiting attention in the last stage of the 
procedure). 
also Singleton, op.cit. p 27.
View of TGWU cited in Thomson and Murray, op.cit. p 140: 
'The procedure should end at the place of work, after 
which the union is free to take such action as the cir­
cumstances warrant'.
Hyman, op.cit. p 52. Muir, J., 'Industrial Relations Pro- 
Singleton, op.cit. p 23. cedures and Agreements', 1981, p.32.
Singleton, op.cit. p 24.
Singleton, op.cit. p 69.
Report of the Royal Commission, 1968. op.cit.
Research Papers of the R.oyal Commission, 1966.
McCarthy W. F,. J ./Parker , 'Shopstewards and Workshop
Relations', 1966.
23
93 McCarthy W.E.J. 'The Pvole of the Shopsteward in British
Industrial Relations’, 1966. p 68.
94 Report of the Royal Commission, op.cit., paragraph 182.
95 Code of Practice, op.cit. p 26-27.
96 Singleton, on.cit. p 78.
97 Singleton, op.cit. p 24.
Hawkins, op.cit. p 150.
98 Report of the Royal Commission, op.cit.
99 Thomson and Murray, op.cit. p 131.
100 Thomson and Murray, op.cit. p 37.
101 ibid. p 59.
102 loc.cit.
103 ibid. p 12,3.
104 ibid. p 131 and Singleton, op.cit. p 78.
1^5 c.f. Chamberlain, op.cit.
Garbarino J. ’Managing Conflict in Industrial 
Relations', BJiR 1969. p 317. 
Thomson/Murray, op.cit. chapter 7.
106 Erd R. 'Die Verrechtlichung Industrieller Konflikte'. 1978. 
Mommsen H. 'Die Gewerkschaften und die Durchselzung des
Sozialstaates', GMH 1981. p 76-86.
Raram, op.cit.
Unterseher, op.cit.
107 Crouch, op.cit. p 45.
Flanders, op.cit. p 25-26.
108 Aaron, op.cit. p 426.
Schregle, op.cit. p 331-333.
109 Singleton, op.cit. p 81.
110 Marsh, op.cit. (Part 1) p 17.
111 Kuhn J.W. 'Bargaining in Grievance Settlement', 1961.
Peach D ./Livernash, 'Grievance Initiation and Resolution'
1974.
Sayles L. 'Behaviour of Industrial Workgroups', 1958.
112 Thomson/Murray, op.cit. p 101.
24
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120  
121 
122
123
124
125
cfo Brown W. et al. 'Factors Shaping Shopsteward Organ­
isation' , BJiPv 1978. p 139.
Ingham G.H. 'Size of Industrial Organisation and 
Worker Behaviour', 1970.
Naase C. 'Konflikte in der Organisation', 1978.
p 180-186.
Singleton, op.cit. p l 2 & 7 3 .
also Kotthoff, op.cit. p 255 and Turner, op.cit. p 66-67*
Brown W. 'A Consideration of Custom and Practice', BJIR
1972. p 58-59.
Brown, op.cit. p 58-59.
Marsh A.I. 'Employee Relations', Personnel Management,
1981. Vol.6, p 34-36 & 47.
Marsh, op.cit. 1967. (Part 1) p 18.
Flanders, op.cit. p 57.
Flanders A. 'A Collective Bargaining - Prescription for 
Change', 1967. p 61.
Marsh, op.cit. (Part 1) p 2.
ILO, op.cit. p 17.
Partridge, op.cit. p 29.
Kotthoff, op.cit. p 253.
Purcell, op.cit. p 8 and Turner H.A. 'Labour Relations in
the Motor Industrv', 
1967. p 221.
Brown, op.cit. P 150-151.
Deutsch, op.cit. p 369.
Walton/McKersie, op.cit. p 137.
Turner, op.cit. (1977) p 69 (On the role of dominant person­
alities in endemic strike situations.)
Marsh A.I. 'Workplace Industrial Relations in Engineering',
1971. p 113. (Out of 432 plants 3 accounted 
for 41% of all strikes.)
McCarthy W.E.J ./Parker, 'Shopstewards and Workshop Relations'
1966. p 70. (Only 3% of plants 
surveyed had frequent strikes and 
rule breaking as the norm in 
industrial relations).
Turner, op.cit. (1977) p 68. (Only 2 out of the 45 firms
surveyed had endemic strike situations).
Purcell, op.cit. p 20.
25
127 ibid. p 18.
128 Kuhn, op.cit. p 270.
Marsh, op.cit. (Part 2) p 88-90.
Singleton, op.cit. p 75.
Thomson, op.cit. p 84. (The main fear is that any change
will affect power relations to the 
detriment of management).
129 Marsh, op.cit. (Part 2) p 88.
130 Marsh, op.cit. (Part 1) p 7. Also Aaron, op.cit. (1974)
p 429-430.
131 Galtung J. 'Institutionalised Conflict Resolution',
Journal of Peace Research no 4. 1965. p 354.
26
Footnotes Chapter Three
1 P.oyal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 
Report. Paragraph 751. (1968).
2 Marsh A.I. 'Disputes Procedures in British Industry',
(Part 1) 1967. p 10.
3 Marsh, ibid. p 14.
Flanders A. 'Industrial Relations - What is Wrong with 
the System?' 1965. p 26.
4 Kahn-Freund 0. 'Labour and the Law', 1977. p 229.
5 Wedderburn K.W. 'Labour Law and Labour Relations in
Britain', RJiR Vol.X, 2, p 273.
6 Lewis Pv. 'The Historical Development of Labour Law', BJiR
1976. p 1-17.
7 Kahn-Freund, op.cit. p 25.
8 Ministry of Labour evidence to the RCTUEA 1968, p 215.
9 cf. Conciliation Act 1896 and the Industrial Courts Act 1919.
cf. Barnes A./Reid, 'Government and Trade Unions 1964-1979',
1980.
Burkitt B./Bowers, 'Trade Unions and the Economy', 1969. 
Mulvey C. 'The Economic Analysis of Trade Unions', 1978.
11 Wedderburn, op.cit. d 282 (The aim of the government is
the restoration of order in industrial re­
lations by reduction of the power of national 
trade union executives and local officials 
and the espousal of individual rights.)
12 Earlier acts included:- Contract of Employment Act 1963, 
Industrial Training Act 1964, Redundancy Payments Act 1965. 
Legislation in the 1970s comprised:- the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act 1974, the Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974, the Employment Protection Act 1975, the Con­
solidation Act 1978, the Sex Discrimination and Race 
Relations Acts 1976.
13 Crouch C. 'Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations
Crisis', 1977. p 256.
Harkin G. 'Government Control of Industrial Relations', 
in Purcell J. (1981) p 77-79.
14 Clegg H.A. 'The Changing System of Industrial Relations in
Great Britain', 1979, p 116.
Also: Aaron B. 'The Settlement of Disputes over Plights -
a Comparison', 1974. p 426.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
27
Gingni G. 'The Peace Obligation', in Aaron B. 1972, p.127-174 
Schregle J. 'Die Regelung von Arbeitsstreitigkeiten aus
rechtsvergleichender Sicht', GMH 1980, p.332-333
Clegg, op.cit.
Kahn-Freund 0. 'Intergroup Conflicts and their Settlement',
in Flanders A. 'Collective Bargaining',
1969. p 70.
Kahn-Freund 0. 'Industrial Relations and the Law', in
Barrett B. op.cit. p 387.
loc.cit.
Wedderburn, op.cit. p 277.
loc.cit. also Marsh A.I. 'Workplace Industrial Relations
in Engineering', 1971. p 55.
Wedderburn, op.cit. p 290. 
ibid. p 275.
Poole M.J.F. et al. 'Managers in Focus', 1981. p 152. also 
Crouch, op.cit. p 255.
Marsh, op.cit. p 56-57.
The following works argue the continued support of employers
for the voluntarist principle
Weekes B. et al. 'Industrial Relations and the Limits of
the Law', 1975.
McCarthy W.E.J. 'Compulsory Arbitration.in Britain — the
Work of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal', 
1968, p 31-44.
Flanders A. 'Industrial Relations - What is Wrong with 
the System?' p 23-25.
Flanders A. 'The Tradition of Voluntarism', p 375.
Kahn-Freund 0. 'Labour and the Law', 1977.
Wedderburn, op.cit. p 290.
HMSO 'Trade Union Immunities', 1981. p 91.
Marsh A.I. 'Dispute Procedures in British Industry -Part 1',
p 16.
HMSO 'Trade Union Immunities', ©f>.
Kahn-Freund 0. 'Uses and Abuses of Comparative Law', p 27.
Lex/is, op.cit. - in 1813/1814 the government repealed the
Statute of Artificers which had given the 
state and Justices of the Peace a role in 
the determination of wages, working con­
ditions, apprenticeships etc.
28
2.9 Kahn-Freund 0. 'Labour, and the Law', 1977. p 39.
30 Flanders A. 'The Tradition of Voluntarism', p 374.
31 loc,cit.
32 Flanders A. 'Trade Unions and the Force of Tradition' in 
Flanders A. 'Management and Unions - Theory and Reform
of Industrial Relations', 1975.
33 cf. Webbs S & B. 'The History of Trade Unionism', 1894.
34 ibid. p 663.
35 Lovell J. 'British Trade Unions 1875-1933', 1977. also 
Flanders A. 'The Tradition of Voluntarism', p 379 - his
example of the railway unions in 1921.
36 ibid. p 377-379.
also Beaumont P./Gregory 'The Role of Employers in
Collective Bargaining', IRJ 
1980. p 51.
37 Marsh A.I. et al. 'Workplace Relations in the Engineering
Industry in the UK and the FRG1, p 1 also
Lovell, op.cit. p 33.
38 Ingham G.K. 'Strikes and Industrial Conflict' 1974. also 
Commission on Industrial Relations Study no 1. 'Employers' 
Organisations and Industrial Relations', 1970.
39 Munns V.G. 'Employers' Associations - the Result of 2 
Studies', 1967. also:-
Jacobs E. et al. 'The Approach to Industrial Change', 1978.p9. 
Schmidt F. 'Industrial Action - the Role of Trade Unions
and Employers' Associations', in Aaron B. et al. 
'Industrial Conflict - a Comparative Legal 
Survey', 1972.
40 Brown W. (ed) 'The Changing Contours of British Industrial
Relations', 1981.
CiR Study no 1, op.cit. p 45-46.
Schmidt, op.cit.
41 Lerner S.W. et al. (ed) 'Workshop Wage Determination',
1969. p 45.
42 Committee on Relations Between Employers and Employees 
Final Report 1918.
43 CIR Study no 1. op.cit.
29
44 Brown, op.cit. p 17. - Single employer agreements are
the main bargaining level. Although multi­
employer agreements are still an important source 
of regulation for 27% of manual workers.
Daniel W.W. 'Wage Determination in Industry', 1976. - 
The two prevalent bargaining levels were 
plant level (72% of establishments,especially 
engineering and metalworking) and company 
bargaining (34% of establishments)
Deaton D.R./Beaumont 'The Determinants of Bargaining 
Structure', BJIR July 1980. p 202-216. - 
Single employer agreements (7;5% of establish­
ments) with plant as key level- (67%) and 
company level in 33%.
Marsh A.I. 'Employee Relations Policy and Decision-Making',
1982. Points to trend to decentralisation 
especially in multi-enterprise companies with 
plant-level as key bargaining level in 85.2% 
of companies.
45 Brown, op.cit. - employers' associations are still im­
portant industrial relations institutions (75% 
of establishments are in membership), although 
their functions have altered from regulatory to 
advisory services.
CiR Study no 1, op.cit. p 20-21. - national agreements 
still determine overtime and shift premia and non­
wage conditions. Deviations in nationally agreed 
working conditions are the usual reason for expelling 
members from the associations.
Lerner, op.cit.
Marsh, op.cit. p 161.
46 Brown, op.cit.
Deaton and Beaumont, op.cit.
47 Brown R.K. ’Shopfloor Strategies and Reactions to Change',
in Parker S.R. et al. 'Sociology of Industry',
1977. p 109.
48 Flanders, 'Industrial Relations - What is Wrong with the
System?' op.cit.
Marsh, 'Disputes Procedures in British Industry', Part 1, 
p 14.
49 Department of Employment Gazette, January 1984. p 18. 
Department of Employment Gazette, February 1984. p 57. 
(Total civilian labour force in 1984 = 26.4 millions).
50 Munns, op.cit.
51 Sisson K. 'Employers' Organisations', in Bains G.S. (1933)
p 122.
52 CIR Study no 1, op.cit.
53 Sisson, ibid. p 127.
30
54 Brown W./Terry 'The Changing Nature of National Agreements',
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 1978. 
p 131. (National single employer agreements 
are replacing national multi-employer 
agreements.)
55 Elliott R.F. 'Some Further Observations on the Importance
of National Wage Agreements', BJIR 1981. p 374.
56 Hill S./Thurley K. 'Sociology and Industrial Relations',
BJiR Vol XII, 74, p 147-70. (Covers 
its effect on size and composition 
of working population, job market, trade 
union development and structure of 
industry.)
Also Cole G.D.H. 'Introduction to Trade Unionism', 1955. p 55
(Looks at its promotion of decentralised 
collective bargaining in Britain).
57 Ingham, op.cit. p 26.
58 Dore R.P. 'British Factory - Japanese Factory', 1973. p 41.
59 Granick D. 'Managerial Comparisons of Four Developed
Countries', 1972. p 357.
60 Marsh A.I. op.cit. (Part 2) p 5.
Ingham, op.cit. p 70.
61 Phelps-Brown E.I-I. 'New Wine in Old Bottles', BJIR Vol.11.
1973. p 329-337.
62 Coser L.A. 'Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict',
1967, p 37.
63 Dahrendorf R. 'Industrie - und Betrlebssoziologie', 1956.
p 129.
Deutsch M. 'The Resolution of Conflict', 1973, p 377.
Dunlop J.T. 'Industrial Relations Systems', 1957. p 16. 
Galtung J. 'Institutionalised Conflict Resolution', 1965.
p 360.
Marsh, op”.cit. p 3.
64 Crouch, op,cit. p 48.
Ingham, op.cit. p 26.
Poole, op.cit. p 130.
65 Dore, op.cit. p 408.
66 Gospel H. 'The Development of Management Organisation in
Industrial Relations’, in Thurley K./Wood.
1983. p 110.
67 Marsh A.I. 'Employee Relations from Donovan to Today',
P .M . -vo 1.13. no.6. 1981. p 36.
68 Granick, op.cit. p 358.
31
69 Child J./Kieser 'Organisation and Management Roles in
British and West German Companies', 1969.
p 260.
70 Flanders A. 'Industrial Relations - What is Wrong with
the System?' 1965. p 30.
71 Crouch C. 'The Intensification of Industrial Conflict', 1973,
p 212-214.
Flanders A. 'Trade Unions and the Force of Tradition', in 
Flanders A. 1975. p 173.
Kahn-Freund 0. 'Direct Democracy' in Kahn-Freund 1979.
72 Flanders A. 'The Tradition of Voluntarism', in Barrett B.1=115. p 330.
73 Hobsbawn E.J. 'Inside Every Worker there is a Syndicalist
Trying to Get Out1, New Society 1979. p 9-10.
74 Flanders A. 'Industrial Relations - What is Wrong with
the System?' p 26.
75 Mack R.W./Snyder 'The Analysis op Social Conflict', in
Smith C.G. 1971. p 28-29. (Definition: 
a small range of effective bases of influenc 
with centralised control over decisions.)
76 Fox A. 'A Sociology of Work in Industry', 1971. p 149. 
Kahn-Freund 0. 'Labour Relations - Heritage and Adjustment',
1979. p 88.
77 Lawrence P. 'Managers and Management in West Germany',
1980. p 127.
78 Granick, op.cit. p 370.
Marsh A.I. 'Emnloyment Relations Policy and Decision-Making',
1982. p 105.
Wilson D.C. 'The Limits of Trade Union Power in Organis­
ational Decision-Making', BJIR November 1982.
p 328.
79 Maurice M. 'Societal Differences in Organising Manufacturing
Units', Organisation Studies Vol.l. no.l. 1980. 
p 59-80.
80 ibid.
Marsden D. 'Industrial Democracy, Job Regulation and Internal 
Labour Markets’, in Diefenbacher H. 1981. 
p 359-372.
32
81 Blankenburg, E. et al., 'PhHnomene der Verrechtlichung 
und ihre Folgen', 1977.
Erd, R . , 'Verrechtlichung industrieller Konflikte', 1978.
FUrstenberg, F., 'Worker Participation in German Industry', 
in Thakur, C.P., 1973, p. 317.
Hoffmann, R. , 'Rechtsfortschritt durch gewerkschaftliche 
Gegenmacht', 1968.
Sorge, A. et al., 'Manpower Training - Manufacturing
Organisation and Workplace Relations in Great Britain
and West Germany', BJIR, 1980, p. 318.
82 Schdnholz, S., 'Grenzen der Regelung individueller
Arbeitsbeziehungen - ein Literaturbericht', 1977, p. 4.
83 Erd, op. cit.
Hoffmann, op. cit.
84 c f. Hoffmann, op. cit,, p. 99.
Leminsky, G,, 'Humanisierung der Arbeit aus eigener 
Kraft', GMH, No. 4, 1980.
85 Jacobs, E., 'The Approach to Industrial Change', 1979, 
p. 94 - 97.
Bergmann, J. 'Gewerkschaften in der BRD', Vol. I, 1975, p. 15.
86 Dahrendorf, R., 'Gesellschaft und Demokratie', 1975, p. 68.
87 Teuteberg, H.J., 'Geschichte der industriellen Mitbestimmung 
in Deutschland', 1961, p. 386.
88 Guillebaud, G.W., 'The Works Council', 1928, p. 230.
89 Bahl, V., 'Lohnverhandlungssystem der Weimarer Republik',
GMH, 1978, p. 399.
Zachert, U., 'Der Tarifvertrag', 1979, p. 77.
90 Bergmann, op. cit., p. 15.
Jacobi, 0., 'Ursache, Funktion und Ergebnis der Einlcommens- 
politik', in Meissner, W . , 1972, p. 54 - 78.
Lehmbruch, G., 'Die Konzertierte Aktion', in Wehling, H.G.,
1978, p. 116.
91 Jacobi, 0, 'Gewerkschaftliche Lohnpolitik unter dem Druck 
anti-Keynesianischer Wirtschaftspolitik', in Bergmann, J.,
1979, p. 326 - 362.
33
92 Erd, R. , op. cit., p. 21.
Bergmann (1975), op. cit., p. 15.
Herding, R., 'Codetermination and Control', in Purcell,
1979, p. 56 - 76.
Jacobs, op. cit., p. 94 - 97.
93 Streeck, W . , 'Gewerkschaftsorganisation und industrielle
Beziehungen', in Matthes, J., 1979, p. 209.
94 Jacobi, op. cit.
95 Streeck, W . , 'Gewerkschaftliche Organisationsprobleme', 1981
Streeck, W., 'Qualitative Demands and the Neocorporatist 
Manageability of Industrial Relations', BJIR, July 1981, 
p. 149 - 169.
96 Unterseher, L., 'Arbeitsrecht - eine deutsche Spezialit^t',
KJB, 1972, p. 196.
97 Bahl, op. cit., p. 399.
Hartwich, H.H., 'Arbeitsmarkt, VerbHnde und Staat', 1967. 
Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 93.
Mommsen, H., 'Die Gewerkschaften und die Durchsetzung 
des Sozialstaates', GMH, 1981, p. 76 - 86.
Zachert, op. cit. p. 77.
98 Erd, op. cit. p. 19.
99 Sturmthal, A., 'Workers' Councils', 1964, p. 13.
Volkmann, H., 'Zur Entwicklung von Streik und Aussperrungen' 
GMH, 1979, p. 347.
100 Mommsen, op. cit. p. 86.
Muszynslci, B., 'Wirtschaftliche Mitbestimmung' , 1975, p. 76 
also Dahrendorf, R . , 'Sozialstruktur des Betriebes', 1959,
p . 66.
101 Mommsen, op. cit.
Muszynski, op. cit.
102 Clegg, H.A., 'The Changing System of Industrial Relations
in Great Britain', 1979, p. 116.
103 Kahn-Freund, 0., 'Intergroup Conflicts and their Settlement'
in Flanders, A., 1969, p. 70.
34
104 Schregle, J ,9 'Die Regelung von Arbeitsstreitigkeiten 
aus reehtsvergleichender Sicht', GMH, 1980, p. 326.
105 ibid. p. 331.
106 Aaron, B., 'The Settlement of Disputes over Rights’, 1974, 
p. 426.
107 Clegg, op. cit. p. 116.
108 Guillebaud, op. cit. p. 26.
109 ibid. p. 31.
110 loc. cit.
111 Ramm, T., 'Structure and Function of Labor Courts' in
Aaron, B., 1969, p. 12 - 23.
Unterseher, op. cit. p. 196.
112 Kahn-Freund, 0., 'Das soziale Ideal des Reichsarbeits- 
gerichts', in Ramm, T., 1966, p. 206.
Unterseher, op. cit.
113 Guigni, G., 'The Peace Obligation', in Aaron, B., 1972, p.131. 
Zachert, U., op. cit. p. 75 - 76.
114 Damman, K., 'Tarifvertrag und Arbeitskampf', 1977, p. 64. 
Guigni, op. cit. p. 168.
115 Doubler, W., 'Das soziale Ideal des BAG', 1975, p. 35.
116 Schwegler, G., 'Streikrecht und Rechtsprechung1, GMH,
1972, p. 299 - 309.
Unterseher, op. cit., p. 200.
117 Schober, R., 'Politische Funktion und soziales Ideal des 
BAG', 1974.
118 Zachert, op. cit. p. 79 - 83.
119 Dahrendorf, op. cit. p. 66.
Ramm, op. cit. p. 263.
120 Dhubler, W . , 'Das Grundrecht auf Mitbestimmung', 1975, p. 128
121 Doubler, W . , 'Das soziale Ideal des BAG', 1975, p. 83 - 84.
122 Erd, op. cit. p. '30 - 42.
35
123
124
125
126
127
128 
129
130
131
132
133
Aaron, B. 'The Settlement of Disputes over Rights', 1974.
DHubler, W. , 'Das Arbeitsrecht', 1976, p. 495 - 497.
Givry, J., 'The Role of the Third Party in the Settlement 
of Grievances at Plant Level', in Roberts, B.C., 1968, p.136.
Ramm, T., 'The Structure and Function of Labour Courts', 
in Aaron, B., 1969, p. 22.
Wedderburn, K.W., 'Conflicts of 'Rights' and Conflicts of 
'Interests'1, in Aaron, B., 1969, p. 76.
Givry, op. cit. p. 136.
Kahn-Freund, 0., 'Labour Law - Old Traditions and New 
Developments', 1968.
Mommsen, op. cit. p. 76 - 86.
Guillebaud, op. cit.
Damman, op. cit. p. 41.
Erd, op. cit. p. 230.
Zachert, op. cit. p. 74.
Schneider, M., 'Unternehmer und Demokratie', 1975.
Bahl, op. cit. p. 400.
Damman, op. cit. p. 46.
Hilllbilsch, U., ' Koalitionsfreiheit und Zwangstarif' , in 
Engelhardt, U„, 1976.
c f. Erdmann, G., 'Die deutschen Arbeitgeberverb&nde*, 1966. 
Saul, K., 'Staat, Industrie und Arbeiterbewegung',1974. 
Damman, op. cit. p. 46.
Bahl, op. cit. p. 399.
Hartmann, H., 'Authority and Organisation in German 
Management', 1970, p. 212.
Ramm, T., 'The Legality of Industrial Action', in Aaron, B., 
1972, p. 262.
Teuteberg, op. cit., p. 350.
Potthoff, E., 'Zur Geschichte der Mitbestimmung1, in 
Potthoff, E., 1962, p. 19.
36
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
Jackson, P./Sisson, K., 'Employer Confederations in 
Sweden and the U.K.', BJiR, No. 3, 1976, p. 306.
(Deals with the similar response from employers in Sweden).
Bahl, op. cit. p. 402.
ibid.
Erd, op. cit. p. 230 - 232.
In addition there is a small Christian trade union, a 
white collar workers' union and civil servants' union.
Marsh, A.I., 'Workplace relations in the engineering 
industry in the U.K. and the FRG', 1981.
Milller-Jentsch, W. , 'Economic Development and Labour 
Conflicts', in Crouch, C./Pizzorno, Vol. 1, 1978, p. 279.
HoB, D., 'Die Krise des institutionalisierten Klassen- 
kampfes', 1974.
Noe, C., 'GebHndigter Klassenkampf', 1970.
Schacht, K. , 'Das Tarifverhandlungssystem der BR.D', in 
Meissner, W . , 1972, p. 79 - 118.
Zachert, U., 'Der Ablauf einer Tarifverhandlung', GMH,
1979, p. 172 - 178.
Schmidt, E., 'IGM 1966 - 1972', KJB, 1972, p. 62 - 76.
Dabrowski, H. et al., 'Der Lohnrahmentarifvertrag II in 
der betrieblichen Praxis', 1977.
Milller-Jentsch, W. , ' Gewerkschaf tliche Tarifpolitik gegen 
Rationalisierungsfolgen', KJB, 1977/78, p. 63 - 72.
R.osenbaum, W. , 'Humanisierung der Arbeit durch gewerk- 
schaftliche Tarifpolitik', SWI No. 1, 1978, p. 27 - 31.
Steinkiihler, F. , 'Werktage werden besser', 1977.
Brumlop, E. et al., 'Humanisierung der Arbeitsbedingungen', 
in Rergmann, J., 1979, p. 264 - 296.
Helfert, M. et al», 'Die gewerkschaftliche Auseinander- 
setzung um Arbeitsbedingungen', WSI-Mitteilungen, 1978, 
p. 73 - 81.
Mayr, J., 'Die Tarifpolitik der IGM', GMH, 1973, p. 575 - 580.
Dzielak, W. et al., 'Belegschaften und Gewerkschaft im 
Streik', 1978.
37
147 Milller-Jentsch, W. , ’Der Arbeitskampf in der Metall- 
industrie', KJB, 1972, p. 13 - 27.
148 Institut filr Sozialforschung, 1 Tarifpolitik unter Krisen- 
bedingungen', 1977.
149 Kalbitz, R., 'Aussperrung in der BRD1, 1979.
Volkmann, op. cit.
150 Kalbitz, R., 'Entwicklung von Streiks und Aussperrung in
der BRD', KJB, 1973, p. 165.
151 Miiller-Jentsch, W. , ’Streiks und Streikbewegungen' , in 
Bergmann, J., 1979, also IRJ July/August 1981, p. 26.
152 DEG, March 1983, p. 105 - 106. (On the number of working 
days lost per 1000 workers in all industries and services 
1972 - 1981:- U.K. = 531, FRG = 23).
153 Miiller-Jentsch, W. , op. cit. p. 25. (On the average 
number of strikes per annum 1966 - 1975:- U.K. = 775,
FRG =52).
154 HoB, op. cit. p. 35.
Kirkwood, T., et al., ’The Limits of Trade Union Power in 
the Capitalist Order’, BJIR, 1976, p. 295 - 305.
Miiller-Jentsch, W. , 'Neue Konf 1 iktpotentiale und 
institutionelle StabilitMt’, in Matthes, J., p. 185.
Streeck, W . , 'Das Dilemma der Organisation', in Meissner, W. , 
1972, p. 130 - 167.
Streeck, W. , 1Gewerkschaftliche Organisationsprobleme in 
der sozialstaatlichen Demokratie', 1981.
Weitbrecht, H., 'LegitimitHt und EffektivitHt der Tarif- 
autonomie', 1969.
155 Arzberger, K. et al., 'Wirtschaftliche Rezession, Konflikt- 
potentiale und Reformbestrebungen', GMH 1976, p. 375 - 380.
Bergmann, J., 'Gewerkschaften in der BRD', Vol. 2, 1977, 
p. 398.
Esser, J., 'Die Gewerkschaf ten als SHule im ,,Modell 
Deutschland", KJB 1980/1981, p. 51 - 62.
156 Dahrendorf, op. cit. p. 42.
157 c f.Grebing, op. cit.
158 c f. Grebing and Muszynski, op. cit.
38
159 Maurice, M./Sellier, ’Societal Analysis of Industrial 
Relations', BJIR, Nov. 1979, p. 322 - 336.
160 Dahrendorf, op. cit. p. 44.
161 Potthoff, op. cit.
162 Dahrendorf, op. cit. p. 44 - 46,
163 Dore, R.P., 'British Factory - Japanese Factory', 1973, p. 12 
also Maurice/Sellier, op. cit.
164 Dahrendorf, op. cit. p. 67 - 68.
165 ibid.
166 c f. Chapter 4, 2Ii and 2Iii.
167 Schregle, J., 'Codetermination in the FRG', ILR No. 117,
p. 88.
168 Duvernell, H., 'Mitbestimmung - heute und morgen', in 
Potthoff, E., 1962, p. 305 - 331.
Grebing, op. cit. p. 242.
Hartmann, op. cit. p. 84.
Muszynski, op. cit. p. 27.
Teuteberg, op. cit. p. 111.
169 Grebing, op. cit. p. 242.
Ramm, op. cit.
170 Grebing, op. cit. p. 242.
Hartmann, op. cit. p. 270.
Muszynski, op. cit. p. 27.
Teuteberg, op. cit. p. 111.
171 Dahrendorf, op. cit. p. 48.
172 Muszynski, op. cit. p. 27. Also Dahrendorf, op. cit. 
p. 55 - 70.
173 Dahrendorf, op. cit. p. 48.
Erd, op. cit. p. 30 - 42.
39
174 Dahrendorf, op. cit. p. 63.
Hartmann, op. cit. p. 84.
Oertzen, P., 'BetriebsrHte in der Novemberrevolution',
1976, p. 275 - 286.
Ramm, op. cit.
Teuteberg, op. cit. p. 301.
175 Skrzypczak, H., 'Zur Strategie der freien Gewerkschaften
in der Weimarer Republik', Vetter, H.O. (ed,), 1975, p. 216
176 c f.Naphtali, F., 'Wirtschaftsdemokratie', pub. 1977.
DGB 'Wirtschaftspolitische GrundsHtze', 1949.
177 Maurice/Sellier, op. cit.
Lawrence, P., 'Managers and Management in West Germany',
1980, p. 3.
178 Maurice/Sellier, op. cit. p. 326.
Marsden, op. cit.
Tylecote, op. cit.
179 Dahrendorf, op. cit. p. 63.
180 Dahrendorf, R. , 'Sozialstruktur des Betriebes', 1959, p. 66
also Conrad, W . , 'Federal Republic of Germany', in Blum A.A
1981, p. 209 - 238.
181 Hartmann, op. cit. p. 212.
182 Mommsen, op. cit. p. 86.
183 Hartmann, op. cit. p. 214 citing the Executive Officer
of the National German Industrialists' Association in 
1933.
184 Mommsen, op. cit. p. 86.
185 Dore, op. cit. p. 415.
186 ibid. p. 419.
187 Kerr, C. et al., 'Industrialism and Industrial Man', 1960.
188 Hickson, D.J., 'The Culture-Free Context of Organisational
Structure', Sociology, No. 8, 1974, p. 59 - 80.
40
189
190
191
192
Alemann, U. , 'Auf dem Weg zum industriellen Korporatismus', 
GMH, 1979, p. 552.
Maurice, M. et al., 'Societal Differences in Organising 
Manufacturing Units', Organisation Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
1980, p. 59 - 86.
Clarke, J., 'Trade Unions, National Politics and Economic 
Management', 1980.
Derber, M. 'Strategic Factors in Industrial Relations 
Systems', Labor and Society, No. 1, 1976, p. 18 - 28.
41
Footnotes Chapter Four
1 White, P.J., 'Is Voluntarism in Decline?', IR.J
Autumn 1978, p. 35 - 43.
2 RCTUEA Report 1968, Parag. 584 and 1063.
3 c f. A. Shonfield in RCTUEA Report also
Kahn-Freund, 0., 'Industrial Relations and the Law1, 
BJIR November 1969, p. 301 - 316.
4 c f. Lewis Roy, 'Collective Labour Law’ in Bain, G.S.,
1983, p. 361 - 392.
5 Marsh, A.I., 'Workplace Industrial Relations in
Engineering', 1971, p. 56.
Poole, M. et al., 'Management Attitudes and Behaviour 
in Industrial Relations', BJIR November 198Z, p. 285 - 
307.
6 Poole, op. cit. p. 297 also Employee Relations, Vol. 5
Nr. 3, 1983, p. i - ii.
7 Booth, A., 'Corporatism, Capitalism and Depression
in Twentieth Century Britain', BJS Vol. XXXIII, No. 2.
1982, p. 200 - 223.
England, J. / Weekes, B., 'Trade Unions and the State'
IRJ Vol. 12, No. 1, 1981, p. 11 - 26.
Storey, J., 'The Challenge to Management Control', 
1980, p. 88.
8 Beaumont, P. et al., 'The Enterprise Response to 
Industrial Relations Legislation', IRJ No. 4, 1981, 
p. 71 - 75.
9 Daniel, W.W., 'Effects of the Employment Protection 
Laws in Manufacturing Industry', DEG June 1978,
p. 658 - 661.
Daniel, W.W. / Millward, N., 'Workplace Industrial
Relations in Britain', 1983, chapter 7.
10 Terry, M . , 'Shopsteward Development and Managerial 
Strategies', in Bain, G.S., 1983, p. 67 - 91.
11 Hepple, B., 'Individual Labour Law’ in Bain, G.S.,
1983, p. 414.
12 Daniel (1978), op. cit. p. 660.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 56.
13 Storey, op. cit. p. 86 also 
England / Weekes, op. cit. p. 20.
14 Storey, op. cit. p. 94.
15 White, op. cit. p. 38.
McCarthy, W.E.J. / Parker, 'Shopstewards and Workshop 
Relations', 1966, p. 67.
c f. Burgess, K., 'The Origins of British Industrial 
Relations' 1975.
Lovell, J. 'British Trade Unions 1875 - 1933', 1977.
c f. Littler, C'.Ps.. , 'A Comparative Analysis of 
Managerial Structures and Strategies', in Gospel, H.F. / 
Littler, 1983, p. 171.
Gospel, H.F., 'Managerial Structures and Strategies' 
in Gospel, H.F. / Littler, 1983, p. 19.
Hobsbawn, E.J., 'Inside Every Worker there is a 
Syndicalist trying to Get Out', New Society, No. 4,
1979, p. 9 - 10.
Crouch, C., 'The Intensification of Industrial,Conflict 
in the U.K.', in Crouch / Pizzorno, Vol. 1, 1968, 
p, 212 - 214.
Flanders, A., 'Trade Unions and the Force of Tradition', 
in Flanders, 1975.
Kahn-Freund, 0., 'Labour Laws Old Traditions and New 
Developments', 1968, p. 78.
Kahn-Freund, 0., 'Direct Democracy', in Kahn-Freund, 0., 
1979.
On the first waves- Cole, G.D.H., 'Workshop Organisation1 
1923, p. 18.
Hinton, J., 'The First Shopsteward Movement', 1973.
On the second waves- Cole, G.D.H., 'Introduction to 
Trade Unionism', 1955.
Clegg, H.A., 'The Changing System of Industrial Relations 
in Great Britain', 1979, p. 17 - 18.
Brown, W . , 'Piecework Bargaining', 1973, p. 144.
Marquand, H.A. et al., 'Organised Labour in 4 Continents' 
1939, p. 185.
Roberts, B.C., 'Trade Union Government and Administration 
1956, p. 74.
CIR Report No. 17, 'Facilities afforded to Shopstewards', 
1971, p. 7 & 10.
CIR Report No. 17, op. cit. p. 6. 
ibid p. 5.
Parker, S.R., 'Workplace Industrial Relations 1972',
1973, p. 18 (From a ratio of 1:4000 in 1950 to 
1:12,000 in 1972).
McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 56.
Boraston, I. et al., 'Workplace and Union', 1975.
Goodman, J.F.B., 'Rulemaking and Industrial Peace', 1972.
43
29 Clegg, op. cit. p. 38.
Taylor, R . , 'The Fifth Estate1, 1980, p. 204.
Terry, M., 'Organising a Fragmented Workforce', BJIR, 
March 1982, p. 1 - 19.
30 McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 38, 56 - 58.
also Brown, W . , 'Piecework Bargaining', 1973, p. 137.
31 RCTUEA R.eport, op. cit. parag. 1009.
32 Marsh, op. cit. p. 64.
CIR Report No. 17, op. cit. p. 8.
33 Undy, R. et al., 'Change in Trade Unions', 1981,
p. 310 (except in the NUM).
34 ibid. p. 262.
35 ibid. p. 288 - 293.
36 ibid. p. 310
ALSO Taylor, op. cit. p. 210. (This has also taken
place in the GMWU and EETPU).
37 Taylor, op. cit. p. 215
38 McCarthy, W.E.J., 'The Role of the Shopsteward in
British Industrial Relations', 1966, p. 60 - 67.
39 Concannon, H., 'The Growth of Arbitration Work in ACAS',
IRJ, Spring 1978, p. 12 - 18.
40 ACAS Annual Report 1982, p. 40.
41 Lex/is, P., 'Employment Protection - a Preliminary 
Assessment', IRJ Vol. 12, 1981.
42 Dickens, L. et al. , 'Research note to P. Lex/is on why
legislation has failed to provide employment 
protection', BJIR, July 1982, p. 257 - 258.
43 ACAS Report 1982, p. 19.
44 ibid. p. 21.
45 Goodman, J.F.B., 'Conciliation in Industrial Disputes',
BJiR, 1974, p. 327 - 351.
46 ACAS Report 1982, p. 23.
47 ibid. p. 32.
48 Ministry of Labour Evidence in P^CTUEA Report, op. cit.
p. 94.
44
49 Goodman, op. cit.
also Concannon, H., 'Handling Dismissals Disputes 
by Arbitration', IRJ, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1980, p. 22.
Dickens, L . , 'Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration' 
in Stephenson, G.M. et al., 1979, p. 289 - 307.
50 Wedderburn, K.W., 'Employment Grievances and Disputes 
Procedures in Britain', 1969, p. 223.
51 Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 167.
52 Brown, W. (ed), 'The Changing Contours of British
Industrial Relations’, 1981, p. 48 - 49.
53 Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 167 (33% of establish­
ments )
also Brown, op. cit. p. 49.
54 Dickens, op. cit. p. 306.
Concannon, op. cit. p. 22.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 167.
55 McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 41 - 42 8* 62.
56 CIR Report No. 1, ’Employers' Organisations', 1970, p.35 & 16( 
Brown, op. cit. p. 20 - 21.
57 c f. Child, J. / Kieser, 'Organisation and Managerial 
Roles in British and West German Companies', in 
Lammers, C.J. / Hickson, 1979, p. 260.
Clarke, P. 'Cultural Context as a Determinant of
Organisational Rationality', in Lammers, C.J. /
Hickson, 1979, p. 272 - 286.
Gallie, D., 'In Search of the New Working Class',
1978, p. 161.
Flanders, A., 'Industrial Relations - What is Wrong 
with the System?', 1965 , p. 30.
Ingham, G.K., 'Strikes and Industrial Conflict',
1974, p. 70.
58 Granick, D., 'Managerial Comparisons of 4 Developed 
Countries', 1972, p. 358.
Marsh, A.I., 'Employee Relations from Donovan to Today',
PM No. 6, 1981, p. 36.
Tylecote, A., 'The Causes of the Present Inflation',
1981.
59 Gospel, H., 'The Development of Management Organisation', 
in Thurley, K. f Wood, 1983, p. 91 - 110.
60 c f.Brown, op. cit. p. 7.
Hawes, W.R. / Smith, 'Employee Involvement outside 
Manufacturing', DF,G, June 1981, p. 268 (with company 
and plant as the key bargaining ievels).
Brown, W. / Sisson, ’The Use of Comparisons in Work­
place Wage Determinations', BJIR, 1975, p. 23 - 51. 
Purcell, J., 'The Management of Industrial Relations', 
BJiR, 1983, p. 1 - 16.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 36.
CIR Pveport No. 85, 'Industrial Relations in Multi- 
Plant Undertakings', 1974, p. 7.
Brown, W., 'Piecework Bargaining', 1973, p. 171.
Brown, W . , 'A Consideration of Custom and Practice',
BJIR, 1972, p. 42 - 61.
CIR Report No. 85, op. cit. p. 28.
Flanders, A., 'Collective Bargaining - Prescription 
for Change', 1967, p. 61.
RCTUEA Report, op. cit. parag. 1022.
Brown, op. cit.
Lerner, S.W., 'Workshop Wage Determination', 1969, 
p. 38.
Edwards, P.K. et al., 'Social Organisation of Industrial 
Conflict', 1982, p. 262.
Gospel, op. cit. p. 108.
Lerner, op. cit.
Poole, M.J.F., 'A Power Analysis of Workplace Labour 
Relations', IRJ Vol. 7, 1976, p. 31 - 42.
R.CTUEA Report, op. cit. parag. 1022.
Brown, W. (ed.), 'The Changing Contours of British 
Industrial Relations', 1981, p. 30 - 31.
Friedmann, II. / Meredeen, 'The Dynamics of Industrial 
Conflict', 1980 (on changes at Ford's).
Marginson, P., 'The Distinctive Effects of Plant and 
Company Size on Workplace Industrial Relations',
BJIR, March 1984, p. 9 - 10.
Marsh, A.I., Employee Relations Policy and Decision- 
Making', 1982, p. 105.
R.oots, P., 'Industrial Relations - Involvement and 
Intervention', ER No. 2, 1982, p. 17 - 22.
Brown, op. cit. p. 31. (Especially legislation).
ibid.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 108. (Especially size).
Cl R Report No. 34, 'The Role of management in Industrial 
Relations', 1973, p. 13.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 105.
CIR Report No. 34, op. cit. p. 13.
Marsh, A.I. / Gi-llies, 'The Involvement of Line and 
Staff Managers in Industrial Relations', in Thurley, K. / 
Wood, 1983, p. 3 2 - 3 8 .
CIR Report No. 34, op. cit. p. 34.
Marsh, A.I., ’Employee Relations from Donovan to Today’, 
PM No. 6, 1981, p. 47»
Sisson, K. / Brown, 'Industrial Relations in the Private 
Sector', in Bain, G.S., 1983, p. 137.
Bradley, K., 'Job Evaluation - Theory and Practice',
1980 (77% of companies surveyed).
Brown, op. cit. p. Ill (43% of companies had job 
evaluation for manual workers).
Sisson / Brown / op. cit. p. 142.
Brown, W. / Terry, 'The Changing Nature of National 
Agreements', Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
1978, p. 119 - 133.
Brown, op. cit. p. 115.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 205.
Batstone, E., 'Industrial Democracy in Britain', in 
Diefenbacher, H., 1981, p. 384.
Brown / Terry, op. cit. p. 129.
CIR Report No. 69, 'Small Firms and the Code of 
Industrial Relations Practice', 1974, p. 11.
Clifton, R. / Tatton-Brown, 'The Impact of Employment 
Legislation on Small Firms', 1979.
Ford, J., 'Who Breaks the Rules? The Response of 
Small Businesses to External Regulation', IRJ, No. 3, 
1982, p. 40 - 49.
Nash, M . , 'Industrial Relations in the Small Firm',
ER No. 4, 1980, p . 15 - 18.
Stanworth, M.J.K. / Curran, 'Growth and the Small Firm', 
Journal of Management Studies, No. 2, 1976, p. 108.
Eyraud, F., 'The Principles of Union Action in the 
Engineering Industries in Great Britain and France', 
BJiR, No. 3, 1983, p. 371.
Warner, M. / Sorge, 'The Context of Industrial Relations 
in Great Britain and West Germany', IRJ, Vol. 11, 1980, 
p. 41 - 49.
Eyraud, op. cit. p. 359.
McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 39 - 40.
RCTUEA Report, op. cit. parag. 1075, 1077 and 1086.
Brown, op. cit. p. 87.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 46.
Brown, op. cit. p. 61.
Flanders, A., 'Collective Bargaining - a Prescription 
for Change', 1967, p. 61.
Turner, H.A., 'Labour Relations in the Motor Industry', 
1967, p. 200.
47
88 Segloxv, P. / Streeck et al. , 'Rail Unions in Britain
and West Germany', 1982.
89 Sorge, A. / Warner, 'Manpower Training, Manufacturing
Organisation and Workplace Relations in Britain and 
West Germany', BJIR., 1980, p. 318 - 333.
90 Brown, W . , 'Piecework Bargaining', 1973, p. 151.
91 Turner, op. cit. p. 142.
92 Brown, op. cit. p. 151 - 153.
93 McCarthy, op. cit. p. 22.
94 Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 42,
Storey, op. cit. p. 120.
95 Terry, M., 'Shopstewards through Expansion and Recession'
IRJ, No. 3, 1983, p. 51.
Terry, M. (Bain, G.S., 1983), op. cit. p. 79.
96 Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 278.
Brown, W. (ed.), 'The Changing Contours of British 
Industrial Relations', 1981, p. 119.
Storey, op. cit. p. 120.
97 McCarthy, op. cit. p. 15.
98 Marsh, A.I., 'Workplace Industrial Relations in
Engineering' , 1971, p. 88.
Brown, op. cit. p. 62.
Schuller, T. / Robertson, 'IIow Representatives 
Allocate their Time', BJIR., Nov. 1983, p. 333.
99 Marsh, op. cit. p. 90.
100 Brown, op. cit. p. 53.
101 Terry, M., 'Organising 
1982, p. 1 - 19.
a Fragmented Workforce', BJIR,
102 cf. Clegg, op. cit. p. 56 - 57.
103 McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 56.
104 McCarthy, op. cit. 
CIR Report No. 17, P-op.
26.
cit. p. 45.
105 CIR. Report No. 17, op. cit. p. 38. '
106 ib id. p . 41.
107 ibid. p. 10.
108 ibid. p. 22 - 26.
48
109
110  
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120 
121
ibid. p. 32. 
c f. Marsh, A.I.
Clack, G., 'Industrial Relations in a British Car 
Factory', 1967, p. 36.
ibid. p. 37.
CIR Report No. 17, op. cit. p. 32.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 94.
Schuller, op. cit. p. 333 (2 hours 40 minutes per week 
were taken up with trade union duties).
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 43 (from 1978).
ibid. p. 42 - 44. See also:-
Batstone, E., 'What have Personnel Managers done for 
Industrial Relations?', PM No. 6, 1980, p. 36 - 39,
Brown, op. cit. p. 119.
CIR Report No. 17, op. cit. p. 53.
Storey, op. cit. p. 120.
Terry, M., 'Shopsteward Development and Managerial 
Strategies', in Bain, G.S., 1983, p. 79.
Roberts, B.C., 'Trade Union Government and Administration', 
1956, p. 69.
Clegg, H.A. et al., 'Trade Union Officers', 1961, p. 156. 
Marsh, A.I. / Coker, 'Shopsteward Organisation in the 
Engineering Industry', BJIR, 1963, p. 170 - 190.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 99.
Goodman, J.F.B. et al., 'Shopstewards in British 
Industry', 1969, p. 92.
McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 54.
McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 54.
McCarthy, op. cit. p. 29.
Brown, op. cit. p. 71.
Mansfield, R. et al., 'The British Manager in Profile', 
1981, p. 25.(Collective bargaining is concentrated in 
the hands of personnel (36%), production (29%) and 
general management (28%).
CiR Report No. 17, op. cit. p. 14 and 19.
Parker, S.R., 'Workplace Industrial Relations 1972',
1973, p. 9.
Storey, op. cit. p. 138 & p. 120 - 121.
Terry, M., 'Shopstewards through Expansion and Recession', 
IRJ No. 3, 1983, p. 51.
Storey, op. cit. p. 120.
49
123
124
125
126
122
127
128
129
130
131
132
Schuller, op. cit. p. 336.
Shafto, T., 'The Growth of Shopsteward Managerial 
Functions', in Thurley, K. / Wood, 1983, p. 45 St 51. 
Terry, op. cit. p. 51. (Examples of electricity and 
public sector).
Terry, M., 'The Emergence of a Lay Elite', 1978.
Terry, M. in Bain, G.S., 1983, op. cit. p. 87.
Brown, W . , 'Piecework Bargaining', 1973, p. 153.
Goodman, op. cit. p. 79.
Batstone, E., 'Shopstewards in Action', 1977.
c f.Armstrong, R. et al., 'Shopstewards and Employee 
Involvement', E.R. No. 4, 1982.
Broad, G., 'Shopsteward Leadership', IRJ No. 3, 1983, 
p. 59 - 67.
Goodman, op. cit. p. 79 - 80.
Nicholson, N., 'The Role of Shopstewards', IRJ No. 1, 
1976, p. 15 - 26.
Partridge, B., 'The Activities of Shopstewards' , IR.J 
No. 4, 1977/78, p. 28 - 43.
Pedler, M.J., 'Shopstewards as Leaders', IRJ No. 4,
1973, p. 43 - 60.
Warren, A., 'The Challenge from Below', IRJ Vol. 2/3, 
1971, p. 52 - 60.
McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 29 - 31.
Also Brown, op. cit. p. 125 - 149.
Brown, op. cit. p. 82 - 136.
Poole, M.J.F., 'A Power Analysis of Workplace 
Industrial Relations', IRJ Mo. 3, 1976, p. 31 - 42.
ibid. (For example, rivalry between production and v 
maintenance workers, sophisticated management policies.) 
Goodman, op. cit. p. 79 - 80. (Trade union restrictions 
on workplace bargaining).
Marchington, M . , 'Shopfloor Control and Industrial 
Relations', in Purcell, J., 1979, p. 133 - 153.
Ramsay, H., 'Participation - the Shopfloor View',
BJIR, 1976, p. 128 - 141.
Schuller, op. cit. p. 336.
Marchington, op. cit.
50
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
Batstone, E. , ’Industrial Democracy in Britain', in 
Diefenbacher, H., 1981, p. 373 - 390.
Beynon, H. , 'Working for Ford', 1973 , p. 87 and 318-.
Degen, G., 'Das Dilemma der britischen Gewerkschaften', 
in Bergmann, J., 1979, p. 387.
Edwards, P.K. / Scullion, 'The Social Organisation of 
Industrial Conflict', 1982, p. 271.
Thunecke, H., 'Betriebsverfassung und Streiks', 1978,
p. 206 - 208.
Thurley, K.E., 'GroBbritanniens Industrie und ihre 
Arbeitskonflikte', 1978, p. 41 - 67.
Brown, op. cit. p. 120.
Crouch, C., 'Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations 
Crisis', 1977, p. 214.
Edwards / Scullion, op. cit. p. 285.
Oertzen, P., 'BetriebsrUte an der Novemberrevolution',
1976, p. 317.
Purcell, J., 'The Management of Industrial Relations 
in the Modern Corporation', BJIR Mo. 1, 1983, p. 1 - 16. 
Storey, J., 'Workplace Collective Bargaining and 
Managerial Prerogatives', IRJ Winter 1976/77, p. 40 - 45. 
Terry, M., 'The Emergence of a Lay Elite', 1978, p. 6 - 7. 
Wilson, D.C. et al., 'The Limits of Trade Union Power 
in Organisational Decision-Making', BJIR, November 1982, 
p. 322 - 341.
Brown, W., 'The Changing Contours of British Industrial 
Relations', 1981, p. 63.
Clack, op. cit.
Lerner, S.W., 'Shopsteward Combine Committees in British 
Engineering Industry', BJIR No. 2, 1966, p. 154 - 164. 
Turner, op. cit. p. 220.
Willmann, P., 'The Growth of Combined Committees', BJIR 
No. 1, 1981, p. 1 - 13.
CIR Report No. 85, op. cit. p. 24.
Purcell, op. cit. p. 5.
Terry, M,, 'The Inevitable Growth of Informality1,
BJIR No. 1, 1977, p. 76 - 90.
Wilson, op. cit. p. 323.
CIR Report No. 85, op. cit. p. 24.
Manwaring, T., 'The Trade Union Response to New 
Technology', IRJ No. 4, p. 7 - 26.
Robins, R. / Webster, 'New Technology - Survey of Trade
Union Response in Britain', IRJ, Spring 1982, p. 726. 
Wilkinson, B., 'The Shopfloor Politics of New 
Technology, 1983.
Bain, G.S. / Price, 'Union Growth', in Bain, G.S., 1983,
p . 12.
Streeck, W . , 'Industrial Relations in West Germany',
1984, p. 156 (on British Leyland).
Terry in Bain, op. cit. p. 87 and in IRJ 1983, op. cit. 
p. 53.
51
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
Sisson / Brown, op. cit. p. 137 Sc 153.
Schuller, op. cit. p. 336.
Dowling, M.J. et al., 'Employee Participation - Practice 
and Attitudes in N.W. Manufacturing Industry', 1981, p. 39.
The Final Report of the Committee on Relations between 
Employers and Employed', 1918.
Clegg, op. cit. p. 152.
Marsh, A.I., 'Workplace Industrial Relations in Engineering', 
1971, p. 51 - 53.
McCarthy, op. cit. p. 33.
Armstrong, op. cit. p. 37
Beaumont, P. et al., 'The Extent and Determinants of 
Joint Consultation Arrangements', JKS Vol. 18, No. 1,
1981, p. 49 - .71.
Brown, op. cit. p. 76.
Cressey, P. et al., 'Industrial Democracy and Participat­
ion', 1981.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 130.
Dowling, op. cit. p. 20.
Gill, C. et al., 'Industrial Relations in the Chemical 
Industry', 1978, p. 229.
Hawes, W.R. / Brookes, C.C.P., 'Change and Review -
Joint Consultation in Industry', DEG, April 1980, d . 353 -
360.
Hawes, W.R. / Smith, D., 'Employee Involvement Outside 
Manufacturing', DEG, June 1981, p. 265 - 271.
Knight, I.B., 'Company Organisation and Worker Participat­
ion', 1979, p. 82 - 83.
Mansfield, R. et al., 'The British Manager in Profile1, f 
1981, p. 25.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 105.
Brown, op. cit.
Beaumont, op. cit. p. 52.
Brown, op. cit. p. 77.
Beaumont, op. cit. p. 57.
Blyton, P., ’Crossnational Currents in Joint Consultation', 
in Mansfield, R. / Poole (ed.), 1981, p. 64.
Hawes / Brookes, op. cit.
Armstrong, op. cit. p. 43 - 44.
c f, Blyton, op. cit. p. 64.
Clegg, C.W., 'Management Attitudes to Industrial 
Democracy', IRJ, 1978, p. 4 - 17.
Cressey, op. cit.
Mansfield, op. cit. p. 26.
52
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160 
161
162
163
Poole, M. et al. , 'Participation - the Manager's 
Viewpoint', ER Vol. 3, 1981, p. 10.
Joyce, P. / Woods, 'Management Attitudes on Industrial 
Relations', ER Vol. 2, No. 5, 1980, p. 30 - 32.
Armstrong, op. cit. p. 16.
Cressey, op. cit.
Dowling, op. cit. p. 35 & p. 42.
Ramsay, 11., 'Participation - the Shopfloor View', BJIR,
July 1976, p. 128 - 141.
Ursell, G. et al., 'Shopsteward Attitudes towards
Industrial Democracy', IRJ No. 4, 1979 / 80, p. 22 - 30.
Armstrong, op. cit. p. 16.
Clegg, C.W., op. cit. p. 17.
Cressey, op. cit.
Dowling, op. cit. p. 38.
Knight, op. cit. p. 84.
Poole, op. cit. p. 10.
Blyton, op. cit. p. 59.
Marchington, M. et al., 'A Case for Consultation', ER,
Vol. 3, No. 1, 1981, p. 10 - 16.
Hawkins, K., 'A Handbook of Industrial Relations Practice', 
1979, p. 212.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 140.
Fox, A., 'Corporatism and Industrial Democracy1, 1978, 
p. 30 - 31.
RCTUEA Report, op. cit. p. 97.
Clegg, H.A., op. cit. p. 267.
Edwards, P., 'Britain's Changing Strike Problem', IR.J,
Summer 1982, p. 14.
Silver, M. , 'Recent British Strike Trends', BJIR No. 1, 
1973, p. 83.
Edwards, P.K., 'Size of Plant and Strike-Proneness',
Oxford Bulletin, Vol. 42, May 1980, p. 156.
Durcan, J.W. / McCarthy et al., 'Strikes in Post-War 
Britain', 1983, p. 193.
Clegg, op. cit., p. 268 (In 1976, 94% of all strikes in 
the EEF area were unconstitutional, unofficial and 
plant-level).
Edwards (1982), op. cit. p. 17.
Brown (1981), op. cit. p. 82.
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
53
DEG November 1976 (1971 - 1973 5% of plants accounted 
for 67% of working days lost and 24% of all strikes).
DEG March 1983, p. 114.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 113 (5% of engineering establishments 
accounted for 65% of all strikes. 3 out of the 432 firms 
surveyed accounted for 41% of all strikes).
McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 45 & p. 70. (Only 3% 
of plants had frequent strikes and rule-breaking as the 
norm).
Turner, H.A. et'al., ’Labour Relations in the Motor 
Industry’, 1967, p. 344.
Turner, H.A. et al., ’Management Characteristics and 
Labour Conflict’, 1977, p. 68.
Edwards, P.K., 1Strike-Proneness of British Manufacturing 
Establishments', BJIR, July 1981, p. 135 - 148.
Durcan, op. cit. p. 193 
DEG March 1983, op. cit.
DEG March 1983, p. 114.
Beaumont, P.B., 'Strikes and the Public Sector', ER 
Vol. 4, No. 2, 1982, p. 23 - 27.
Clegg, op. cit. p. 266.
Crouch, C., 'The Intensification of Industrial Conflict 
in the U.K.', in Crouch, C. / Pizzorno (Vol. 1), 1978, 
p. 191 - 256.
Hyman, R., 'Strikes', 1977 ed. Postscript.
Parker, S.R., 'Workplace Industrial Relations 1973', 1974. 
Silver, op. cit. p. 96.
DEG March 1983, p. 114.
DEG March 1983, p. 105 - 106.
Walsh, K., 'Strikes in Europe and the United States',
1983, p. 215.
DEG March 1983, p. 105 - 106.
Walsh, op. cit. p. 131.
DEG March 1983, p. 44.
Edwards (1982), op. cit. p. 19.
Walsh, op. cit. p. 94.
ibid. p. 134.
ibid. p. 84 Sc 95.
Clegg, op. cit. p. 266.
Silver, op. cit. p. 96.
Edwards (1981), op. cit. (accounted for only 4% of 
variance in strike figures).
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 214.
Silver, op. cit. p. 99.
54
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
137
188
139
190
191
Beaumont, op. cit. p. 23 - 27.
Clegg, op. cit. p. 266.
Hyman, op. cit.
Brown, op. cit. p. 89 - 90.
Edwards (1980), op. cit. p. 156. (Size accounts for 
only 15 - 20% of variance in strike figures).
ibid. p. 152.
Edwards (1982), op. cit. p. 14.
Edwards, P.K., 'The Pattern of Collective Industrial 
Action', in Bain, G.S., 1983, p. 232.
Edwards, P.K., 'The Local Organisation of a National 
Dispute', IRJ Spring 1982, p. 61.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 214.
Brown, op. cit. p. 89 - 90.
Enderwick, P. / Buckley, 'Strike Activity and Foreign 
Ownership', BJIR Nov. 1982, p. 320. (Said to lead to 
a higher level of activity).
Gennard, J. / Steuer, 'The Industrial Relations of 
Foreign-Owned Subsidiaries in the U.K.', BJIR July 1971, 
p. 143 - 159. (Said to lead to lower levels of strike 
activity).
Brown, op. cit. p. 90 - 91.
Smith, C.T.B. et al., 'Strikes in Britain 1966 - 1973',
1978.
Edwards, op. cit.
Purcell, J., 'Trust, Trauma and the Role of Government 
Agencies in the Preform of Workplace Industrial Relations 
1978.
Walsh, op. cit. p. 215 - 217.
Goodman, J. et al., 'Focus on Footwear - Formula for 
Conflict but a Pattern for Peace', PM No. 6, 1977, p. 23
Durcan, op. cit. (Wages issues constituted 49% of 
stoppages, 65% of workers involved in strikes, 79% of 
working days lost 1946 - 1973).
Hyman, R., 'Disputes Procedures in Action', 1972, p. 43. 
McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 45 (50% of all strikes).
Brown, W . , 'Piecework Bargaining', 1973, p. 159.
Cameron, G.C., 'Postwar Strikes in the North-East Ship- 
Building and Shiprepairing Industry', in Evans / Creigh, 
1977, p. 133 - 157.
Marsh, A.I., 'Workplace Industrial Relations in Engineer 
ing', 1971, p. 103.
Turner, op. cit. p. 200.
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200 
201 
202
203
204
205
206 
207
208
5 5
For details of the effect of job evaluation schemes on 
wages conflicts cf.
Gill, op. cit. p. 101.
Lerner, op. cit. p. 247.
Crouch, op, cit. p. 214.
Silver, op. cit. p. 85.
DEC October 1983, p. 42.
Walsh, op. cit. p. 135. (Conflict issues were 'over- 
whelmingly pay and overwhelmingly wage rates and earnings 
levels'.)
Edwards (1982), op. cit. p. 15.
Clack, op. cit. p. 62 and p. 92.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 236.
DEG October 1983, p. 42.
McCarthy / Parker, op. cit. p. 45.
Turner, op. cit. p. 334.
Eric Parsloe Survey in ER Vol. 4, Mo. 2, 1982, p. v - vi.
(The 1983 Survey in ER Vol. 5, No. 3, 1983, p. i - ii
shows that attempts to assert managerial prerogatives is
the one factor likely to provoke industrial conflict).
Storey, op. cit. p. 134.
c f. Eyraud, op. cit.
McCarthy, op. cit. p. 25.
ibid. p. 27.
Marsh, A.I., 'Disputes Procedures in British Industry', 
Part 1, 1966, p. 15 - 18.
c f. Marsh, op. cit. (Parts 1 and 2).
Marsh, A.I. / Jones, R.S., 'Engineering Procedure and 
Central Conference at York in 1959', BJIR March 1964, 
p. 228 - 250.
Hyman, op. cit. p. 66.
Clack, op. cit. p. 44.
ibid. p. 99 and p. 63. (The 'breach of procedure' strike)
Marsh, op. cit. Part 1.
Code of Industrial Relations Practice 1972, p. 26. 
also: Hawkins, K. , 'A Handbook of Industrial R.elations 
Practice', 1977, p. 141.
Muir, J., 'Industrial Relations Procedures and Agreements' 
1981, p. 21 Sc 28.
Muir, op. cit. p. 31 - 32.
Thomson, A.W.J. / Murray, V.V. , 'Grievance Procedtires' , 
1976, p. 101 - 102.
56
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220 
221 
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
c f. Clifton / Tatton-Brown, op. cit.
CIR Report No. 69, 'Small Firms and the Code of 
Industrial Relations Practice', 1974, p. 11 & p. 33 - 35.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 159.
Karsh, A.I., 'Employee Relations from Donovan to Today',
PM No. 6, 1981, p. 47.
Sisson / Brown, op. cit. p. 149.
Brown, W . , 'The Changing Contours of British Industrial 
Relations', 1981, p. 44 - 47.
ibid. p . 268.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 297.
Joyce, P. / Woods, A., 'Management Attitudes on 
Industrial Relations', ER Vol. 2, No. 5, 1980, p. 30 - 32.
Brown, op. cit. p. 120.
Marsh, A.I., 'Employee Relations Policy and Decision- 
Making', 1982, p. 187.
Brown, op. cit. p. 44.
Daniel / Millward, op. cit. p. 297.
Brown, op. cit. p. 44.
Parker, S.R. / Wilder, 'Changes in Workplace Industrial 
relations', BJIR March 1975, p. 14 - 22.
Marsh, A.I., 'Workplace Industrial Pvelations in Engineer­
ing', 1971, p. 102 Sc 106.
ibid. p. 103.
ibid. p. 106 Sc 108.
ibid. p. 106,
ibid. p. 62.
Marsh, A.I., 'Employee Relations from Donovan to Today', 
PM Vol. 13, No. 6 , 1981, p. 47.
loc. cit.
Sisson / Brown, op. cit. p. 149. 
ibid. p. 152 - 153. 
ibid. p. 137.
Batstone, E., 'What have Personnel Managers done for 
Industrial Relations?', PM No. 6, 1980, p. 36 - 39.
Turner, H.A. et-al., 'Management Characteristics and 
Labour Conflict', 1977, p. 74.
57
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
ibid. p. 37 - 39.
also: Joyce / Woods, op. cit. p. 30 - 32.
Terry, M., 'The Inevitable Growth of Informality',
BJIR No. 1 , 1977 , p. 87.
c f.Ogden, S.G., 'Bargaining Structure and the Control 
of Industrial Relations', BJIR July 1982, p. 170 - 185 
(for the opposite effect).
Purcell, J., 'The Lesson of the CIPv's Attempt to Reform 
Workplace Industrial Relations', IRJ No. 2, 1979, p. 11. 
also: Hawkins, K. 'The Management of Industrial Pvelations', 
1978, p. 224.
Purcell, op. cit. p. 16 (Traumas include: prolonged or 
frequent strike action, threat of the sole customer to 
end his orders, complaint of customers to government 
about strike levels, a major investment programme going 
abroad, the threat of closure).
c f. also: Friedmann / Meredeen, op. cit. (Part 4).
Gill, C. et al., 'Developing an Explanatory Framework 
for Industrial Relations', IRJ Vol. 7, 1977, p. 15.
Ogden, op. cit.
Gouldner, A.W. (A), 'Wildcat Strike', 1954.
Gouldner, A.W. (B), 'Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy1, 
1954.
Gouldner (A), op. cit. p. 121. 
loc. cit.
Gouldner (B), op. cit. p. 237. 
ibid. p. 236.
CIR Report No. 85, op. cit. p. 22.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 36 & 47.
Terry, M., 'Shopsteward Development and Managerial 
Strategies', in Bain, G.S., 1983, p. 87.
Thomson / Murray, op. cit. p. 131.
Clegg, H.A., 'Mitbestimmung und gewerkschaftliche Macht*, 
GMH 1957, p. 615.
Erd, R., 'Die Verrechtlichung industrieller Konflikte1,
1978.
FUrstenberg, F., 'Worker Participation in German Industry', 
in Thakur, C.P., 1973, p. 310.
Schregle, J., 'Codetermination in the FRG', ILR No. 117, 
1978, p. 88. ('The German inclination to resolve 
differences by integrating opposing forces into an 
institutional organism').
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
JO
Grebing, H., 'Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung1, 
1966, p . 242.
Muszynski, B., 'Wirtschaftliche Mitbestimmung1, 1975, 
p. 27.
Teuteberg, II.J., 'Geschichte der industriellen 
Mitbestimmung', 1961, p. 111.
The Berliner Protokoll, 1905.
c f.The Auxilliary Services Act 1916, The Works Council 
Act 1920, The Works Constitution Acts 1952 and 1972.
Guillebaud, C.W., 'The Works Council', 1928. (In the 
area of conflicts about rights).
Works councils can be elected in all firms with 5 
employees or more for a 3 year period of office before 
reelections. The size of the works council is related 
to the size of the firm (WCA, Parag. 9), as is the 
existence of an executive committee (WCA, Parag. 27) 
and other specialist committees. The WCA 1972 also deals 
with provisions for training of works council members 
and time off (Parag. 37 & 38), special protection 
against dismissals (Parag. 102 and 103).
c f. To attend works council meetings (Parag. 31), works 
and departmental meetings (Parag. 46), involvement in 
works council elections (Parag. 14 (7), and 16), access 
to the workplace (Parag. 2 (2)), involvement in the 
training of works councillors (Parag. 37,6), application 
to a labour court If the works council does not fulfill 
its statutory obligations (Parag. 23). The Act gives 
preeminence to regulation by collective agreements 
(Parag. 87(1)) and defines areas of works council rights 
which can be extended by collective agreement. c f.
Schaub, G., 'Der Betriebsrat', 1973, p. 51.
Kotthoff, H., 'BetriebsrHte und betriebliche Herrschaft', 
1981, p. 256. (Re emphasises the importance of the 
will to participate in the regulation of workplace 
issues on the part of management and the works council 
for participation to be effective. Since over 66% of 
managements surveyed had no desire to regulate issues 
jointly with the works council, those works councils 
relying on management usually exhibit a form of 
deficient participation).
For definitions c f. Weber, E. / Bitzer, 'Arbeitsrecht 
und Sozialfibel', 1977 p. 336.
Issues covered include:- working hours, time, place and 
form of wage payment, holiday arrangements, piecework 
rates and bonus schemes, works rules, technical devices 
to monitor employee performance, safety, social welfare 
schemes, works accommodation, suggestion schemes (Parag. 87) 
the administration of training schemes in the workplace 
(Parag. 98), the contents of staff questionnaires 
(Parag. 94) and selection criteria in the hiring of staff 
(Parag. 95) and dismissals (Parag. 102).
59
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
c f*WCA, Parag. 99 (Issues covered include:- 
appointments, transfers, any reorganisation of the work­
place which directly affects the workforce.
Parag. 90.
Parag. 80.
Parag. 105.
Parag. 74 (2).
Parag. 2(1) ‘Acts of industrial warfare between the 
employer and the works council shall be unlawful...
The employer and the works council shall refrain from 
activities that interfere with operations or imperil 
the tranquility of the establishment'.
Parag. 23.
Parag. 74(1) 'They shall discuss the matters at issue 
with an earnest desire to reach agreement and make 
suggestions for settling their differences'. Provisions 
are made for them to meet together at least once a 
month and all agreements are to be written down and 
signed for then to have legal effect (77).
For example, in cases of a works council veto of a 
dismissal (Parag. 102) or individual personnel issue 
(Parag. 99(4)), and on any points of law. Individual 
legal entitlements, such as issues relating to the 
contract of employment and dismissals, are dealt with 
by the 'Urteilsverfahren' of the court. Conflicts 
involving the works councils' rights are dealt with 
by the 'BeschluBverfahren'.
Parag. 76. The Board's responsibilities lie in the 
area of conflicts of interests. Compulsory arbitration 
occurs in the case of areas covered by codetermination 
rights. Conciliation in the form of a recommendation 
occurs in all other areas.
Parag. 84 and 85.
Blankenburg, E. et al., 1PhHnomene der Verrechtlichung 
und ihre Folgen', 1977, p. 26 (circa 4% o f  c a s e s  
referred to labour courts in Berlin were dealt with 
under the BeschluBverfahren). Gelsenkirchen labour 
court figures 1980 (2% of all cases were collective 
questions involving works councils rights).
Kittner, M. , 'Arbeits- und Sozialordnung', 1977.
(Figures for 1976 show 1.4% of all cases were collective).
Kittner, op. ci.t. p. 168. (With collective issues 
30% are referred by employers, probably due to the 
legal requirement to refer issues vetoed by the works 
council to the labour court for a decision).
60
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
Der Betriebsrat Nr. 6, 1981, p. 262. (In 1978 there 
were 1.2 million dismissal cases of which 8% (p. 266) 
were referred to labour courts).
Kittner, op. cit. p. 168.
Blankenburg, op. cit. p. 6 & p. 12. (46% of lawsuits
in W. Berlin were in firms with under 100 employees,
40% in those with 100 to 1000, 14% in those with 1000 
or more).
Der Betriebsrat Nr. 6 , 1981, p. 263. (In a study of 
612 companies and 880 dismissal cases, 60% of the cases 
were in firms with under 50 employees, 20% of the 
cases in firms with under 5 employees, which are not 
covered by the Protection against Dismissals Act). 
SchBnholz, S., 'Grenzen der Regelung individueller 
Arbeitsbeziehungen durch Recht1, 1979, p. 23. (Found 
5 times as many cases from firms with under 100 
employees than those with 1000 employees or more).
Feser, K. et al., 1Arbeitsgerichtsprotokolle', 1978, 
also Blankenburg, op. cit. on inverse relationship 
between social power and reference of conflicts to 
labour courts.
FBhr, H. , 1 Arbeitsrecht flir Arbeitnehmer', 1978, 
p. 324.
Blankenburg, op. cit. p. 6.
SchBnholz, op. cit. p. 6. (The best circumstances for 
realisation of the WCA are:- firms with 500 employees 
or more, trade union organisation of 60 - 100%, an 
economic committee and representation on the supervisory 
board (p. 12). References to the courts occur where 
there is no agreement on the criteria necessary for 
resolution (p. 82).
Der Betriebsrat Nr. 6, 1981, p. 264 (66% of the total 
workforce work in firms with a works council. Only 
41% of dismissals occur in these firms
ibid. p. 265. (In 66% of cases the works council agreed 
with the dismissal, in 20% no response, only in 8% 
of cases did the works council oppose it and the employer 
then withdrew 30% of these cases. Opposition of the 
works council to a dismissal doubles the number of 
employee references to the labour courts).
DUubler, W . , 'Das Arbeitsrecht', Vol. 2, 1976, p. 497.
Der Betriebsrat Nr. 6 , 1981, p. 271.
c f. Dhubler, op. cit. Kittner, op. cit. p. 171.
DMubler, W. , 'Da's Sozialideal des Bundesarbeitsgerichts* , 
1975.
FBhr, op. cit. p. 324.
61
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
Kittner, op. cit. p. 172.
c f. Blume, 0., '10 Jahre Mitbestimmung' in Potthoff, E. 
et al. ( 1962) , p. 155 - 156.
Blankenburg, op. cit. p. 12. (Apart from the
institutionalisation of workplace relations, the size 
of the firm, type of workforce and average duration 
of employment are used to explain the low litigation 
rates in the public sector, metalworking and electrical 
industries in comparison to construction and hotel and 
catering, p. 14. Dismissal cases are the most common 
legal conflicts in the former, in less legalised 
sectors payment due is the most common issue).
Fdhr, op. cit. p. 323.
Der Betriebsrat Nr. 6 , 1981, p. 262 - 263.
Schdnholz, op. cit. p. 23. (Points to a rise of 857. 
in references to the labour court between 1969 and 1974, 
especially in the area of dismissals).
Blankenburg, op. cit. (Refers to a rise in all court 
cases since 1970 due to the deteriorating economic 
situation).
Kdrnich, J.H., 'Das arbeitsgerichtliche Beschluss- 
verfahren in Betriebsverfassungssachen', 1971, p. 21.
Schaub, op. cit. p. 124 - 130.
Weber / Bitzer, op. cit. p. 368.
P.amm, T., 'The Structure and Function of Labor Courts', 
in Aaron, B. (1969), p. 19.
c f. Kdrnich, op. cit. p. 21 (on Parag. 81 of the Labour 
Court Act which leaves the question of whether to 
involve the labour court in the resolution of workplace 
issues to the parties).
Ramm, op. cit. p. 22 (reflected in the representation 
by lawyers not in person, the dominant role of the 
labour court judge and decline in the role of the wingmen 
representing the trade union and employers' association, 
the formalisation of the proceedings and the view of 
labour law as a cluster of legal problems not as a 
social issue).
Blankenburg, op. cit. p. 25 - 26.
DHubler, W . , 'Das Arbeitsrecht', Vol. 2, p. 488.
c f.Doubler, W . , 'Das Sozialideal des Bundesarbeitsgerichts1
1975.
Guillebaud, op. cit. (on the 1920 Works Council Act). 
Unterseher, L., 'Arbeitsrecht - eine deutsche 
SpezialitMt', KJB 1972, p. 196.
286
287
283
2S9
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
293
299
DHubler, op. cit. p. 60.
Erd, op. cit. p. 30 - 42.
Knuth, M. et al., 1Zustandekommen und Analyse von 
Betriebsvereinbarungen', 1981.
Marsh, A. et al., 'Workplace Relations in the 
Engineering Industry in the U.K. and the FRG', 1981, p. 81. 
Wagner, H.R., 'Erfahrungen mit dem Betriebsverfassungs- 
gesetz', 1960, p. 130 - 133.
Wagner, op. cit. p. 144.
Blankenburg, op. cit. p. 54 (on the 'broad in­
effectiveness of labour law regulations in individual 
firms, especially the smaller ones').
Marsh, op. cit.
Parag. 87,1.
Parag. 77,3.
Guillebaud, op. cit. p. 66 - 67. (The works council 
is described by him as an industrial union in microcosm).
ibid. p . 51.
ibid. p. 216.
loc. cit.
ibid. p. 217.
Streeck, W . , 'Gewerkschaftliche Organisation und
industrielle Beziehungen', GMH 1979, p. 728. 
also: Bergmann, J., 'Gewerkschaften in der BRD', Vol. 1, 
1975, p. 372.
Erd, op. cit. p. 113 - 115.
Miller, D,, 'Trade Union Workplace representation in 
the FRG', BJiR, 1978, p. 62.
Miiller-Jentsch, W. , 'Neue Konf 1 iktpotentiale', in 
Matthes, J., 1979, p. 185.
Treu, E., 'Dual istisches System der Interessenvertretung' ,
1980.
Streeck, op. cit. p. 727.
c f. I-Iuss, H. / Schmidt, G., 'Kooperation und Mit- 
bestimmung1, 1972.
Teschner, E., 'Zentralische Lohnbildung', KJB 1972, 
p. 134 - 144.
Vilmar, F., 'Mitbestimmung am Arbeitsplatz', 1971. 
Wiedenhofer, H., 'Fragen zur Integration gewerk- 
schaftlicher Tarifs- und Betriebspolitik', GMH 1979, p. 700. 
Zachert, U., 'Der Tarifvertrag1, 1979, p. 164 - 211.
c f.Bergmann, op. cit. p. 414.
63
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
Miiller, A., 'Grundlagen und Entwicklungstendenzen von 
Koalitionsfreiheit und Tarifautonomie', GMH 1973, p. 550. 
Zachert, op. cit. p. 56 - 57 and p. 155 - 156.
Dabrowski, H. et al., 'Probleme der Umsetzung tarif- 
vertraglicher Regelungen*, WSI-Mitteilungen No. 2,
1978, p. 92.
Kotthoff, II., 1 Zum Verhhltnis von Betriebsrat und 
Gewerkschaft', in Bergmann, J. (1979), p. 300. (Works 
councillors constitute 707o of the members of the 
collective bargaining commissions as well as 707o of 
the delegates at trade union conferences).
Parag. 76(3). 'In taking its decisions the conciliation 
committee shall have due regard to the interests of 
the establishment and of the employeees concerned'.
Marsh, op. cit. (He points out that the procedures of 
the conciliation board, unlike in Britain, depend on 
the issue being referred. In Britain, the procedures 
are interchangeable and followed at will).
Knuth, M. / Schank, 'Betriebliche Normsetzung als 
Mitbestimmungswirkung', in Diefenbacher, H. (1981).
(In a study of 540 firms with 500 employees or more 
60 had had a conciliation board since 1972 (up until 
1979). There were 77 cases in all of which 56% dealt 
with areas extended by the WCA 1972).
Kotthoff, II., ' Zur Anwendung des BetrVG in den Betrieben1 , 
in Blankenburg, E. / Lenk, K.‘, 1980, p. 347. (Only 
4% of works councils in his study had referred issues 
to a conciliation board in the 3 - 4  years prior to 
the study).
Zachert, U., 'Betriebliche Mitbestimmung', 1979, p. 50 - 51. 
Zachert, U., 'Der Ablauf einer Tarifverhandlung', GMH
1979, p. 172. - 178. (Points to the low level of 
conciliation with reference to collective bargaining 
at regional and national levels. In 1976 only 100 of 
the 7000 collective agreements had arisen from 
conciliation).
Der Betriebsrat Nr. 9/10, 1980, p. 454. (Cites an 
IGM survey showing 507, of cases were about redundancies,
257o about wages issues, 10% on social issues, especially 
works rules, 9% on working hours and holidays).
Marsh, op. cit. (Redundancies and wages issues were 
the 2 key areas).
Zachert, U., 'Betriebliche Mitbestimmung', p. 50 - 51.
Ebsworth, D., 'Industrial Relations in the West 
German and British Chemical Industries', 1980, p. 369.
Knuth / Schank, op. cit. p. 181.
ibid. p. 130.
64
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
Zachert, op. cit. p. 51.
Streeck, op. cit. p. 122.
Michael is, II, P. , 'Die Praxis der Einigungsstelle nach 
dem BetrVG 1972’, in 'Der Betriebsrat', Nr. 9/10,
1980, p. 460.
Knuth / Schank, op. cit. p. 181.
ibid. p. 180 and Michaelis, op. cit. p. 456.
Child, J. / Kieser, 'Organisation and Management 
Roles in British and West German Companies', in 
Lammers, C.J. et al., 1979, p. 251 - 272.
Granick, D., 'Managerial Comparisons of 4 Developed
Countries', 1972, p. 360.
Hartmann, H., 'Authority and Organisation in German 
Management', 1970, p. 58. (Based on field studies 
carried out 1953 - 1955).
I-Iofstede, G., 'Hierarchical Power Distance in 40 
Countries', in Lammers, C.J. et al., 1979, p. 97 - 119. 
Lawrence, P., 'Managers and Management in West 
Germany', 1980, p. 90.
Child / Kieser, op. cit. p. 265 -- 266.
Wilpert, B. / Pv.ayley» J., 'Anspruch und Wirklichkeit 
der Mitbestimmung', 1983, p. 77.
Lawrence, op. cit. p. 89.
Also:- Lawrence, op. cit. p. 52.
Maurice, M. et al., 'Societal Differences in Organising 
Manufacturing Units', Organisation Studies, Vol. 1,
No. 1, 1980, p. 72.
Maurice, M. et al., 'For a Study of the Societal Effect' 
in Lammers, C.J. et al., 1979, p. 50 - 53.
Hartmann, op. cit. p. 294.
ibid. p. 71 - 75 and p. 270.
ibid. p. 294
Harbison, F.H. et al., 'Steel Management in 2 
Continents', Management Science, Nr. 2, 1955, p. 31 - 39 
(Found the supervisory span of control in the FRG to be 
40 compared with 15 in the USA).
Maurice, op. cit. in Lammers / Hickson (1979)(shows top 
wages in France are 3 - 4  times higher than the average 
wage differential whilst in the FR.G they are only 1.5 - 
2.2 times higher. There are also fewer hierarchical 
levels due to the smaller number of supervisory staff 
in the FR.G
65
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
Harbison, op. cit. (The size of the specialist, 
technical, clerical and management components was 
much smaller in the FR.G than in the USA) .
Maurice, op. cit. (1980). (The German units had the 
largest works components and the smallest supervisory 
components in a comparison with France and Germany).
Lawrence, op. cit. p. 156.
Sorge, A. / Warner, 'Manpower Training - Manufacturing 
Organisation and Workplace Relations in Britain and 
West Germany', BJIR., Nr. 3, 1980, p. 318 - 333.
Also, Lawrence, op. cit. p. 82.
Maurice, op. cit. (1980), p. 78. (Higher qualifications 
in FRG).
loc. cit.
Lawrence, op. cit. p. 80. (On the dominance of 
engineers in top management in FRG).
Sorge / Warner, op. cit.
Lawrence, op. cit. p. 93 ('the organisation of product­
ion, selling goods and running firms are activities
which are taken seriously and are well-rewarded'. He 
contrasts this with the emphasis on marketing, finance 
and business manoeuvres in the U.K. and France).
Lawrence, op. cit. p. 127.
Tylecote, A., 'The Causes of the Present Inflation',
1981. (Chapter 2 - Management Side:- British Satisficers 
and German Maximisers).
Fores, M. et al., 'Germany's Front-line Force',
Management Today, March 1973, p. 88.
Lawrence, op. cit. p. 156.
Maurice, op. cit. (1980), p. 76. (On the dominance of 
technical qualifications for foremen. The promotion 
of management as a whole is based on professional 
criteria. This contrasts with the emphasis on loyalty 
to the firm in France and Britain - in Britain there 
is a higher incidence of people with no formal qualif­
ications, only works-related experience).
Fores, op. cit. p. 158.
Maurice, op. cit. (1980), p. 72.
Fores, op. cit. p. 89.
66
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
Maurice, op. cit. (1980).
Warner / Sorge, 'The Context of Industrial Relations 
in Great Britain and West Germany', IRJ Vol. 11, 1980, 
p. 47. (Shows the absence of a rigid separation 
between maintenance and production workers as regards 
training. Focus is on the factory as a whole not the 
department in the FRG as training is based on job 
rotation. German firms have a plethora of semi­
skilled, factory based apprenticeship schemes of 2 
years duration. German workers often serve more than 
one apprenticeship, and this, together with job rotation, 
creates a flexible workforce. In the U.K., apprentice­
ships are rarer and last longer. There are no recognised 
rules for training the unskilled. Most train for 2 
months only).
Hotz, B., 'Productivity Differences and Industrial 
Relations Structures', Labour and Society, Vol. 7, Nr. 4, 
1982, p. 333 - 354.
Maurice, op.- cit. (1980), p. 70 - 72,('individual 
grievances (in the FRG) could usually be settled at a 
lower level than in other countries'), (p. 72).
Fores, op. cit. p. 158.
Lawrence, op. cit. p. 117. (On the fact that German 
managers do not appear to have many 'problems'. Those 
mentioned were technical or product-related or due to 
a shortage of skilled workers).
Fores, op. cit. p. 158.
Lawrence, op. cit. p. 116. (On the greater acceptance 
of authority and the lack of emphasis on harmony due 
to the fact that German firms already exhibit it).
White, M. et al., 'Under Japanese Management', 1983.
(On British workforces' respect for management as 
expert technicians, planners and organisers and the 
consequent low level of disputes in Japanese subsidiaries 
in the U.K.).
Lawrence, op. cit. p. 181 - 188.
Bergmann, J. et al., 'Kommunikation im Industriebetrieb', 
1965, p. 56.
Dahrendorf, R., 'Sozialstruktur des Betriebes', 1959, p. 32.
Liltge, F. et al. , 'Die soziale Stellung des Meisters im 
Industriebetrieb', 1954, p. 105.
Weltz, F., 'Vorgesetzte zwischen Management und Arbeiter', 
1964, p. 45.
Child / Kieser, op. cit. p. 266.
Sorge, A. et al., 'Microelectronics and Manpower in 
Manufacturing', 1981.
Sorge, A. et al:, 'New Technology and Craftmen's Skills 
in Great Britain and West Germany', in E.R., Vol. 4, No. 5, 
1982, p. 21.
67
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
Hartmann, H., 'Works Councils and the Iron Law of 
Oligarchy', BJIR, Vol. XVII, 1979, p. 70.
Kotthoff, H., 'BetriebsrMte und betriebliche Herrschaft', 
1981, p. 267. (Describes the process whereby works 
councillors distance themselves from their previous 
jobs and promotion prospects and come to view the 
works council as a career, investing much in the role* 
developing skills and become an elite which prevents 
effective participation by the workforce).
Also:- Fiirstenberg, F., 'Worker Participation in German 
Industry', in Thakur, C.P. (1973), p. 322.
Kotthoff, op. cit. p. 268. (On the monopoly of influence 
of works council chairmen).
Wilpert, op. cit. p. 58.
FUrstenberg, F., 'Der Betriebsrat - Strukturanalyse 
einer Grenzinstitution' , Kdlner Zeitschrift filr 
Soz.iologie 1 , Vol. X, Nr. 3, 1958, p. 421.
Pouyadou, R.M., 'Die Abh&ngigkeit des Arbeitnehmers 
von Betriebsrat', 1978, p. 5.
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 30.
ibid. p. 28.
Blume, 0., 'Normen und Wirklichkeit einer Betriebs- 
verfassung', 1964, p. 80. (For an example of a firm 
with 18 different committees set up by the works council). 
Schmitt, W.D., 'Die Organisation industrielle 
Beziehungen als Voraussetzung filr die Praktizierbarkeit 
der Mitbestimmung', GMH 1973, p. 649. (On the 16 
committees in the steelworks he studied).
Becker, W. , 'Die Ubertragung von Betriebsratsbefugnissen 
auf Ausschiisse und einzelne Betriebsratsmitglieder' ,
1979.
Fiirstenberg, op. cit. p. 428.
Wilpert, op. cit. p. 49.
Miller, D., 'Social Partnership and the Determinants of 
Workplace Independence in West Germany', BJIR, March 
1982, p. 60 - 61.
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 11.
Fiirstenberg, F., 'Die Soziallage der Chemiearbeiter' ,
1969, p. 263 - 266.
c f. Adorno, T.W. et al., 'Betriebsklima' , 1955, p. 52. 
Blume, 0., 'Normen und Wirklichkeit einer Betriebs- 
verfassung', 1964, p. 28.
Neuloh, 0., 'Der neue Betriebsstil', 1960.
Popitz, H. et al., 'Technik und Industriearbeit', 1957, 
p. 143.
Schardt, L.P., 'Belegschaft und betriebliche Interessen- 
vertretung', GMH 1979, p. 159.
Wilpert, op. cit. p. 49 - 66.
68
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
Blume, op. cit. p. 28.
KiBler, L. et al. , 'Mitbestimmung als Kommunikations- 
prohlem', in Diefenbacher, II., 1981, p. 198 & p. 206.
KiBler, op. cit.
Kotthoff, II., 'BetriebsrMte in der BRD', 1981, p. 252 - 253.
Kotthoff, op. cit. p. 240.
KiBler, op. cit. p. 199.
Blume, op. cit. p. 36.
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 20.
Adorno / Dirks, op. cit. p. 67.
Blume, op. cit. p. 23.
Dybowski, G., 'Die Interessenvertretung durch den 
Betriebsrat', 1980, p. 67.
Leiss, M. , 'Rationelle Betriebsratarbeit', 1979, p. 22.
Blume, op, cit. p. 36.
Popitz, op. cit. p. 134 - 135.
Schardt, op. cit. p. 164. (Although 50% said they should 
do all in their power to avoid a strike).
ibid. p. 162. (Although 66% said they did not).
Adorno / Dirks, op. cit. p. 67.
Blume, op. cit. p. 30.
Dybowski, op. cit. p. 69.
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 19.
Roberts, I.L., 'The Works Constitution Acts and 
Industrial Relations in West Germany', BJIR XI, 1973, 
p. 338 - 367.
Wilpert, op. cit. p. 55.
Mtlckenberger , U., ' Betriebsverfassung und basisorient- 
iertierte Betriebsratpolitik', in Duhm, R. et al., 1975, 
p. 134.
Brock, A., 'Die Interessenvertretung der Arbeitnehmer 
im Betrieb', 1976, p. 54.
FUrstenberg, F., 'Der Betriebsrat', KBlner Zeitschrift 
fUr Soziologie X, 3, 1958, p. 421 8e p. 428.
Schardt, op. cit. p. 162 (43% included the works council 
in this category).
FUrstenberg, op. cit. p. 420.
Dohse, K., 'AuslUndische Arbeit und betriebliche 
Personalpolitilc' , GMH 1982, p. 427 - 438.
Dombois, R . , 'Massenentlassungen bei VW', Leviathan Nr. 4, 
1976, p. 432 - 464.
Kern, II., 'Die Bedeutung der Arbeitsbeziehungen in den 
Streiks 1973', KJB 1974, p. 25 - 43.
69
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
Kudera, W. et al., 'Zur Interessenorientierung und 
Interessenstrategie von Angestellten', in Matthes, J. , 
1979, p. 341.
loc. cit.
Schumann, M. et al. , 'Tendenzwende im ArbeiterbewuBtsein 
Frankfurter Hefte Nr. 4, 1977, p. 69 - 74.
Schumann, M. et al., 'Entwicklungen des Arbeiter- 
bewuBtseins', GMH, 1979, p. 152 - 159.
Schumann (1979), op. cit.
Geissler, B. et al., 'Krise und betriebliche Arbeits- 
beziehungen', in Matthes, J., 1979, p. 333.
The socalled 'basisnahe Strategien'.
c f. FUrstenberg in Thakur (1973), p. 324; Leiss, op. cit 
p. 24; Miickenberger, op. cit. p. 136.
Hoffmann, R., 'Mitbestimmung am Arbeitsplatz', in 
Huss, H. et al., 1972, p. 83.
Johannson, K., 'Der Betriebsrat', 1977, p. 261 - 263. 
Kotthoff, op. cit. p. 261.
Merznika, L. et al., 'Stellung und Aufgaben gewerkschaft 
licher Vertrauensleute1, KJB 1972, p. 162 - 170. 
Miickenberger, op. cit. p. 147.
Schardt, op. cit. p. 171.
Schmidt, E., 'Auseinandersetzungen um die Rolle der 
Vertrauensleute in der IGM', KJB 1974, p. 130 - 148. 
Schmidt, E., 'Die Rolle der Betriebsrat in der 
Gewerkschaftsbewegung', KJB 1973, p. 177 - 193.
Wilpert, op. cit. p. 107 - 108.
Zachert, U., 'Betriebliche Mitbestimmung', 1979, p. 54.
VJallraven, K.P., 'Stellung und Aufgaben der gewerk- 
schaftlichen Vertrauensleute', in Brehm, 11., 1978, 
p. 182 - 223.
'IGM Guidelines for Shopstewards', 1973, p. 78.
Dzielak, W. et al., 'Belegschaften und Gewerkschaft im 
Streik', 1978.
Jacobi, 0., 'Innerverbandliche Stellung der Vertrauens­
leute in der IGCPK', KJB 1973, p. 83 - 93.
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 48.
ibid. p. 38. (83% took problems to management
representatives, 10% to the works council).
ibid. p. 38 - 39. (Shopstewards also defined their
role in these terms).
ibid. p. 49. (These stewards are elected by the whole 
workforce and operate as an organisational link between 
the works council and management on the one hand and 
the workforce on the other).
70
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
Blume, op. cit. p. 26.
Neuloh, op. cit. p. 173.
Miller, D., 'Grievance Processing in a German Steel 
Plant', 1976.
Koch, K. , 'Trade Union Workshop Representatives in the 
FPvG', 1978, p. 79. (Found a 'well-ordered union work­
shop representative system’ where members ’were actively 
involved in grievance settlements, questions of wage 
problems., safety issues').
c f.Miller, D., 'Trade Union representation in the FRG', 
BJIR, November 1978, p. 346 - 347.
Weiss, M., 'Gewerkschaftliche Vertrauensleute1, 1978.
(86% had time off for elections, 667. for shopsteward 
meetings every 4 - 6  weeks, 58% had 1 hour a week or 
more for trade union duties, 98% time off for taking 
up a grievance with the works council).
Problems include:- lack of time, technical problems 
arising from work organisation, management reprisals etc.
Erd, op. cit. p. 87.
Schmidt, op. cit. (1974), p. 134.
Treu, II.E., ' Dualistisches System der Interessenver-
tretung und Einheitsgewerkschaft', 1980, p. 39 (a 134% 
increase).
Streeck, W . , ’Industrial Relations in West Germany',
1984, p. 29.
Miller, op. cit. p. 339.
Schmidt, op. cit. p. 130.
Streeck, op. cit. p. 31 - 37.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 54 - 56. (In 1975, 86% of works 
councillors were also shopstewards).
Streeck, op. cit. p. 30.
Treu, op. cit. p. 106 - 107.
Fiebig, E., ’Organisation und Mitglied', 1972, p. 130. 
(42% referred issues to the works council, 26% resolved 
issues themselves, 24% referred issues to either shop- 
stewards, foremen or colleagues).
Nickel, W. , ’Zum VerhHltnis von Arbeiterschaft und 
Gewerkschaft', 1972, p. 244 (42% referred issues to 
the works council, 22% to foremen, 15% to shopstewards).
Schmidt, op. cit. p. 130.
Miller, op. cit. p. 347 - 348.
71
395
396
397
39S
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
Berthold, H., 'Betriebsrat und Vertrauensleute im 
Betrieb', 1981, p. 86.
Miller, op. cit. p. 336 (On Post Union Agreement 1975). 
Weiss, op. cit. p. 29 - 34 (On company-level agreements 
in the chemical industry).
WSI-Mitteilungen Nr. 9, 1976, 'Tarifvertragiiche 
Regelungen zum Schutz gewerkschaf tl icher Vertrauensleute' 
p. 556 - 558.
Miller, op. cit. p. 336.
Zachert, U., 'Mitbestimmung ohne die Gewerkschaften',
GMH 1979, p. 342 - 346.
Koopmann, K., 'Gewerkschaftliche Vertrauensleute',
Vol. 2, 1979, p. 745 - 748.
R.ose, Go , 'Die Behinderung der Gewerkschaftsarbeit im 
Betrieb', GMH Mr. 5, 1977, p. 329 - 336.
Vilmar, F., 'Mitbestimmung am Arbeitsplatz', 1971, p. 119
Pusch, M. et al., 'Oualitdtszirkel, Werksstattskreise, 
Aktionskreise der VWAG', GMH Nr. 11, 1983, p. 740 - 745.
Brock, A. et al., 'Die Interessenvertretung der Arbeit- 
nehmer im Betrieb', 1976, p. 69. (99% of shopstewards
in small firms are works councillors).
Nickel, op. cit. p. 254 (60% of firms with 100 employees 
or less have no works council representation in the 
craft metalworking sector).
Wallraven, op. cit.
Streeck, op. cit. p. 9 (High density in steel and car 
manufacture, low in electrical engineering).
Bitterli, U. et al., 'Betriebsratswahlen 1975', KJB 1975, 
p. 64 - 85.
KJB 1973, 'Betriebsratswahlen 1972', p. 43 - 64. 
Stuppardt, R. et al., 1Betriebsratswahl bei Opel 
Bochum und Opel RUsselheim in 1975', KJB 1975, p. 49 - 63
Streeck, op. cit. p. 134 - 135.
c f. Chapter 5, Firm C.
Adorno, op. cit. p. 51.
Bergmann, op. cit. p. 374.
Bergmann / Zapf, op. cit. p. 60.
Brock, op. cit. p. 60.
Dybowski, op. cit. p. 73 - 75.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 85 ('tacit recognition of the presence 
of the Vertrauensmann in metalworking industry in 
Germany in no way implies the independence enjoyed by 
shopstewards in the U.K.
Kotthoff, op. cit. p. 253.
72
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
Dzielak, W. et al., 1Konstitutionsbedingungen 
industrieller Konflikte', 1976/1977 , p. 34.
Carew, A., 'Democracy and Government in European Trade 
Unions', 1976, p. 74.
Marsden, D., ' Shopstex^ards in Great Britain, West 
Germany and France', Employee Pvelations Vol. 2, Kr. 4, 
1980, p. 4.
WCA Parag. 74(2).
WCA Parags. 74(1) and 2(1) stipulate that they must 
meet together at least once a month and seriously 
seek to resolve their differences.
Pohle, E., 'Das BetrVG in der betrieblichen Praxis',
1979, p. 17. (Points out that the employer must be 
x/illing to hold talks at the x/orks council's request 
and not postpone them x/ithout good reason. The works 
council must refrain from activities which lead to 
excessive and avoidable costs for the employer).
Schaub, op. cit. p. 48 - 50. (On the need for mutual 
openness and honesty and the resolution of differences 
by joint negotiation, references to the labour court 
or to a Conciliation Board).
Blume, op. cit. p. 141.
Brock, op. cit. p. 45.
Johannson, op. cit. p. 56.
Fiirstenberg, F. (1958), p. 420.
Zachert, U., op. cit. p. 69 - 70.
Details of a labour court case, Gelsenkirchen 1980.
(The works councillor was dismissed for informing the 
workforce of the threatened dismissal of a shop- 
steward in a manner likely to incite industrial action).
Joharmson, op. cit. p. 39. (The works councillors can 
participate in official trade union action but not in 
their capacity as works councillors).
Zachert, op. cit. p. 70.
Employees face the threat of dismissal and compensation 
claims for losses suffered as a result of the action.
The Employment Protection legislation does not apply 
in cases of dismissal due to industrial action, although 
the special protection of works councillors - that they 
can only be dismissed on grounds meriting instant dis­
missal and this requires the agreement of the works 
council or labour court - still applies.
420 Kotthoff, op. ci't. p. 62 and p. 81.
73
422
423
42.1
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
Brock, op. cit. p. 50.
Leiss, op. cit. p. 26.
Baroth, H.D., 'In unseren Betrieben', 1977.
Brock, op. cit. p. 50.
SOFT Report 1980, 'Humanisierungsprobieme und 
Belegschaftsvertretung in Klein- und Mittelbetrieben',
p. 18 - 20.
Bergmann / Zapf, op. cit. p. 58. (Works councils as 
the 3rd element in the formal organisation with line 
and staff management).
Der Betriebsrat Nr. 12, 1981, p. 575. (Management 
use of the works council as a crisis manager in the 
recess ion).
Brock, op. cit. p. 50. (The works council as a social 
welfare department).
Fiirs tenberg, op. cit. p. 422. (Problem of alienation 
of the workforce).
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 28.
Filrstenberg, op. cit. p. 423.
Der Betriebsrat Hr. 12, 1981, p. 576. (On the need 
to involve shopstewards and employees in their work to 
avoid becoming crisis managers).
Kotthoff, op. cit. p. 261. (An example of such a 
works council).
Blume, op. cit. p. 142. (On the extensive provisions 
in the WCA for contacts between the works council and 
management as otmosed to contacts works council - 
workforce).
Kotthoff, op. cit. p. 270.
Miller (1982), op. cit. p. 44 ('social partnership').
Brigl-Matthiass, K., 'Das Betriebsrhteproblem', 1926, 
p. 242 - 243. This is reflected in early studies of 
the operation of the WCA 1952:-
c f. Blume, op. cit. p. 141. (35% of works councils
surveyed claimed they had not been accepted by manage­
ment. Both sides sought to keep their distance to 
maintain bargaining positions, p. 145 - 148. 73% of
works councils described their relations with management 
as 'mutual tolerance with each side going its own way', 
only 177= cooperated on the basis of 'mutual dependency' . 
Generally, works councils were more suspicious of 
management in the metalworking industries than in 
chemicals and construction).
Guillebaud, op. cit. p. 96.
Brigl-Matthiass-, op. cit. p. 242.
Guillebaud, op. cit. p. 220.
74
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
Kessler, R., 'Sozialliberale Retriebsverfassung',
KJR 1972, p. 104 - 120. (Objections include the 
increased influence of conciliation boards, provisions 
on grievance procedures, the extension of works council 
rights especially in dismissal cases).
Kessler, R . , 1Unternehmerstrategien gegen das neue 
BetrVG', Kritischer Justiz 1972, p. 90.
Rose, G., op. cit. p. 335. (On the negative inter­
pretation of the WCA 1972 by employers).
Der Betriebsrat Nr. 12, 1981, p. 574 and p. 572.
Reiss, op. cit. chapter 1. (On employer tactics in 
boom periods and in the recession).
Rose, op. cit,
Der Betriebsrat Nr. 9/10, 1980, p. 460.
Kiihl, G. , 'Probleme und Aufgaben gegenwBrtiger Betriebs- 
rattHtigkeit', GMH Nr. 11, 1981, p. 640.
R.ose, op. cit. p. 335.
Bergmann, J., 'Gewerkschaften in der BRD', Vol. 1,
1975, p. 425.
Der Betriebsrat Nr. 12, 1981, p. 571.
Dybowski, op. cit. p. 80 and p. 115.
Kotthoff (1980), op. cit. p. 334. (Two-thirds of works 
councils accepted the norms of the WCA whilst 50% of 
management were sceptical. 94% of managers, however, 
said their works councils did not cause trouble, 72% 
said they were not oriented towards the trade unions,
81% claimed to have good relations with their works 
council).
Jacobs, E. et al., 'The Approach to Industrial 
Change in Britain and West Germany’, 1978, p. 100. 
Kotthoff (1981), op. cit. p. 270 - 271.
Bergmann, op. cit. p. 426.
Dybowski, op. cit. p. 63. (Negotiation is viewed as 
the sole means of effective representation).
Kotthoff (1981), op. cit. p. 256. (66% of management
are said not to desire such relations).
Guillebaud, op. cit. (On management concessions during 
the economic upturn 1920 - 1923 and intimidation of the 
works councils in the recession 1923 - 1926).
Guillebaud, op. cit. p. 227.
Leiss, M., 1Betriebsrdte - Konfliktpuffer oder Gegen- 
macht1, Frankfurter Hefte Nr. 4, 1977, p. 129 - 135. 
Leminsky, G., ’Probleme der Betriebsverfassung',
GMH Nr. 10, 1975_, p. 585 - 589.
Oertzen, P., 'Betriebsrdte in der Novemberrevolution',
1976, p. 275. (Shows how the most effective works 
councils were those in large cities in large firms with
mechanised mass oroduction,especially iron, steel and metalworking;.
Schregle, J., ’Codetermination in the FRG1, International 
Labour Review Nr. 117, p. 98.
75
444
445
446
447 
443
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
Kotthoff, op. cit. p. 246.
ibid. p. 245 - 246. (In this firm the works council 
rarely met with management and rejected all legal 
restrictions on their activity).
c f. Bergmann, J., 'Neues LohnbewuBtsein und die 
Septemberstreiks1, KJB 1972, p. 174.
c f.Dzielak, W . , 1Gewerkschaftliche Betriebspolitik 
und Streikf Hhigkeit' , GMl-I 1979, p. 680 - 691.
Braun, S., 'Thesen zur Soziologie des Streiks1, in 
Flirstenberg, F., 1974, p. 209 - 224.
Mliller-Jentsch, V. , 'Die spontane Streikbewegung 1973', 
KJB 1974, p. 44 - 54.
Dabrowski, 11. et al., 'Der Lohnrahmentarifvertrag II 
in der betrieblichen Praxis', 1977.
Kern, op. cit. p. 25 - 43. (Demands focused on extra 
breaks, reduction of line speed linear wage increases). 
Milller-Jentsch, op. cit. p. 44 - 54.
Mill ler-Jentsch, W. , ' Gewerkschaf tl iche Betriebspol itik 
gegen Rationalisierungsfolgen', KJB 1977/73, p. 63 - 72. 
Schmidt, E., 'Spontane Streiks 1972 - 1973', KJB 1973, 
p. 3 0 - 4 0 .
Brumlop, E. et al., 'Humanisierung der Arbeits­
bedingungen', in Bergmann, J., 1979, p. 264 - 296. 
Helfert, M. et al., 'Die gewerkschaftliche Ausein- 
andersetzung urn Arbeitsbedingungen', WSI-Mitteilungen 
1978, p. 73 - 31.
Trautwein-Kalms, G. et al., 'Gewerkschaften und 
Humanisierung der Arbeit', 1980.
Milller-Jentsch (1974), op. cit.
Johannson, op. cit. p. 59; Kotthoff, op. cit. p. 235 - 
240; MUckenberger, op. cit. p. 145.
Streeck, op. cit. p. 25.
WCA 1972, Parag. 77(3).
Marsh, op. cit. (Estimates wage drift as between 
3 - 16%).
Schmidt, E., 'Betriebsnahe Tarifpolitik', KJB 1972, 
p. 145 - 161. (Estimates wage drift at 30%).
Teschner, E., 'Lohnpolitik im Betrieb', 1977. (Up 
to 30% workplace drift including the monetary value 
of social benefits).
j
Jung, W. et al., 'Die alleingelassenen Belegschaften- 
Betriebsvereinbarungen und gewerkschaftliche Tarif­
politik' , 1977 , 'p. 81. (Details of the 1973 study 
by the Institut fiir Sozialforschung into 'Aspekte 
betrieblicher Lohnpolitik').
76
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
Blume, op. cit. p. 102 - 103. (Shows the dissatis­
faction of works councils about centralised wage 
determination, especially in the large firms).
Schmidt, op. cit.
(Workplace bargaining in the 1960s occurred via 
initial discussions with the works council before the 
employer offered workplace wage increases to the 
workforce via the individual contracts of employment.
This avoided the WCA prohibition on wage bargaining).
Tescher, op. cit. p. 140.
ibid. p. 100.
Blume, op. cit. p. 102 - 103.
Marsh, op. cit. (Points, however, to the fact that 
job evaluation criteria are increasingly being 
regulated by collective agreements).
Erd, op. cit. p. 67.
Marsh, op. cit. (On the lack of intense workforce 
activity over wages in the FRG due to the extent of 
employer control).
Maitland, I., 'Disorder in the British Workplace - the 
Limits of Consensus', BJTR Vol. XVIII, Mo. 3, 1980, 
p. 353 - 364.
Teschner, op. cit. p. 13.
Teschner, E., 'Neue Entlohnungsmethoden', KJB 1974, p. 204. 
Marsh, op. cit. p. 101.
Maitland, op. cit. p. 359. (he describes British work­
place pay structures as being the result of 1000s of 
trials of strength. This creates a structure which 
is anomalous, inequitable and unstable with the con­
sequence that wTorkers seek to protect their own earnings 
in the general 'free for all').
Schmiede, R. , ' Entwicklungstendenzen und Widersprilche 
der Leistungsentlohnung', KJB 1974, p. 215 - 231. (For 
example he cites Siemens who employ 4000 work study 
engineers).
Bartblke, K. et al., 'Konfliktfeld Arbeitsbewertung',
1981. (On the subjectivity of the v/eighting) .
Brock, A. et al., 'Der Konflikt urn Lohn und Leistung1,
1976. (Covers the problems created by rationalisation 
as physical exertion is reduced and manual workers are 
subsequently demoted to lower wage groups).
Teschner, E., 'Lohnpolitik im Betrieb', 1977, p. 140.(62% of 
workers saw wages as the most important area of works 
council activities, and 51% would like to see greater 
works council involvement in wages issues, 49% in job 
evaluation, 32%,in general wage increases and 287o in 
piecerates).
77
467
468
469
470
471
46 6
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
loc. cit, (Shows workers recognised the limited 
influence of the works council on wages. 36% said 
they had no influence, 37% a small influence, 14% 
a large influence on wages in the workplace).
Marsh, op. cit. p. 156.
WCA Parag. 87,1,1.
Karstedt, S., 1Betriebsjustiz', in Wehling, H.G. (1978), 
p. 131. (This was more likely in large firms).
ibid. p. 132, 135 - 136.
Kaiser, G. et al., 1Betriebsjustiz1, 1976, p. 206 - 207. 
(Found the same preference for internal resolution).
Karstedt, op. cit.
EIRR, 'Joint Disciplinary Committees in the Car Industry', 
Mr. 84, 1931, p. 17. (Shows the flexible resolution of 
disciplinary issues at Volkswagen and Audi. Initial 
warnings are given without reference to the committees.
A formal procedure is only introduced with serious 
offences, where defence and witnesses appear before 
the committee. There are no fixed sanctions, each 
case is dealt with individually. Warnings are removed 
from the records after 2 years, reprimands and fines 
after 4).
Karstedt, op. cit. p. 133 - 134.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 156.
Blume, op. cit. p. 123. (34% of works councillors
were dissatisfied with their rights in this area).
The Redundancy Payments Act 1965 accords a statutory 
right to compensation in the case of redundancies. The 
Employment Protection Act 1975 places an obligation 
upon employers to consult with the trade unions on 
redundancies - the reasons, numbers involved, selection 
procedures -and to notify the Secretary of State for 
Employment if numbers exceed 100 within 90 days or 10 
within 30 days. All complaints are dealt with by the 
Industrial Tribunals.
WCA Parag. Ill and 112.
Erd, op. cit. p. 80.
Marsh, op, cit. p. 160.
Dohse, K. , 1AuslUnderentlassungen beim Volkswagenwerk', 
Leviathan Nr. 4, 1976, p. 487 - 493.
Dombois, R . , 'Massenentlassungen bei Volkswagen',
Leviathan Mr. 4, 1976, p. 432 - 464.
Giilden, K. , ' Mitbestimmung in der Wirtschaf tskrise' , 1978. 
Gillden, K. et al. , 'Volkswagen - Krisenldsung durch 
Entlassung', KJB 1975, p. 38 - 46.
Jacobs, op. cit. p. 131.
Marsh, op. cit.Mendius, II.G. et al., 'Personalabbau und Interessen- 
vertretung durch den Betriebsrat', Leviathan Nr. 4, 1976, p. 465 - 484.
78
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
OUlden, o d . cit. (1978).
Ullmer, R". , 'Die Krise der AEG', KJB 1980/31 , p. 78 - 89. 
Weber, M. et al., ’Siemens Bruchsal ~ Kampf urn bedrohte 
Arbeitsplhtze', KJB 1977/78, p. 125 - 134.
p. 280.
Gerl, K. et al., 'Mitbestimmung und InteressenberUck- 
sichtigung bei der Lang AG’, 1977, p. 28. (The works 
council was not informed until the new machinery was 
installed).
GUIden, op. cit. (1978). (The works council was 
dependent on rumours about the closure of a rolling 
mill).
Roth, S., 'RationalisierungsmaBnahmen der 80er Jahre',
GMH Nr. 3, 1982, p. 129 - 143. (Shows how new 
technology is introduced by a series of small steps 
and the works council remains ignorant of its total 
impact on the workforce).
Gerl, op. cit. p. 46.
ibid. p. 52.
Marsh, op. cit. p. 90. Also Uotz, op. cit. p. 346.
ibid. p. 94. c/f Schaub, op. cit. p. 231 - 232.
Kohl, H., 'Personalplanung und Gewerkschaften1, WSI- 
Hitteilungen Hr. 4, 1978, p. 222.
WCA Parag. 99, 1 and 2.
c f. Pohle, op. cit. p. 60. (He describes 'transfers' 
as an assignment to other work area, which is expected 
to last 1 month or more or involving substantial 
changes in the conditions under which the work is 
performed. Short term movements and those not involving 
substantial changes can be decided by the employer 
alone).
WCA Paragraphs 90, 111 and 112.
In the Wage Framework Agreement No. 2, 1973, which 
covered breaks, speed of line, reduced working hours for 
older workers, provisions for earlier retirement with 
a works pension at 60.
The 'Humanisierung der Arbeit' debate. c f. following 
works.
Altmann, N. et al., 'Bedingungen und Probleme betrieblich 
initiierter HumanisierungsmaBnahmen', (4 volumes) 1980, 
especially volume 2, 'Neue Arbeitsforraen und Betriebsrat' 
Herding, R., 'Codetermination and Control', in Purcell, J 
(1979); p. 71. -
Kern, II. et al. , 'Der soziale ProzeB bei technischen 
Umstellungen1, 1972.
Krahn, IC., 'Zur Anwendung praxisrechtlicher Bestimmungen 
bei der Gestaltung betrieblicher Arbeitsbedingungen', 
in PUhler, W. (1979).
79
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
Altmann, volume 2, op. cit. p. 559. 
ibid. p. 625. 
ibid. p. 631.
ibid. p. 632 and 638.
ibid. p. 695. (50% of workers questioned did not
know what the works council spent its time on especially 
in the large firms).
ibid. p. 667. 
ibid. p. 523.
Krahn, op. cit.
Dabrowski, H. et al. , 'Probleme der Umsetzung tarif- 
vertraglicher E.e gel ungen zur Humanisierung der Arbeit1, 
WSI-Mitteilungen Hr. 2 , 1978, p. 92. (The LRTV 2 
required 30 works agreements to be made concrete at 
workplace level. Only 1 provision was generally 
applied in the plants - extra breaks for assembly- 
line workers).
As expressed in the socalled 1 Tabukatalog1 of the BDA, 
which includes no negotiation on the reduction of the 
working week, rights for shopstewards in the workplace, 
works agreements on personnel information systems.
Dabrowski, op. cit. p. 92. (The legal norms are only 
effective where employers desire change for economic and 
personnel reasons).
WCA Parag. 74(2).
An issue involving legal entitlements can be referred 
to the labour court by individual employees, although 
the employee must continue to obey the employers' 
instructions until a decision is reached.
Details include the persons responsible at each stage 
of the procedure, any time limits, whether grievances 
need to be referred in writing etc. c f. F6hr, op. cit. 
p . 138 .
Knuth / Schank, op. cit. (Of 6,240 works agreements 
from 468 firms only 17 dealt with details of a grievance 
procedure according to WCA Parag. 86).
Zachert, U., 'Der Tarifvertrag', 1979, p. 56.
Miller, op. cit. (1976), p. 15 - 16.
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 360.
.Rensinger, G., ''Muster einer Arbeitsordnung und andere 
Betriebsvereinbarungen liber soziale Angelegenheiten' , 
1973, p. 19.
80
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 362.
Dybowski, op. cit. p. 83. 
ibid. p. 89.
Miller, D., 'Trade Union Workplace Representation in 
the FRG', BJIR Nov. 1978. (Cites the findings of the 
IGM Survey of shopstewards 1974 that 84% of stewards 
were involved in some regulation of grievances and 
42?o dealt with minor wage disputes).
Miller, D., 'Grievance Processing in a German Steel 
Plant', 1976. (Shopstewards were involved in the 
initial stages of the informal procedure).
Koch, op. cit. (1974). (Shopstewards were involved 
in the first stage of resolution of minor issues).
Adorno, op. cit. p. 51 -.52.
Dybowski, op. cit. p . 73.
Fiirstenberg, F., 'Worker Participation in German 
Industry', in Thakur, C.P. (1973). Technical issues 
are refensd to the foreman (76%) and personnel issues 
(54%). Only 5% of employees go to the works council 
(electronics company).
Ueiiloh, op. cit. (63% referred issues to management,
23% to the works council, 5% to shopstewards).
Sturmthal, A., 'Workers' Councils', 1964, p. 79 - 21.
Bergmann / Zapf, op. cit. p. 60.
Thura, W . , 'Empirische Studie zu den innerbetrieblichen 
Einflussfaktoren des Betriebsklinas', 1972.
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 30.
ibid. p. 31.
Blume, op. cit. p. 142 - 143.
Fiirstenberg, op. cit. p. 317.
Schmitt, op. cit. p. 649. (The committee system in 
iron and steel is said not to operate by majority votes.
If there is no unanimous agreement, the issue is 
referred back to the works council for discussion, then 
on to the works manager and labour director if there is 
still no agreement, although the need to involve the 
latter two characters in resolution is exceptional, p. 652)
Dzielak, W. et al., 'Konstitutionsbedingungen 
industrieller Konflikte1, 1976/1977. (Resolution in 
Plant A centred on the works council chairman and a small 
group of 'informed members' of the works council, which 
led to conflicts with the shopsteward body. In Plant B, 
resolution centred on the chairman and his deputy).
Kluge, M. et al., 'Betriebsrate in der industriellen 
Provinz', 1981, p. 123. (One of many such examples in 
the book where 'the works council chairman operates as a 
second general director of the company. Even in firms 
where there was evidence of an oppositional strategy
involving shopstewards and the workforce, the chairman 
still carried the burden of negotiations with management 
and management encouraged individual negotiations). Kotthoff, op. cit. p. 268. (On the monopoly of 
influence of the works council chairman, who is often tbo only representative of the workforce).
518
519
52.0
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
81
c f.Kluge, op. cit.
c f„reference 322.
Kotthoff, op. cit. p. 271.
Killer, D., 'Grievance Processing in a German Steel 
Plant', 1976. (c f. low strike quota, the small number 
of references to third parties).
ibid. (pe gives examples of the different channels:- 
works council chairman, full-time works councillors, 
committees, senior stewards, shopstewards, which are 
all under the control of the works council).
ibid. p. 28.
WCA Parag. 77, sections 2 - 4 .  (To be legally binding 
they must be in writing, signed, displayed and must 
not deal with issues normally regulated by collective 
agreements).
WCA Parag. 88.
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 354. (Found 9 works agreements,
6 at company, 3 at workplace level at Agrochemie AG).
Knuth / Schank, op. cit. (Discovered 15 per firm on 
average over a 7 year period. 55 of the 500 firms 
surveyed had no agreements (77% of these were small 
firms). Size was the biggest influence on the number 
of agreements:- those with less than 300 employees 
had an average of 8, those with over 300 an average of 
16 agreements).
Koch, K. , 'Conciliation and Arbitration in the FPvG', 1984. 
(60% had an average of 5 agreements p.a., 12% had 5 - 1 0  
p.a., 2.7% had 11 - 15, and 1.4% had 16 - 20 agreements 
p . a . ) .
Knuth / Schank, op. cit.
Ebsworth, op. cit. p. 359. (5 dealt with wages,
particularly bonuses, 1 with an extra holiday for shift­
workers and 1 with travelling expenses for the works 
council).
Jung, op. cit. (Main areas were:- wages, working hours, 
social measures).
Maase, X. , 'Weiterbildung - Aktionsfeld flir den Betriebs­
rat', 1975, p. 62. (A survey of 100 metalworking firms 
and construction firms showed key areas to be:- wages, 
personnel and safety measures, social welfare issues).
Fitting, K. et al., 'BetrVG - Handkonmentar', 1974, p. 732.
Adomeit, K. , 'Die P>.egelungsabrede' , 1960, p. 70.
Fitting, op. cit. p. 774. (For use in the area of 
genuine individual measures such as holiday dates for 
an individual employee. It represents the application 
of the WCA to individual situations).
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
Adoraeit, op. cit. (On WCA 34(1), that the works council 
is obliged to keep minutes of its meetings to avoid 
any misunderstandings about oral agreements).
Blomeyer, W. , 'Pvegelungsabreden1 , Der Betriebsberater , 
1969, p. 101.
KBssler, op. cit. p. 330. (On the need for everything 
to be in writing, including all conversations with 
management via the telephone).
Fitting, op. cit. p. 774.
Adomeit, op. cit. p. 74.
Blomeyer, op. cit. p. 103. (Discusses the meaning of 
'trustworthy cooperation' and the implication that this 
will not lead to an insistance on express declarations 
of all workplace agreements).
Schauber, V., 'Zur Abgrenzung der Betriebsvereinbarung 
von anderen Vereinbarungen zwischen Betriebsrat und 
Arbeitgeber', Recht der Arbeit, 1963, p. 375. 
(Distinguishes between a 'Betriebsvereinbarung' for 
collective issues and a 'Regelungsabrede' for individual 
Issues).
Dombois, R., 'Informelle Norm und Interessenvertretung', 
Leviathan Nr. 3, 1980, p. 375 - 405. (On the 'Pensum' - 
an agreement between the foreman and his workgroup that 
once their work is finished, they can go home without 
loss of wages).
FBhr, op. cit. p. 35.
Seiter, II., 'Die Betriebsiibung' , 1967. (Gives examples 
in the area of special allowances, holidays, hiring and 
firing, e.g. avoidance of dismissal of long-serving 
employees, employment of persons with a criminal record 
on the recommendation of a social worker).
FBhr, op. cit. p. 35. (For example, a bonus payment 
has to he given on 3 consecutive occasions for the same 
reason).
Seiter, op. cit. p. 81.
FBhr, op. cit. p. 35. (Custom and practice is not 
recognised by the courts where there was a proviso that 
the measure did not apply in future cases or where there 
was a case of mistaken interpretation by management).
Dombois, op. cit. (Show7s how opportunities for the 
development of custom and practice were non-existent 
in the car plant as formalisation of effort norms are 
very high in car manufacture in comparison to the docks). 
FBhr, op. cit. p. 17 - 18. (On the aim of the works 
council to make concrete all workplace rulings to 
prevent employers imposing their own views).
536 Marsh, op. cit. p. 193.
537 Leiss, M. , 'Betriebsrhte - Konfliktpuffer oder Gegen- 
nacht1, Frankfurter Hefte Nr. 4, 1977, p. 129 - 135. 
(Points to a loss of power from the works council and 
the workforce to company-level councils with the 
introduction of new technolo gy>.
538 Streeck, op. cit. p. 151.
539 Sorge, A. et al. , 'Microelectronics and. Manpower in 
Ma nufac tur ing', 1981.
540 c f. Thomson, A.N.S. / Murray, V.V., 'Grievance 
Procedures', 1976, p. 102.
541 IDE International Pvesearch Group, 'Participation, Formal
Rules, Influence and Involvement', in Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 18, 1979, p. 292.
Streeck, op. cit. p. 154.
Wilpert (1980), op. cit. p. 323.
Wilpert, B. / Rayley, J., 'Anspruch und Wirklichkeit 
der Mitbestimmung1, 1983, p. 103.
542 Marsh, A.I., 'Disputes Procedures in British Industry', 
Part 2, 1966, p. 29.
Purcell, op. cit. p. 11.
543 Bergrnann, J. et al. , ' Gewerkschaf ten in der 3RD1,
Vol. 1, 1975, p. 414.
Kotthoff (1980), op. cit. p. 348.
544 c f.Chapter 4, 1, II.
Streeck, op. cit. p. 156.
545 Streeck, op. cit o 13 * 148 *
546 c f. Purcel 1, op. cit . p. 4 - 22.
547 c f. IDE Report, 
Wilpert (1980), 
Wilpert (1983),
op. 
op. 
op.
cit. 
cit. 
cit.
p. 323.
p . 81,
548 Wilpert (1983), op. cit. p . 103.
Footnotes Chapter Five
Limited data available. Information obtained in an 
interview of 1J hours with one of the heads of the firm.
In practice the number of employees varies. In the wages 
section, the manager has only 1 employee below him.
UCA 1972 Section 2, paragraph 1.
Only management's view about grievances was obtained.
'Stundenlohn'.
The directors consult departmental heads on all works 
agreements because they are responsible for their 
implementation.
Information is based on 3 interviews with the technical 
director and works manager, a pilot study of the question­
naires and an actual questionnaire survey of 8 foremen,
21 employees and 7 works councillors.
Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft, trade union of white- 
collar employees.
In the mechanical engineering subsidiary, the technology 
is provoking many conflict issues.
The technical manager has worked his way up from the 
shopfloor in firm B.
The works managers have all been apprentices with firm B 
and worked their way up to their present positions.
WCA 1972 section 106, paragraph 1. At company level there 
is a company works council of 13 members drawn from the 3 
plants to deal with issues affecting the whole company 
such as works rules.
All rounded percentages.
In 1981, the works council chairman of 21 years stood 
down and is now deputy chairman. The election also 
produced a large number of other new members.
Skilled workers = 43% (3 councillors), downgraded skilled 
worker = 14% (1), technical staff = 28% (2), unskilled = 
14% (1).
Works council - only 1 member said there was a need to 
increase trade union organisation, only 1 a closer co­
operation between the works council and trade union. The 
level of trade union organisation was not seen as an 
obstacle to their work. Their view of the shopsteward's 
role as dealing with trade union organisational work
helps to explain why they view shopstewards as unnecessary in the firm.
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17 Although problems exist in the mechanical engineering 
plant due to the introduction :qT NC-machines.
18 Conflict areas included section 87, paragraphs 4, 10 and 
11, where management's view is that the works council 
should see that employees get the correct wage at the 
correct time but everything else should be left to 
management, and section 87, parag. 6 which is said to 
permit the works council to block important investments 
and risk jobs.
19 F’or example, the works council has agreed to forego 2 
of the 4 works meetings per annum allowed by law 
(section 43, parag. 1) and management grants concessions 
in return.
20 867= (6 councillors) said an extension of the WCA 1972 
was necessary to improve representation in the workplace.
21 100% said further works council training as necessary. 
Shopstewards are seen as unnecessary cF. note 16.
22 1007= said an increase in workforce support for the works 
council was necesssary for improved representation. The 
problem was seen as particularly acute among white-collar 
employees who do not put up any candidates for the works 
council elections.
23 5774 said management attitudes were an obstacle to their
work.
24 50/4 of foremen said bonus issues arise, 507. new wage
group issues and 887= problems with wage levels.
25 5774 said the wages system was an obstacle in their work.
26 637. (5 foremen).
27 887. (7 foremen).
28 257. (2) said they occurred sometimes. The rarity of
dismissals was explained partly by problems of recruiting 
skilled engineers.
29 Mentioned by 757= (6) of foremen.
30 387. (3) said it occurred often, 627, (5) sometimes.
31 As revealed in the foremen's interpretation of 'talks to 
halt production' (women gossiping instead of working), 
and 'action to restrict production' ('a drop in the 
quality of the work of employees due to a reduced sense 
of their responsibilities').
32 717, of employees s'aid they were free to choose who they
referred issues to so their choice of foreman cannot 
necessarily be related to stipulations in the works rules.
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33 The chairman described his contacts with management as 
occurring 'very often', his deputy as 'often'. The 
replies of other works councillors ranged from 'sometimes' 
to 'very seldom'.
34 88% (7) of the foremen and 100% of works councillors, 
who put it in the first position as the most important 
procedure regulating their work.
35 50% of foremen mentioned wage agreements and 75% agree­
ments on general conditions.
1007> of works councillors mentioned wage agreements (in 
2nd position among important procedures) and 100% the 
agreements on general conditions (in 3rd position).
36 By 88% (7) of foremen and 43% (3) works councillors.
37 By 63% of foremen (5) and 43% (3) works councillors.
38 There had been conflict with the trade union over the 
introduction of a check-off system.
20 members left and the chairman still pays his by cash, 
preferring to leave the union than use the check-off 
system.
39 cf. WCA 1972 section 87, parag. 1. The director of the 
company has a legal background and sits on the regional 
board of the employers' association, which may explain 
the adherence of management to the minimum requirements 
of the WCA 1972 and collective agreements.
40 Although many are craftsmen from other professions such
as shoe-making, car mechanics. The higher wages and 
greater job security in firm C have attracted them to 
work in a mass assembly plant. Training lasts 2 - 3  
weeks.
41 The reorganisation is based on a concentration of production
in specific plants - the development of 'international 
centres of production' - based on an orientation towards 
cheaper wage countries. This has led to plant closures
and redundancies of 23,100 employees throughout the company.
42 46% (5) had constituencies of 26 - 50 employees, 36%, (4)
of 0 - 25 employees. Only 18% (2) had constituencies of 
100+ employees.
43 82% (9) had between 1 - 3  chargehands. The policy of
management is to reduce the number of chargehands with the 
reduction in the workforce and the introduction of new 
technologies which operate by increased reliance on 
individual motivation and machine-determined work pace.
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44 Most production foremen are trained by the firm. Only 1 
foreman w as an industry foreman with professional qualif­
ications. There were no craft foremen, i.e. professionally 
trained foreman with the qualifications to train others
as foremen.
45 Criticism of the former works council includes the fact 
that it was hardly in evidence - no-one referred any 
issues to it. Similarly, no-one knew the shopstewards 
or what they were supposed to do, although they did go 
through shopsteward training courses.
46 The challenge took the form of an appeal to a labour 
court to declare the election null and void due to 
irregularities in the drawing up of the list of candidates. 
The works council called a new election before the labour 
court decided the issue. A second appeal was made on
the grounds that the election booths were closed 1 hour 
early. This was a technical error as no-one else came 
to vote during that hour.
47 Members of Christian trade union and political grouping 
organised a protest signature against the works council's 
policy on overtime. The workforce was to be free to 
choose whether to work overtime or not.
48 3 by l a w  (WCA 1972, section 38, parag. 1) and 1 by a 
works agreement as he is near retirement. The deputy 
chairman is not released from his job and forms a contact 
with the workforce.
49 477o are unskilled, 27%, technical staff, 20% skilled. 1 
did not reply to the question.
50 Chairman was a professional mechanical engineer, his 
deputy is a translator.
51 60% are 46 - 55 (9); 13% are 36 - 45 (2); 13% are 56 - 65 
(2); and 1 is in the age range 26 - 35.
52 The executive committee (5 members); wages and salaries (5)
personnel (5); safety and work organisation (5); 
suggestion (a joint committee with 3councillors); welfare 
(joint - 2 members); canteen (joint - 2 members).
53 In 1981, the works council ended the following committees 
and now deal with the problems as they arise:- foreign 
workers, white-collar workers, training.
54 Some members w ho spoke at works meetings have been 
penalised by some foremen and departmental managers. 
Problems arise as employees get older and want a quieter 
job as this is left to the foremen's discretion. 50% of 
shopstewards said management attitudes were a problem in 
their work (30% of these referred to foremen, 20%, to 
departmental managers).
55 25% of stewards mentioned work organisation as a problem 
357 the shift systen, 40 3 the lack of time, 157, the work 
oressure.
25% of stewards mentioned rivalries as a 
problem, 20% the level of trade union organisation, 7074 
the lack of support from the workforce. The workforce 
view of relations showed 60% described them as neutral,
4074 as good. Their view of workforce support for the 
workforce representatives was 3974 medium range, 33% low, 
17% very low. On support for the trade union, the 
figures were 39% medium, 2674 low, 11% very low.
An example given was of craftworlcers wanting as much 
overtime as possible and undermining the policy of the 
works council to preserve jobs and increase hirings.
3074 in the 26 - 35 age range, 30% in the 46 - 55 range,
257, in 36 - 45 range.
407, were semi-skilled, 3074 skilled, 20% unskilled.
2174 had 0 - 1 0  employees in their constituency, 5% had
1 1 - 2 0 ,  21% had 2 1 - 3 0 ,  16% had 31 - 40, 16% had 41 - 50 
57, had 51 - 60, 11% had 61 - 70, 5% had 70+ employees.
64/4 distinguished b e t w e e n  the shopstewards as trade union 
and the works council as legal workforce representatives, 
6474 described shops tewards as mediators between the works 
council and the employees, 5074 made the distinction 
between shopstewards as representatives of trade union 
matters and the works council as representative of 
workforce interests.
8774 saw their role as a mediator between the works 
council and the workforce, 64% as looking after employees 
on the shopfloor, 607, as trade union organisational duties
The chairman claims the new personnel manager only appears 
to be interested in workforoe needs and interests. In 
fact, he thinks only in terms of figures and the works 
council has to prove things to him in figures before he 
will accept their argument. 5074 of works councillors 
and 3074 of shopstewards said improvements in management 
cooperation with the works council is necessary.
ck section (iii).
For example, if no information is provided about planned 
cutbacks in personnel, the works council will not see the 
need to restrict overtime work.
797, of works councillors said more training was necessary, 
60% of shopstewards said their training needed to be 
extended, 24% of employees said there should be more 
works council training and 2174 more shopsteward training 
for representation of workforce interests to be improved.
For example, transfer to a quiet sitting-down job as 
an employee gets older. Employees fear indirect con­
sequences if they turn down a request for extra shifts. 
Egoism is also a problem - employees only see the extra 
money for themselves not the long term effects on 
employment for the whole workforce.
For example, the work of the company-level works council 
is often not understood because it does not produce 
immediate advantages for the individual. The white- 
collar workers are more appreciative of its work.
60% of shopstewards called for greater workforce support 
of the works council and shopstewards, 30% for an 
increase in the level of trade union organisation. 79% 
of works councillors saw a need for greater workforce 
support for the works council, and 57% for a higher level 
of trade union organisation. 52% of employees said more 
support for the works council was necessary, and 18% an 
increase in trade union organisation.
Codetermination rights in the case of individual staff 
movements such as hirings, grading, regrading, transfers.
For example, if an employer hires an employee without 
the consent of the works council, it is the works council 
who must appeal to the labour court with a well-argued 
case to prevent it. 100% of the works council, 50% of 
shopstewards and 49% of employees said extensions to the 
WCA 1972 were necessary. 50% of works councillors and 
35% of shopstewards called for an extension of legislation 
on company-level codetermination.
Their own employer has 10 legal advisers in the employers' 
association in the town where the firm is situated. The 
German Trade Union Federation is said to employ 2 legal 
experts for all the trade unions.
60% of foremen and 30% of shopstewards said piecerate 
issues arose; 55% of foremen and 477. of shopstewards 
said bonus issues were raised.
27% of foremen and 42% of shopstewards in the case of 
wage groups; 36% of foremen and 47% of stewards on wage 
levels.
The works council faces problems in the way cuts are 
introduced - management shocks the workforce by the 
possibility of cuts in long service payments then informs 
them these payments will continue albeit with a 9% cutback, 
which was the original intention of management anyway.The workforce is relieved,the company appears in a generous 
light. The cuts in service payment are, however, a dis­
tracting element to divert attention from more serious cuts 
elsewhere. The problem for the works council is how to 
react to such incidents - if they create a fuss, they only 
fall in with management strategy.
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76 Mentioned by 27% foremen and 39% shopstewards.
77 18% of foremen and 6% of stewards said they occurred 
often, 727, of foremen and 44% stewards said they 
occurred sometimes.
78 In such cases, the works council has no say in the terms
offered and to whom.
79 9% of foremen and 67o of stewards said dismissals occurred
often, 18% of foremen and 22% of stewards said sometimes.
80 9% of foremen and 6% of stewards said this occurred often.
46% of foremen and 50% of stewards said sometimes.
81 Management estimates that 18% of the cutback can be
achieved by no new hirings.
82 cf. section 87, parag. 6, WCA 1972. Problems concern
the new computerised system.
83 97o of foremen and 44% of stewards (especially craft-
workers) said overtime occurred often. 18% of foremen 
and 40%. of stewards said problems arose about overtime 
working and 46% of foremen, 47% of stewards said problems 
arose with shifts, particularly in the area of 3 shift 
working.
84 Extra shifts are agreed to if they are needed due to
errors in production planning but only under specific 
conditions - no short-time working, no dismissals, 
voluntary, extra 2.5 DM per hour.
85 27% of foremen and 17% of stewards said employees worked 
in groups in their sections, 64% of foremen and 56% of 
stewards had a mixture of group and individual jobs. 
Individual jobs are found particularly in the maintenance 
sector.
86 97o of foremen and 59% of stewards said large technical 
changes occurred often. 55% of foremen and 42% of 
stewards said that they caused problems.
9% of foremen and 53% of stewards said small technical 
changes occurred often. 82% of foremen and 587o of 
stewards said that this caused problems.
87 Also includes the heat levels in departments.
88 The finished product weighs 24 kg and has to be carried 
although this is being reduced by mechanisation of 
production.
89 86% of councillors and 95% of stewards referred to these.
90 Mentioned by 93% of councillors and 55% of stewards.
91
91 Mentioned by 86% of councillors and 65% of stewards.
92 93% of works councillors and 83% of stewards referred 
to these.
93 i.e. working hours, referred to by 64% of councillors and 
33%. of stewards.
94 37| hours were actually worked and 2^ hours were paid 
breaks. Previously, breaktimes had not been paid so 
employees had to be at work longer than 40 hours to make 
up the ir wages.
95 ‘an die dafiir vorgesehenen Stellen'.
96 827= said the foreman, 3674 the works council, 97> the 
shopstewards and 6474 said they were free to choose who 
they referred issues to.
97 6874 said relations with the foremen were good or very 
good. 7274 said relations with the chargehands were good 
or very good.
98 7274 said relations with the works council were good or 
very good. 8274 were satisfied or very satisfied with 
the works council's work.
99 4474 said between 41 - 6074 of issues, 22% said between 
81 - 907., 3374 said between 91 - 10074 of issues.
100 Of those viewing their responsibilities as individual 
councillors, most ( 3674) had a constituency of less than 
50 employees.
101 1874 were satisfied, 5374 neutral and 2974 dissatisfied.
102 4774 were satisfied, 53% said they seldom received any 
information.
103 For example, the works council found out about the survey 
of white-collar jobs when employees and shopstewards 
reported seeing men using stopwatches to time jobs in 
their departments.
104 Details show management protests at the works council 
collecting signatures about poor ventilation. The 
employees should, in their view, follow the correct 
procedures of discussing the issue individually with 
their foreman and then referring it to the works council 
executive committee for resolution with management. 
Further employee grievances included noise levels, help 
in lifting heavy parts, shortage of parking spaces.
105 Areas dealt with included works holidays, staff 
questionnaires, changes in the contracts of chargehands, 
requests for jobs for relatives, dismissals due to 
absenteeism (13), works council warnings about unrest
among employees due to the high level of dismissals, management asked for proof of this!
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The only management contribution was a request for extra 
shifts.
The works council is small enough for all to meet together 
when necessary and there is no need for any committees 
with an independent decision-making capacity.
AT-Angestellten.
'Fragen grundlegender Art'.
They include:- wages for hourly paid employees, bonus 
payment system, pay in cases of short-term absences 
without a doctor's certificate, working hours in the 3 
shift departments, principles of overtime at weekends, 
details of overtime in technical services, evaluation 
of the performance of white-collar workers, works 
holidays, works suggestion scheme, employee support system.
For example, the bonus payment system. If an employee 
desires a change in the bonus he is paid he must provide 
a written statement of the reasons for the change to 
the collective agreements office where a joint committee 
looks at the issue. If there is no agreement it is 
referred to the works council and management and then on 
to a binding arbitration board.
On the evaluation of white-collar workers' performance, any 
complaints are sent to the personnel department in 
writing and they are assessed by them together with the 
works council.
'Bekanntmachung, Mitteilung, Aushang'.
'interne Mitteilung' cF» works council's written protest 
about management's interpretation of a works agreement.
'Regelung' e.g. on a suggestion scheme at company level.
There are between 30 - 40 different starting times.
Works rules (64%), works agreements (46%), departmental 
agreements (27%), WCA (27%), agreement on wages (27%), 
agreement on conditions (18%), other management guide­
lines (18%).
There is extensive regulation of issues by collective 
agreements, covering working conditions, wage guarantees, 
the 13th monthly income, protection against the effects 
of rationalisation, wage levels, evaluation of perform­
ance, analytical evaluation, allowances if an employee 
is working away from home, special allowances, protection 
of shopstewards and youth representatives, conciliation 
procedure.
Complaints procedure in the collective agreement on the 
evaluation of the performance of white-collar employees 1975.
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They said they were not sure on what points the works 
council objected to the evaluation, that there had not 
yet been a proper complaint.
6 wingmen for the first conciliation board, 4 for the 
second.
The chairman was a director of a metalworking firm and 
a regional labour court judge. He claimed 120,000 Marks 
expenses for 1 afternoon. The officials from the 
employers' association and trade union each claimed 
75% of his fee.
The firm w as offending against legislation on working 
hours by working 12 hour shifts on a regular basis to 
complete work which should have been done during normal 
working hours. 337 employees were affected, 38 weeks 
of 12 hour shifts were worked.
Parag. 19 of the collective agreement on working con­
ditions 1975.
'Hilfsmonteure'.
55% of the white-collar and 76% of the blue-collar sectors.
i.e. section dealing with steel girder construction.
Shopstewards have existed in the firm since 1976.
The shopstewards described their role as trade union 
representatives, dealing with trade union duties. They 
put trade union duties in 1st position, support of the 
works council second.
The works council distinguished between the stewards' 
role as trade union representatives and mediators between 
the works council and workforce, and their own role as 
legally qualified interest representatives of the work­
force .
The chairmen felt that if stewards tried to take a 
problem to management, they would be told to 'get lost' 
because it is the works council's role to deal with it. 
Management might listen to the leader of the shopsteward 
body though.
This was a common management threat. The works council 
and stewards were unsure of how serious the threats were.
All the shopstewards emphasised the need to extend the 
WCA, train the works council, improve shopsteward rights 
and training, 4 works councillors wanted improvements in 
the WCA and works council training, 3 an extension of 
shopsteward rights. 70% of employees referred to an 
extension of the WCA, 487o to works council training,
41% shopsteward rights and training.
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Mentioned by all the shopstewards; 3 works councillors 
mentioned trade union organisation and 3 the workforce's 
support for the works council. 52% of employees pointed 
to trade union organisation, 44% to improved workforce 
support for the works council and shopstewards.
Management has given out forms for the workforce to fill in 
the details of their jobs. The workforce did not fill 
them in and management seems to have forgotten about it 
for the time being.
i.e. when an employee is unsuited for a particular job.
2 shopstewards referred to the problem of physical 
exertion in the works.
All shopstewards said it was a problem and 2 said it was 
an obstacle to their role as did 2 works councillors.
This only occurred after several employees fell ill and 
an industrial doctor was called in by the works council.
The chairman argued that management would have an 
apoplectic fit if they saw workers standing around idle.
Problems existed between the works council and the business 
manager, and between the workforce and foreman.
Overtime requested for employees working on construction 
sites.
63% of employees referred to the works council on pay 
issues, 42% on work organisation, 1T b on overtime, 63% 
on working conditions, 73% on facilities, 53% on personal 
issues, 707, on problems with other employees, 87% on 
problems with management, 96% on safety. 35% on technical 
issues (with the foreman and chargehand at 307o each) .
52% saw the works council very often, 18% often, 15%, 
s ome t ime s.
52% saw him very often, 20% often, 7% sometimes.
The works council held a surgery for a trial period but 
no-one came as it is easy to come into contact with the 
works council in the workplace.
Apart from dismissals and disciplinary cases which could 
be referred to a labour court.
If management is in the firm, issues can be dealt with 
on the spot usuaHy. Problems arise as management is often 
away visiting clients, meeting bank managers, builders etc.
They claimed to play a part in the resolution of overtime, 
personal, holiday, working conditions, wage levels and 
wage group issues.
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Agreed in 1974. The bonus used to be subject to management's 
discretion.
1Protokollnotizen1 distributed to management, the employee 
concerned and the works council.
The WCA 1972 was in first position, wage agreements second, 
and agreements on general working conditions third.
They were called in to inspect a crane. The works council 
wanted its use to be stopped as the brakes were broken.
The reason given has been the economic circumstances of 
the firm.
5 NC-machines are operating at present and more are 
planned. They are introduced without informing the works 
council and employees who cannot cope with the new 
machines are dismissed.
Statements such as:- 'This is the sort of thing we have 
to put up with from the works council here'.
The works council meets together as a group to deal with 
these issues.
The works council was not able to support a questionnaire 
survey of the workforce and management was not available 
for an interview.
Although there are a large number of foreign workers 
on the construction sites.'
Only 507= of those employed on the construction sites are 
members.
10% of white-collar workers belong to DAG, the white- 
collar workers' trade union.
Overseas construction work now represents 507= of total 
turnover.
Committees include:- executive committee (9 members), 
economic (4), wages and piecerates (16), white-collar 
workers (13), accommodation (7), holiday, training and 
youth (7), safety (10), health insurance (5), social (4), 
suggestion (2), construction (10).
A worker director under the 1976 Codetermination Act, 
where the supervisory board does not have parity in work­
force and shareholder representatives. The worker
director is seen by others and describes himself as management s man.
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2 wex^held in 1981. Working hours lost by them are 
calculated in minutes.
If the works council and shopstewards have no prior 
knox/ledge of the action they reject it.
Sections 84 and 85.
New employees are given information by shopstewards or 
their colleagues on x/ho to refer to. It is usual 
practice to go to the foreman first to see what he 
thinks about a problem.
White-collar workers, hox/ever, tend to keep to the 
management hierarchy.
Foremen referred to the loss of decision-making com­
petence and their concentration on technical questions.
The foremen surveyed were all craft foremen with 25 years 
service or more with the firm. Their average age was 
45 and they spend 75% of their time on the shopfloor.
Including problems with overtime pay.
They referred to a sense of comradeship with shopstewards. 
They often sit together during breaks and discuss problems 
concerning employees informally.
They all send fortnightly reports to the works council on 
the issues they have resolved.
i.e. issues which involve large sums of money and those 
x/ith an effect on other firms in the company.
Agreements at company level cover foreign plants too 
therefore agreements have to be very general .
They cover wages systems, extra allowances, service pay­
ments, working hours, rules on transfer of employees 
between 2 plants, safety regulations, difficult working 
conditions, redundancy agreements (1977 and 1980), VDU 
jobs, works passes etc.
There is no works agreement on the continuation of wages 
during sickness and holidays for construction site workers. 
When conflicts arise they are referred by the employees 
concerned to the labour court with IGM help.
The works council chairman estimates 90% of decisions 
favoured the works council.
An example was given of management's refusal to provide 
written information to the economic committee. Pressure 
was put on the worker director by the company board to 
concede to protect the company's public image.
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The decision of the board reduced the number of 
redundancies from 700 to 190. The works council decided 
on who should go and chose those employees who would 
cost the company the most in compensation and who wanted 
to leave anyway.
The worker director admitted ruefully that the works 
council chairman always knew what was going on. ('Er 
ist immer am Ball!').
The means used included the use of specific conflict issues 
to increase the workforce’s awareness of management 
strategies and the need for trade union representation.
The Christian Metalworkers Union organises 2% of the 
workforce, DAG organises 1.57=. There is also another 
group of workers who were excluded from membership of 
the IGM after conflict over the works council election 
list in 1972. (Members of the former works council).
Production workers in firm G earn more than skilled 
electricians with 10 years service in small firms in the 
region.
cF. section ( ii) .
The number of works councillors per department depends 
partly on the size of the department - there are 3 in 
the foundry, 13 in the assembly-line sectors, 1 for 
maintenance workers.
6 are responsible for white-collar workers, 2 for foreign 
workers, 3 for female workers.
Others are the suggestion committee, personnel for white- 
collar workers, salary, education, canteen/kitchen, and 
collective agreements committees.
DAG has 2 representatives, CMV has 3.
Among maintenance workers the constituency may be only 
5; among assembly-line workers it can be 40.
They estimate 3/4 of a day per week is spent on trade 
union duties.
On procedures regulating the role of shopstewards, 857= 
said IGM rules, 367= plant-level agreements between the 
works council and management.
The replies are from those shopstewards who put the 
particular duty in 1st or 2nd position. They had more 
than 1 option available in their responses.
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The works council is able to show foremen and management 
that resolution of issues progresses quickly and smoothly 
when they cooperate with the shopstewards. Indirect 
threats are still made - for example, a comment that a 
shopsteward is spending rather a lot of time on trade 
union work. The works council says it is up to the 
shopstewards to stand their ground and ignore the threats.
Except in the gearbox assembly department. Section 
meetings of shopstewards, works councillors and manage­
ment are held on a quarterly basis there.
For example, if the workforce shows some opposition to 
a decision during a works meeting, the shopsteward 
executive sometimes will not defend the joint decision 
hut calls for more discussion of the issues. This is 
seen by the works council as shirking their collective 
responsibilities.
As in the case of a departmental manager the shopstewards 
wanted to see sacked. In view of the social consequences for 
the man, the works council agreed he should be moved to 
another job where he would have no dealings with the work­
force .
Problems with the dispersion of members and skilled 
workers putting their own interests first.
To do their primary job of recruiting and maintaining 
the membership, the shopstewards argue they need to be 
seen to take workers' complaints seriously.
Especially in the maintenance department and gearbox 
assembly. The dispersion of workers in the first and 
the number of workers in the second mean works councillors 
must concentrate on special problem areas.
The works council has agreed a large salary increase for 
themselves.
The usual pattern is described as the works council fearing 
the stewards will operate independently, the shopstewards 
opposing the works council because its representation 
is so weak. In some firms, political factionalism in 
the workforce representative bodies destroys all prospect 
of cooperation.
They formed 2/3 of the works council in 1972 and the 
final 1/3 was replaced in 1975. The former works council 
chairman and some members were excluded from the IGM 
because they opposed the shopstewards' list for the 
works council election and drew up their own list. They 
objected to the works council being bound by the trade 
union.
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202 The works council accuses the management of breaking 
trust*more often than they accuse the works council.
They can refuse to continue working unless an issue is 
resolved and no manager wants to be conspicuous in this 
w a y . ■
The company was formerly state-owned. Now it is a private 
company with the state and regional authorities owning 
35% of the shares.
61% of the stewards (1st position) and 86% of the works 
councillors (1st position).
Problems had arisen in the past when there was a threat 
to close several plants in the company. This was the 
result of poor management planning on investments and 
products. Closures were only averted after the inter­
vention of the IGM and national and regional government 
representatives and the decision to equalise the burden 
via redundancies spread across all plants. Works council 
and shopstewards wanted to prevent this from recurring.
49% of stewards and 57% of works councillors.
As in the case of short-time working which management 
wanted to keep secret for another month.
The works council views the peace obligation as applicable 
only in the case of negotiation of collective agreements 
to ensure management does not have to negotiate under 
pressure.
This is interpreted as the necessity of not making 
exaggerated demands which would threaten the firm’s 
future. The representatives consider all demands before 
they put them before management as to whether they can be 
met by them. In the case of big demands they seek their 
gradual introduction.
57% of works councillors, 58% of shopstewards (shop- 
steward training only).
43% of works councillors.
66% of shopstewards said wage group issues occurred, 70% 
wage level issues.
3 - 4  levels on the conveyor belt. Most are in group E.
Most employees are in group E, packers in D, technical 
equippers in II and I, depending on whether they work 
on the conveyor belt or mechanised presses.
32,000 redundancies out of a workforce of 126,000.
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216 Those who left the firm tended to he blue-collar, 
assembly-line workers in the lowest wage groups, especially 
foreign and female workers and those over 59 and below 
30. The core workforce was left intact.
If a transfer is to another wage system the employee 
gets 3% extra. He is guaranteed his former wage for 3 
years then it is reduced, depending on his years of 
service. If the transfer is within a wage system, he 
gets 1.8% extra for 3 months.
Transfer to a new wage system - 957, of foremen said this 
occurs sometimes, 18% of stewards said it occurred often 
and 68% sometimes. Transfer within a wage system - 52% 
of foremen and 39% of stewards said often, 48% of foremen 
and 46% of stewards sometimes.
71% of foremen and 61% of stewards said they occurred 
sometimes.
86% of foremen and 64% of stewards said this occurred 
sometimes.
100% of works councillors said shifts were an obstacle.
67% of foremen and 82% of stewards mentioned this.
487, of foremen and 76% of stewards mentioned this. (It 
includes steam from the tempering section and heat in 
summer).
42% of stewards mentioned this* especially the oil used 
to keep materials from cracking.
By 29% of foremen and 71% of works councillors.
Noise is at its maximum allowed level in gearbox assembly.
Employees have suffered from ear problems in the past.
The workforce feared that slow workers would hold up 
production and they would have to work over to attain 
the stipulated piecerates.
Especially the new belts which management wants to work 
at full capacity. The firm is attempting to fix time- 
rates for machine repairs. Problems are also due to 
the policy of no new hirings.
Lack of materials, personnel, breakdowns, transfers from 
one area to another as production declines in one section.
The department has moved from 2 shifts to 1 shift to cut 
4 jobs. The workforce now has to fetch its own material.
7 6% of foremen and 617, of stewards said problems some­
times occur.
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14% of foremen said size was a problem (they had 
constituencies of 100+) and 2974 of works councillors.
4274 of stewards and 1474 of foremen mentioned this. Problems 
include the need to contact members before and after shifts 
in the maintenance section, problems of getting all 
members together. 297= of works councillors cited it 
as a problem in contacting workers.
2474 of stewards and 2.474 of foremen.
Mentioned by 10074 of works council and 5874 of stewards. 
Mentioned by 8674 of works council and 85% of stewards.
3674 of works council and 8274 of steward s.
5774 of works councillors.
86% of works councillors.
3674 of stewards.
10074 of works council, 9074 of stewards.
7174 of works council, 4774 of stewards. ( 4374 of works 
council also mentioned deLays in resolution and 2974 
problems with management policies).
4374 of works council and 3074 stewards.
2974 of works council.
In 1973 the first workplace strike occurred involving 
300 skilled workers in the toolmaking section and lasting 
2 days.
In 1982, the workforce feared job losses would result 
from price rises and held a workplace meeting for 2 hours.
It had no obvious effect on management who raised prices 
anyway.
427, of stewards mentioned problems of workforce support 
of shopstewards, 21% of them saw it as an obstacle in 
their work. 247= said the expectations of the workforce 
were problematic.
For example, they could refuse to do work which offended 
against safety regulations but they are reluctant. Shop- 
stewards claimed the workforce was willing to put up 
with too much.
Workforce responses disclaim this - 25% s§,w it as high,
50/4 as medium, 1374 low and 874 said there was none at all. 
Shopsteward replies also disclaim this - 42% said work­
force support for workplace action was high and 4374 
medium. 5074 said support for trade union action was high 
and 3874 medium.
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Or if a grievance goes above works councillor - depart­
mental manager level.
3277 cited the shopsteward as pay issues, 4977 on piece- 
rates, 3477 on overtime, 53% on working conditions, 47% 
on social facilities, 4477 on personal problems, 5577 on 
problems with other employees, 6277 on problems with 
management.
In the assembly sections when the full piecerate is
worked there are 45 employees per belt together with a
shopsteward. There is a stand-in worker (Springer)
for every 15 - 20 employees. 6277 said they saw their
shopsteward very often, 307o often.
In the repair workshop and machine section.
32% said they saw him often, 3077 sometimes, 21% seldom 
and 1777 very seldom or never.
Issues like wages, overtime and shifts, safety.
Issues like machinery, tools, working conditions.
This is in contrast to the fitters who work in groups 
of 5 - 6 and have a high level of solidarity. The lack 
of solidarity among electricians influenced their 
relations with the shopstewards - no-one was willing to 
stand in shopsteward elections. They faced problems if 
they took time off as stewards - work piled up, they had 
to use their own free time to fulfill their duties, the}? 
were bypassed in promotion and were not supported by 
their members.
The procedure was described as:-
employee — > shopsteward— >chargehand— ^foreman St works council
This reflects the works council policy of encouraging 
shopstewards to resolve small issues with the foremen.
i.e. a group piecerate based on the car model being 
assembled. It is not wage-related, an employee or group 
of employees do not lose wages if they do not attain it.
4677 spent under | hour per day. 4877 spent between J hour 
and 1 hour.
According to 9177 of stewards. Communication was usually 
by telephone.
27% said their contacts occurred very often, 3977 often and 
24% sometimes.
They met the works council 4 times p.a. during works 
meetings and 8 times p.a. during full shopsteward meetings. 
The shopsteward executive was also seen 8 times p.a. 
during full shopsteward meetings. There were no contacts
with works council committees.
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266 They tended to ignore shopstewards and were seen as the 
counterparts of the works council.
Foremen referred to constant contacts with shopstewards. 
Special meetings were held once a week with shopstewards 
on their section to talk over issues. 45% of foremen 
had 1 - 3  stewards, 40% had 4 - 6 .  90% of foremen were
members of IGM.
Or communicate by telephone - 71% said they referred 
issues by telephone as well as in person.
Issues are usually referred during the works councillors' 
walkabout.
Each 'hall' has circa 4 departmental managers and 7 works 
councillors. Issues seldom go beyond works councillor - 
departmental manager level.
100% said they referred issues on to works council committees.
57% said they referred issues on to the chairman.
Individual employee problems take up to 1 week to resolve* 
working conditions from 1 hour to 1 year depending on 
their seriousness.
Employees complained of poor information and representation 
when on late shifts because no works councillors are 
available.
Problems of centralised management organisation and con­
sequent delays in management decision-making.
They take measures if management attempts to block the 
stewards' action either directly or indirectly. Although 
the situation sometimes arises due to the laziness of 
shopstewards.
They are told to sort out their problems with their own 
works councillors.
Meetings include the shopsteward executive committee, 
local trade union officials and youth representatives.
During these meetings, shopstewards deal with all issues 
arising from the workforce.
cf. Collective agreements on wage differentials and on 
transfers, wage guarantees etc. Grievances relating to 
wages not resolved at workplace level are referred to a 
central committee at company level comprising management 
and workforce representatives who negotiated the original 
agreements.
Agreements cover short-time working, hiring, dismissals. 
Before an employee appeals to a labour court on an issue 
relating to his entitlements under these agreements, 
the issue is referred to a central arbitration committee 
at company level for resolution.
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The personnel manager and works council chairman in 
firm G are both representatives on company-level 
negotiating bodies.
There are an estimated 20 cases of dismissal p.a. Works 
council and management have an informal agreement that 
there will be no dismissals without the agreement of 
the works council.
On sections 91 and 111 of the WCA 1972 and on the issue 
of executive employees (leitenae Angestellten). Both 
cases were decided in management's favour.
On the shopstewards' right to hold section meetings, 
which was only partly conceded by the labour court.
In conflicts involving works council objections to the 
appointment of a manager (the decision was that he serve 
a probationary period) and on a bid by employees in 
quality control to move into a higher wage group (the 
claim was rejected).
The negotiating committee includes all works council 
chairmen and all chairmen of the wages and salary 
committees.
Agreed in 1980 - the workplace wage system is based on 
this.
This deals with problems arising from the collective 
agreement on wages and includes all works council chair­
men and the regional representative of the IGM. It meets 
monthly.
Together with the national and regional government 
representatives and private shareholder representatives.
cF. Bitterli, U. et al., ' Betr iebsratswahlen 1975', KJB 
1975, p. 64 - 85.
Britscho, W.» 'Opel Rlisselheim-Konflikte urn Sonderschichten', 
KJB 1977/78, p. 151 - 154.
Delp, V. et al., 'Gewerkschaftliche Betriebspolitik bei 
Ford', KJB 1974, p. 161 - 174.
KJB 1973, 'Betriebsratswahlen 1972', p. 43 - 64.
KJB 1977/1978, 'Rationalisierungen - die Kollegen beginnen 
sich zu wehren', p. 9 - 22.
Mendius, H.G. et al., 'Personalabbau und Interessen- 
vertretung durch den Betriebsrat', Leviathan, 1976, p. 465-484 
Sacksletter, H., 'Neuer Anfang bei Daimler-Benz in 
Untertiirkheim?' , KJB 1979/80, p. 114 - 121.
Stuppardt, R. et al., 'Betriebsratswahl bei Opel Bochum 
und Opel Rllsselheim 1975', KJB 1975, p. 49 - 63.
One firm had 53 works councillors, all with job release.
In 1 firm the shopsteward executive met fortnightly. The 
departmental level shopstewards met with works councillors 
fortnightly during working hours for 75 minutes each 
meeting.
105
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
The unions represented are usually IGM, DAG and CMV. 
Sometimes there are 2 lists of IGM candidates for works 
council elections - one official, one unofficial. In 1 
firm there were 11 opposing lists in the works council 
election of 1972.
In 1 firm the works council was replaced in the 1975
elections after 15 years in office. There w e r e 2 IGM
lists in the election.
In 1 firm the works council was split - 23 seats went
to the former works council members and 12 to the new
list. In others, the oppositional group is outside the 
works council in the shopsteward body or ordinary shop- 
stewards against the works council and their own 
executive body.
cf* works council in Daimler-Benz UntertUrkheim after 
workforce unrest in 1976.
cF. Stuppardt, op. cit.
i.e. Reduction in the number of wage groups to improve 
solidarity and reduce unfair wage differentials.
Insistence that there can be no works council work without 
the support of the shopstewards and close cooperation 
between the 2 bodies. Involvement of shopstewards in 
resolving minor issues, greater scope for department- 
level works councillors and the works council as a 
whole and reduction in the scope of the committees.
View of themselves as representatives of the workforce 
not social partners of management.
For example, there are no agreements that management will 
not dismiss an employee without the consent of the works 
council. The works council's policy is to reject all 
dismissals and seek a solution via transfers. Pveferences 
have been made to labour courts and conciliation boards 
on codetermination issues such as non-reference of over­
time to the works council for their agreement.
1500 of these or 3077 of all production workers are Turkish.
i.e. coking plant and the blast furnaces.
Recent introduction of the 'steelworker grade' with 
1 year training followed by 2 years of practical 
experience of the full range of jobs. Workers in this 
grade receive rapid promotion to the lower-middle 
management ranks.
3077 of all employees who are covered by collective 
agreements are unionised. The firm employs a large 
number of executive staff not covered by agreements. They 
have set up their"own association and are seeking trade 
union status which has so far been rejected by the labour 
court.
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In 1949 there were 400,000 steel jobs in the town.
By 1982 this had been reduced to 250,000 and the numbers 
is still declining.
The company is one of the largest producers of steel 
pipes in the world. It now owns all the processes 
necessary for the complete production of steel pipes.
Previously, firm II was part of the controlling company, 
now it has been transferred to another company within 
the concern. This means that the controlling company 
is now purely administrative and this has called into 
question the applicability of Montan codetermination as 
the Ilontan model only applies where there is 50% steel 
production or above. If the Montan model of codetermination 
is lost for the controlling company, employees will have 
little influence on the central decision-making level 
in the concern.
One belongs to the association of higher executive 
employees.
These include:- wages and salary, working hours, social, 
personnel, safety, accommodation, suggestion, training, 
handicapped, white-collar workers, personnel-hirings 
and manning. All the chairmen of the committees sit on 
the executive committee of the works council.
These are divided into 35 production and 6 white-collar 
areas.
They meet during the early shift and are paid if they 
would be at work then. The agenda includes a report 
by the works council, reports on the labour market 
situation, organisational and work issues.
For example, where one department was being closed 4 
meetings were held in one month.
In 1973 the leader of the shopsteward body stepped down.
In 1980, the works council chairman retired early. The 
conflict was a political power struggle between the two 
men.
Their views are sought on the agencb for a works meeting,the 
. --.content, of iwor.ks(.agreements . The exchange of views takes 
place through the 5 works councillors on the shop- 
steward executive, works council reports at shopsteward 
meetings and departmental meetings.
The shopstewards mobilise the workforce and explain 
the pros and cons of action.
In the white-collar sector there are 1600 employees 
represented by 5 works councillors with 50 stewards to 
help them maintain contact.
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Seminars for shopstewards and IGM members are held in 
the works outside working hours. Weekend schools are 
also held for shopstewards and there is an informal 
agreement that shopstewards are allowed an extra day's 
holiday to attend the school.
For example, no time off to fulfill their duties.
Attitudes are most favourable among those foremen 
belonging to the IGM as they have a better appreciation 
of the shopsteward's role.
He is an ex-military man, president of the employers' 
association. He is due to be replaced by the technical 
manager in firm H and this is thought to hold better 
prospects for cooperation because he is a pragmatist 
who knows the industry inside out, although he is said 
to be no friend of the union.
They are usually rebuked in private by management and 
relations improve for a short while then they attempt 
to ignore the law again. Management training on human 
relations is given but it is not thought to change the 
attitudes of those over 50.
For example, the works council cannot reject short-time 
working out of hand but has to discuss it in the light 
of the needs of the firm.
He has been trained by the trade union in their Social 
Academy. The present 3rd generation of worker directors 
is seen as more effective than the previous two. Often 
they have been works councillors themselves and are no 
longer just theorists with no practical experience in 
the steel industry.
The present manager came up through the ranks from being 
a turner to member of a works council to works council 
chairman to personnel manager.
Craft workers are in group 14, 1st smelter and 2nd 
maintenance worker in group 12.
The employees continue to receive their old wage for 1 
year as from the time the last employee is transferred. 
Management allows the employees to receive training to 
obtain extra qualifications during this time so that 
they can move into a job paying the same wage when the 
wage guarantee ends.
OPEC policies have reduced drilling operations.
A conti-shift system whereby at any one time 2/9 of the 
workforce are on the early shift, 2/9 on the afternoon 
one, 2/9 on the night shift, 2/9 are free and 1/9 is 
on holiday.
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328 The employees have no fixed breaks, only enough time 
to eat a sandwich at their machines. They are paid 
for the time they would have spent on breaks.
For example, there is no flexibility in starting and 
finishing tiroes. The employee has to stay at his job 
until the man from the next shift relieves him.
The state has tied subsidies and grants to improvements 
in the level of dust, water pollution, noise, the re­
cycling of waste products and safety levels.
For example, mechanisation of the steering in the 
rolling mills and the blast furnaces. The reduction 
in the physical pressures of work since the late 1960s 
does, however, create problems among the foreign workers 
who are not equipped to operate the new sophisticated 
machinery.
For example, a complaint by an employee that the foreman 
always picks on him to cover for workers who are sick.
The foremen tend to choose those who offer the least 
resistance to unpleasant or covering work.
In 1972 the workers in the rolling mill occupied the 
administrative block. Other workers joined the strike 
in sympathy with their claim. In 1973 the transport 
workers called a workplace strike.
The strike led to 22 dismissals, which centred on those
involved in the 1972 workplace action.
For example, the refusal to negotiate on certain issues, 
a tighter control of works passes, obstacles to shop- 
steward elections.
i.e. the rolling mill, transport sector, main workshop. 
Solidarity is weaker in the blast furnaces due to the 
higher proportion of foreign workers there.
They are all industrial foremen who have received skilled 
training and have at least 5 years work experience.
For example, the issue as to who should obtain the 
position of 1st skilled worker in a department is decided
de facto in the department but the decision is formally
ratified by a committee.
The works councillors are only in the production sector 
at certain times such as during the cleaning shift or 
the change in shifts. There are particular problems 
in the maintenance sector due to the dispersion of the 
workforce across 3 production departments. Contacts 
are made via telephone.
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340 This committee meets with management once a week and
deals with dismissals, overtime and wages issues. The 
other committees meet with the relevant heads of 
department.
341 lie is recommended for the post by full-time trade union
officials and works councillors.
342 The personnel manager has been nominated as the next
worker director to take up office in 1983. He has now 
left the works to work in the administration of the 
company until then because of a trade union rule that 
internal candidates should not be nominated. The present 
personnel manager who has taken his place was formerly 
the works council chairman in a branch of the pipeworks.
343 For example, agreements on extra job releases for works
councillors, shopsteward facilities. They could all be 
retracted by management if they so wished.
344 The)'' include annual agreements on holiday regulations,
special payments and allowances, matters relating to 
the collective agreement on general working conditions.
345 Firm H no longer has a worker director and has to refer 
questions to the worker director in the pipe works. He, 
in turn, has to refer questions to the worker director 
in the main administration of the company. Problems 
also arise with the policy of establishing uniform 
regulations in the pipe works and firm H.
346 43 employees are members of the representatives assembly,
2 are in the local trade union administration. Others 
sit on trade union committees including the collective 
bargaining committee.
347 That is a conciliation board as set down in the collective
agreement on general working conditions to deal with 
issues relating to that agreement. The board comprises
1 works councillor, 1 trade union representative, 1 
legal expert from the employers' association, 1 manage­
ment representative and a neutral chairman who is a 
labour court judge. The board can be called by 1 side 
only.
348 Extra training is now being given due to the increasing
complexity of the technology. The chargehands and 
column leaders are particularly affected by the new
developments. Problems arise due to the low level of
skills among the workforce - during the 1960s skill 
levels were high due to the recruitment of self-employed 
craftworkers. The workforce in the concern as a whole 
comprises 21% white-collar workers, 79% blue-collar 
workers (of which 9% are unskilled , 55% semi-skilled 
and 36% skilled workers).
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- the executive committee, youth and training, social 
facilities, canteen, wages, safety, legal.
- accommodation, pensions and financial support-, 
committees.
Instead of 2 works meetings.
4174 of works councillors said improvements in shop- 
steward work were necessary and 59/4 called for more 
training for works councillors and shopstewards.
Although 2174 said problems arose due to the fact that 
worker expectations are too high.
The chairman receives information on planning, invest­
ments and is involved in the monthly production meetings. 
In return he bears joint responsibility for decisions 
taken.
1 Verbriiderung' .
He emphasises the fact that the director has the con­
fidence of the workforce representatives and therefore 
is less likely to have a conflictual approach. He also 
ensures that "the views of the workforce are discussed 
on the profit-dominated company board.
70/4 of the workforce, 537= of works councillors and 6474 
of stewards. The works council chairman emphasised 
section 90 of the UCA on personnel planning and said 
there needed to be a much clearer formulation of works 
council rights in this area.
5374 of works councillors, 3674 of stewards.
They emphasised the need to avoid legalism and interpret 
the laws flexibly in practice to secure the smooth running 
of the firm.
'fachlich, sachlich und nlichtern'.
Mentioned by 657= of works councillors, 50/4 of shopstewards 
and 5574 of employees.
Mentioned by 4774 of works councillors and 32/4 of stewards.
7974 of stewards said these occurred sometimes, 677= of 
foremen.
147= of stewards said this occurred often, 6974 said some­
times as did 8374 of foremen.
According to 3674 of stewards and 5074 of foremen.
1174 of stewards said often, 5774 sometimes as did 8374 
of foremen.
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367 On wages, 33% said the issues were individual ones,
50% said they were individual and group issues.
On working conditions, 17% were individual and 33% 
of foremen said individual and group conflicts arose.
On problems between employees, 3377 said the conflicts 
were individual in nature, 5077 said both individual 
and group conflicts occurred.
368 60% said they referred technical issues to the charge- 
hand .
369 55% referred personal problems to shopstewards.
370 40% referred them to shopstewards, 35% to the foreman.
371 Since the production employees work away from the 
administrative block these are their most obvious con­
tracts found either in the production itself or the 
works council office.
372 207, said they used the telephone as well as direct 
oral references.
373 Although 35% said written resolution also occurred.
374 307o said very often, 50% often.
375 257o said very often, 557, often.
376 30% said very often, 357, often for the chargehands.
15/7 said very often, 3077 often for the foremen.
377 187, had constituencies of 11 - 20; 46% constituencies 
of 21 - 30.
378 43% mentioned chargehands as a first reference point 
too and 297, the foremen.
379 31/7 said contacts were very often, 54% often.
380 38% said very often, 27% often.
381 3977 spent under J hour a day.
382 5077 had constituencies of 26 - 50; 3377 constituencies
of 51 - 75.
383 3377 received them by telephone too.
384 5077 said they also received references whilst in their 
office as well.
385 Chargehands - 177, of foremen saw them very often, 50% 
often.
Departmental managers - 1777 saw them very often, 337, often. 
Shopstewards - 5077 saw them often.
Works council - 50% saw them often..
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47% said they resolved under 20% of issues, 2476 resolved 
between 21 - 40% of issues. The chairman and his deputy 
resolved between 61 - 80% of issues arising.
Although the\< stressed they did not have departmental 
responsibilities and dealt with issues usually via the 
works council office - the central reference point for 
employees.
The executive and safety committees are the most 
important committees. The former deals with matters of 
discipline and personnel together with the personnel 
department.
Issues such as pensions, service awards, personnel 
issues under the WCA 1972 and questions covered by 
collective agreements.
One example of this was the reference of the 1976 Co­
determination law to the Constitutional Court by the 
Employers’ Federation.
An estimated 1 5 - 2 0  cases per annum*with foreign workers 
overrepresented in the references to the Labour Court.
cr. Section 21 in chapter 4.
In firms A,B,C,D,F,I,
Emphasised by both the works councillors and foremen.
Dismissals usually only occur at the end of a long 
process to rehabilitate the employee.
It was pointed out that most German workers recognise 
the futility of doing so. Foreign workers often do 
appeal against a decision of the works council and 
management.
In firm E,the heating issue. In firm A, works holidays.
Firms G and H said there was seldom need to refer 
issues to a labour court as there were so many other 
means of exerting pressure on management.
Some firms, such as firm I, were able to draw up a 
compulsory redundancy agreement without reference to 
a conciliation board. This may be due to an undemanding 
workforce or the fact that redundancies were concentrated 
on the foreign employees.
Much depends on the opportunities for internal resolution 
these were extensive in firms G and H, and there was 
no need to refer issues to outsiders.
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401 This may have been due to the high level of central­
isation of decision making with the lack of resources 
at local level to reach internal agreements and the 
need to show the company board that management was not 
giving in to works council demands. It could also be 
due to the clash of personalities among leading 
negotiators on the management and works council sides.
In firm G, trade union officials are represented on 
the supervisory board and they negotiate the company 
agreements with management. In If, trade union officials 
also sit on the supervisory board, where workforce 
representatives have equal representation with share­
holder representatives. Trade union officials also 
attend works council, shopsteward and works meetings.
cf. Firms C, E, G, H.
This is reserved for the personnel committees in the 
largest firms such as firm G.
cf. firm B, the works council chairman had over 25 years 
service before he stepped down and became deputy chairman.
cf. firms G and II.
In such firms employees are reluctant to stand for 
election as works councillors, cf. firms B and E.
cf. firm C, where there was some opposition to works
council restrictions on overtime working.
Dzielak, E. et al., 1Konstitutionsbedingungen industrieller 
Konflikte', 1976/1977.
Kotthoff, II., 'BetriebsrHte und betriebliche Herrschaft1, 
1981, p. 253.
cf. section 2, II, ii, B.
cf, firms C and F.
cf. firm H and firms in the motor car production industry,
The economic situation was also a crucial influence on 
the exercise of political pressure for cooperation at 
company level in firm G.
Official warning strikes were also dependent on the 
shopstev/ards.
This does not apply to white-collar workers who refer 
issues via the management hierarchy in their departments.
Firm F had 60 works agreements.
114
Footnotes Chapter Six
4 1 Firm A.
2 1 Informations:? ragen 1 .
3 In the largest firms there had also been strikes against
joint wage agreements in the early seventies, especially 
in 1972 and 1^73.
4 In relation to size of firm, dismissals were more common
in smaller firms. In large firms, dismissals were only 
used in serious disciplinary cases with the consent of 
the works council.
5 Firm C faced problems of workforce solidarity as a result 
of rationalisation and specific management policies, 
especially those towards the trade union and works council.
6 Other conflicts included overtime and shifts in firm C, 
payment of time lost due to heating breakdown in firm E, 
management behaviour in F and H, conflict over management 
agreement not to introduce new price rises being broken 
in G.
7 For example, cuts in the level of company allowances, the 
overruling of local management decisions, product price rises, 
transfer of works council personnel function to company 
works councils.
8 This, in turn, was dependent on levels of trade union 
organisation in specific firms and shopsteward organisation.
9 Prohibition of overt conflict measures (WCA 74,2), provision 
for workplace meetings (WCA 43,3).
10 Via, for example, the proportion of white-collar, foreign
and female labour which is associated with low trade 
union density and individual responses to management 
decision-making. Other significant influences on trade 
union organisation include skill levels, general education 
levels, previous work experience of the current workforce.
11 cr. chapter one* p.
12 cF. p. 5*2. - 85.
13 Some plant-level actors are critical of the attempts by
the regional and national organisations to promote conflictual 
attitudes at plant level, which, in their view, belong to 
the higher levels of the system.
14 There was a tendency for some managers to view as interests 
what works councils saw as their rights and this provoked 
conflicts between the two parties.
Due to the absence of empirical studies of British firms 
in the thesis, the information on British fims is taken from 
the literature survey, cf-l' chapter four.
For example, fluctuation of earnings, large and un­
justified wage differentials, complex wage payment systems, 
inequities and anomalies in the wages system.
For example, strikes sometimes occur in protest at strikes 
in other areas of a plant or company, which are hindering 
production and the work of other employees, c.h Clack, G. , 
'Industrial Relations in a British Car Factory1, 1967.
Transfers create more problems in the British context as 
mobility of labour on the shopfloor is reduced as a 
result of multi-trade unionism based on occupational 
distinctions and nreser ation of each occupation's sphere 
of activity.
White, P.J., 'Is Voluntarism in Decline?', IRJ Vol. 9,
1973, p. 35 - 43.
ibid.
Brown, \K  , ’Piecework Bargaining', 1973.
cf. c h . 1, p . 33 - VI .
cf. ch. 1, P. - 48.
o Clack, op. cit
Turner, H.A. et al., 'Labour Relations in the Motor 
Industry', 1967.
Sorge, A. et al., 'Micro-Electronics and Manpower in 
Manufacturing', 1931.
(In British firms, the new technology is introduced in 
such a way as to maintain the division between the line 
and specialised departments and the new technology is in 
the hands of 'experts'. In the FRG, the line is involved 
in the introduction and operation of new technology).
Woodward, J., 'Industrial Organisation - Theory and 
Practice', 1965.
Prais, S.J., 'The Evolution of Giant Firms in Britain', 1976.
cf. Concannon, !I. , ' Growth of Arbitration Work in ACAS1 ,
IRJ Spring 1978, p. 12 - 18. (Increase from 18% to 28% 
of conflicts referred to ACAS).
Firm F - the reason for the large number of agreements 
was the practice of putting in writing all informal agree­
ments made by telephone or orally during joint meetings.
In G due to its semi-nationalised status, in H due to the 
influence of the Codetermination Lav; for Coal, Steel and 
Iron industries of 1951.
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The foremen, generally, did not deal with discipline, 
wages, shifts and transfers except at firm G}where their 
actual function was more that of a departmental manager 
since their sections were so large.
This was related to size of firm and technological 
processes - in mass assembly the foreman was often not 
available for grievance reference.
In the metalworking sector, there is a long trade union 
tradition and shopstewards existed before works councils 
were introduced unlike the newer industries such as 
chemicals and the electro-technical industry.
This example shows the impact of differing ideologies and 
values on conflict resolution at plant level.
In contrast to argument used by Thomson, A.U.J. et al., 
'Grievance Procedures', 1976, p. 101, for British firms.
Thomson, A.W.J., op. cit. p. 59.
Hyman, R. , 'Disputes Procedures in Action', 1972, p. 39. 
ibid. p. 43.
Hence negative statements such as: 'auf ihre Rechte
nochen1, 'mit den Gesetzbuch unter dem Arm herum1aufen'.
In Britain, problems arise at foreman level; in the FRG, 
at departmental management level.
Purcell, J., 'Lessons of the CIR's Attempt to Reform 
Workplace Industrial Relations', 1979, p. 10 and 13.
Management seeks to restrain shopstewards' extension of 
their role as it fears the situation will 'get out of 
hand'.
cF. ch. 4, section I, IV, ii. 
ibid.
Terry, M., 'The Inevitable Growth of Informality', 1977. 
Purcell, op. cit.
Including, too, trade union representation at company level, 
p. 61-L2 .
cfe problems mentioned in connection with size (development 
by mergers and takeovers or differentiation of production 
within the same company) and with technology (the technical 
hardware and process may be the same but its application 
varies with context of the plant).
cf. The Montan Act or the semi-nationalised status of firm G, 
which leads to involvement of trade union officials, 
national and local government representatives on the super­visory board of companies.
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Footnotes Chapter Seven
There is some support for this view in the study by 
Gorge, A. et al. (1983) on the application of micro­
electronics in engineering firms in the FP„G and U.K. , 
and in the study by Bergmann, J. (1977) on the effects 
of the economic recession on the cooperation between 
trade unions and employers in the FRG and their ad­
herence to state guidelines.
For example, the differences in work organisation, 
working conditions, management and workforce organisation 
and conflicts and conflict resolution processes in the 
pressworks, maintenance department and assembly-1ines 
in firm G.
Recent crossnational studies underline the importance of 
viewing industrial relations structures and processes 
in their wider national context cf.
Blyton, P., 'Cross-national Current in Joint Consultation' 
in Mansfield, R. / Poole (1981), p. 66 on the need for a 
'broad explanatory framework which enconpasses individual, 
organisational and extra-organisational levels of analyses'.
cf. Mansfield, R., 'The International Study of Organisational 
Structure', in Mansfield / Poole (1981), p. 19 - 20.
Poole, U. , 'Divergence and Convergence in Management 
Structure', in Mansfield / Poole (1981), where examples 
are given of how different value systems have influenced 
management policies in the FRG (product-orientation5 and 
the USA (market-orientation).
Legislative changes can lead to alterations in actors' 
attitudes and policies, although the fixed nature of 
attitudes often means changes in relationships only arise 
with the emergence of new actors in the workplace.
cf. also:- Blyton, P., 'Crossnational currents in Joint 
Consultation', in Mansfield, R. / Poole (1981), p. 66 on 
the need to consider actual practice and attitudes as 
well as institutions.
cf. also:- Poole, M . , 'Industrial Democracy in Comparative 
Perspective', in Mansfield, R. / Poole (1981), p. 33. On 
the significance of structural and non-structural forces 
in the determination of the formal patterns and actual 
influence and involvement in firms.
'Codetermination' was, however, restricted to the works 
council adding its signature to management documents in 
some firms, especially small ones.
'Power' is viewed in the study in terms of the respective 
ability of the actors to impose their own definitions 
and interests in specific conflict situations.
)
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10 Legal prohibitions on plant-level conflict measures and 
wage bargaining tend to put a brake on the exploitation 
of their power position by the workforce.
11 cf. Trade union and employer association cooperation 
with the state in the 'Konzertierte Aktion'.
12 Exceptions include the Boot and Shoe industry cf.
Goodman, J. in Personnel Management (1977)* and some firms 
where a threat to the continued existence of the firm 
has promoted both sides to seek areas of cooneration:- 
cf. Purcell, J. in IRJ (1979).
also Storey, J., 'The Challenge to Management Control’,
1980, p. 31 on the footwear industry.
13 Purcell, on. cit.* j.
14 cf. Fox, A., 'Beyond Contract', 1974.
Goldthorpe, J.H., 'Industrial Relations in Great Britain - 
a Critique of Reformism', in Clarke, T. / Clements (1977).
15 cf. socalled 'enlightened management*techniques displayed 
in the chemical industry and in Japanese companies.
16 Thus, the economic recession alone will not lead to long­
term changes in relations nor will unilateral management 
styles as in the case of British Leyland.
17 Equally, where there is no agreement on the procedural
aspects of relationships, favourable environmental 
conditions will not produce cooperative relations, cf.
U.K. firms in the 1960s.
13 cf. Terry, K. , 'Shopsteward Development and Managerial
Strategies', in Bain, G.S. (1933).
Terry, M., 'Shopstewards through Expansion and Recession'
IRJ 19u33 on the importance of senior stewards and Joint 
Shor)s t ewa rd Comm i 11ee s .
19 cf. Marsh, A.I., 'Disputes Procedures in British Industry', 
Part 1, 1967, where the British system is said to be 
based on the procedural regulation of substantive issues, 
although there were no formally agreed procedures in 
operation.
20 The footwear industry in Britain is noted for the moderate
constitutional behaviour cf both sides, cf. Storey, op. cit. 
p. 31 - 32, and thus bears closer ressemblance to the German 
system than other industries in Britain.
21 cf. Storey, op. cit. p. 33 on the similar situation in
the British footwear industry, where 'industry-wide agree­
ments facilitate the subsequent filling-in of rules but noth­
ing like the undermining of central constitutional authority 
in other industries'.
22 Poole, op. cit. p. 31.
23 Roles, include:- laissez-faire, dirigism, guardian of
social stability.
Attitudes develop in the course of experience in 
industrial relations processes and feedback to conflicts 
arising as they influence the perception of conflict in 
the workplace.
The need to look at objective and subjective factors is 
also true of any investigation into the power position 
of the actors.
For example, the influence of individuals with definite 
views and policies rather than the collective sense of 
'personality' as used by Blain, A.N.J. in 'Pilots and 
Management', 1972.
For example, in Purcell's study, op. cit. cooperation 
arose from a crisis situation which almost led to the 
firm going bankrupt. Cooperation in this case is based 
on economic interests not societal values and is expected 
to provide a lower level of legitimacy and hence stability 
in the relationship.
cf. Poole, M., 'Industrial Democracy In Comparative 
Perspective', in Mansfield, R. / Poole (1981), p. 34 ~ 35 
on the importance of both aspects in industrial relations 
research.
cf. Poole, M., 'Divergency and Convergence in Management', 
in Mansfield, II. / Poole (1981), p. 53, on the need to 
avoid a one-sided commitment to universalistic or 
cultural istic perspectives as divergences and convergences 
exist in industrial relation system comparisons.
As recognised in the recent work by the Industrial 
Democracy in F.urope research group and Mansfield and Poole, 
op. cit. (1931).
Past decisions place some constraints on present day 
actor decisions.
cF. Mansfield, R. , 'The International Study of Organisational 
Structure', in Mansfield / Poole, 1981, p. 19. Decisions 
on structure are shaped by the values, ideologies, interests 
and perception of management and other groups with an 
impact on the decision.
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Appendix 1. Summary of Key Areas of Questioning in the
Interview Schedules and Questionnaire Survey
The development of areas of questioning and the multiple choice 
questions in the survey was influenced not only by the comments 
of the respondents themselves but also by Thomson and Murray's 
work,3 especially their adoption of a scale for grievance 
frequency rate, their distinction between formal procedures, 
standard practices and actual practice and their examples of 
questions to elicit the role of participants in the grievance 
resolution process, for example, the percentage of grievances 
they deal with, the time spent on resolution, the type of 
grievances dealt with and the first and later contacts of 
grievants and those dealing with the grievances.
The case study questions covered the influence of the technology, 
market context, economic context, trade union and employers' 
association and other third parties, organisational structure 
and structure of the worker representative systems on the con­
flicts arising and the processes of resolution, questions also 
covered the different roles of management and worker represent­
atives in the resolution process, patterns of interaction, 
estimations of the state of their relations and an assessment 
of the impact of legislation on plant-level conflict resolution. 
The respondents were given a simplified checklist of ten key 
areas in advance and the interviewer had more detailed guide­
lines of areas to be covered in discussion.
The questionnaires were substantially modified after the pilot 
study showed problems of comprehension, lack of knowledge of 
certain groups of respondents about areas such as the role of 
shopstewards, the extent of conflicts in the department and 
conflict levels in the plant as a whole. The questionnaire 
addressed to the employees was reduced from 30 to 19 questions* 
covering who they refer -specific grievances to, the reasons for 
the choice of referee, their knowledge and adherence to
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specified grievance procedures, how they communicate their 
grievances, how the resolution of their grievances is communicated 
to them and by whom, their satisfaction with the system of 
representation, improvements to the system, their estimation 
of relations in the workplace, their main contacts at work and 
questions about their age, training, job title, service, and 
trade union membership. Questions to the foreman covered the 
type of wage system in operation, the frequency of a catalogue 
of grievances and the form of grievances arising - individual or 
group where he spent most of his time, time spent on resolution, 
key procedures, the percentage of questions resolved by him 
and which ones, how grievances are referred, forms of resolution, 
his main contacts at work, the next stage in the resolution 
process after the foreman, his satisfaction with his competences, 
with management support, the extent of conflict measures, his 
estimation of relations in the workplace and statistical details 
including constituency size (27 questions in all). The shop- 
stewards answered 24 questions covering similar areas about 
grievance frequency then questions relating to their role in 
the resolution process and their estimation of relations. Finally, 
the works councillors answered 27 questions dealing with their 
role in the resolution process.
Adjustments to the questionnaires after the pilot survey reduced 
the level of comparability between the questions addressed to 
different respondents in order to increase the specificity of 
the questions and their relevance to the particular respondent's 
situation.
>
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Fragen an den Betriebsrat 2.1.a)
1. Organisationsstruktur der Arbeitnehmervertretung im Betrieb
A)Der Betriebsrat
Die Anzahl von Betriebsratsmitgliedern, Betriebsausschlisse0 
Die Aufgaben der Betriebsratsmitglieder und der Ausschiisse,
Besteht ein Gesamt- und ein Konzernbetriebsrat? Gibt es 
Arbeitnehmervertreter im Aufsichtsrat?
B)Die Vertrauensleute
Die Anzahl von Vertrauensleuten und ihre Organisationsstruktur«,
Gibt es Vereinbarungen iiber die Aufgaben der Vertrauensleute?
Welche sind ihre Aufgaben im Betrieb?
C)Die Kommunikationsnetze zwischen Betriebsrat und den Vertrauens­
leuten
Haben sie gemeinsame Sitzungen? Welche sind die Informations- 
kanale zwischen Betriebsrat und Vertrauensleute? Wie funktioniert 
die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Beiden? Vie sieht die Rollen- 
und Aufgabenaufteilung zwischen den beiden Arbeitnehmervertretungen 
aus?
2a Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der gewerkschaftlichen Organisation 
des Betriebs und der arbeitnehmervertretung
Wann, wie und warum kam eine Arbeitnehmervertretung in diesem 
Betrieb zustande? Was sind die Hauptereignisse in der Entwick- 
lung der Vertretung und ihrer Beziehungen zum Management und zu 
der Belegschaft? Wie sehen die zukiinftigen Fntwicklungen aus?
3- Die Politik der Arbeitnehmervertretung im Betrieb
Insbesonders im uinblick auf das Lohnsystem - Lohngruppen, 
Lohnermessung, Betriebsvereinbarungen iiber Lohne, Probleme mit 
dem jetztigen Lohnsystem und auf die Personalpolitik des 
Managements - Disziplinarma.Bnahmen, Versetzungen, Kurzarbeit, 
Kiindigungen und Fntlassungen, die Beschwerdeordnung.
Belegschaftsstatistik
BelegschaftsgroBe, ihre Zusammensetzung nach Produktions- 
arbeitern, Angestellten, Facharbeitern, angelernten und 
ungelernten Arbeitnehmern, Nationalitaten* Der Organisations- 
grad der Belegschaft.
5- Beziehungen der Arbeitnehmervertretung zur Gewerkschaft
AusmaB und Formen der Kontakte zur Gewerkschaft durch den 
Betriebsrat und den Vertrauenskorper. Die Rolle der Gewerk- 
schaft bei Anrufen des Arbeitsgerichts und von Einigungsstellen* 
Ihre Rolle bei der Beilegung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen und 
der Vertretung der Interessen der Belegschaft auf betrieb- 
licber Ebene.
6 a Andere "dritte Parteien", 'die einen EinfluB auf die Beilegung von 
Arbeitnehmerproblemen im Betrieb haben
A)Das Arbeitsgericht-die Anzahl von Gerichtsfalien pro Jahr.
Was fur Falle kommen vor und warum werden sie an das Arbeits- 
gericht uberreicht? Die Ergebnisse von Arbeitsgeriehtsverfahren*
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Was sind die Vorteile und Nachteile einer Hinwendung an das 
Arbeitsgericht aus Sicht des Betriebsrats?
B)Einigungsstellen-die Anzahl von Fallen, die in den letzten
5 Jahren an Einigungsstellen uberreicht worden sind. Was fur 
Falle kommen vor und warum kam es bei diesen Fragen zu 
Einigungsstellenverfahren? Die Ergebnisse von Einigungsstellen­
verf ahren und die Vorteile und Nachteile eines Anrufs aus 
Sicht des Betriebsrats?
C)Andere dritte Parteien, die einen wichtigen EinfluB auf die 
Beilegung Arbeitnehmerprobleme im Betrieb haben? Wie hoch 
schatzen Sie den Prozentsatz von Arbeitnehmerproblemen ein, 
die innerbetrieblich ohne die Einschaltung dritter Parteien 
gelost werden konnen?
7. Der EinfluB der 'Technologie des Betriebs auf die Arbeitnehmer­
probleme , die im Betrieb vorkommen
z.B. im Hinblick auf Fragen der Arbeitsicherheit, der Arbeits­
bedingungen, Lohnprobleme, Qualifikations-und ArbeitsplatzverLust.
8 . Der EinfluB der .jetztigen Marktlage des Betriebs auf die Arbeit­
nehmerprobleme, die im Betrieb vorkommen
z.B. im Hinblick auf Umstrukturierungen, Rationalisierung, 
Entlassungen, Kurzarbeit, Einstellung des Managements zu Arbeit­
nehmerproblemen, zu der Arbeitnehmervertretung.
9* Arbeitnehmerprobleme im Betrieb
Was fur Probleme kommen vor? Wie oft kommen sie vor? In welchen 
Arbeitsbereichen? Ji/as sind Ihrer Meinung nach die wichtigsten 
Probleme und warum? Wie unterscheiden 3ie zwischen Rechts-und 
Interessenproblemen?
80. Die Beilegung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen im Betrieb
'Was fiir Richtlinien gibt es iiber die Beilegung von Arbeitnehmer­
problemen im Betrieb? Werden diese Richtlinien in der tagtaglichen 
Praxis angewandt? Auf welchen Ebenen werden die verschiedenen 
Probleme gelost?-Vertrauensleuteebene, Betriebsratsmitgliedsebene, 
BetriebsratsausschuBebene, Betriebsratsvorsitzenderebene usw.
Was sind die verschiedenen Losungsprozesse und welche Formen 
haben die Ergebnisse der Losungsprozesse-Betriebsvereinbarungen, 
Regelungsabreden, und andere Formen? Wie hoch ist das AusmaS 
von Konfliktmafinahmen durch die Belegschaft und urn welche Fragen 
geht es in solchen Fallen?
11o Die Beziehungen zum Management
Wie schatzen Sie die jetztigen Beziehungen zwischen den Arbeit- 
nehmervertretern und dem Management im Betrieb ein? Wie ist die 
Entwicklung der Beziehungen gewesen? Was fiir Kommunikationsnetze 
bestehen zwischen den Beiden, so daB sie schnell miteinander in 
Kontakt kommen konnen, wenn Probleme auftreten?
12. Die Einstellung zum Arbeitsrecht auf betrieblicher Ebene
Wie schatzen Sie den EinfluB des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes auf 
die Beziehungen im Betrieb, die Losung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen 
und die Vertretung ihrer Interessen ein? Inwieweit ist das Gesetz 
verbesserungswurdig? Reicht das Gesetz fiir die Losung von Arbeit­
nehmerproblemen aus?
Praeen an den Betriebsrat Q “  2.1.b)
Qrganisationsstruktur der Arbeitnehmervertretung im Betrieb
a) Per Betriebsrat
-  7/ieviel’e Betriebsratsmitglieder im Betrieb? Preistellungen? Zusam- 
mensetzung aus Produktionsarbeitern (Pacharbeitern, Angelernten, 
Ungelernten usw.) und Angestellten, Gewerkschaftliche Organisation.,
- Wieviele Betriebsratsausschlisse? Welche Zustandigkeitsbereiche? 
Wieviele Mitglieder hat jeder AusschuB? Was fur Pragen werden dort 
behandelt? Wie kommen die Pragen an die Ausschiisse? C wie vermittelt, 
von wem. warum an den AusschuB uberreicht?)„ Wie werden die Pragen 
gelost?C SinzelgesprHche mit Managementvertretern, unter den Mit- 
gliedern des Ausschusses, gemeinsame Sitzungen mit der Management- 
seite, wie oft treffen sie sich - Ausschiisse und Management;?
Wie oft finden AusschuBsitzungen statt? Welcher Prozentsatz der 
Probleme, die an die Ausschiisse uberreicht werden, werden dort gelbst? 
Was fur Probleme werden nicht durch die Ausschiisse gelost? Warum?
An wen werden diese Prohleme weitergereicht?
Welche sind die wichtigsten Ausschiisse und warum? Was fiir Entscheid- 
ungsbefugnisse haben die Ausschiisse zB selhststandigesEntscheidungs- 
befugnis?
Wieviele Zeit verbringen die Betriebsratsmitglieder bei der Arbeit in 
den Ausschiissen? '‘Hie lange dauern die LosungsprozeBe in den Ausschiis- 
sen?
Wenn keine Ausschiisse hat der Betriebsrat Sprechstunde? Wie verlauft 
der LosungsprozeB im Betriebsrat?- Wie oft treffen sie sich, wie oft 
und wie treffen sie sich mit dem Management? Mit wem von der Manage- 
mentseite?
- Was sind die Aufgaben der einzelnen Betriebsratsmitglieder - bestimmte 
Zustandigkeitsbereiche?
- Besteht ein Konzern- Oder ein Gesamtbetriebsrat? - wer sind die Ver- 
treter auf diesem Betriebsrat? Wie oft treffen sie sich? Wie oft 
treffen sie sich mit der Managementseite? Welche Pragen behandeln 
sie auf dieser Ebene? Was fiir Vereinbarungen sind auf dieser Ebene 
abgeschlossen worden?
- Gibt es Arbeitnehmervertreter im Aufsichtsrat? Welche? Welche Pragen 
sind im Aufsichtsrat behandelt? Einschatzung der Auswirkung der 
Gesetzgebung-Montanmitbestimmung oder Mitbestimmunggesetz auf die 
Beziehungen auf betrieblicher Ebene?
h) Die Vertrauensleute
-Wieviele Vertrauensleute im Betrieb? Wieviele Gewerkschaften sind im 
Betrieb vertreten? Wie sind die Vertrauensleute im Betrieb verteilt?- 
in bestimmten Bereichen konzentriert? Warum?
-Welche Aufgaben haben die Vertrauensleute im Betrieb? Was fiir eine 
Rolle spielen sie bei der Losung Arbeitnehmerprobleme auf uhteren 
Ebenen, was sind ’kleine Pragen'?
-Wie sieht ihre Organisationsstruktur aus?-Vertrauenskorper? Wie ge~ 
wahlt, wie groB, welche Aufgaben? Wie groB sind die Betreuungsbereiche, 
wie oft treffen sie sich untereinander/mit dem Betriebsrat?
-Gibt es irgendwelche Vereinbarungen/Abreden iiber die Vertrauensleute- 
arbeit im Betrieb? Wie stebt das Management/die Vorgesetzten zu den 
Vertrauensleuten?- miBtrauisch, feindlicb, ignorieren sie, akzeptieren 
sie usw?
-Wie schatzen Sie die Arbeit der Vertrauensleute in diesem Betrieb- 
was fiir Probleme gibt es? Wie ist die Arbeit verbesserungswlirdig?
Wie sieht die zukiinftigen Entwicklungen aus? Wie ist die Entwicklung 
der Arbeit gewesen?
c) Die Kommunikationsnetze zwischen Betriebsrat und den Vertrauensleuten
- Wie wird die Zusammenarbeit der Vertrauensleute und des Betriebsrats 
organisatorisch aufgebaut? - gemeinsame Sitzungen, wie oft, Kontakte 
Vertrauensleute-einzelne Betriebsratsmitglieder in den Abteilungen?
Wie werden Informationen weitergegeben? Wie unterstiitzen die Ver-
t^a-uensleute den Betriebsrat? Beispiele von der praktischen Zusam- 
menarbeit? Wie beschreiben Sie den Unterscbied in den Funktionen 
der Vertrauensleute und des Betriebsrat?
• Die gesch.ichtlic.he Entwicklung der gewerkschaftlichen Organisation des 
Betriebs und der Arbeitnehmervertretung*
- Schilderung der Griindung und der Entwicklung der gewerkschaf tlichen 
Organisation des Betriebs* Wie hoch ist der jetztige Organisations- 
grad? Sind bestimmte Arbeitnehmergruppen besser organisiert als 
anderen? Warum? Wie sieht die zukunftige Entwicklung aus? Was sind die 
wichtigsten Einflusse/Hindernisse in dem Aufbau der Organisation der . 
Belegschaft und der Arbeit der Vertrauensleute gewesen? Wie schatzen 
Sie die jetztige Situation ein? Wie schatzen Sie den EinfluB des Organi- 
sationsgrads und der Anzahl der Vertrauensleute auf die Arbeit des 
Betriebsrats ein?- Bereitschaft der Belegschaft, ihre Interessen zu ver- 
teidigen, sich zu Problemen zu auBern, .Durchsetzungsvermogen des 
Betriebsrats bei dem Management, KonfliktmaBnahmen?
- Schilderung der Beziehungen der Arbeitnehmervertretung zum Manage­
ment - schwierige Zeiten, warum? Anderungen auf Managementseite zB 
Wechslung in der Person des Geschaftsleiters, die die Beziehungen 
beeinfluBt haben* ilnderungen auf Betriebsratsseite zB neuer Vorsitz- 
ende/Leiter des 7ertrauenskorpers? Wann wurde ein Betriebsrat zum 
ersten Mai gewahlt? Wie kam es dazu?
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3* Die Politik der Arbeitnehmervertretung im Betrieb
- Lohnsystem - Lohngruppen, Lohnermessungssysteme, Pramienlohne, Akkord- 
lohn, Sonderentgelte. Betriebsvereinbarungen uberLohnfragen? Probleme 
mit dem jetztigen Lohnsystem? Wie werden dieserProbleme behandelt?
- Personalpolitik -- Wie sieht es im Betrieb mit DisziplinmaBnahmen des 
Managements, Versetzungen, Umgruppierungen, Kurzarbeit, Schichtarbeit/ 
tiberstunden, Entlassungen aus?- AusmaB und entstehende Probleme? 
Betriebliche Sozialleistungen? Gibt es eine Beschwerdeordnung fur den 
Betrieb? ( Kopie? ). Wie sieht die Beschwerdeordnung in der Praxis 
aus? Vereinbarungen uber die Erweiterung der Rechte des Betriebsrats?
V. Belegschaftsstatistik
- GroBe der Belegschaft?
- Ihre Zusammensetzung - Produktionsarbeiter/Angestellten, mannlich/ 
weiblich, Nationalitat (welche Abteilungen? ), Alter (Stammbelegschaft), 
Herkunft (Stadt, Dorf, Pendelverkehr, vorherige Arbeitsplatze)*
Fragen zur Beschaftigungssituation in der Gegend*
- Ausbildung - Facharbeiter, angelernte, ungelernte, Auszubildenden*
- Krankheitsfalle, Unfalle.
5* Beziehungen der Arbeitnehmervertretung zur Gewerkschaft
- Kontakte zur Gewerkschaft - wie oft? welcher Art?-telefonisch, schrift- 
lich, personlich. Mit wen?-ortliche Vertreter, Vorstand, bestimmte 
Abteilungen wie zB Rechtsabteilung? Griinde filr die Kontakte?- Informa- 
tionen (Rechts-, tarifvertragliche),Hilfe mit Problemlosung im Betrieb?
- Wie oft kommen auBerbetriebliche Gewerkschaftsvertreter in den 
Betrieb ein? Zu welchem AnlaB? Welche Rolle spielen sie bei Arbeits- 
gerichtsverfahren, Einigungsstellenverfahren?
- Haben Betriebsratsmitglieder/Vertrauensleute Funktionen in der ort- 
lichen Gewerkschaftsvertretung/im iarifskommission? Haben Sie je 
Kontakte zu Vertretern des Arbeitgeberverbandes?
6 o Andere !,dritte Parteien1,' die einen EinfluB auf die Beilegung von
Arbeitnehmerproblemen im Betrieb haben.
A) Das Arbeitsgericht - die Anzahl von Fallen pro Jahr, die an das 
Gericht gebracht werden? (Arbeitnehmerklagen, Klagen des Betriebs- 
rats aufgrund des BVG, Klagen des Managements). Was fiir Fragen? 
Warum an das Gericht gebracht? Ergebnisse? -Gerichtsurteil, 
KompromiBlosung nach Beratung des Richters? Einschatzung des Sin- 
flusses des Gerichts auf die Beziehungen im Betrieb?-Vorteile/ 
Nachteile, Drohmoglichkeiten.
B ) Einigungsstellen - die Anzahl von Fallen wahrend der letzten 5 
Jahre*. Was fiir Falle werden in der Praxis erst durch Einigungs­
stellenverf ahren losbar? Warum? Was f ind die Ergebnisse von 
solchen Verfahren? Einschatzung des Einflusses solcher Verfahren 
auf die Beziehungen im Betrieb? - Vorteile/Nachteile, strategische 
Rolle von Einigungsstellen im ProblemlosungsprozeB?
C) Andere dritten Parteien?- Arbeitsamt, sonstige Vermittler?
D) Wie hoch schatzen 3ie den Prozentsatz von Arbeitnehmerproblemen, 
die innerbetrieblich zwischen Betriebsrat und Management gelost 
werden konnen?
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7<> Per EinfluB der Technologie des Betriebs auf die Arbeitnehmerprobleme, 
die im Betrieb vorkommen.
- zB die Einfliisse von Merkmalen wie die Produktentwicklung (schnell, 
langsam, wechselhaft), die Arbeitsprozesse ( kleine/groBe Produkt- 
ionsgange, FlieBbandarbeit, Schichtarbeit, die Organisation der 
Arbeit) auf die Arbeitsbedingungen im Betrieb, auf das Lohnsystem 
und die Probleme, die daraus entstehen, auf Anzahl der Arbeits- 
platze, Umgruppierungen und Versetzungen und Entlassungen, Quali- 
fikationsverlust usw.
8 . Der EinfluB der ,ietztigen Marktlage des Betriebs auf die Arbeitnehmer­
probleme, die im Betrieb vorkommen.
- zB die Einfliisse von Merkmalen wie der Anteil von Belegschaftskosten; 
als Prozentsatz der Gesamtkosten, Umsatz und Gewinne, Entwicklungen 
auf den Markt im Inland und im Ausland,auf Umstrukturierungen des 
Betriebs und Entlassungen, Versetzungen der Arbeitnehmerschaft, auf ■ 
eine Politik der Rationalisierung des Managements und die Auswirk- ■ 
ungen auf die Belegschaft, auf die Einstellung des Managements zur ! 
Belegschaft und z-u den Forderungen der Arbeitnehme.rvertretung? (
9. Arbeitnehmerprobleme im Betrieb
- Wie oft kommen folgende Arten von Arbeitnehmerproblemen vor - oft, 
manchmal, nie, warum kommen sie vor, in welchen Abteilungen/Arbeits- 
gruppen?
“ Eohnprobleme - zB. Fragen zum Akkordsystem - Arheitssollvorgahe, 
Arbeitstempo, Stiickzahl. Fragen zum Pramienlohnsystem-Leistungs- 
systemzeitvorgabe, Gulagen zum Lohn. Fragen zu Lohnumgruppierungen, j 
Einstufungsfragen. Fragen zu ^ e n Schichts-und Sonderzulagen. Andere : 
Lohnprohleme?
Jjragen zur Arbeitsorganisation- Fragen zu Versetzungen,Urn gruppie rung-
- en
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Probleme mit der Abhangigkeit von Band- oder Taktarbeit, Arbeitstempo, 
Arbeitssoll, Monotonie der Arbeit, Arbeitsqualitat, Verteilung der 
Arbeit unter den Arbeitnehmern.
Vie oft kommen groBe tecbnische Anderungen/kleine technische Ander- 
ungen im Betrieb vor? Kommt es zu Arbeitnehmerproblemen wegen dieser 
Anderungen wie zB. Lohnabstufungen, Dequalifikation, Versetzungen, 
Entlassungen?
Wie oft kommt es zu Storungen der Arbeit wegen technischer oder arbeits 
organisatorischer Febler? zB. Maschinen gehen kaputt, schlechte Mater- 
ialversorgung, Mangel an Werkzeuge usw?
- Pragen zur Arbeitszeit - Uberstunden, Schichtarbeit, Pausenregelungen*
- Pragen zu den Arbeitsbedingungen - Larin, Schmutz, Staub, schlechte 
Luft, schwere korperliche Arbeit, schwere geistige Arbeit, groBe Unfall 
gefahren, Arbeitsmonotonie?
- Pragen zum Verlust des Arbeitsplatzes - Entlassungen (aus wirtschaft- 
lichen Grunden von mehreren Arbeitnehmern zur gleichen Zeit) , Kurz- 
arbeit?
- Soziale Pragen - Probleme mit der Verteilung der zeitlichen Verlegung 
des Urlaubs der Arbeitnehmer, Beschwernisse wegen der sozialen Ein- 
.richtungen zB. Wasch-Dusch-Pausenraume, Kantine?
- Probleme unter Arbeitnehmern insbes. Gruppen von Arbeitnehmern wie 
Instandhaltung, Produktionsarbeitnebmer, verscbiedene Abteilungen*
~ Probleme zwischen Arbeitnehmern und ibren Vorgesetzten - Verstosse 
gegen die Arbeitsordnung, lastige Kontrolle der Vorgesetzten usw*
- Welche sind Ihrer Meinung nacb die wichtigsten Arbeitnebmerprobleme? 
Warum? Bitte geben Sie Beispiele von den folgenden Problemarten;- 
eine Beschwerde, ein Rechtsproblem, ein Interessenproblemo Wie oft 
kommt es vor, daB der Betriebsrat und das Management anderer Meinung 
sind iiber die Art der Probleme, die im Betrieb vorkornmen zB. der 
Betriebsrat sieht ein Problem als ein Rechtsproblem, das Management 
sieht es als ein Interessenproblemc Beispiele?
Die Beilegung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen auf betrieblicber Ebene
a) Bestehen Richtlinien, die schriftlich festlegen, wie Arbeitnebmer­
probleme im Betrieb zu losen sind? zB* Arbeitsordnung, empfohlenen 
Beschwerdeweg, eine Bescbwerdeordnung? Wie sind sie zustande ge- 
kommen? Werden sie in der Praxis gefolgt? Bestehen Richtlinien oder 
Vorsatze, die so etwas regeln obne schriftlich festgelegt zu sein?
b) Welche sind die ublicben Beschwerdewege fiir die Arbeitnehmer im 
Betrieb? - Arbeitnebmer-Vertrauensmann/Meister/Vorarbeiter/Betriebs- 
ratsmitglied/Betriebsleitung/Personalabteilung/andere?
c) Welche Rollen spielen folgende bei der Losung Arbeitnebmerprobleme 
im Betrieb? Welche Probleme werden an sie uberreicht? - Vertrauens­
leute, Betriebsratsmitglieder (freigestellte/nicbt freigestellte), 
Betriebsratsausschiisse , Betriebsratsgremium, Betriebsratsvorsitzender. 
Pragestellung:- wer uberreicht welche Probleme an sie? Wie werden die 
Probleme an sie uberreicht?-schriftlich, miindlich, telefonisch? An 
wen leiten sie die Probleme, die sie nicht losen konnen? Wie sieht 
der ProblemlosungsprozeB aus? Welche Pormen haben die Losungen?- 
Absprachen, Notizen usw? Wie sehen die Kommunikationsnetze zwischen
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den Arbeitnehmervertretern nnd den Managementvertretern aus?
d) Welche Formen hat die Losung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen? 
Betriebsvereinbarungen-Anzahl, Themenbereiche, wie und warum kamen sie 
zustande? Wie werden sie in der Praxis angewandt?
Regelungsabreden-Themenbereiche, wie und warum kamen sie zustande dh» 
von wem abgeschlossen? Schriftliche Form? Beziehung zu den Betriebs- 
vereinbarungen? Was geschieht, wenn es zu unterschiedlichen Auffassungen 
iiber die Interpretation von Regelungsabreden kommt?
Betriebliche tlbungen-Beispiele? Wie und warum kommen sie zustande? wie 
verbreitet sind sie?
Andere Regelungsformen-vertragliche Einheitsregelungen, mundliche Ab- 
sprachen, Aktenvermerke.
Wie wird es entschieden iiber welche Form der Losung?
e) Wie oft kommt es vor, daB kein Ergebnis erzielt werden kann? Bei welchen 
Fragen? Was geschieht bei solchen Fallen?
f) Wie oft kommt es zu folgenden KonfliktmaBpahmen im Betrieb? - absicht- 
liche Leistungsverringerung der Arbeitnehmer als Druckmittel, Dienst 
nur nach Vorschrift, spontane Arbeitsniederlegungen A).bei Tariffragen
B) bei betrieblichen Fragen, auBerordentliche Betriebs- oder Abteilungs- 
Versammlungen, produktionshemmende Gesprache, Betriebs- oder Abteilungs- 
besetzung, alle Arbeitnehmer nehmen gleichzeitig das individuelle 
Beschwerderecht nach dem BetrVG wahr, der Betriebsrat weigert seine 
Zustiramung zu PersonalmaBnahmen des Managements. Andere MaBnahmen, die 
vorkommen?
Aus welchen Griinden kam es zu solchen MaBnahmen? Wie lange dauerten die 
MaBnahmen? Wie wurden die Konflikte letztenende gelost?
g) Die Einstellung des Betriehsrats zur Problemlosung im Betrieb-
- Zufriedenheit mit der Losung Arbeitnehmerprobleme im Betrieb nach 
Schnelligkeit der Losung, ob die Losungen als "gut” fiir die Arbeit­
nehmer betrachtet werden konnen, die Vermeidung offener Konflikte, 
Beitrag zum guten Betriebsklima?
- Probleme mit der Losung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen im Betrieb?-zB. 
Einstellung und Verhaltensweise von bestimmten Personen, die fur die 
Losung zustandig sind, Probleme mit dem Kommunikationsnetz im Betrieb, 
mangelnde Rechte der Arbeitnehmerseite, andere Probleme?
- Wie sehen Sie die Rolle von Problemlosungsverfahren im Betrieb:-
- Es ist wichtig, sich an die Regeln zu halten, weil man sonst das
lity Vertrauensverhaltnis zwischen Betriebsrat-Belegschaft und dem
Management zerstoft.
- Die Regeln sind nur solange zu halten, indem sie die Interessen der
\rer Belegschaft fordern. Manchmal besteht die Berechtigung, sie zu miB-
achten.
- Die Regeln sind zweitrangig. An erster Stelle steht das Vertrauens-
lore verhaltnis zwischen Betriebsrat und Management. Regeln alleine
niitzen wenig.
- Hauptsach'e ist, daB Probleme schnellstens gelost werden. Man sollte
3xible die Wege gehen, die eine schnelle Losung im Einzelfall herheifiihren
werden.
11. Die Beziehungen zum Management
- Einschatzung der jetztigen'Beziehungen-formal,auf das Gesetz aufgebaut, 
miBtrauisch, konfliktorisch, sozialpartnerschaftlich(nach dem BetrVG), 
gegenseitige Respektierung auf der Basis gegensatzlicher Interessen, 
Teamwork, eine andere Bezeichnung?
- Wie konnten die Beziehungen verbessert werden Ihrer Meinung nach?
- Einstellung des Managements zur Zusammenarbeit mit dem Betriebs- 
rat? - kooperationsbereit (aufgeschlossen filr die Beriicksicbtigung 
von iirbeitnehmerinteressen) , autoritar, bur.okratisch, nicht kon- 
sequent- schwache Fuhrung, keine Sntscheidungsmacht, ganz auf 
Profiten ausgerichtet* Einschatzung seiner Offenheit, Informations- 
bereitschaft.
- Wie verlauft die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Management in der Praxis?- 
v/ie oft treffen sie sich, informelle/formelle Zusammenkiinfte?
- Welche Vorteile erwarten Sie von der Kooperation mit dem Manage­
ment?
129
12* Die Einstellung zum Betriebsverfassungsgesetz/Arbeitsrecht auf 
betrieblicher Ebene* ~ ~
- Wie beschreiben Sie den EinfluB des BetrVG auf die Beziehungen im 
Betrieb? - Richtschniir filr die Beziehungen zum Management, das 
MindestmaB an Zusammenarbeit/das HochstmaB, nur von Wichtigkeit, 
wo die personliche Beziehungen sehr schlecht sind, eher positiv/ 
eher negativ?
- Welche sind die Vorteile/die Nachteile von einer gesetzlich gereg- 
elten Betriebsverf assung? Reicht das G-esetz fur die Vertretung |
Arbeitnehmerinteressen im Betrieb aus oder sind andere Paktoren ;
von grdSer 'Wichtigkeit wie zB* der Organisationsgrad der Beleg­
schaft, die Anzahl von gewerkschaftlichen Vertrauensleuten, 
giinstige wirtschaftliche Situation usw« Wie stehen Sie zu den 
Prinzipien wie das Betriebswohl, die vertrauensvolle Zusammen- 
arbeit, die Betriebsfriedenbewahrung, die im Betriebsverfassungs- 
gesetz verankert sind?
- Vieles wird durch das BetrVG geregelt in der BRD (im Gegensatz zu 
GroBbritannien)« Fuhrt dies zur Belastung/Schwierigkeiten bei 
Ihrer Arbeit als Vertreter von den Arbeitnehmerinteressen?
- Wie stehen Sie zum BetrVG/Mitbestimmungsgesetz als einem sozial- 
und wirtschaftspolitischen Programm?
13« Statistische Angaben ;
- Alter, seit wie lange im Betrieb, seit wie lange Betriebsrats- j
vorsitzender, welche Tatigkeiten iiben/ubten Sie im Betrieb aus, \
andere gewerkschaftliche Punktionen/Betriebsratsfunktionen, j
wo verbringen Sie Ihre Zeit als Betriebsratsmitglied-im Betriebs- 
ratsbiiro, in der Abteilung, bei Gesprachen mit Managementvertreter 1 
-n, bei AusbildungsmaBnahmen, anderswo?
*
Fragen an die Betriebsleitung/Personalleitung
130
2.2.a)
1. Technologie des Betriebs
Produkttyp; Arbeitsprozesse; groBe technische Anderungen 
in den letzten 10 Jahren; vorgesehene Anderungen.
2. Marktlage des Betriebs
Anteil der Belegschaftskosten an den Gesamtkosten; Zufrieden- 
heit mit Umsatz und Gewinnen; Entwicklungen in der Umsatzlage 
(Inland und Ausland); Programmplanung - Rolle der Marktfor- 
schung, Verkaufsprognosen, Auftragseingang usw; EinfluB der 
jetzigen Marktlage auf Arbeitsnehmerprobleme im Betrieb, z.B. 
Qualifications- und Arbeitsplazverluste.
3. Organisationsstruktur der Firma/des Betriebs
Firmentyp; Organisationsaufbau; Zustandigkeiten im Hinblick 
auf die L5sung von Arbeitsnehmerproblemen; verschiedene Ma- 
nagementebenen.
4. Geschichtliche Entwicklung der Firma/des Betriebs
Griindungs jahre; bedeutende Ereignisse in der Entwicklung der 
Firma.
5. Betriebliche Management-Politik
Inbesondere im Hinblick auf das Lohnsystem - Lohngruppen, 
Lohnermessung, Betriebsvereinbarungen iiber Lohne, Probleme 
mit dem jetzigen Lohnsystem - und auf die Personal-Politik 
des Managements - DisziplinarmaBnahmen einschlieBlich Kiindi- 
gungen, Versetzungen, Kurzarbeit und Entlassungen - die Be- 
schwerdeordnung des Betriebs.
6. Belegschaftsstatistik
BelegschaftsgroBe, Zusammensetzung der Belegschaft nach Pro- 
duktionsarbeitern, Angestellten, Altersgruppen, weiblichen 
und mannlichen Arbeitnehmern, Nationalitaten, Krankheits- und 
Umfallsstatistiken.
7. Beziehungen zum Arbeitgefoerverband
Seit wann sind Sie Mitglied in einem Arbeitgeberverband?
Warum sind Sie Mitglied/Nichtmitglied? Was fiir Kontakte haben 
Sie zum Verband? Was fiir eine Rolle spielt der Verband bei An- 
rufung des Arbeitsgerichts, bei Einigungsstellen, bei der Bei- 
legung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen innerhalb des Betriebs?
8. Andere "dritte Parteien," die einen EinfluB auf die Beilegung 
von Arbeitnehmerproblemen, die im Betrieb vorkommen, haben.
a) Das Arbeitsgericht - Anzahl von Gerichtsfallen pro Jahr;
was fiir Falle kommen vor und warum werden sie an das Arbeits­
gericht uberreicht? Ergebnisse von Arbeitsgerichtsverfahren.
b) Einigungsstellen - Anzahl von Fallen, die an eine Einigungs- 
stelle wahrend der. letzten 5 Jahre uberreicht worden sind. 
Griinde, weshalb es zu einer Einigungsstelle bei diesen Fragen
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kam. Ergebnisse Einigungsstellen-Verfahren, Vorteile und Nach- 
teile aus dem Gesichtspunkt des Managements*
9. Arbeitnehmerprob1erne im Betrieb
Was filr Probleme kommen vor? Wie oft kommen sie vor? In we li­
chen Arbeitsbereichen? Was sind die wichtigsten Probleme 
Ihrer Meinung nach und warum? Wie unterscheiden Sie zwischen 
Rechts- und Interessenproblemen?
10. Die Beilegung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen im Betrieb f
Was fiir Richtlinien gibt es tiber die Beilegung von Arbeitneh­
merproblemen im Betrieb? Werden diese Richtlinien in der tag- 
lichen Praxis angewandt? Auf welchen Betrieb- bzw. Manage- 
mentsebenen werden die verschiedenen Arbeitnehmerprobleme ge- 
lost? Was fur Formen haben die Ergebnisse des Losungsprozesses 
- Betriebsvereinbarungen, Regelungsabreden, andere Formen? Wie 
groB ist der Umfang von KonfliktmaBnahmen durch die Belegschaft 
und urn welche Fragen geht es in solchen Fallen?
11. Die Beziehungen zu den Arbeitnehmervertretern
Wie schatzen Sie die jetzigertBeziehungen zwischen Management 
und den Arbeitnehmervertretern im Betrieb ein? Was fiir Komrau- 
nikationsnetze bestehen zwischen den beiden, so daB sie schnell 
miteinander in Kontakt kommen konnen.
12. Die Einstellung zum Arbeitsrecht auf betrieblicher Ebenen
Wie schatzen Sie den EinfluB des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes 
auf die Beziehungen im Betrieb und die Suche nach KompromiB- 
losungen ein? Inwieweit ist das Gesetz verbesserungswiirdig?
Fragen an die Betriebsleitung/Personalleitung 2.2.b)
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. Technologie des Betriebs
- Industrietypus
- Produktmerkmale-einzelne einfache Produkte, Prototypen, groBe Artikeln, 
die in verschiedenen Etappen gebaut werden. Schnelle Produktentwick- 
lung, sehr wechselhafte Produkte; langsame Entwicklung/wenig wechsel- 
reich/stabil.
-ProduktionsgroBe
-Arbeitsprozesse-kleine/groBe Produktionsgange;Massenproduktion/Einzelteil 
fertigung. FlieBbandarbeit, Schichtarbeit, Arbeitsorganisation-Arbeits- 
gruppen/Arbeitnehmer arbeiten an Einzelarbeitsplatzen.
-Bestimmung der Produktionsprogramms-Marktforschung, Verkaufsprognose, 
je nach Auftragen bestimmt, Stabilitat der Produktionsiage?
-GroBe technische Anderungen wahrend der letzten 10 Jahre, vorgesehene 
technische Anderungen? Welche Auswirkungen auf das Produktionssystem? 
Welche Auswirkungen auf die Belegschaft-Arbeitsplatze, Lohngruppen, 
Umgruppierungen, Dequalifikationsverluste, Kurzarbeit, Entlassungen, 
neue Arbeitsplatze?
-Kleine technische Anderungen?
-• Marktlage des Betriebs
- Anteil Belegschaftskosten als Prozentsatz der Gesamtkosten? - unter 
12%, 12-25%, 26-50%, iiber 50%.
- Umsatz und Gewinne in den letzten 5 Jahren- unzufriedend, zufrieden- 
stellend, gut, sehr gut?
- Handelsumsatz der Industrie als Gesamte - am Wachsen, am Stagnieren, 
gleichbleibend? Entwicklungen im Ausland und im Inland. Zukunftsaus- 
sichten? Lage der Firma selbst?
- EinfluB der Marktlage der Firma auf die Belegschaft-Auswirkung auf die 
auftretenden Probleme zB Ausbau, Umbau, Einschrankungen der Firma und 
Auswirkung auf Kurzarbeit, Entlassungen, Lohngruppen, ^ualifikationen?
3. Organisationsstruktur der Firma
- BetriebsgroBe
- Selbststandig oder Teil eines groBeren Konzerns?
- Aufbau des Konzerns und Platz der Firma innerhalb des Konzerns-zB 
verschiedene Unternehmensbereiche, die Verteilung der Verantwortungen 
und Entscheidungsbefugnisse zwischen Konzern und Firma, Vereinbarungen 
auf Konzernebene, die die Firma direkt betreffen insbesonders im 
Hinblick auf die Losung Arbeitnehmerprobleme-Beschwerdeordnung, Lohn- 
politik, Personalpolitik, Arbeitsordnung, von wem abgeschlossen? 
Autonomie der Betriebsleitung.
- Aufbau der Organisationstruktur innerhalb der Firma selbst- Betriebs- 
leitung-Geschaftsfiihrer? Verschiedene Stufen in der Struktur und die 
Verantwortung jeder Stufe in Hinblick auf die Losung Arheitnehmer- 
probleme im Betrieb? Anzahl der Meister im Produktionsbereich, GroBe 
ihrer Arbeitsbereiche, ihre besondere Verantwortungen im Hinblick
auf die Losung Arbeitnehmerprobleme(Auswirkung des Betriebsverfassungs- 
Gesetz auf seine Aufgaben). Die Personalabteilung-an wen ist der 
Personalleiter verantwortlich, wie sind die Aufgaben in der Personal- 
abteilung aufgeteilt, insbesonders im Hinblick auf ihre Zusammen- 
treffen mit dem Betriebsrat bei gemeinsamer Problemlosung?
4. Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Firma
- warm wurde die Firma gegrundet, von wem, welche sind die Hinter- 
griinde zur Griindung der Firma? Wie groB war die Firma damals?
- Welche sind die Hauptereignisse in der Entwicklung der Finaa- Ausbau- 
zeiten usw? Wechslungen in der Person der Betriebsleitung und die Auswirkungen auf die Beziehungen mit dem Betriebsrat?
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5. Die Politik des Managements' im Betrieb
- Lohnsystem- Anzahl von LohngruppenLohnermessungssysteme-summarisch, 
anaiytisch, Pramiensystem fiir Zeitlohner, Akkordlohn, Betriebsverein- 
barungen iiber Lohnfragen-welche? Betriebliche Lohnanteil? Probleme 
mit dem jetztigen Lohnsystem? -Welche Managementvertreter hefassen 
sich mit auftretenden Lohnproblemen?
- PersonalpoIitik-AusmaG von DisziplinmaBnahmen, Griinde dafiir. Kiindi- 
gungen-wieviele?Aus welchen Griinden? Versetzungen, Umgruppierungen? 
Kurzarbeit, Entlassungen - wie oft, warum? Schichtarbeit. Betriebliche 
Sozialleistungen. Arbeitsordnung,Beschwerdeordnung? Vereinharungen 
iiber die Arbeit der Vertrauensleute. Erweiterungen der Rechte des 
Betriebsrats durch freiwillige Betriebsvereinbarungen oder Abreden?
6 . Belegschaftstatistik *
- GroBe der Belegschaft?
- Zusammensetzung-Produktionsarbeiter-Angestellten, mannlich-weiblich, 
Nationalitat? Alter (Stammbelegschaft?), Herkunft(Stadt, Dorf, Pendel- 
verkehr) einige Fragen zur Beschaftigungssituation in der Gegend, 
Ausbildung-berufliche Abschliisse- Facharbeiter, angelernte-uugelernte, 
Anzahl der Auszubildenden-welche? Welcher Prozentsatz der Belegschaft 
von der Firma selhst ausgehildet?
- Krankheitsfalle, betriebliche Unfalle pro Jahr, Ausscheidungen aus der 
Firma dh. Kiindigungen von Irbeitnehmern selbst ausgerufen?
7* Beziehungen zum f>.rbeitgeberverband
- Beit wann ein Mitglied des Verbandes?
- Hintergriinde zur Mitgliedschaft?
- Kontakte zu dem Verband- wie oft? welcher Art- telefonisch, schriftlich, 
miindlich? Griinde fiir die Kontakte- Informationen iiber die Tarifver- 
trage, Hilfe mit der Problemlosung im Betrieb, juristische Hilfe usw.
- Wie oft kommen Vertreter des Verbandes in den Betrieb selbst ein?
Aus welchen Griinden?
- Welche Rolle spielt der Verband bei Einigungsstellen- und Arbeits- 
gerichtsverfahren?
- Welche Tarifvertrage treffen auf den Betrieb zu? Gibt es auch Haus- 
oder Firmentarifvertrage?
- Haben Managementvertreter Funktionen im Arbeitgeberverband inne?
Welche Funktionen? zB. Mitglied eines ortlichen Ausschusses, Ortsver- 
waltung:, Bezirksverwaltung, 1 arifkommissionen?
- Welche Kontakte haben Sie zu Gewerkschaftsvertretern? zB Betriebs- 
versammlungen usw.
8 . Andere "dritte Parteien1' , die einen EinfluB auf die Beilegung von
Arbeitnehmerproblemen, die im,betrieb vorkommen, haben.
- Arbeitsgericht- Wie oft werden Probleme an das Arbeitsgericht iiber- 
reicht? Von Management- oder Betriebsrats- oder Arbeitnehmerseite? 
Urteilsverfahren oder BeschluBverfahren?- Anzahl von Urteilsverfahren 
pro Jahr, Anzahl von BeschluBverfahren in den letzten 5 Jahren?
Was fiir Fragen werden an das Gericht iiberreicht? Was sind die Ergeb- 
nisse von solchen Anrufen gewesen-Unterstiitzung der Argumentation 
des Managements, des Betriebsrats, KompromiBiosung ausserhalb vom 
Gericht selbst? Warum werden solche Fragen nicht innerbetrieblich 
losbar- Mangel an Einigungswillen, Unklarheit des Gesetzes, Mangel 
von Fachkenntnissen auf juristischem Gebiet, Strategie der einen 
oeite oder der anderen, Pochen auf das Gesetz?
’Welche sind die Vorteile und die Nachteile von Arbeitsgerichtsver- 
fahren? Spielt das Gericht eine indirekte Rolle im LosungsprozeB 
zwischen Management und Betriebsrat- als strategisches Mittel oder 
Prohmittel in Verhandlungen gebraucht? 'Welche sind die Entwicklungen
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in Arbeitsgerichtsverfahren gewesen?-zB Anderungen in das AusmaB der 
Verfahren, in die Art der Falle? Varum?
Einigungsstellen- Wieviele Einigungsstellenverfahren hat es seit 1972 
gegeben? Uber welche Fragen?-Rechts-Regelungsfragen. Was fiir Einigungs­
stellenverf ahren?-erzwungene, freiwillige. Von wem angerufen-Management, 
Betriebsrat, beide Seiten? Welche Zusammensetzung?-gewahlter oder bestell- 
ter Vorsitzende? Was sind die Ergebnisse von diesen Verfahren gewesen?
Warum wendet man sich mit diesen Fragen an Einigungsstellen? Was sind 
die V'orteile und Nachteile eines Einigungsstellenverf ahren, urn betriebliche 
Probleme zu losen?-welche sind die Auswirkungen auf die Beziehungen im 
Betrieb, hatte man zu einem ahnlichen Ergebnis durch eigene Verhandlungen 
kommen konnen? Spielen Einigungsstellenverfahren eine strategische Rolle 
in dem ProblemlosungsprozeB, oder werden sie als Bedrohungsfaktor je 
benutzt? Welche sind die Entwicklungen in Einigungsstellenverfahren ge­
wesen?-EinfluB der wirtschaftlichen Lage usw. 
andere dritte Parteien? zB. Arbeitsamt, andere Vermittler?
Wie hoch schatzen Eie~den Prozentsatz von Arbeitnehmerproblemen, die im 
Betrieb vorkommen, die innerbetrieblich ohne die Iiilfe dritter Parteien 
gelost werden konnen?
Arbeitnehmerprobleme in diesem Betrieb
Wie oft kommen folgende Arten von Arbeitnehmerproblemen vor- oft, manch- 
mal, nie, warum und von welchen Abteilungen, Arbeitsgruppen kommen sie 
vor; -
Lohnprobleme - zB. Fragen iiber das Akkordlohnsystem-Arbeitssollvorgabe, 
Arbeitstempo. Fragen iiber das Pramienlohnsystem- Leistungssystemzeitvor- 
gabe, Zulagen zum Lohn. Fragen zu Lohnumgruppierungen, Einstufungsfragen. 
Fragen zu den Schichts- und Bonderzulagen. Andere Lohhprobleme?
Probleme zur Arbeitsorganisation- Fragen iiber Versetzungen(mit Lohnum- 
gruppierung), Umgruppierungen(keine Lohnumgruppierung), Probleme mit der 
Abhangigkeit von Band- oder Taktarbeit-Arbeitstempo, Vielfalt der Teile, 
Arbeitssoll, Monotonie, Fragen zur Arbeitsqualitat, Verteilung der Arbeit 
unter den Arbeitnehmern.
Wie oft kommen groBe, technische Anderungen/kleine technische iinderungen 
im Betrieb vor? Kommt es zu Arbeitnehmerproblemen wegen dieser Anderungen?
- Lohnabstufungen/Dequalifikationen, Versetzungen?
Wie oft kommt es zu Storungen der Arbeit wegen technischer, arbeitsorgan- 
isatorischer Fehler?-liascbinen kaputt, schlechte Materialversorgung,
Mangel an Werkzeuge usw?
Fragen zur Arbeitszeit- zu Uberstunden, zu Schichtarbeit, zu Pausenrege- 
lungen? \
Fragen zu den Arbeitsbedingungen - Larin, Schmutz, Staub, schlechte Luft, 
schwere korperliche Arbeit, schwere geistige Arbeit, groBe Unfallgefahren? : 
Fragen zum Verlust des Arbeitsplatzes- Entlassungen?-aus wirtschaftlichen I 
Griinden von mehreren Arbeitnehmern zur gleichen Zeit, Kurzarbeit? j
Soziale Fragen-Probleme mit der Verteilung der zeitlichen Verlegung des : 
Urlaubs der Arbeitnehmer? Beschwernisse wegen der sozialen Einrichtungen 
im Betrieb- Wasch-und Dusch-und Pausenraume, Kantine usw.
Probleme unter Arbeitnehmern insbesonders Gruppen von Arbeitnehmern wie 
zB Instandhaltung und Produktionsarbeitern, verschiedenen Abteilungen. 
Probleme zwischen Arbeitnehmern und den Vorgesetzten- Verstosse gegen die 
Arbeitsordnung-Beispiele, lastige Kontrolle der Vorgesetzten usw.
Welche sind Ihrer Meinung nach die wichtigsten Arbeitnehmerprobleme? Wie 
ist die Entwicklung der wichtigen Arbeitnehmerprobleme im Betrieb gewesen? 
Konnen Sie Beispiele von folgenden Problemarten geben, sind solche 
Bezeichnungen von Arbeitnehmerproblemen ein Begriff bei Ihnen im Betrieb? I
- eine Beschwerde, ein Rechtsproblem, ein Interessenproblem? ( 
Wie oft kommt es vor, daB Sie und der Betriebsrat anderer Meinung sind 
uber die Art der Probleme, die vorgekommen sind? Beispiele?
Die .Beilegung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen auf betrieblicher Bbene
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sO Bestehen Sichtlinien. die schriftlich festlegen. wie Arbeitnehme.r- \ 
probleme im Betrieb zu losen sind? wie zB Arbeitsordnung, empfohlen- < 
er Beschwerdeweg? eine Beschwerdeordnung. Wie sehen die Richtlinien 
aus? Wie sind sie zustande gekommen? Werden sie in der Praxis ge- t
folgt? p
Bestehen Richtlinien oder Vorsatze, die so etwas regeln ohne schrift- f 
lich festgelegt zu sein? j
b) Welche sind die ublichen Beschwerdewege im Betrieb? Arbeitnehmer- 
Vertrauensmann/Meister/Betriebsratsmitglieder/Betriebsleitung/ Person-- 
alabteilung?
c) Welche Rollen snielen folgende Managementvertreter bei der Losung 
Aroeitnehmerprobleme-welcher Prozentsatz von auftretenden Problemen 
werden durch sie gelost?- Meister, Abteilungsleiter, Personalabteil- : 
ung, Betriebsleitung? Andere wichtige Managementvertreter bei der 
Losung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen?
Fragestellung- Welche Arten von Problemen werden an die jeweiligen 
Vertreter gerichtet? Von wem? Wie werden sie uberreicht-schriftlich, ?
mundlich, telefonisch, an wen leiten sie die Probleme, die nicht :
gelost werden konnen, weiter? Wie wird die Problemlosung durch diese j 
Vertreter organisiert? zB Zusammentreffen mit Betriehsratsmitgliedern,f 
Zusammentreffen mit Betriebsratsausschiissen? Welche Formen haben die f 
Lcsungen von ^r1'eitnehmerproblemen-miindliche Absprachen, schriftliche [ 
Notizen usw? Kommunikationsnetze zwischen den verschiedenen Vertreterni 
und dem Betriebsrat? i
d) Welche Formen hat die Losung der Arbeitnehmerprobleme im Betrieb?- 
Betriebsvereinbarungen- Anzahl, Themenbereiche, wie und warum zustande. 
gekommen? Wie angewandt in der Praxis?
Regelungsabreden-fhemenbereiche? Wie zustande gekommen-von wem abge- ; 
schlossen? Schriftlich? Wenn es zu unterschiedlichen Interpretationen j 
uber die Regelungsabreden kommt? 1
Betriebliche Ubungen-Beispiele? Wie zuskande kommen? Das AusmaB von 
solchen Regelungen. i;
Andere Regelungsformen, die im Betrieb beniitzt werden?- vertragliche [ 
Einheitsregelungen, Absprachen ohne gesetzliche Basis? Aktenvermerke. ;
J-
IWie entscheidet man iiber die Form der Losung? I
e) Wie oft kommt es vor, daB kein Ergebnis erzielt werden kann? Bei 
welchen Fragen? Warum? Was geschieht bei solchen Fallen? j
f) Wie oft kommt es zu folgenden KonfliktmaBnahmen im Betrieb?- absicht- j- 
liche Leistungsverringerung der Arbeitnehmer als Druckmittel, Dienst | 
nur nach Vorschrift, spontane Arbeitsniederlegung a) bei fsrifrunden I-
b) bei betriebllchen Fragen, auBerordentliche Betriebsversammlungen, |
produktionshemmende Gesprache, Betriebs- oder Ahteilungshesetzung, 
alle Arbeitnehmer nehmen gleichzeitig das individuelle Beschwerde- 
recht nach dem BetrVG wahr, der Betriebsrat weigert seine Zustimmung f 
zu Uberstunden/Mehrarbeit/Versetzungeno Andere vorgekommene MaB- |
nahmen?
Aus welchen Griinden kam es zu solchen MaBnahmen? Wie lange dauerten 
die MaBnahmen? Wie wurde die Problemlage letztenende gelost?
g) Die Politik des Managements zur Losung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen?
- gibt es bestimmte Probleme, die immer direkt an die Betriebsleitung ! 
zur Losung gewandt werden sollten? Welche? j
- Wie machen Sie die Unterscheidungen zwischen Problemen und Losungs- |
prozessen? Auf welcher Basis?-das BetrVG? andere Erwagungen?
- Welche sind Ihre Einstellungen zu der Losung von Arbeitnehmer­
problemen in diesem Betrieb?- je nach Schnelligkeit, ' guten Losungen’ ,[ 
der Vermeidung von Konflikten mit der Belegschaft und mit dem 3etrie-| 
bsrat? der Aufrechterhaltung des Funktionierens des Betriebs, dem 
Beit rag zum guten Betri@bskl.ima? j
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- ,1 as fiir Probleme gibt es mit den" Losungsprozessen im Betrieb? Wo 
sind sie verbesserungswiirdig?
- Wie sehen Sie die Rolle von Problemlosungsregeln im 3etrieb?
_ty - Es ist wichtig, sich an die Regeln zu halten, weil man sonst das
Vertrauensverh'iltnis zwischen Belegschaft und Management storen wird. 
jr - Die Regeln sind nur so lange zu halten, wie sie die Interessen des
Betriebs und des Managements dienen. Manchmal besteht die Berechti- 
gung, sie zu miBachten. 
are - Die Regeln sind zweitrangig. An erster Stelle steht das Vertrauens-
verhiiltnis zwischen Betriebsrat und Management. Regeln alleine ohne 
die Vertrauensbasis niitzen wenig. 
oible - Die Hauptsache ist, daB Probleme gelost werden durch die Methoden, 
die eine schnelle Losung am besten herbeifiihren konnen.
11. Die Beziehungen mit dem Betriebsrat
-Einschatzung der jetztigen Beziehungen- formal, auf das Gesetz aufge- 
baut, miBtrauisch, konfliktorisch, sozialpartnerschaftlich(nach dem 
BetrVG), gegenseitige Respektierung auf der Basis gegensatzlicher 
Interessen, Teamwork, andere Bezeichnung?
-Wie kbnnten die Beziehungen verbessert werden?
-Entwicklung der Beziehungen- Hauptereignisse, schwierige Zeiten?
-Einstellung des Betriebsrats zur Zusammenarbeit Ihrer Meinung nach? 
-Kooperationshereit-hereit, Probleme anzupacken und zu losen,aufge- 
schlossen fiir die Beriickslchtigung der Interessen des Managements, sein< 
Gesichtspiinkte , kompetent, vertrauenswiirdigkeit ,0f f enheit ,Wertretung 
der Interessen und Wiinsche der Belegschaft?
-Wie verlauft die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Betriebsrat in der Praxis?
-Welche Rolle spielen die Vertrauensleute im Betrieb Ihrer Meinung 
nach?
-Welche Vorteile erwarten Sie von der Zusammenarbeit mit dem Betriebsrat
12. Die Einstellung zum BetrVG
-Wie wurden Sie den EinfluB des BetrVG auf die Beziehungen im Betrieb 
bezeichnen?-Richtschnur fiir die Beziehungen zur Belegschaft, Mindest- 
maB an Zusammenarbeit, HochstmaB an Zusammenarbeit, nur wichtig, wo 
die Beziehungen sehr schlecht sind?
-Welche sind Ihrer Meinung nach die Vorteile und die Nachteile des 
Gesetzes-fuhrt das Idee von Interessengegensatzen in den Betrieb ein, 
Instrument der Gewerkschaften, in den Betrieb einzudringen, nicht 
realisierbar in der Praxis, zweideutig.
-Wo ist das Gesetz verbesserungswiirdig Ihrer Meinung nach?
-Bietet es die Grundlage fiir eine erfolgreiche Partnerschaft oder sind 
andere Faktoren wichtiger? Beispiele?- Person des Managements und des 
Betriebsrats, die wirtschaftliche Lage, die Informations-und Kommuni- 
kationspolitik des Managements?
Besteht Ihrer Meinung nach die Moglichkeit einer guten Zusammenarbeit 
hier im Betrieb ohne eines BetrVG.
-Wie schatzen Sie den EinfluB von gesetzlichen Regeln auf das Gebiet 
der Arbeitnehmer-Arbeitgeberbeziehungen ein? -Interesse in GroBbritan- 
nien fiir die Auswirkungen in der FRG- gute Beziehungen fordern, wo sie 
nicht gut sind, gute Beziehungen in schwierigen Zeiten fordern wie zB 
in der jetztigen wirtschaftlichen Lage.
-Wie. stehen Sie zum BetrVG als einem sozial-und wirtschaftspolitischen 
Programm?
13° Statistische Angaben
- Wie alt, wie lange schon im Betrieb, wie lange in jetztiger Position, 
vorherige T'itigkeiten, beruflichen AbschluB, gewerkschaftlich organis
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Fragen an die Belegschaftsmitglieder
Alle Belegschaftsmitglieder, an die sich diese Fragebogen richtet, sind 
gebeten, alle Fragen zu beantworten, indem Sie die jeweils zutreffende(n 
Antwort(en) in den Kastchen ankreuzen. Bitte beanfcworten Sie die Fragen 
von Ihrem Arbeitsbereich/von Ihrer Arbeitsgruppe aus.
1. Wenn folgende. Probleme auftreten an wen wenden Sie sich 
zuerst? (Bitte kreuzen Sie nur die ers.te Kontaktsperson an)
a) Lbhnprobleme dh. Einstufungsfragen, Lohnumgruppierungen usW-Vertrauensmann
-Vorarbeiter
-Meister
-Betriebsratsmitglied 
-Personalabteilung 
-andere. Vorgesetzte
vorgabe, Arbeitstempo. ,r , a 2------------ £—  -Vertrauensmann
-V orarbeiter
-Meister
-Betriebsrat smitglied
-Personalabteilung
-andere Vorgesetzte
d) Probleme mit den Maschinen oder Werkzeugen'oder Material
e)
-Vertrauensmann
-Vorarbeiter
-Meister
-Betriebsrat smitglied
-Personalabteilung 
-Einrichter 
-andere Vorgesetzte
Probleme wegen Uberstunden oder Schichtarbeit
-V ertrauensmann 
-V orarbeiter 
-Meister 
-Betriebsrat smitglied 
-Personalabteilung 
-andere Vorgesetzte
b) Probleme wegen der Arbeitsorganisation wie z.B.
Umgruppierungen (keine Lohnumgruppierung) ,Arbeitsverteilupig_
-Vertrauensmann
-Vorarbeiter
-Meister
-Betriebsratsmitglied 
-Personalabt e ilung 
-andere:. Vorgesetzte
c) Probleme mit dem Arbeitssollvorgabe ,Leistungss.ystemszeit
i'l
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f) Probleme wegen der Arbeitsbedingungen wie z.B. Larm, 
Scbmutz, Luft
g) Probleme liber die Arbeitssicherheit
h) Klagen iiber die sozialen Binrichtungen wie z.B„ 
die Kantine, die Waschraume, usw
i) Personliche Probleme
3) Probleme mit anderen Arbeitnehmern
-Vertrauensmann 
-Vorarbeiter 
-Meister 
-Betriebsratsmitglied 
-Personalabteilung 
-andere. Vorgesetzte
-Vertrauensmann
-Vorarbeiter
-Meister
-Betriebsratsmitglied 
-Personalabteilung 
-andere: Vorgesetzte.
-V ertrauensmann
-Vorarbeiter
-Meister
-Betriebsratsmitglied 
-Personalabteilung 
-andere Vorgesetzte .
-V ertrauensmann
-V orarbeiter £
-Meister 3
-Betriebsrat smitglied 4-
-Personalabteilung 5
-andere- Vorgesetzte . G
-V ertrauensmann 1
-Vorarbeiter Z
-Meister 3
-Betriebsratsmitglied 4-
-Personalabteilung -Sicherheitsbeauftrag
5
G
-andere Vorgesetzte ?
13□
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k) Probleme mit Ihren nachsten Vorgesetzten
-Vertrauensleute 
-anderen Vorarbeitern 
-anderen Meistern 
-Betriebsratsmitglied 
-Personalabteilung 
-andere- Vorgesetzte-
n  *
der Betriebsrat erklart 
sie das machen sollten
es den Arbeitnehmern, wie
- ich wende mich grundsatzlich an meinen Vertrauensmann
- ich wende mich grundsatzlich an mein Betriebsratsmitglied
- ich wende mich grundsatzlich an den Meister/Vorarbeiter
- ich bin frei, mich mit meinen Problemen an alle zu wenden
- ich weiB nicht, an wen ich mich mit Problemen wenden 
sollte
Warum wenden Sie sich an die Personen, die in Prage 1 genannt worden 
sind, zuerst?
- wegen des positiven Verhaltens meiner Vorgesetzten
- wegen des negativen Verhaltens meiner Vorgesetzten
- wegen des positiven Verhaltens der Vertrauensleute
- wegen des negativen Verhaltens der Vertrauensleute
- wegen des positiven Verhaltens der Betriebsratsmitglieder
~ wegen des negativen Verhaltens der Betriebsratsmitglieder
- wegen technischer Griinde, die mich an meinen Arbeitsplatz 
binden wie zB FlieBbandarbeit/Taktarbeit usw
- wegen der Arbeitsorganisation in meinem Bereich, zB Schicht- 
arbeit, GroBe oder Zerstreuung der Arbeitsgruppen usw
- weil mein Vertrauensmann schwer zu erreichen ist*
- Weil meine Vorgesetzten schwer zu erreichen sind.
- weil meine Interessen durch die obengenannten Personen am 
besten vertreten werden.
3. Woher wissen Sie, an wen Sie sich mit Ihren Problemen 
wenden sollten?
- aus der Arbeitsordnung
- aus anderen Richtlinien der Betriebsleitung
- mein Meister oder Vorarbeiter haben . mi'r erklart, 
wie ich das machen sollte
- meine Kollegen erklaren, wie ich das am besten mache
- die Vertrauensleute erklaren, wie ich das machen 
sollte
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4 » Wie vermitteln Sie Ihre Prohleme an die zustandigen 
Personen?
a) - schriftlich
- miindlich/personlich
- telefonisch
b) - ich vermittle die Prohleme selbst an die zustandige
Person
- ich gehe zu der zustandigen Person mit einem Kollegen 
zusammen
- ich gehe zu der zustandigen Person immer mit mehreren 
Kollegen zusammen
c) - ich warte bis zur Abteilungs- oder Betriebsversammlung
- ich gehe zur Sprechstunde des Betriebsrats
- ich warte his zur meinen Arbeitspause oder Schichtsende
ich gehe direkt zu der,zustandigen Person, sobald das 
Problem vorkommt
- ich spreche mit der zustandigen Person an meinem Arbeits­platz .
- mit dem Meister, wenn er seinen Rundgang macht
- mit dem Vertrauensmann an unserem Arbeitsplatz
- mit dem Vorarbeiter/Meister, der in der Nahe 
arbeitet
1
2.
3
iU
4 -2.□
140
. Wenn Ihr Problem gelost worden ist, wie wird die Losung 
an Sie vermittelt? (haufigste Formen der Vermittlung)
a/ schriftlich
- mundlich
b - durch den Meister oder den Vorarbeiter
- durch den Vertrauensmann
- durch den Betriebsrat/einzelne Betriebsratsmitglieder
- durch Managementvertreter wie zB0 Unterabteailungsleiter 
Abteilungsleiter, Betriebsleitung.
tv-3□
/+it-
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Wie hoch schatzen Sie die Unterstiitzung Ihrer Kollegen, 
wenn Sie ein Problem in dem Betrieb ' haben?
- die Unterstutzung ist sehr 
hoch
- die Unterstutzung ist hoch
- die Unterstutzung ist weder 
hoch noch niedrig
- die Unterstutzung ist niedrig
- die Unterstutzung ist sehr 
niedrig
es gibt keine Unterstutzung 
von den Arbeitskollegen
Sind Sie mit der Vertretung der Arbeitnehmerinteressen und der 
Losung der Arbeitnehmerprobleme durch den Betriebsrat.»
sehr zufrieden 
zufrieden
weder zufrieden noch unzu- 
frieden
unzufrieden
sehr unzufrieden
4
<
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8* Sind Sie mit der Vertretung der Arbeitnehmerinteressen 
durch die Vertrauensleute• .
- sehr zufrieden
- zufrieden
- weder zufrieden noch 
unzufrieden
- unzufrieden
- sehr unzufrieden
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9„ Wie oft haben Sie iiberhaupt Kontakte zu den folgenden 
Personen/Ausschussen im Betrieb? Bitte geben Sie an, 
ob die Kontakte sehr oft, oft, manchmal, selten, sehr 
selten oder nie stattfinden!(nicht zutreffend=keine Vertrauensl
a) Ihren Vorarbeitern
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
b) Ihren Ileister(n)
c) Ihren Vertrauensleuten
d) Ihren Betriebsratsmitgliedern
e) Ben Abteilungs/Unterabteilungsleitern
f) Der Betriebsleitung
-sehr oft 
—oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
-sehr oft 1
-oft 2
-manchmal j,
^-selten 4-
-sehr selten 5
- m e y
-sehr oft 'i
-oft z
-manchmal 3
-selten 4-
-sehr selten 5
-nie w
-nicht zutreffend
-sehr oft
-oft n
-manchmal 3
-selten 4-
-sehr selten 5- m e C*
eute)
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g) Dem Betriebsratsvorsitzenden/seinem Stell- 
vertreter
-sehr oft 
—oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
10. Werden Sie Ihrer Meinung nach ausreichend informiert 
uber die Losung der Arbeitnehmerprobleme, die auf 
Betriebsrats-Management-ebene stattfindet?
- Ja
- Nein
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ii*Wie konnte eine konsequentere Vertretung Arbeit­
nehmerprobleme und Interessen in diesem Betrieb 
sichergestellt werden Ihrer Meinung nach?
a
b
d
h
k
m
Lurch eine Erweiterung der Rechte des Betriebs­
rats im Betriebsverfassungsgesetz
Durch eine Erweiterung der Rolle der Vertrauens­
leute im Betrieb
Durch die verbesserte Ausbildung der Betriebs- 
rate
Durch die verbesserte Ausbildung der Vertrauens­
leute
Lurch eine groBere Einbindung des Betriebsrats 
in die Gewerkschaftspolitik
Durch eine groBere Einbindung des Vertrauens- 
korpers in die Gewerkschaftspolitik
Durch die Starkung der gewerkschaftlichen Organi­
sation des Betriebs
Durch eine groBere Bereitwilligkeit der Beleg­
schaf t, den Betriebsrat zu unterstiitzen
Lurch eine groBere Bereitwilligkeit der Beleg­
schaf t , die Vertrauensleute zu unterstiitzen
Durch eine kooperativere Einstellung des Manage­
ments, den Arbeitnehmervertretern und Arbeit­
nehmerinteressen gegeniiber
Durch eine kooperativere Einstellung des Betrieb- 
rats dem Management gegeniiber
Durch eine kooperativere Einstellung der Vertrauens­
leute dem Management gegeniiber
Durch eine verbesserte wirtschaftliche Lage des 
Betriebs
n ) Das jetztige Betriebsverfassungsgesetz reicbt fiir eine konsequente Vertretung von Arbeit­
nehmerinteressen in diesem Betrieb aus*
7
7-
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12. Wie schatzen Sie die Beziehungen zwischen den i - •
folgenden Personengruppen im Bereich ein, wo (nicht zutreffehd=
Sie arbeiten? Bitte geben Sie an, ob Sie die keine Vertrauensleute)
Beziehungen fiir sehr gut, gut, weder gut noch !
schlecht, schlecht oder sehr schlecht halten.
a) Der Belegschaft und den Meistern
- sehr gut
- gut
- weder gut noch schlecht
- schlecht
- sehr schlecht
b) Der Belegschaft und den Vertrauensleuten
- sehr gut
- gut
- weder gut noch schlecht
- schlecht
- sehr schlecht- nicht zutreffend
c) Der Belegschaft und den Betriebsratsmitgliedern
- sehr gut
- gut
- weder gut noch schlecht
- schlecht
- sehr schlecht
- Kontakte so selten-keine 
Schatzung mogliciu
”d) Der Belegschaft und'deri“Vorarbeiterh .- sehr gut
- gut
- weder gut noch schlecht
- schlecht
- sehr schlecht
Statistische Angaben
83* Wie alt sind Sie?
- unter 18
- 1 8 - 2 3
- 2 6 - 3 3
- 3 6 - 4 - 5
- 4 - 6 - 5 5
- 5 6 - 6 5
84-. Sind Sie?
- mannlich
- weiblich
J ahren
Q 4 2
„ Was ist Ihre gegenwartige 'Tatigkeit?
- Auszuhildender
- angelernter Arheiter
- Facharbeiter
- ungelernter Arbeiter
- technischer Angestellter
- freigestellter Vertrauens­
mann
- freigestelltes Betriebsrats- 
mitglied
- Facharbeiter mit angelernter 
Tatigkeit
- Ingenieur
16- Wie lange sind Sie schon im Betrieb beschaftigt?
- 0 - 5  Jahre
- 6-10  Jahre
- 11 -15 Jahre
- 16 -20 Jahre
- 21 -25 Jahre
- uber 25 Jahren
Sind Sie Gewerkschaftsmitglied? Bitte kreuzen Sie die zutreffende Antwort an.
- Ja,bei der.IG-Metall
- Ja,bei dem christlichen Metallarbeiter-- 
Verband
- Ja,bei der-DAG
- Ja, bei einer anderen Gewerkschaft. 
Welche?
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- Nein, ich bin kein Gewerkschaftsmit- 
glied. -• •
Haben Sie eine gewerkschaftliche Funktion inne? Wenn ja, 
welche(n)?
- Vertrauensmann
- Mitglied der Jugendvertretung
- Mitglied des Betriebsrats 
Arbeitnehmervertreter im Aufsichtsrat
- Mitglied eines ortlichen Ausschusses
- Mitglied der Ortsverwaltung
- Mitglied der Bezirkskommission
- Mitglie'd der Tarifkommission
19. Wie lange sind Sie schon Gewerksehaftsmitglied?
0 - 5 Jahre- 6 - 10 
-  11 -  15 
- 16 - 20 "
- 21 - 25
- mehr als 25 Jahre
Vi oi F>n . Dank_ffir Ihre JliknrhiiiJLL
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Fragen an die Meister
^ > „ Z
Alle Meister, an die sich dieser Fragebogen richtet, sind 
gebeten, alle Fragen zu beantworten, indem Sie die jeweils 
zutreffende(n) Antwort(en) in den Kastchen ankreuzen.
Bitte beantworten Sie die Fragen vom Ihrem Zustandigkeits- 
bereich als Meister aus.
1a ) Fragen zum Lohn/G-ebalt
i) Wie wird die Arbeit in Ihrem Zustandigkeitsbereich 
bewertet?
- analytische Arbeitsbewertung
- summarische Arbeitsbewertung
- eine andere Bewertung. Welche?
ii) Wie werden die Arbeitnehmer in Ihrem Zustandigkeits­
bereich entlohnt?
- Akkordlohn (einschlieftlich Stuck- und Zeitakkord)
- Zeitlohn
- Pramienlohn(doh.leistungskontrollierter Zeitlohn)
- andere Lohnform. Velche?
iii) Wie oft kommt es zu Fragen der Arbeitnehmer in Ihrem
Zustandigkeitsbereich uber das Akkordsystem? (z .B. iiber 
die Arbeitssollvorgabe, das Arbeitstempo)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
- nicht zutreffend-kein Akkordlohn besteht
iv) Wie oft kommt es zu Fragen der Arbeitnehmer iiber
das Pra.mienlohnsystem?(z .3. iiber die Leistungssystems- 
zeitvorgabe usw)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
- nicht zutreffend-kein Pramienlohnsystem
v) Wie oft kommt es zu lohnumgruppierungen in Ihrem 
Zustandigkeitsbereich?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
vi) Wie oft kommt es zu .Einstufungsfragen in Ihrem 
Zustandigkeitsbereich?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
J2li£sr.
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1B) Fragen zur Arbeitsorganisation
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i) 'Welche Aussage heschreiht am ehesten die Arbeits- 
platze in Ihrem Zustandigkeitsbereich?
- die Arbeitnehmer arbeiten allein und sind zu- 
standig fiir ihre eigene Arbeit
- die Arbeitnehmer arbeiten in einer Gruppe oder 
in einem Team von Arbeitnehmern
- die Arbeitnehmer arbeiten teilweise allein, teil- 
weise in Gruppen
ii) Wie oft kommt es zu Versetzungen in dem Bereich,
wo Sie arbeiten?(dh mit Lohnumgruppierung gebunden)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
iii) Wie oft kommt es zu Umgruppierungen in dem Bereich, 
wo Sie arbeiten?(dh. keine Lohnumgruppierung)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
iv) Kommt es zu Problemen in Ihrem Zustandigkeits­
bereich wegen der Abhangigkeit von Band- oder 
Taktarbeit?(zB Arbeitnehmerprobleme wegen des 
Arbeitstempos, der Vielfalt der Teile, des Arbeits- 
solls, des Gebundenseins am Arbeitsplatz)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
- nicht zutreffend- 
keine Akkordarbeit
v) Kommt es zu Arbeitnehmerprobleme in Ihrem Arbeits- 
bereich wegen der Verteilung der Arbeit?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
vi) Wie oft kommt es vor, daB groBe technische Ander- 
ungen in den Bereich eingefiihrt werden, wo Sie 
•arbeiten?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
vii) Kommt es zu Arbeitnehmerproblemen wegen dieser
groBen technischen Anderungen?(zB Versetzungen,Lohn™
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
-nicht zutreffend- 
keine groBen Anderungen
abstufung,Dequalifikation)
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viii) Wie oft kommt es Vor, daB kleine technische Ander­
ungen in Ihr Bereich eingefiihrt werden?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
ix) Kommt es zu Arbeitnehmerproblemen wegen dieser 
kleinen technischen Anderungen?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
- nicht zutreffend-keine 
kleine Anderungen
x) Wie oft kommt es zu Storungen bei der Arbeit in Ihrem 
Zustandigkeitsbereich wegen technischer oder organis- 
atorischer Probleme?(zB kaputte Maschinen/Werkzeuge, 
Mangeln an der Materialversorgung usw)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
xi) Wie oft kommt es zur Kritik/zu Problemen im Hinblick 
auf der Arbeitsqualitat in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
xii) Gibt es Arbeitnebmerprobleme in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich 
wegen der Arbeitsorganisation? (zB Wartezeiten, 
Schwierigkeiten bei der gemeinsamen Beniitzung von 
Werkzeugen usw)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
10) Fragen zur Arbeitszeit
i) Werden Gberstunden in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich gearbeitet?
- Ja, oft
- J a , manchmal
- Hein, nie
ii) Kommt es zu Fragen oder Problemen der Arbeitnehmer 
wegen uberstunden/Mehrarbeitszeit?
- oft
- manchmal 
nie
- nicht zutreffend- keine 
Jberstunden/Mehrarbeitszeit
iii) Wird in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich in Schicht gearbeiteff?
- Ja, in 4 ochichten
- Ja, in 3 ochichten
• - Ja, in 2 Schichten
- wir arbeiten Normalschicht
iv) Kommt es zu Arbeitnehmerproblemen in Ihrem Arbeits- 
bereich wegen Schichtarbeit?
- Ja, oft
- J a , manchmal.
- Mein,nie
- nicht zutreffend-keine 
Schichtarbeit •
1D) Fragen zu den Arbeitsbedingungen
i) Welche der folgenden Arbeitsbedingungen treffen auf 
Ihr Arbeitsbereich zu?
- Larm
- Scbmutz/Staub
- schlechte Luft
- schwere korperliche Arbeit der Arbeitnehmer
- schwere geistige Arbeit der Arbeitnehmer
- groBe Unfallgefahren
- keine der Bedingungen treffen zu
ii) Kommt es zu Arbeitnehmerbeschwernissen wegen der oben- 
genannten Arbeitsbedingungen?
- Ja, oft
- J a , manchmal
- Mein, nie
- nicht zutreffend-keine der obengenannten Bedingungen
"IS) Fragen zum Verlust des Arbeitsplatzes
i) Ist es in Ihrem Bereich zu JEntlassungen gekommen? 
(dh.Entlassungen aus wirtschaf tlichen G-riinden von 
mehreren Arbeitnehmern zur gleichen Zeit)
- Ja
- Nein
ii) Ist es zu Kiindigungen in Ihrem Bereich gekommen?
(dh» Kiindigungen vom Arbeitgeber ausgerufen wegen 
VerstoBe gegen die Arbeitsordnung)
- Ja, oft
- Ja, manchmal
- Nein, nie
iii) Ist es zu Kiindigungen gekommen, die von Arbeit­
nehmern ausgerufen worden sind?
- Ja, oft
- Ja, manchmal
- Nein, nie
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iv) Ist es wahrend der letzten 2 Jahre zur Kurzarbeit in 
Ihrem Arbeitsbereich gekommen?
- Ja, oft
- J a , manchmal
- Nein, nie
1F) Fragen zum sozialen Bereich
i) Kommt es in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich zu Problemen wegen 
der Verteilung der zeitlichen Verlegung des Urlaubs 
der Arbeitnehmer?
- Ja, oft
- J a , manchmal
- Nein, nie
ii) Kommt es zu Beschwernissen der Arbeitnehmer in Ihrem 
Arbeitsbereich wegen der sozialen Einrichtungen?
(z.B. Wasch-und Duschraume, Pausenraume, Kantine usw)
- Ja,
- Ja»
oft
manchmal
- Nein, nie
8G) Fragen zum Arbeitsklima
i) Wie schatzen Sie das Arbeitsklima unter den Arbeit- 
nehmern in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich?
- gut 4
- teilweise gut,teilweise2 
schlecht
- weder gut noch schlecht 3
- schlecht ^
ii) Wie schatzen Sie das Arbeitsklima zwischen den Arbeit- 
nehmern und ihren Vorgesetzten in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich?
- gut n
- teilweise gut, teilweise 
schlecht a.
- weder gut noch schlecht 3
- schlecht j,
2. Wenn Fragen oder Probleme zu den folgenden Themen vorkommen , 
treten sie meistens als Einzelprobleme(nur einen Arbeit­
nehmer betreffend) oder werden meistens mehrere Arbeit­
nehmer davon angesprochen?
i) Lohn/Gehalt z.B. Fragen iiber den Akkordsatz, die
Leistungsbeurteilung fiir Pramienlohn, Einstufungsfragen
- Einzelprobleme ^
- Gruppenprobleme ^
- teilweise Einzelprobleme, teilweise Gruppenprobleme 3
- solche Probleme kommen nie vor in meinem Arbeitsbereich ^
B. Umgruppierungen, Verteilungii) Arbeitsorganisation z 
der Arbeit usw
- Einzelprobleme
- Gruppenprobleme
- teilweise Gruppenprobleme,teilweise Einzelprobleme
- solche Probleme kommen nie vor
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iii) Arbeitszeit z.B. Mehrarbeit, Schichtarbeit
- Einzelprobleme
- Gruppenprobleme
- teilweise Einzelprobleme,teilweise Gruppenprobleme
- solche Probleme kommen nie vor
iv) Arbeitsbedingungen z.Bc Larm, Bchmutz, otaub usw
- Einzelprobleme
- Gruppenprobleme
- teilweise Einzelprobleme,teilweise Gruppenprobleme
- solche Prohleme kommen nie vor
v) Urlaub z.B„ die zeitliche Verlegung
- Einzelprobleme
- Gruppenprobleme
- teilweise Einzelprobleme,teilweise Gruppenprobleme
- solche Probleme kommen nie vor
vi) Probleme unter Arbeitnehmern
- Einzelprobleme
- Gruppenprobleme
- teilweise Einzelprobleme,teilweise Gruppenprobleme
- solche Prohleme kommen nie vor
vii) Probleme zwischen Arbeitnehmern und ihren Vorgesetzten
- Einzelprobleme
- Gruppenprobleme
- teilweise Einzelprobleme,teilweise Gruppenprobleme
- solche Prohleme kommen nie vor
3* Was fiir einen Prozentsatz Ihrer Zeit verbringen Sie.. 
- in Ihrem Biiro oder an Ihrem Schreibtisch
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0 - 20%
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beim Rundgang in der Werkstatt?
80 - 100%
bei Gesprachen mit Managementvertretern v
0 - 20% 
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60 - 80% 
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bei Gesprachen mit Betriebsratsmitgliedern
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4* Wieviele Zeit verbringen Sie taglich mit der Losung von 151 
Arb e i tnebme rp rob1emen?
- weniger'als eine halbe Stunae- eine halbe bis 1 Stunde
1 bis 2 Stunden
2 bis 3 Stunden
3 bis 4- Stunden 
iiber 4 Stunden
Bestehen Schwierigkeiten, die Ihre Kontakte zu der 
Belegschaft im Hinblick auf die Losung von Arbeitnehmer­
problemen erschweren? Bitte geben Sie an, welche 
Schwierigkeiten es gibtI
Arbeitsorganisatorische Schwierigkeiten wie z 
FlieBbandarbeit„
,B,
- Schichtarbeit
- Larm
- Betreuungsbereich zu groB
- Betreuungsbereich zu zerstreut
- Zeitmangel
- Rivalitaten zwischen Arbeitnehmern/ Arbeitnehmer- 
gruppen.
- das Verhalten der Vertrauensleute
- das Verhalten der Betriabsratsmitglieder
- die mangelhafte Arbeit der Vorarbeiter
- das Verhalten meiner Vorgesetzten
8) Welche Richtlinien fiir die Beilegung von Arbeitnehmer­
problemen sind in Ihrer Arbeit von Wichtigkeit?
- das Betriebsverfassungsgesetz
- Betriebsvereinbarungen, die auf Betriebsrats-/ 
Managementebene abgeschlossen worden sind
- Vereinbarungen oder Regelungsabreden, die auf 
Abteilungsebene abgeschlossen worden sind
- Regelungsabreden, die auf Werkstattsebene verein- 
bart werden
- die Manteltarifvertrage
- die Lohn- und Gehaltstarifvertrage
- andere Tarifvertrage
- die Arbeitsordnung
- die Arbeitsrichtlinien
7) Wie hoch ist der Prozentsatz von Arbeitnehmerproblemen, 
die in der Werkstatt vorkommen, die von Ihnen ohne 
Einschaltung hoherer Instanzen erfolgreich gelost 
werden konnen?
- o - 20% 1
- 21 - 40% X
- 41 - 60% 3
- 61 - 8 0% 4
- 81 - 90% 5
- iiber 90% 6
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8 . Woher wissen die Arbeitnehmer, an wen sie sich mit 
ihren Problemen wenden sollten?
i)
- von der Arbeitsordnung des Betriebs
- von anderen schriftlichen Richtlinien des 
Betriebs
ii)
- der Meister oder Vorarbeiter erklaren, wie 
sie das machen sollten
- ihre Kollegen erklaren, wie man das machen 
sollte
- die Vertrauensleute erklaren, wie man das 
machen sollte
- der Betriebsrat erklart es den Arbeitnehmern
- die Arbeitnehmer sind frei, sich an alle.zu 
wenden, wenn sie Probleme haben.
• 9» Wie werden Arbeitnehmerprobleme an Sie vermittelt?
( haufigste Methoden)
i) ~ durch den Arbeitnehmer(n), der das Problem hat.
- durch Gruppen von Arbeitnehmern
- durch die Vertrauensleute
- durch die Vorarbeiter
- durch den Betriebsrat/ Betriebsratsmitglieder
- durch meine Vorgesetzten
- durch die Personalabteilung
ii) - schriftlich
- miindlich
- per Telefon
iii) - in meinem Biiro oder an meinem Schreibtisch in 
der Werkstatt
- bei meinem Rundgang in dem Betrieb
- bei Treffen mit meinen Vorgesetzten
- bei Betriebs- oder Abteilungsversammlungen
80 . Welche Form haben Losungen von Arbeitnehmerproblemen 
auf Ihrer Ebene? (haufigste Formen)
i) - miindliche Brklarung einschlieSlich Telefon- 
gesprach
- schriftliche Erklarung
ii) - eine Absprache zwischen Meister und Betriebsrat
- eine Absprache zwischen Meister und seinem 
nachsten Vorgesetzten
- eine Absprache zwischen Meister und Personal­
abteilung oder Personalleiter
- eine Absprache zwischen Meister und Vertrauens- 
mann/ Vertrauensleuten
- eine Absprache zwischen Meister und Arbeitnehmer/ 
Arbeitnehmern
1
2
1
2
1
4-
5
j
'I
1
A
1
'I
1
Q
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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11. 'Nie oft haben Sie bei der Losung von Arbeitnehmerprob­
lemen Kontakte zu den folgenden Personen/
Ausschussen? Bitte geben Sie an, ob die Kontakte 
sehr oft, oft, manchmal, selten, sehr selten oder nie 
stattf inden! <<micht zutreffend=keine Vertrauensleute/Ausschusse im Betri 
a) - den Vertrauensleuten
pb)
b) - der Vertrauenskorperleitung
*
c) Ihren Vorarbeitern
a) einzelnen Betriebsratsmitgliedern-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
e ) - der Betriebsleitung -sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
f) den Betriebsratsausschussen
g)
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie 
*~nicht zutreffend
Ihren nachsten Vorgesetzten wie z.B. Unterab- 
teilungsleiter, .Abteilungsleiter usw
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
-sehr oft A
- oft 2.
-manchmal 3
-selten A
-sehr selten *5
-nie 4
-nicht zutreffend 1
-sehr oft 1
-oft 2
-manchmal I
-selten A
-sehr selten
-nie 4
-nicht zutreffend 1
-sehr oft 1
-oft I
-manchmal 3
•rselten <*-
-sehr selten <;
-nie 4
lot
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Wenn Arbeitnehmerprobleme zu“*cLen folgenden Fragenbereichen 
welche werden meistens schon auf Ihrer Ebenevorkommen 
gelost?
Akkordfragen zB Arbeitssollvorgabe, Arbeitstempo usw 
PramienberechnungenzB Leistungszeitvorgabe 
Einstufungsfragen
Versetzungen dh. Lohnumgruppierungen 
Umgruppierungen dh. ohne Lohnumgruppierung 
DisziplinarmaBnahmen zB bei VerstoBen gegen die 
Verteilung der Arbeit. Arbeitsordnung.
Arbeitsqualitat sfragen
Fragen iiber die technischen Einrichtungen- 
Maschinen, Werkzeuge, Material
Schichtsfragen
Uberstunden/Mehrarbe it sz eit
Arbeitsbedingungen-Larm, Schmutz, Luft usw
Arbeitssicherheitsfragen
Fragen zur zeitlichen Verlegung der Urlaubszeit
Fragen iiber soziale Einrichtungen-Waschraume usw
\Persdnllche Arbeitnehmerprobleme
Streitigkeiten zwischen Arbeitnehmern
Streitigkeiten zwischen Arbeitnehmergruppen
Streitigkeiten zwischen Arbeitnehmern und ihren 
Vorgesetzten
An wen werden Arbeitnehmerprobleme, die nicht auf Ihrer 
Ebene losbar sind, weitergeleitet?
-an die Unterabteilungsleiter 
-an die Abteilungsleiter 
-an Betriebsratsmitglieder 
-an die Personalabteilung 
-an Betriebsratsausschusse 
-an die Betriebsleitung
•am den Betriebsratsvorsitz- 
enden.
14-. Sind Sie iiber den weiteren Verlauf des Losungsprozesses 
auf hoheren Ebenen und die Ergebnisse 9 0 0 0
-sehr gut informiert 
-ausreichend informiert 
-selten informiert 
-nie informiert
15. Kommt es vor, daB Arbeitnehmer sich direkt an den 
Betriebsrat oder Ihre Vorgesetzten richten^ohne 
ihre Probleme zuerst mit Ihnen zu besprechen?
- Ja, sehr oft
- J a , manchmal
- nur sehr selten
- Nein, nie
- pi .R n i o.h t
;fcS
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16. Sind. Sie mit dem AusmaS Ihrer Entscheidungskom-
petenzen im Hinblick auf die Losung von Arbeitnehmer­
problemen ,die in Ihrem Bereich vorkommen, ..«,<>
- sehr zufrieden
- zufrieden
- weder zufrieden noch 
unzufrieden
- unzufrieden
- sehr unzufrieden
Statistische Angaben
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^7 * Wie alt sind Sie?
18. Sind Sie?
- 18 - 25
- 26 - 35
- 36 - 45
- 46 - 55
- 56 - 65
- mannlich 
-■ weiblich
“19. Welche Meisterausbildung haben Sie gemacht/machen Sie 
zur Zeit?
- Industriemeisterpriifung
- Handwerkmeisterpriifung
- werksinterne Meister- 
priifung
- eine andere Priifung.
20fl Wie lange sind Sie schon im Betrieb beschaftigt?
0 - 5 Jahre
- 6 - 1 0  Jahre
- 11 - 15 J ahre
- 16 - 20 Jahre
- 21 - 25 Jahre
- mehr als 25 Jahre
21 . Wie. lange sind Sie schon Meister?
0 - 5 Jahre
- 6 - 1 0  Jahre
- 11 - 15 Jahre
- 16 - 20 Jahre
- 21 - 25 Jahre
- mehr als 25 Jahre
2B« Sind Sie Gewerkschaftsmitglied? Wenn ja, bei 
welcher Gewerkschaft?
- IG-Metall 1
- DAG i
- christlicher Metall- 
arb e i t e rve rb and
- eine andere Gewerkschaft
3
4
- bin kein Mitglied 5
z
3
4
5 
4
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23 • Haben Sie eine gewerkschaftliche Funktion inne?
Wenn ja, welche?
- Vertrauensmann
- Arbeitnehmervertreter im Aufsichtsrat
- Betriebsratsmitglied
- Mitglied eines gewerkschaftlichen ortlichen 
Ausschusses
- Mitglied der Ortsverwaltung
~ Mitglied der Bezirkskommission
- Mitglied der Tarifkommission
- habe keine gewerkschaftliche Funktion inne.
24 „ Hatten Sie eine gewerkschaftliche Funktion inne,
bevor Sie Meister wurden? Wenn ja, welche?
- Vertrauensmann
- Arbeitnehmervertreter im Aufsichtsrat
- Betriebsratsmitglied
- Mitglied eines gewerkschaftlichen ortlichen 
Ausschusses
- Mitglied der Ortsverwaltung
- Mitglied der Bezirkskommission
- Mitglied der Tarifkommission
- habe nie eine gewerkschaftliche Funktion innegehabt
3
4
5
to
1
%
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Wieviele Vorarbeiter arbeiten in Ihrem Zustandigkeits- bereich?
- keine Vorarbeiter
- 1 - 3 Vorarbeiter
- 4 - 6 Vorarbeiter
- 7 -10 Vorarbeiter
- iiber 10 Vorarbeiter
Wieviele Vertrauensleute sind in Ihrem Zustandigkeits- 
bereich?
- keine Vertrauensleute
- 1 - 3 Vertrauensleute
- 4 - 6 Vertrauensleute
- 7 -10 Vertrauensleute
- iiber 10 Vertrauensleute
1
2
3
4
5
2
I
A
5
I4S
2? „ Fiir wieviele Arbeitnehmer'sind Sie Meister?
-  0 -  25
- 26 - 50
- 51 - 75
-  76 -  100
- iiber 100 Arbeitnehmer
jj± i
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Fragen an die Betriebsratsmitglieder
Alle Betriebsratsmitglieder, an die sich dieser Fragebogen richtet,sind 
gebeten, alle Fragen zu beantworten, indem Sie die jeweils zutreffende(n) 
Antwort(en) in den Kastchen ankreuzen. Bitte beantworten Sie die Fragen 
von Ihrem Zustandigkeitsbereich als Betriebsratsmitglied aus oder vom 
Betrieb. aus,wenn Sie an kein Bereich gebunden sind.
1* Was fiir einen Prozentsatz Ihrer Zeit verbringen Sie.*
-in Ihrer Abteilung? 0 - 20%
20 - 40%
40 - 60%
' 60 - 80%
SO - 100%
-bei Betriebsratsaus- 0 - 20%
schussen? 20 - 40%
40 - 60%
60 - 80%
80 - 100/°
-bei Betriebsrats- oder 0 - 20%
Vertrauensleutesitzungen? 20 - 40%
40 - 60%
60 - 80%
80 - 100%
-bei der Personalabteilung? 0 - 20%
20 - 40%
40 - 60%
60 - 80%
80 - 100%
bei WeiterbildungsmaBnahmen? 0 - 20%
20- 40%
40- 60%
60— 80%
80-100%
2. Welche Richtlinien fiir die Beilegung von Arbeitnehmer­
problemen sind in Ibrer Arbeit als Betriebsrat von 
Wichtigkeit? Bitte numerieren Sie die zutreffenden 
Richtlinien, so daB die Wichtigsten an erster Stelle 
sind* - Das Betriebsverfassungsgesetz
- Betriebsvereinbarungen und 
Vereinbarungen auf Konzernebene
- Vereinbarungen/Regelungsabreden 
auf Abteilungsebene
- die Arb.eitsordnung
- Manteltarifvertrage
- Lohn- und Gehaltstarifvertrage
- andere ilanagementricbtlinien
34) Gibt es bestimmte Vorgaben im Betrieb, die festlegen, wie Arbeitnehmerprobleme durch verschiedene 
Instanzen gelost werden sollten? z B  Arbeitsordnung,einen 
empfohlenen Beschwerdeweg. ja
Nein
WeiB nicht
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gibt,3B) Wenn es solche Vorgaben
bei ' der Losung Arbeitnehmerprobleme angewandt?
Ja
Nein
WeiB nicht
4 . Wie werden Arbeitnehmerprobleme an Sie vermittelt?
( haufigste Methoden )
IA)-durch den Arbeitnehmer/Arbeitnehmern, der/die betroffe 
ist/sind.
B)-durch die Vertrauensleute.
0)-durch die Meister oder Vorarbeiter.
D)-durch die Unterabteilungs- oder Abteilungsleiter.
E)-durch die Betriebsleitung.
F)-durch die Vertrauenskorperleitung.
G)-durch den Bertriebsratsvorsitzenden oder seinen 
Stellvertreter
H)-durch die Betriebsratsausschusse oder andere Betriebs­
ratsmitglieder
IIA)-schriftlich
B)-telefonisch
C)-miindlich / personlich 
IIIA)-im Buro in der Abteilung
B)-beim Rundgang in der Abteilung
C)-in Betriebsratssitzungen, im Betriebsratsbu.ro oder 
Sitzungen mit den Vertrauensleuten.
5. Bestehen Schwierigkeiten in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich, die 
eine erfolgreiche Losung Arbeitnehmerprobleme erschwe- 
ren? Bitte numerieren Sie .sie,so daB die groBte Schwier 
an erster .Stella .ist..
-arbeitsorganisatorische Probleme zB FlieBband- 
arbeit.
-Schichtarbeit
-Larm
-Betreuungsbereich zu groB 
-Betreuungsbereich zu zerstreut 
-Zeitmangel
-Rivalitaten zwischen Arbeitnehmern/ 
Arbeitnehmergruppen
-mangelhafte Arbeit der Vertrauensleute
-das Verhalten der Managementvertreter
-der Mangel an Interesse der Mitglied- 
schaft
-das Entlohnungssystem
-der Mangel an Unterstiitzung von dem 
Betriebsrat als Gremium - Es bestehen keine Schwierigkeiten
1
b I
j
1
i
3
1
L 1
i
1
1
1
ii
'I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Lgkeit
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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6. Wie hoch ist der Prozentsatz von Arbeitnehmerproblemen, 
die in Ihrer Abteilung vorkommen, die von Ihnen auf 
Abteilungsebene erfolgreich gelost werden konnen?
0
21
41
61
81
20 b 
40 b 
60/c
80b
100b
7. Welche Form hat die Losung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen auf 
Ihrer Ebene? ( haufigste Form )
A) -eine mundliche Erklarung
-ein Telefongesprach
-eine schriftliche Erklarung
8
B) -eine Absprache
Tt
leiter.
-eine .Absprache
-eine Absprache
*
zwischen Ihnen und dem Meister 
M " " dem Abteilungs-
zwischen Ihnen und der Personal-
abteilungo
zwischen Ihnen und dem Unterab-
teilungsleiter.
Wie lange dauert die Losung der meisten Arbeitnehmer­
probleme, die auf Ihrer Ebene gelost werden?
9. Sind Sie mit Ihren Entscheidungsbefugnissen im Hinblick auf die Losung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich,
-sehr zufrieden 
-zufrieden 
-unzufrieden 
-sehr unzufrieden
- weniger als 2 Stunden 1 ss
- 2 Stunden bis einen halben Tag -i SL
- einen halben Tag bis einen Tag
- 1 bis 3 Tage
'I 14
ss
- 3 Tage bis eine Woche
— 1 bis 2 Wochen
2 SFl
4 {,0
- 2 bis 4 Wochen 1 fcl
- iiber einen Monat 1 62
4?
4?
-So
Si
Si
5a
54-
*mehrere Antworten mbglich ab'er numerieren Sie bitte die 
Zeitspannen, so daB die gewohnlichste Zeitspanne fur die 
Losung Arbeitnehmerprobleme an erster Stelle ist.
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0.s Wie oft haben Sie Kontakte zu den folgenden Personen/
Ausschussen bei der Losung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen, die in 
Ihrem Arbeitsbereich vorkommen? Bitte geben Sie an, ob 
die Kontakte sehr oft, oft, manchmal, selten, sehr
selten oder nie stattfinden! (nic^t^zutg^ffend^keine Vertrauensleute/Aussc
a)-den Vertrauensleuten
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten
husse
-"111©*- nicht zutreffend
b)-der Vertrauenskorperleitung
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie*«■ nicht zutreffend
c)-den Belegschaftsmitgliedern
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
d)-den Meistern oder Vorarbeitern
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
e)-den Unterabteilungsleitern oder 
dem Abteilungsleiter
-sehr oft 
-oft
r-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie^
f)-den Betriebsratsausschussen
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten
fc-^nixht zutreffend
g)-der Personalabteilung/Personal- 
leiter -sehr oft
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
h)-der Betriebsleitung/Arbeitsdirektor
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
6 4
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i)-dem Betriebsrat als Gremium
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
j)-dem Betriehsratsvorsitzenden/ 
seinem Stellvertreter
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
11-. Bitte geben Sie an, welche der folgenden Prob'lem- 
bereiche auf Ihrer Ebene meistens gelost werdenl
a)Akkordfragen. zB Arbeitssollvorgabe, Arbeitstempo
b)Pramienberechnungen zB Leistungssystemzeitvor- 
gabe.
c)Versetzungen dh. Lohnumgruppierungen
d)Umgruppierungen dh. keine Lohnumgruppierung 
e ) Schichtsf ragen
f)0'ber stunden /Mehrarbeitszeit
g)Kurzarbeit
li) DisziplinmaBnahmen zB„ VerstoBe gegen die 
Arbeitsordnung
i ).Streitigkeiten Arbeitnehmer(n)-Vorgesetzten
0 )Arbeitsbedingungen-Larm, Schmutz usw 
k)3oziale Einrichtungen-Waschraume usw
1 )Urlaubs-fragen zB zeitliche Verlegung d.Urlaubs 
m .) Arbeitssicherheitsf ragen
n/Streitigkeiten zwischen Arbeitnehmern 
o ) M ,f Arheitnehmergruppen
12) An wen werden Arbeitnehmerprobleme, die nicht auf Ihrer 
Ebene losbar sind, weitergeleitet?-Personalabteilung/Personalleiter
-Betriebsratsausschusse
-Betriebsleitung
-Betriebsratsvorsitzenden, seinen 
Stellvertreter oder den Betriebsrat 
als Gremium
-V ertrauenskorperleitung
-andere Betriebsratsmitglieder
-andere Abteilungsleiter
13) Kommt es vor, daB Arbeitnehmerprobleme nicht an Sie 
vermittelt werden, sondern von unteren Ebenen (z.Be 
der Werkstatt ) direkt an obere Ebenen vermittelt 
werden (z.B. Betriebratsvorsitzenden, Personalab- 
teilung oder Betriebsleitung)?
-Ja, sehr oft
-Ja, manchmal
-Nein, nur sehr selten
-Nein, nie
-WeiB nicht
12
33
34.
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'14; wie Konnte eine Konsequenrere v enurebang
nehmerinteressen in diesem Betrieb sichergestellt 
werden Ihrer Meinung nach?
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15)
a)Durch eine Erweiterung der Rechte des Betriebsrats 
im Betriebsverfassungsgesetz
b)Durch eine Erweiterung der Rolle der Vertrauens­
leute im Betrieb*z„B. bei der Losung Von Arbeit­
nehmerproblemen.
c)Durch die verbesserte Ausbildung der Betriebs rats- 
mitglieder/ Vertrauensleute
d)Durch eine Erweiterung der Rechte der Arbeitnehmer­
vertreter unter dem Mitbestimmungsgesetz/Montanmit- 
bestimmungsgesetz.
e)Durch eine groBere Einbindung des Betriebsrats/ 
Vertrauenskorpers in die Gewerkschaftspolitik.
f)Durch eine *Starkung der gewerkschaftlichen 
Organisation des Betriebes
g)Durch eine groBere Bereitwilligkeit der Beleg­
schaft, den Betriebsrat zu unterstutzen
h)Durch eine kooperativere Einstellung des Manage­
ments den Arbeitnehmervertretern und Arbeitnehmer- 
interessen gegeniiber.
i) Das Betriebsverf assungsgesetz reicht fiir eine wirk- 
same Vertretung Arbeiterinteressen im Betrieb aus.
Wie heschreiben Sie die Rollenaufteilung zwischen den
a)Die Vertrauensleute befassen sich mit kleinen Prob- 
lemeh, der Betriebsrat mit groBeren Problemen.
b)Der Betriebsrat ist der Interessenvertreter der 
Arbeitnehmer, die Vertrauensleute befassen sich mit 
gewerkschaftsorganisatorischen Aufgaben.
c)Die Vertrauensleute sind frei, die Interessen der 
Belegschaft voll zu vertreten, da der Betriebsrat an 
Sozialpartnerschaft mit dem Management gebunden ist.
d)Die Vertrauensleute sind die gewerkschaftlichenVer- 
treter der Arbeitnehmer, der Betriebsrat der gesetz- 
liche. Vertreter.
e)Die Vertrauensleute sind eher Vermittler der Prohleme 
der Arbeitnehmer an den Betriebsrat, der diese Prob­
leme mit den Managementvertretern lost.
1^6) 1st es nach Ihrer Erfahrung in d'en letzten 5-Jahren zu 
einigen der folgenden MaBnahmen gekommen? Bitte geben 
Sie an, welche schon vorgekommen sind!
a) Leistungsverringerung
h) Dienst nach Vorschrift
c) Spontane Arbeitsniederlegung
d) Warnstreik wahrend der Tarifrunde
e) Keine Zustimmung zur Mehrarbeit/ 
uberstunden
auBero.rdentliche Betriebs- oder Abtei- 
lungsversammlung
Produktionshemmende Gesprache
Alle Arbeitnehmer nahmen gleichzeitig 
das Beschwerderecht nach dem Betriebs­
verf assungsgesetz wahr
Betriebs- oder Abteilungsbesetzung 
Keine der obengenannten MaBnahmen sind 
vorgekommen
f)
s)
h)
a
a)
1
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17 ) Aus welchen Griinden kam es zu dieserUj MaBnahme(n;?
a) Betriebliche Lohnfragen
b) Tarifrunde
c) Arbeitsbedingungen
d) Entlassungen
e) Das Verhalten der Managementvertreter
f) Die Verzogerung des Managements bei der 
Losung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen/bei Ver- 
handlungen mit dem Betriebsrat
g) BisziplinarmaBnahmen des Managements/ 
Kiindigungen
h) Politikdes Managements
i) Frage nicht zutreffend-keine MaBnahmen 
sind vorgekommen in diesem Betrieb.
18) Wie wurden diese Konflikte gelost?
a) Anrufung einer Einigungsstelle und 
EinigungsstellenbeschluB
b) Anrufung des Arbeitsgerichts 
G-erichtsentscheid
c) Mit der Hilfe auBerbetrieblicher Gewerk­
schaft s- und Verbandsvertreterd) KompromiBldsung durch erneute Verhandlun- gen aes Managements und Betriebsrats*
Statistische Angaben
19 ) Wie alt sind Sie?
20 ) Sind Sie?
18 - 25 
26 - 35 
36 - 45 
46 - 55 
56 - 65
-mannlich
-weiblich
21) Welche Tatigkeit ubten Sie aus, bevor Sie freigestellt 
wurden/ iiben Sie nocb aus?
-Pacharbeiter 
-angelernter Arbeiter 
-ungelernter Arbeiter 
-Ingenieur
-technischer Angestellter
-Pacharbeiter mit angelern­
ter Tatigkeit
-Meister 
im Betrieb beschaftigt?
- 0 - 5 Jahre
- 6 - 10 Jahre 
-11 - 15 Jahre 
-16 - 20 Jahre 
-21 - 25 Jahre 
-mehr als 25 Jahre
22)Vie lange sind Sie schon
1 6 3 1 \
1 i m
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23 <* ■ Wie lange sind Sie schon Betriebsrat?
-weniger als ein Jahr 
- 1 - 5  Jahre 
- 6 - 1 0  Jahre 
-11 - 15 Jahre 
-16 - 20 Jahre 
-21 - 25 Jahre 
-mehr als 25 Jahre
24 o Haben Sie andere Betriebsratsfunktionen inne? Welche?
-Betriebsratsvorsitzender oder stell- 
vertretender Vorsitzender
-Vorsitzender oder stellvertretender 
Vorsitzender eines Betriebsratsaus- 
schusses
-einfaches Mitglied eines Betriebs­
rats aus s chus s e s
-freigestelites Betriebsratsmitglied
25. Sind Sie Gewerkschaftsmitglied? Wenn ja, bei welcher 
Gewerkschaft?
-bin nicht gewerkschaftlich organi- 
siert
-Industriegewerkschaft Metall 
-christlicher Metallarbeiterverband 
-deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft
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2G o Wieviele Vertrauensleute sind in Ihrem Zustandigkeitsbereich?
- keine Vertrauensleute "
-  1
-21
-41
-61
-81
20 Vertrauensleute 
40 
60 
80 
100
iiber 100 Vertrauensleute
27° Wieviele Arbeitnehmer
_  0 -
-50 - 
- 100 -  
-150- 
- 200 -  
- 300-  
- 500-  
-iiber
sind in Ihrem Betreuungsbereich? 
 50 
100 
150 
200 
300 
500 
1000 
1000 Arbeitnehmer 
Ich danke Ihnen fiir Ihre geduldige Mitwirkung
1
1
1
1____
1
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Fragen an die Vertrauensleute
Alle Vertrauensleute, an die sich dieser Fragebogen richtet,
sind gebeten, alle Fragen zu beantworten, indem Sie die jeweils 5
zutreffende(n) Antwort(en) in den Kastchen ankreuzen. Bitte |“
beantworten Sie die Fragen von Ihrem Verantwortungsbereich als 
Vertrauensmann aus. —
1A) Fragen zum Lohn und zum Gehalt
i) Wie wird die Arbeit in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich 
bewertet?
- analytische Arbeitsbewertung
- summarische Arbeitsbewertung
- eine andere Bewertung. Welche?
ii) Wie werden die Arbeitnehmer in Ihrem Arbeits­
bereich entlohnt?
- Akkordlohn (einschlieBlich Stuck- und Zeitakkord)
- Zeitlohn
- Pramienlohn (d.h.leistungskontrollierter Zeitlohn)
- andere Lohnform. Welche?
iii) Wie oft kommt es zu Fragen der Arbeitnehmer in 
Ihrem Arbeitsbereich iiber das Akkordlohnsystem?
ZoB„ iiber die Arbeitssollvorgabe, das Arbeitstempo.
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
- nicht zutreffend,kein 
Akkordlohn besteht.
iv) Wie oft kommt es zu Fragen der Arbeitnehmer in 
Ihrem Arbeitsbereich iiber das Pramienlohnsystem? 
z.B. iiber die Leistungssystemszeitvorgabe usw.
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
- nicht zutreffend, 
kein Pramienlohnsystem
v) Wie oft kommt es zu Lohnumgruppierungen in Ihrem 
Arbeitsbereich?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
vi) die oft kommt es zu Einstufungsfragen in Ihrem 
Arbeitsbereich?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
lo
11
r i
166
1B) Fragen zur Arbeitsorganisation
i) Welche Aussage trifft am ehesten auf Ihren Arbeits- 
platz zu?
- ich arbeite allein und bin zustandig fiir meine 
eigene Arbeit*
- ich arbeite in einer G-ruppe/in einem learn von 
Arbeitnehmern
- ich arbeite teilweise allein, teilweise in einer 
Gruppe von Arbeitnehmern
ii) Wie oft kommt es zu Versetzungen in dem Bereich, wo 
Sie arbeiten?(d0h« eine Lohnumgruppierung kame 
damit in Frage)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
iii) Wie oft kommt es zu Umgruppierungen in dem Bereich, 
wo Sie arbeiten?(d«h» keine Lohnumgruppierung)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
iv) Komrat es zu Problemen in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich
wegen der Abhangigkeit von Band- oder Taktarbeit?
(z.B. wegen des Arbeitstempos, der Vielfalt der 
Teile, des Arbeitssolls, des Gebundenseins am 
Arbeitsplatz usw)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
- nicht zutreffend- 
keine Band/Taktarbeit
v) Kommt es zu Arbeitnehmerproblemen in Ihrem Arbeits­
bereich wegen der Verteilung der Arbeit?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
vi) ^ie oft kommt es vor, daB groBe technische Anderungen 
in den Bereich, wo Sie arbeiten, eingefuhrt werden?
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
vii) Kommt es zu Problemen fiir die Arbeitnehmer wegen
dieser groBen technischen Anderungen?(z0B«Versetzungen, 
Lohnabstufung usw)
- oft
- manchmal
- nie
- nicht zutreffend- 
keine groBen Anderungen
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viii) Wie oft kommt es vor, daB kleine, technische 
Anderungen eingefiihrt werden?
- oft 1
- manchmal z
- nie 3
ix) Kommt es zu Problemen fiir die Arbeitnehmer wegen 
dieser kleinen, technischen Anderungen?
- oft 1
- manchmal 2
- nie 3
- nicht zutreffend- 
keine solchen.Ander­ 4
ungen
x) Wie oft kommt es zu Storungen bei der Arbeit in Ihrem 
Arbeitsbereich wegen technischer oder organisatoris- 
cher Fehler?(z.B.kaputte Maschinen/Werkzeuge,MangeIn 
an der Materialversorgung usw)
- oft 1
- manchmal 1
- m e 3
xi) Wie oft kommt es zur Kritik/zu Problemen im Hin­
blick auf der Arbeitsqualitat in Ihrem Arbeits­
bereich?
- oft 1
- manchmal 1
- m e 3
xii) Kommt es zu Problemen unter den Arbeitnehmern in 
Ihrem Arbeitsbereich wegen der Organisation der 
Arbeit?(z.B.Wartezeiten, Schwierigkeiten bei der 
gemeinsamen Beniitzung von Werkzeugen usw)
- oft 1
- manchmal 2
- nie 3
1C) Fragen zur Arbeitszeit
i) Werden Uberstunden in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich gearbeitet?
- Ja, oft 1
- Ja, manchmal Z
- Hein, nie 3
ii) Kommt es zu Fragen der Arbeitnehmer wegen Uber- 
stunden/Mehrarbeitszeit?
- oft 1
- manchmal a
- nie 3
- nicht zutreffend- 
keine Uberstunden/ 
Mehrarbeitszeit
k
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iii) Wird in Ihrem Arheitsbereich in Schicht gearbeitet?
- Ja, in 4 Schichten
- Ja, in 3 Schichten
- Ja, in 2 Schichten
- wir arbeiten Normal- 
schicht
iv) Kommt es zu Problemen fiir die Arbeitnehmer in Ihrem 
Arbeitsbereich wegen der Schichtarbeit?
- Ja, oft
- Ja, manchmal
- Nein, nie
- nicht zutreffend- 
keine Schichtarbeit
1D) Fragen zu den Arbeitsbedingungen
i) Welche der folgenden Bedingungen treffen auf Ihr 
Arbeitsbereich zu?
ii) Kommt es zu Problemen fiir die Arbeitnehmer wegen der 
obengenannten Arbeitsbedingungen?
- Ja, oft
- Ja, manchmal
- Nein, nie
- nicht zutreffend
E) Fragen zum Verlust des Arbeitspiatzes
i) Ist es in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich zu Entlassungen gekommen? 
(d.h.Entlassungen aus wirtschaftlichen Grunden von 
mehreren Arbeitnehmern zur gleichen Zeit)
- Ja
- Nein
ii) Ist es zu Kiindigungen in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich gekommen? 
(d*h.Kiindigungen vom Arbeitgeber ausgerufen wegen Ver- 
stoBe gegen die Arbeitsordnung)
- Ja, oft
- Ja, manchmal
- Nein, nie 
die von Arbeitnehmerniii) Ist es zu Kiindigungen gekommen, 
ausgerufen worden sind?
- Ja, oft
- J a , manchmal
- Nein, nie
- Larm ?
1- Schmutz/Staub
- schlechte Luft )
- schwere korperliche Arbeit 1
- schwere geistige Arbeit(z„B. groBe Verantwortung usw) 1
- groBe Unfallgefahren 1
- keine Bedingungen treffen zu
21
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iv) Ist es wahrend der letzten 2 Jahren zur Kurzarbeit 
in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich gekommen?
- Ja, oft
- Ja, manchmal
- Nein, nie
F) Fragen zum sozialen Bereich
TjKommt es in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich zu Problemen wegen 
der Verteilung der zeitlichen Verlegung des Urlaubs 
der Arbeitnehmer?
- Ja, oft
- Ja, manchmal
- Nein, nie
ii) Kommt es zu Beschwernissen der Arbeitnehmer in Ihrem 
Arbeitsbereich wegen der sozialen Einrichtungen? 
zB Vasch- und Duschraume, Pausenraume, Kantine usw.
- Ja, oft
- J a , manchmal
- Nein, nie
8G-) Fragen zum Arbeitsklima
i) Vie schatzen Sie das Arbeitsklima unter den Arbeit­
nehmern in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich?
- gut
- teilweise gut, teilweise 
schlecht
- weder gut noch schlecht
- schlecht
ii) Wie schatzen Sie das Arbeitsklima zwischen den Arbeit­
nehmern und ihren Vorgesetzten in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich?
- gut
- teilweise 
schlecht
gut, teilweise
- weder gut noch schlecht
- schlecht
Gibt es irgendwelche Vereinbarungen uber die Rolle 
und Aufgaben der Vertrauensleute? Bitte kreuzen 
Sie das Zutreffendste!
a) Richtlinien der IG-Metall
b) Ortsstatut der gewerkschaftlichen Verwaltungs- 
stelle
c) Vereinharung zwischen Betriebsrat und Management
d) Vereinbarung zwischen Vertrauensleuten und 
Management
e) Es gibt keine Vereinharung
1
z
b
1
2
I
V
Ux>
□
4r4
U-S
. 170Mit welchen Aufgaben verbnngen Sie den groBten
Teil Ihrer Zeit als Vertrauensmann? Bitte nume- 
rieren Sie die Aufgaben von 1 bis 6 , so daB die
wichtigste Aufgabe an erster Stelle istI
a) Die Sohlichtung von Streitigkeiten zwischen 
Arbeitnehmern
b) Die Schlichtung von Streitigkeiten zwischen 
Arbeitnehmern und Vorgesetzten
c) Gewerkschaftliche Aufgaben wie Schriftenver- 
teilung, Mitgliederwerbung, Binkassierung von 
Beitragen
d) Vermittlung zwischen Arbeitnehmern und dem 
Betriebsrat (Informationstrager des Betriebsrats)
e) Die Unterstutzung des Betriebsrats bei seinen 
Verhandlungen mit dem Management z.B. durch die 
Organisation von Belegschaftsaktionen.
f) Die Betreuung d^r Arbeitnehmer hauptsachlich bei oersOnlichen Problemen.
4. Bestehen Schwierigkeiten in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich, 
die Ihre Tatigkeit als Vertrauensmann erschweren?
Bitte numerieren Sie sie, so daB die groBte-Schwierigkeit an
IL Tj a  ,__a; Arbeitsorganisatorische Schwierigkeiten wie z.B.
FlieBbandarbeit, die mich an meinen Arbeitsplatz i 
binden i I
b) Schichtarbeit
c) Larm
d) Betreuungsbereich zu groB
e) Betreuungsbereich zu zerstreut
f) Zeitmangel
g) Rivalitaten zwischen Arbeitnehmern/Arbeitnehmer- 
gruppen
h) Die mangelhafte Arbeit der Betriebsratsmitglieder
i) Das Verhalten der Vorarbeiter und Meister
j) Das Verhalten des Managements z.B. Abteilungs- 
und Unterabteilungsleiter, der Betriebsleitung
k) Der Mangel an Interesse der Mitgliedschaft 
1) Das Entlohnungssystem
m) Der Arbeitsdruck
n) Ich besitze zu wenig Fachkenntnisse, um mit 
den Problemen der Arbeitnehmer fertig zu 
werden
o) Probleme mit der gewerkschaftlichen Organisa­
tion der Arbeitnehmer wie z.B. zu niedrige 
Organisationszahl; Arbeitnehmer, die in anderen 
Gewerkschaften organisiert sind.
p) zu groBen Erwartungen der Mitgliedschaft
q) personliche Griinde
r) keine Schwierigkeiten bestehen
5o Wenn Probleme in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich vorkommen, an 
wen wenden sich die Arbeitnehmer zuerst?
- an ihren Vertrauensmann
- an den Vorarbeiter
- an den Meister
- an ihr Betriebsratsmitglied
- an die Personalabteilung
- an das Management wie z,B, Unterabteilungs/Abteilungs- 
Leiter, Betriebsleitung.
- an den Betriebsratsvorsitzenden
- an die Vertrauenskorperleitung
6 . Wieviele Zeit verbringen Sie taglich mit der Losung 
Arbeitnehmerprobleme? ( Im Durchschnitt)
- weniger als eine halbe 
Stunde
- eine halbe bis 1 Stunde
- 1 bis 2 Stunden
- 2 bis 3 Stunden
- 3 Dis 4 Stunden
- iiber 4 Stunden am lag
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7 . Wie werden Arbeitnehmerprobleme an Sie vermittelt? 
(haufigste Methoden)
a) - durch den Arbeitnehmer/die Arbeitnehmer, die
das Problem hat/ haben.
- durch den Vorarbeiter
- durch den Meister
- durch das Betriebsratsmitglied in'meiner Abteilung,
- durch die Vertrauenskorperleitung
- durch andere Vertrauensleute
- durch andere Managementvertreter
- durch die Betriehsratsausschusse
b) - an mich an meinem Arbeitsplatz
- in der Arbeitspause
- nach Schichtsende
- bei Vertrauensleutesitzungen/Vertrauenskorpersitzun
- bei Treffen mit Managementvertretern
- bei Sitzungen mit dem Betriebsrat zusammen
- bei Betriebs- oder Abteilungsversammlungen
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8 Wie oft haben Sie Kontakte zu den folgenden Personen/ 
Ausschussen bei der Losung v o n  Arbeitnehmerproblemen? 
Bitte geben Sie an, ob die Kontakte sehr oft, oft, 
manchmal, selten, sehr selten oder nie stattfinden.
a) Ihren Vorarbeitern
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
b) Ihren Meistern
c) Den nachst hoheren Vorgesetzten
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
d) Dem Betriebsratsmitglied in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
e)- Den Vertrauensleuten in Ihrer Abteilung
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie “
f)- Dem Vertrauenskorperleiter/der Vertrauenskorper- 
leitung
-sehr oft 
-oft
-manchmal 
-selten 
-sehr selten 
-nie
-nicht zutreffend
A Sind Sie mit dem AusmaB Ihrer Sntscheidungskompetenzen 
und Ihrer Rolle auf dem Gebiet der Losung von Arbeit­
nehmerprobleme ru o.
- sehr zufrieden?
- zufrieden?
- weder zufrieden noch unzu- 
frieden?
- unzufrieden?
- sehr unzufrieden?
-1
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80-Bitte geben Sie an, bei welchen der folgenden Fragen- 
bereiche Sie eine Rolle bei der Losung von vorkommen- 
den Arbeitnehmerproblemen in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich 
spielen.
a) Akkordfragen.zB Arbeitssollvorgabenfragen
b) Pramienberechnungen.zB Fragen der Leistungssystems- 
vorgabe usw
c ) Lohnumgruppierungsfragen
d) Umgruppierungsfragen in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich 
e; Einstufungsfragen
f) Fragen zur Arbeitsqualitat
Verteilung der Arbeit -Arbeitnehmerprobleme dazu 
Arbeitnehmerfragen zur Schichtarbeit 
Arbeitnehmerfragen zu Uberstunden/Mehrarbeitszeit 
Beschwernisse iiber Arbeitsbedingungen-zB Larm,Schmutz
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Fragen der zeitlichen Verlegung des Urlaubs der Arbeit­
nehmer
Beschwernisse iiber die sozialen Einrichtungen,zB Wasch- 
raume, Pausenraume, Kantine
Personliche Arbeitnehmerprobleme
Streitigkeiten zwischen Arbeitnehmern
Streitigkeiten zwischen Arbeitnehmern und Vorgesetzten
DisziplinarmaBnahmen,zB VerstoBe gegen die Arbeits- 
ordnung usw
12
Welche Formen haben die Losungen von Arbeitnehmer' 
problemen, bei denenSie eine Rolle spielen?
( haufigste Formen)
a) eine miindliche Erklarung einschl. Telefongesprach
b) eine schriftliche Erklarung
c) eine Absprache zwischen Ihnen und dem Meister
d) eine Absprache zwischen Ihnen und den Vorarbeitern
e) eine Absprache zwischen Ihnen und dem Arbeitnehmer/
den Arbeitnehmern
f) eine Absprache zwischen Ihnen und dem Betriebsrat 
und den zustandigen Managementvertretern
An wen bringen Sie Arbeitnehmerprobleme, die nicht auf 
Ihrer Ebene losbar sind?
- an die Betriebsleitung
- an das§ Betriehsratsmitglied in meiner Abteilung
- an Betriebsratsmitglieder, die fur andere Abteilunge 
zustandig sind
- an den Betriebsratsvorsi-tzenden oder seinen Stell­
vertreter
- an den Unterabteilungsleiter
- an den Abteilungsleiter
- an die Personalabteilung/den Personalleiter
- an die Vertrauenskorperleitung
II- an die Betriebsratsausschusse
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13- Sind Sie iiber den weiteren Verlauf des Losungsprozesses 
auf hoheren Ebenen und iiber die Ergebnisse.....
- sehr gut informiert?
- ausreichend informiert?
- selten informiert?
- nie informiert?
14. wie konnte eine konsequentere Vertretung .von Arbeitnehm 
interessen in diesem Betrieb sichergestellt werden 
Ihrer Meinung nach?
a) Durch eine Erweiterung der Sechte des Betriebsrats 
im Betriebsverfassungsgesetz
b) Durch eine Erweiterung der Rolle der Vertrauens­
leute im Betrieb., z .B. bei der Losung Arbeitnehmer­
probleme .
c) Durch.die verbesserte Ausbildung der Betriebsrats- mitgliederd) Durch die verbesserte Ausbildung der Vertrauens­
leute
e) Durch eine Erweiterung der Rechte der Arbeitnehmer- 
vertreter unter dem Mitbestimmungsgesetz/Montanmit- 
bestimmungsgesetz
f) Durch eine groBere Einbindung des Betriebsrats in 
die Gewerkschaftspolitik
g) Durch eine groBere Einbindung des Vertrauenskorpers 
in die Gewerkschaftspolitik
h) Durch die Starkung der gewerkschaftlichen Organisa­
tion des Betriebs
i) Durch eine groBere Bereitwilligkeit der Belegschaft, 
den Betriebsrat zu unterstiitzen
j) Durch eine groBere Bereitwilligkeit der Belegschaft, 
ihre Vertrauensleute zu unterstiitzen
k) Durch eine kooperativere Einstellung des Managements 
den Arbeitnehmervertretern und Arbeitnehmerinteressen 
gegeniiber
l) Durch eine kooperativere Einstellung des Betriebsrats 
und des Vertrauenskorpers dem Management gegeniiber
1 5 e Wie beschreiben Sie die Rollenaufteilung zwischen den 
Vertrauensleuten und den Betriebsraten im Hinblick 
auf die Losung von Arbeitnehmerproblemen hier im ...Betrieb'
a) Die Vertrauensleute befassen sich mit kleinen 
Problemen, die Betriebsrate mit groBeren Problemen
b) Der Betriebsrat ist der Interessenvertreter der 
Arbeitnehmer, die Vertrauensleute befassen sich 
mit gewerkschaftsorganisatorischen Aufgaben
c) Die Vertrauensleute sind frei, die Interessen der 
Belegschaft voll zu vertreten, da der Betriebsrat 
an Sozialpartnerschaft mit dem Management gebunden 
ist
d) Die Vertrauensleute sind die gewerkschaftlichen 
Vertreter der Arbeitnehmer, der Betriebsrat der 
gesetzliche. Vertreter
e) Die Vertrauensleute sind eher Vermittler der 
Probleme der Arbeitnehmer an den Betriebsrat, der 
diese Probleme mit den Managementvertretern lost.
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16. Ist es nach Ihrer Erfahrung in den letzten Jahren
zu einigen der folgenden MaBnahmen in Ihren Arbeits­
bereich gekommen? Bitte geben Sie an, welche schon 
vorgekommen sind!
a) Leistungsverringerung
b) Dienst nach Vorschrift
c) Spontane Arbeitsniederlegung
d) Warnstreik wahrend der Tarifrunde
e) Keine Zustimmung zur Mehrarbeit/tlberstunden
f) Demonstration/Protestkundgebung
g) AuBerordentliche Betriebs- oder Abteilungs- 
versammlung
h) Produktionshemmende Gesprache
i) Alle Arbeitnehmer nahmen gleichzeitig das Beschwerde- 
recht nach dem Betriebsverfassungsgesetz wahr
j) Betriebs-, Abteilungs-, Sektionshesetzung
k) Keine der obengenannten MaBnahmen sind vorgekommen.
'17. Aus welchen Griinden kam es zu dieser(n) MaBnahme(n)?
a) Betriehliche Lohnfragen
b) Tarifrunde
c) Arbeitsbedingungen
d) Entlassungen
e) Das Verhalten der Managementvertreter
f) Die Verzogerung des Managements bei der Losung 
Arbeitnehmerprobleme/bei Verhandlungen mit dem Betriebsrat
g) Disziplin,armaBnahmen des Managements
h) Die Politik des Managements
i) Erage nicht zutreffend-keine MaBnahmen sind vor­gekommen.
18.0 Wie hoch schatzen Sie die Solidaritat der Arbeit­
nehmer in Ihrem Arbeitsbereich......
a) Bei der Unterstiitzung ihrer Kollegen, wenn sie 
Prohleme in der Werkstatt haben?
- sehr hoch
- hoch
- weder hoch noch niedrig
- niedrig
- sehr niedrig
b) Bei der Unterstiitzung YCn Aktionen, die von der 
Gewerkschaft oder von dem Vertrauensleute- 
korper ausgerufen werden?
- sehr hoch
- hoch
- weder hoch noch niedrig
- niedrig
- sehr niedrig
'I
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Statistische Angaben 
19t. Wie alt sind Sie?
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20- Sind Sie?
- unter 18 Jahren 
- 1 8 - 2 5  
- 2 6 - 3 5  
- 3 6 - 4 5  
- 4 6 - 5 5  
- 5 6 - 6 5
- mannlich
- weiblich
21- Was ist Ihre gegenwartige Tatigkeit?
- Auszubildender
- angelernter Arbeiter
- Facharbeiter
- ungelernter Arbeiter
- technischer Angestellter
- freigestellter Vertrauens­
mann
- Facharbeiter mit angelern­
ter Tatigkeit
- Ingenieur
22.. Wie lange sind Sie schon im Betrieb beschaftigt?
- 0 - 5 Jahre
- 6 - 1 0  Jahre
-  11 -  15
-  16 -  20 "
-  21 -  25
- mehr als 25 Jahre
23 o . Wie lange sind Sie schon Vertrauensmann?
- weniger als ein Jahr
1 - 5 Jahre
-  6 -  10
-  11 -  15
-  16 -  20
-  21 -  25
- mehr als 25 Jahre
24 . Fiir wieviele Arbeitnehmer sind Sie der Vertrauensmann?
1
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0 - 10 1
- 11 - 20 z
- 21 - 30 3
- 31 - 40 V
- 41 - 50 5>
- 51 - 60 C?
- 61 - 70
- mehr als 70 Arbeitnehmer £
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